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POST-UDAYANA NYAYA REACTIONS TO DHARMAKIRTI'S VADANYAYA : AN EVALUATION

In the post-Udayana-Nyāya tradition[1] attempts were made to rebut Dharmakīrti's views concerning *Nigrahasthānas* as expressed in his *Vādanyāya*. Principally there are two such attempts, viz the *Anvīkṣānayatattvabodha*[2] of Vardhamāna and the *Nyāya-Sūtra-Vṛtti*[3] of Viśvanātha, representative of two trends reacting to Dharmakīrti. This paper* aims at understanding their arguments and evaluate their significance.

In the post-Udayana era of the *Nyāya*-school one comes across discussion of different issues concerning *Vāda* in general and *Nigrahasthānas* in particular in the three major works,[4] viz. the *Tārkika-rakṣā* of Varadarāja, the *Anvīkṣā* of Vardhamāna and the *Vṛtti* of Viśvanātha. Of them, for the reasons to be explained later, we shall concentrate here only on the last two. While dealing with them in their chronological order the first section of the present study deals with the contention of the *Anvīkṣā*. The second section considers the arguments of the *Vṛtti*. In both these section, we shall not only study their arguments against Dharmakīrti but also explain their philosophical stand-points. This will enable us to place them in their proper perspective, and assess and examine their importance in the last section.

As stated earlier, we shall not deal in this paper with the *Tārkika-rakṣā*. This is for the following two important reasons :

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1) Broadly speaking, post-Udayana *Nyāya* reactions to Dharmakīrti's *Vādanyāya* fall chronologically into two groups : (a) prior and (b) posterior to the advent of *Navya-Nyāya*.[5] Further, both these kinds of reactions fall into two major camps : (i) those which take the shape or form part of an independent treatise, as evidenced by Varadarāja's *Tārkika-rakṣā* or Vardhamāna's *Anvīkṣā*, or (ii) those which form part of an elaborate commentary written to explicate the contention of Gautama in his *Nyāya-Sūtras*. This trend is illustrated by Viśvanātha's *Vṛtti*. Being a post-Udayana reaction to Dharmakīrti we should have normally taken note of Varadarāja's contention in this paper. However, in contrast to Vardhamāna and Viśvanātha, Varadarāja seems more to fall in line with post-Dharmakīrti *Nyāya* reactions to *Vādanyāya* till Udayana in an important respect. In any of such reactions, no matter whether advanced in the form of an independent treatise like Jayanta Bhaṭṭa's *Nyāya-Mañjarī* or as a part of a full-scale commentary like Vācaspati's *Nyāya-Vārtika Tātparya-tīkā*[6] or Udayana's *Nyāya-Vārtika-Tātparyaṭīkā Pariśuddhi*[7], a prolonged attempt seems to be made to elaborate and defend the views either of Vātsyāyana or Uddyotakara as the chief, if not the sole, exponent of Gautama, and dispose of Dharmakīrti's views concerning *Nigrahasthānas* on the ground that they do not merit any serious attention. This sort of an almost dogmatic refusal to take cognisance of Dharmakīrti's views on the theme is also evidenced by Varadarāja's *Tārkika-rakṣā* and in consequence it falls more in line with *Nyāya* reactions to Dharmakīrti till Udayana, although it is written in the post-Udayana era of the *Nyāya* tradition. Therefore, it does not seem to merit an independent treatment.

2) In some of the post-Udayana reactions to Dharmakīrti, on the contrary, no matter whether in the form of an indepen-

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dent treatise or part of an elaborate commentary, one notices a differential trend in so far as they concentrate upon such issues as the following and proceed to consider their importance in the changed intellectual atmosphere that came in vogue with the advent of *Navya-Nyāya*[8] :

a) What should be an appropriate definition of *Nigrahasthāna/s ?*

b) In which context should *Nigrahasthānas* be taken a serious note of ? and

c) What should be basis of their classification ?

On this count, too, Varadarāja's *Tārkika-rakṣā* does not seem to merit any serious separate treatment not only because it was written prior to the advent of *Navya-Nyāya* but also because it is almost silent about the above-mentioned issues. Vardhamāna's *Anvīkṣā* as well as Viśvanātha's *Vṛtti,* on the contrary, though written posterior to Gaṅgeśa's *Tattvacintāmaṇī*, the pioneering work of *Navya Nyāya,* are alive to these problems. Yet, they seem to deal with them following divergent, though not exactly opposite, tracks. Both the works, format wise, seem to be indebted to Udayana. The *Anvīkṣā* avowedly follows the route of Udayana's *Nyāya-Pariśiṣṭa,*[9] whereas the *Vṛtti* is in accordance with the *Pariśuddhi.*[10] Of them, again, while the *Anvīkṣā* represents a thematic treatment of *Nigrahasthānas* in a commentary on the line of *Nyāya-Bhūṣaṇa,* the *Nyāya-Mañjarī* or the *Pariśiṣṭa,* wherein different themes, issues, problems, topics, concepts etc. from the *Nyāya*-tradition are discussed and the views of the adversaries are criticised, *Vṛtti* represents the trend of the literal-commentary to the *Nyāya Sūtras* on the pattern of the *Nyāya-Bhāṣya,*[11] the *Nyāya-Vārtika,*[12] the *Tātparya-ṭīkā,* the *Pariśuddhi* etc.,

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where the consideration is not merely to concentrate on a certain theme, but rather to explain each *Sūtra* of Gautama.

Although the time during which the *Anvīkṣā* and the *Vṛttī* were written the controversies between the Buddhists and the Naiyāyikas were not as live and strong as they were till the time of Udayana, yet the impact exerted by them on the intellectual atmosphere had not died down completely. Moreover, philosophical debates between adherents of different philosophical trends continued to be carried on. Hence, importance of the consideration of such *Padārthas* as *Vāda* acknowledged by the *Prācīna-Nyāya* had not disappeared completely. And yet in the then prevalent intellectual atmosphere their treatment was required to be refined in such a way that hitherto discovered points of weakness and vulnerability do not continue to infect it. Hence, attempts were made in the *Anvīkṣā* and the *Vṛtti* to refine and modify the tradition in such a way that the stronger points of the prevalent tradition could be highlighted and the reasons plausible according to *Nyāya* tradition of non-acceptance of Dharmakīrti's contention could be brought out. In order to carry out such an exercise more refined terminology of the *Navya-Nyāya* was taken help of wherever feasible. Nonetheless, it is also important to note that though the foundations of *Navya-Nyāya* were laid, the scheme of the *Seven Padārthas* accepted by it does not seem to have taken profound roots and in consequence the reduction of the *Sixteen Padārthas* of the *Prācīna-Nyāya*[13] to the *Seven Padārhas* of the *Navya-Nyāya*[14] was not attempted then as it came to be done much later at the hands of Nīlakaṇṭha, Dinakara, etc. It is in the juncture-period of the disappearance of the *Prācīna* and advent of the *Navya-Nyāya* tradition that both these works were written. Hence, one finds that the discussion of *Vāda-Padārthas* in general and *Nigrahasthānas* in particular is pursued therein

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within the framework of the *Sixteen Padārthas* of the *Prācīna-Nyāya* and yet their interpretation is attempted with the help of the technical language of the *Navya-Nyāya*, wherever feasible. Thus understood, both these works represent a new mode of defending the tradition of *Prācīna-Nyāya* in the Post-Udayana era of the *Nyāya*-tradition.

With this background we turn to the consideration of the arguments of the *Anvīkṣā* regarding the nature and status of *Nigrahasthānas*.

I

Anvīkṣānayatattvabodha : A Philosophical Study –

As pointed out earlier, *Anvīkṣā* is a thematic commentary on the fifth chapter of the *Nyāya-Sūtras*. It consists of two sections, viz. *Jāti* and *Nigrahasthāna/s*, dealing with the last two *Padārthas* accepted by *Prācīna-Nyāya*. In the present context we shall concentrate only on the second section of the *Anvīkṣā*, i.e., *Nigvahasthāna/s*.

Before we turn to analyse the arguments of the *Anvīkṣā*, an explanation about the intention behind its being written appears to be essential. For that would enable us to answer two important questions :

(a) Why Vardhamāna feels that refinement in the discussion of *Nigrahasthānas* is essential, and (b) granted that it is essential, how it is to be brought in while interpreting the *Nyāya-Sūtras*. The following reasons seem to have prompted the *Anvīkṣā* being written :

(i) Vardhamāna wrote the *Anvīkṣā* obviously to interpret the fifth chapter of the *Nyāya-Sūtras* in a modified way. Although he has respect for his predecessors like Vātsyāyana, Udayana,[15] etc. and makes use of the important points put forth by them, yet he also seems to be aware of the fact that it

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is not merely enough to defend the *Nyāya–Bhāṣya* against the *Nyāya–Vārtika* or conversely.[16] For, that will not bring in precision and clarity essential for rebutting the opponents like Dharmakīrti. Hence, use of the prevalent technical terminology of *Navya–Nyāya* is necessary for interpreting the *Nyāya–Sūtras*. Accordingly, he makes use of such terminology in his work wherever needed.

(ii) In the rebuttal of the contention of an opponent an almost dogmatic defence of the views of the predecessors is not enough. At times, it is equally essential and important to show their limitations. Knowing this, Vardhamāna seems to point out some of the inadequacies of his Nyāya predecessors while defining *Vāda, Kathā, Nigrahasthānas,* etc. He criticises their definitions to be more inclusive and vague, and hence pleads strongly for refinement in them. Of course, while doing this, according to him, enough care should be taken to ensure that the distinction between three kinds of determiners of *Vāda* etc., should not be ignored. They are :

a) direct determiners (*sākṣāt–niyāmaka*)

b) primary determiners (*pradhāna niyāmaka*) and

c) derivative determiners (*gauṇa–niyāmaka*).

The requisite precision and clarity should never be attempted to be brought in at the cost of ignoring such vital distinctions. This aspect lacking in the works of his predecessors is sought to be introduced with the help of the refined language of the *Navya–Nyāya*

Similarly, while modifying the prevalent interpretation of the *Nyāya–Sūtras* additional varieties of *Nigrahasthānas*, if any, should also be considered and incorporated, in the absence of which the discussion of them is likely to remain incomplete, and

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thus may jeopardise comprehensiveness of the consideration of *Nigrahasthānas*. Consequently, he seems to introduce certain newer species of them too.[17]

(iii) Lastly, and perhaps more importantly, since Dharmakīrti in his *Vādanyāya* criticises the *Nyāya* theory of *Nigrahasthānas* in general and Uddyotakara's in particular, if the *Nyāya-Sūtras* are to be interpreted, it is essential to react to Dharmakīrti's view. But while doing this countercriticism of Dharmakīrti's view should not be the only aim.[18] Rather, on careful closer scrutiny one is likely to notice that re-interpretation of the tradition is the primary objective of Vardhamāna's work. However, it also becomes clear that while on the one hand Dharmakīrti's philosophically important points are acknowledged tacitly, yet, on the other hand, an attempt is also made to criticise Dharmakīrti showing indirect redundancy of his theory, and thus bringing out non-dispensability of the contention of the *Nyāya*-tradition. That is why the *Nigrahasthānas* accepted by Dharmakīrti are still shown to be subsumable under those accepted by the *Nyāya*-tradition and in this way showing superiority and importance of the treatment of *Nigrahasthānas* at the hands of the *Nyāya* predecessors of Vardhamana seems to be the principal aim behind writing the *Anvīkṣā*.

With this, we wish to outline the theory of *Nigrahasthānas* according to the *Anvīkṣā*. Here our task is two-fold : one, to capture the modifications Vardhamāna introduces while interpreting the *Nyāya-Sūtras* and mark his departure from his predecessors. And two, to comprehend his criticism of Dharmakīrti's theory of *Nigrahasthānas*. We shall deal with these points in the same order. For, unless one knows his theory, it is not possible to assess and evaluate his criticism of Dharmakīrti's view.

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Vardhamāna's Theory of Nigrahasthānas

Vardhamāna seems to hold that *Nigrahasthānas* should be considered within the context of *Kathā* in general and *Vāda* in particular. For, the former is the generic (primary) (*pradhāna-niyāmaka*) determiner of it whereas the latter is the direct determiner (*sākṣāt-niyāmaka*) of it. Further, by *Vāda* he seems to mean both *Vijigīṣu-vāda* and *Tattvabubhutsu-vāda* as well,, and *Kathā* is constituted of four elements. viz.

i) *Vādi* who seeks to establish a thesis without giving rise to fallacies and guarding against blemishes (*Hetvābhāsa śaṅkā nirāsa* and *Kaṅtakoddhāra*).

ii) *Prativādi* who attempts to advance his own thesis (*Prativādi siddhānta sthāpanā*).

iii) To expose weaknesses in other's arguments together with attempting to establish one's own thesis (*Paroktadūṣaṇasahita svapakṣa sthāpanā*).

iv) Adjudication of success etc. (*Jayādī vyasthāpanam*).[19]

In the light of these constitutive conditions Vardhamāna defines *Kathā* as that in which while *Vādi* puts forth his thesis with the intention of establishing it, *Prativādi* proceeds showing faults in *Vādi's* arguments and attempts to establish his own contention instead.

This does not, however, mean that the traditionally laid down determiners of *Kathā* in general and *Vāda* in particular should be neglected. While formulating the definition of *Nigrahasthāna* they have a significant role to play. For, the determiners of *Vāda* are derivatively the determiners of *Nigrahasthānas*, i. e.,

i) The thesis put forth must be in accordance with the accepted *Pramāṇas* and appropriate *Tarka* (*Pramāṇa-tarka sādhanopālambha*).

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ii) The thesis sought to be established must not be inconsistent with the philosophical position of the school to which one subscribes (*Siddhāntāviruddha*), and that

iii) It should be sought to be advanced with the help of an argument with five constituents (*Pañcāvayavopapanna*).[20]

On the background of these three kinds of determiners acknowledged in the *Nyāya* tradition it is interesting to enquire into Vardhamāna's definition of *Nigrahasthāna/s.*

A *Nigrahasthāna,* according to him, is that (context) wherein one (arguer) fails to understand the reason prompting the discussion (*kathā-uddeśa*), the results and consequences of the discussion (*kathā-phala*), the motive of the discussion (*kathā-prayojana*), or the purpose of the discussion (*kathā-hetu*) on account of absence of an indicator of appropriate knowledge of any (one) of them (*Yathārtha jñāna viraha liṅgatvam*).[21]

On this background it is easy to understand his objections to his predecessors' theory of *Nigrahasthāna/s.* They are :

(1) According to Vardhamāna, predecessors' definition of *Nigrahasthāna* seems to be incorrect. For, *Nigrahasthāna* is not differentiated from *Chala, Jāti,* etc. and hence their definition of it is too inclusive (*Ativyāpta*). Rather, *Nigrahasthānas* like *Niranuyojyānuyoga,* etc. should be used for differentiating *Nigrahasthānas* from *Chala, Jāti,*[22] etc. Otherwise, the definition of *Nigrahasthāna* remains either *Avyāpta* or *Ativyāpta* Dūṣita.

(2) It is incorrect to understand *Nigrahasthāna/s* in terms of faults of arguments instrumental to the establishment of a thesis (*Sādhana-dūṣaṇa*) as Dharmakīrti does. For, when one indulges in a discussion/debate different arguments pertaining to variety of subjects are used. And one cannot be held to be defeated just because he has used variety of arguments, which

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apparently seem to be inconsistent It is, therefore, not the argument which is so much at fault but rather the person resorting to such arguments Hence, a person is defeated on account of his failure to recognise proper use of arguments.[23]

(3) One's failure to respond (*Ananubhāṣaṇa*) in itself does not constitute to be a *Nigrahasthāna* for it may be due to such contingent factor as the audience turning violent (*Sabhākṣobha*).[24] Hence, it is the reason behind one's not arguing further which should be taken into account rather than merely the fact that one does not argue further.

(4) To define *Nigrahasthāna* in terms of *Apratipatti* and or *Vipratipatti* too is incorrect. For, *Apratipatti* and/or *Vipratipatti* could at the most be used as classificatory clues rather than as defining marks. The definition of *Nigrahasthāna* should be free from defects of its being either too wide or too narrow.

Further, even *Apratipatti* and/or *Vipratipatti*, as marks classificatory of *Nigrahasthāna*, need to be understood in a refined way. It is the individual who is defeated[25], since the faults–*Apratipatti* and/or *Vipratipatti*–of comprehending the subject matter in an incorrect way lies with the individual. Thus understood, *Apratipatti* means lack of proper knowledge of the motive behind the discussion resulting in improper use of words in their proper context, while *Vipratipatti* means knowledge contradictory of it.[26]

Thus, *Nigrahasthānas*, broadly speaking, are of two kinds, viz. *Apratipatti* and *Vipratipatti*. And twenty-two kinds of *Nigrahasthānas*, discussed in the *Nyāya-Sūtras*, could be classified under these two heads. Such a classification of *Nigrahasthānas* could be shown to be mutually exclusive and jointly exhaustive. For, the *fundamentum divisionis* of them, mentioned above, could be shown to be an appropriate basis of their

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classification, especially since it revolves around the consideration of internal *(Prasajya-pratiṣedha)* and/or external negation *(Paryudāsa)*.[27]

(5) Unlike his *Nyāya*-predecessors Vardhamāna seems to hold that *Hetvābhāsas* are not only a kind of *Nigrahasthānas* but also that the latter arise due to the former. For *Hetvābhāsas* are indicative of defective *Hetus* on account of lack of proper comprehension on the part of the individual involved in the discussion and hence he is declared to be defeated. Going a step further, he also seems to hold that along with defective *Hetus* other *Sādhanābhāsas*, like *Paksābhāsas*, *Sādhyābhāsas*, *Dṛṣṭāntābhāsas* too lead to *Nigrahasthānas*. For, they too are related with defective *Hetu* and thus indicate failure of knowing the subject–matter properly on the part of the individual in whose arguments they figure. Thus, in the context of *Kathā*, *Hetvābhāsas are prima facie Nigrahasthānas* and directly fallacies of *Hetu*.[28]

Further, other varieties of *Hetu-doṣas*, viz. *Ātmāśraya*, *Anyonyāśraya*, *Cakraka*, etc. too should be added to the list of *Hetvābhāsas* primarily and *Nigrahasthānas* derivatively.[29]

(6) Consideration of different *Nigrahasthānas* at the hands of the *Nyāya* predecessors, according to Vardhamāna, is perhaps incomplete. Certain other sub-varieties should be added for bringing in greater comprehensiveness in their consideration. For instance, *Pratijñāhānī* and *Pratijñāsanyāsa*, etc. are of five kinds, whereas *Hetvantara* or *Arthāntara*, etc. are of four kinds.[30]

Having briefly taken account of Vardhamāna's theory of *Nigrahasthānas* and the rationale behind its refinement, it would be interesting to understand his criticism of Dharmakīrti, our main point of interest. It is to this that we now turn.

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Vardhamāna's Criticism of Dharmakīrti

Following are the grounds on which Dharmakīrti is criticised in the *Anvīkṣā* :

(a) Vardhamāna seems to bring out four kinds of incompleteness in Dharmakīrti's theory of *Nigrahasthānas* : (i) The basis of *Nigrahasthāna/s.* viz. *Asādha nāṅgavacana* and *Adoṣodbhāvana,*[31] provided in the *Vādanyāya,* is incorrect. For, instead of defining *Nigrahasthāna* it rather tells us what leads to it. On the contrary, in the *Anvīkṣā* an attempt is made to give both the genera and the differentia of *Nigrahasthāna* through its definition. Hence, Vardhamāna claims definitional superiority for the *Nyāya* treatment of *Nigrahasthānas.* (ii) Since neither differentia nor genera being provided through the definition of *Nigrahasthāna,* it becomes very difficult for Dharmakīrti to correlate different kinds of *Nigrahasthānas.* Thus, a unificatory principle not being provided, the treatment of *Nigrahasthānas* at his hands remains scattered and incoherent. On the country, in the *Anvīkṣā* an attempt is made not only to spell out the direct *(ɔākṣād),* primary *(Pradhāna)* and the derivative *(Gauṇa)* determiners *(Niyāmaka)* of *Nigrahasthānas,* but an appropriate relation between them also is ascertained. Hence, the theory of *Nigrahasthānas* put forth in the *Anvikṣā* is claimed to be more comprehensive as compared to that of *Vādanyāya.* (iii) The so-called definition of *Nigrahasthāna* given by Dharmakīrti does not take into consideration negation – internal or external – of comprehension, i.e., either lack of proper cognition *(yathārtha pratipatti abhāva)* or contradictory cognition *(viruddha pratipatti),* whereas Vardhamāna claims that his definition of *Nigrahasthāna* revolves around the notion of *Pratipatti*[32] and hence is held to be supplying a classificatory clue to it as well. (iv) The two kinds of *Nigrahasthānas,* viz. *Asādhanāṅgavacana* and *Adoṣodbhāvana,* given by

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Dharmakīrti, are neither mutually exclusive nor jointly exhaustive.[33] On the other hand, the kinds of *Nigrahasthāna* accepted by *Nyāya* not only fulfil this requirement but all the twenty-two *Nigrahasthānas* acknowledged by it remain properly classifiable under them. Thus considered, Dharmakīrti also seems to score poorly on the count of classification of *Nigrahasthānas.*

(b) Dharmakīrti's criticism of the *Nyāya* predecessors, like Uddyotakara, too, seems to be irrelevant and hence dispensable. For, he fails to show twenty-two *Nigrahasthānas* accepted by the *Nyāya* to be reducible to those accepted by him. On the top of it all, he himself admits that his consideration of *Nigrahasthānas* is incomplete[34] and hence for its comprehensiveness accepts some of the *Nigrahasthānas* like *Apratibhā*, given by the *Nyāya* tradition.[35] Moreover, *Nigrahasthānas* at the hands of Dharmakīrti are considered within the limited context of *Tattvanirṇīṣu-vāda* alone and hence seem to be inflexible. The *Nyāya* treatment of *Nigrahasthānas,* on the contrary, treating them in both the contexts, viz *Tattvabubhutsu–vāda* and *vijigīṣu-vāda,* i.e, the general framework of *Kathā*, appears to be more flexible and inclusive. Accordingly, Vardhamāna seems to hold it to be philosophically more valuable, precise and comprehensive in nature.

c) Moreover, Dharmakīrti seems to have failed to comprehend importance of such *Nigrathasthānas* as *Apratibhā*, which could have been used as a unificatory principle in his framework, and thus correlate the two *Nigrahasthānas,* viz. *Asādhanāṅgavacana* and *Adoṣodbhāvana,* acknowledged by him under one heading. Thus, the *Nyāya* perspective concerning *Nigrahasthānas* seems to be superior to that of Dharmakīrti.

Having discussed above Vardhamāna's objections to Dharmakīrti's treatment of *Nigrahasthānas* in the *Vādanyāya* and its

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rationale, we now turn to the consideration of the theme at the hands of Viśvanātha in his *Vṛtti*. This is our task in the next section.

II

The Vṛtti on Nigrahasthānas

On careful study one finds that by and large the interpretation of the *Nyāya-Sūtras* in the *Vṛtti* seems to be nothing else but a rationalization of the stand of the *Nyāya*-tradition along with circumvention of the limitations of the predecessors. Something of this kind is perhaps natural to happen especially because the living and creative opposition from the Buddhists camp had died down by that time. What remained to be considered was historical and intellectual relevance of *Nigrahasthānas* as they were discussed in the *Nyāya* tradition. As a result, one does not notice sharp opposition to the Buddhist contention on the theme in Viśvanātha's work. Rather, there seems to be an unconscious attempt to imbibe in the *Nyāya* tradition some of the points advanced by such Buddhist opponents as Dharmakīrti without mentioning his name. There is also an attempt at re-interpreting the thrust of the *Nyāya* tradition on the theme without giving up allegiance to it, although *Prācīna-Nyāya* had then ceased to be living trend within the fold of which the *Nyāya* - Buddhist Controversy concerning nature and status of *Nigrahasthānas* was carried on over couple of centuries.

As mentioned earlier, by the time the *Vṛtti* was written intra-school or inter-school philosophical controversies concerning the nature and status of debates had dried down. In fact even the tradition of *Prācīna-Nyāya* was not taken seriously by the adherents of the *Nyāya* school themselves as much as it once used to be taken. As a result, Viśvanātha's writing a commentary called *Vṛtti* on the *Nyāya-Sūtras* seems more a matter of

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academic and historical interest. And yet, while doing this sort of an exercise he has focussed attention on some of the important points in the light of which we wish to proceed :

(1) In the *Vṛtti* Viśvanātha clearly acknowledges some of the absurdities and dogmatic elements in the thoughts of the *Nyāya* predecessors. For, he states that a detailed discussion of such *Padārthas* as *Nigrahasthānas*, etc. can at the most serve the purpose of instructing novices and sophomores in the art of debating.[36] That is, the discussion of *Nigrahasthānas* can hardly be said to be philosophically illuminating. Secondly, the move on the part of Gautama to speak of *Hetvābhāsas* as the thirteenth independent *Padārtha* on the one hand and to subsume them under the sixteenth *Padārtha* called *Nigrahasthāna/s* on the other is too inscrutable to understand and make satisfactory sanse of.[37] The only reason, perhaps, to discuss them separately may be that while the *Padārthas* like *Jāti, Nigrahasthānas,* etc. have no significant role to play in one's epistemic enterprise, those like *Hetvābhāsas* necessarily have. Thus understood, Viśvanātha's writing a brief commentary on the first and second section of the fifth chapter of the *Nyāya–Sūtras* seems more a matter of an academic exercise indulged in order not to give an impression that he had totally ignored it. This may also be done, in so far as debates and discussions used actually to go on, to show that the theme of *Nigrahasthānas* disussed by the *Prācīna-Nyāya* has historical interest to serve and continues to be important from the point of history of ideas.

(2) In the *Nyāya*–tradition up to Udayana, interpreting the *Nyāya-Sūtras* two camps were seen—one following the *Bhāṣya* and another the *Vārtika*. And in Udayana, too, in his two works, viz the *Pariśiṣṭa* and the *Pariśuddhi*, an attempt is made to defend the significant points of one predecessor against those raised by another.[38] But in the *Vṛtti* it is seen for the first time

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that Viśvanātha not only acknowledges the faults of the predecessors but attempts also to give them up by bridging up the gaps by trying to bring the two warring camps [39] together. For, he clearly sees the fact that the divergence in the interpretation of the *Nyāya-Sūtras* generated by the *Bhāṣya* and the *Vārtika* facilitated the opponents like Dharmakīrti. He seems to be aware of the controversies between his predecessors of the system and the opponents, especially like the Buddhists. Hence, a due care seems to be taken while interpreting some of the varieties of *Nigrahasthānas*, like *Apārthakam* [40], *Aprāptakālam*, [41] *Paryanuyojyopekṣaṇam* [42], *Niranuyojyānuyoga* [43] etc. And, at times, one finds that Dharmakīrti's views are twisted in such a way that they could be fitted in the *Nyāya* framework easily for bringing in the homogeneity in the tradition. [44]

(3) Following the prevalent tradition, he states that there are three kinds of *Kathās*, viz, *Vāda, Jalpa* and *Vitaṇḍā*. [45] Taking into consideration the nature of means used and the objectives sought to be accomplished, *Kathā* should be defined. For, communicability–context is essential for each one of them. Hence, he defines *Kathā* as that which is carried out with the help of the rules of arguments and in which either establishment of truth or one's own victory or opponent's defeat are aimed at. [46] Thus, on the one hand, in his view, *Vāda, Jalpa* and *Vitaṇḍā* could be correlated and yet their distinction could be recognised on the other. Eventhough the use of an argument having five constituents (*Pañcāvayavī Anumāna*) is the minimum condition for each one of them, it is on the basis of the use of *Pramāṇa* and *Tarka* by *Pakṣa* and *Pratipakṣa* that they could be distinguished. [47] Further, since *Pañcāvayavī Anumāna* is the necessary condition of *Kathā* in general, the fallacies related to *Anumāna* too are applicable to all the three kinds of *Kathās*

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equally. Hence, *Hetvābhāsas* have an important role to play on the general level of *Kathā*.[48] Nonetheless, *Nigrahasthānas* alone could be located in *Vāda*, i.e., one variety of *Kathā*, and hence they too need to be considered separately. Thus, consideration of *Hetvābhāsas* on two levels – as an independent *Padārtha* and as a kind of *Nigrahasthāna* – seems to be in order.[49]

(4) According to the *Vṛtti*, following the prevalent tradition, there is a distinction between two kinds of *Vāda – Tattvabubhutsu–vāda* and *Vijigīṣu–vāda* – and use of *Chala, Jāti* and *Nigrahasthāna/s* is prohibited in the former but not in the latter. The use of them is permitted in *Vijigīṣu–vāda*,[50] since it is meant for training of the beginners and not helpful for the establishment of the truth. There is a marked difference between *Vāda* carried out between a teacher and pupil, between adherents of different schools aiming at the establishment of truth. Hence, *Nigrahasthānas* have an educative importance in teacher-pupil debates.[51]

(5) Lastly, *Nigrahasthāna* iadicates a defeat of the person in a debate and consists of either *Vipratipatti* and/or *Apratipatti*.[52] The basis of the consideration of *Nigrahasthāna/s* should not involve exigencies – like one's fainting and hence keeping mum *(Ananubhāṣaṇa)*, etc. but rather only of those cases where either opposing cognition or lack of cognition is the cause of it.

Thus, in the *Vṛtti* attempt is made to criticise Dharmakīrti and his followers sympathetically while re-interpreting the *Nyāya* tradition to bring out its historical relevance.

Uptil now we gave a sketch of the main contention of the *Anvīkṣā* and the *Vṛtti* regarding the nature and status of

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Nigrahasthāna/s in response to such opponents as Dharmakīrti. However, from a methodological point of view it is necessary to critically consider the points made by the defenders of the *Nyāya* tradition and assess their acceptability. This would enable us to see their philosophical significance and contribution they made to the furtherance of thought. It is to this that we turn in the next section.

III

Critical Evaluation

Turning to the critical evaluation of the responses of the representatives of the post-Udayana *Nyāya* adherents to the points raised by Dharmakīrti and his followers regarding the nature and status of *Nigrahasthānas*. In this sort of an attempt one finds that while there are some points of agreement between them, there is also an important divergence. First coming to the points of similarity on the basis of which both the *Anvīkṣā* and the *Vṛtti* criticise Dharmakīrti :

(1) Both Vardhamāna and Viśvanātha agree with their *Nyāya* predecessors on the view that *Kathā* is of three kinds, viz. *Vāda, Jalpa* and *Vitaṇḍā*, and *Nigrahasthānas* are to be located in the context of *Vāda* primarily. However, it is not denied that *Nigrahasthānas* could be considered along with *Chala, Jāti,* etc., too, in the context of *Kathā* in general. In other words, *Vāda* is of two kinds, viz. *Tattvabubhutsu-vāda* and *Vijigīṣu-vāda,* and *Chala, Jāti,* etc, are permissible in *Vijigīṣu-vāaa* if not in the *Tattvahubhutsu-vāda* as well. And *Nigrahasthānas* could be located in both the contexts. The only difference that lies is the treatment of *Nigrahasthāna* is such that while in the context of *Tattvabubhutsu-vāda* it is a positive hindrance, in the context of *Vijigīṣu-vāda* it is a boon in disguise. Again, in the latter context *Nigrahasthānas* are said more to be instrumental

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to the defeat of the adversary rather than one's own victory. Thus, contextually they have a differential role to play.

On the contrary, Dharmakīrti rightly insists that *Nigrahasthānas* have an important role to play only in the context of *Tattvanirṇīṣu-vāda*. i.e., *Vāda* proper. For, the other two varieties of *Kathā*, viz. *Jalpa* and *Vitaṇḍā*, or the other kind of *Vāda*, viz *Vijigīṣu-vāda*,[53] where defeat of the adversary is the sole aim and where resorting to methodologically foul means is freely permissible, is not philosophically worthwhile, especially since such a kind of *Vāda* does not aim at discovery of truth. Merely defeating somebody in a debate is not on important consideration,[54] and hence the other variety of *Vāda*, viz. *Vijigīṣu-vāda* or of *Kathtās*, viz: *Jalpa* and/or *Vitaṇḍā* are not worthy of seriously being entertained as a means of discovery of truth.[55] Moreover, if defeating an adversary somehow and anyhow is the solitary aim, independent of discovery of truth, then various kinds of *argumentum ad hominem*, physically assaulting somebody, pushing, pulling, etc. could also profitably be added to the list of acknowledged *Nigrahasthānas*.[56] Further, points of philosophical interest are never intended to be inquired into in this way. Instead of concentrating upon the nature and status of such debates and the factors which are beneficial or obstructive to them, it is futile to indulge into enlistment of number of *Kathās*, species of *Vāda* and varieties of *Nigrahasthānas*. For, nothing of this kind is methodologically rewarding and can hardly enable us to stipulate context-free determiners of *Nigrahasthānas*, and that of *Vāda* as well. Thus, Dharmakīrti seems to be right in holding that no philosophically interesting purpose would be served in the dual consideration of *Vāda* and the role of *Nigrahasthānas* in them.

(2) Secondly, for *Naiyāykas* in general and Vardhamāna or Viśvanātha in particular *Nigrahasthānas* means a point of defeat

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or a failure in argumentation. It may be because of the lack of appropriate knowledge (*Apratipatti*) or due to misunderstanding (*Vipratipatti*) of the persons involved in the debate. Thus, according to them, a *Nigrahasthāna* is envisaged to figure in a similar fashion both from the side of a *Vādin* or *Prativādin*. Further, it is said to revolve around victory or defeat in a debate. This, however, is a mistake on two counts : (i) As pointed out by Dharmakīrti, discovery of truth involves a twin exercise[57] – (a) establishment of viability of truth i.e., establishment of one's own position (*Svapakṣasthāpana*) and (b) unviability of untruth i.e, disestablishment of the position of the opponent. Just any one of them would not make up for both. (ii) The role of *Vādin* and *Prativādin* in the discovery of truth is not analogous but rather differential, and accordingly that which might occasion occurrence of a *Nigrahasthāna* legitimately from each side cannot be the same as *Nyāya* advocates imagine. For, a *Nigrahasthāna* would arise from each of their side according as they fail to perform their appropriate role. Thus considered, whereas what would constitute to be a *Nigrahasthāna* from one side is failure to spell out proper determiners of establishment of truth (*Asādhanāṅgavacana*), while from the other side failure to spot illegitimate determiners to be such (*Adoṣodbhāvana*).[58] Both of them may originate from ignorance or lack of intelligence (*Apratibhā*).[59] But to say that is too simplistic and hardly spells out differential responsibilities of *Vādin* and *Prativādin* in the discovery of truth.

(3) Thirdly, both Vardhamāna and Viśvanatha, in agreement with *Nyāya*-adherents, seem to be dogmatic and uncompromising on the following three counts, and accordingly their view seems to be alike questionable –

(a) They seem to insist, in conformity with the *Nyāya* tradition, that an *Anumāna* appropriated in any form of *Kathā* must

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necessarily be *Pañcāvayavī* and that this nature of it must be accepted by anybody irrespective of the school of philosophical thought to which he adhers [60] They also seem not to question Vātsyāyana's principal contention that conclusion of every argument must be jointly yielded by all the *Pramāṇas* which *Naiyāyikas* accept, especially because its premisses are held to correspond with the *Pramāṇas* accepted by them.[61] Secondly, they also seem to accept, in conformity with the view of the adherents of *Nyāya,* that while debate between a teacher and a pupil, or that between adherents of like-minded trends of thought could be conducive to the discovery of truth, such a debate between adherents of unlikeminded schools cannot be. Both these views, however, are untenable. The former because it seeks to dogmatically universalise the *Nyāya* view concerning *Anumāna,* while the latter because it simply rules out the possibility of adherents of unlikeminded schools of philosophical thought being seriously engaged in cooperative discovery of truth. For instance, debates between adherents of *Nyāya* and Buddhism and their contribution to furtherance of philosophical thought can hardly be ignored, however the *Nyāya* adherents may like dogmatically to disregard their significance.

(b) The dogmatic subscription to the view on the part of Vardhamāna and Viśvanātha, that debates/discussion are basically of three kinds, that these three kinds are on par with one another, and that *Nigrahasthānas* are envisaged to play a differential role depending on the purpose for which one engages oneself in a debate, too, likewise is questionable. For, while *Vāda* proper concentrates merely on establishment of one's own position, perhaps independently of the consideration whether it is shown to be so questionably or otherwise, *Jalpa* and *Vitaṇḍā* concentrates merely on defeating an adversary by any means – fair or foul. Each of them involves fallacy of omission,

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although of a different sort. *Vāda* seems to undermine the importance of dis-establishment of a counter knowledge-claim, while *Jalpa* and *Vitaṇḍā* seem merely to concentrate upon dis-establishment of a counter knowledge-claim, but caring nothing for the establishment of that knowledge claim which one intends to put forth. Each of these approaches, thus, amounts to mistaking part for the whole, – the task that appropriately lies in front of each party indulging in a philosophically interesting debate.

(c) Further, if *Nigrahasthānas* are those points in debate/discussion reaching which one forefeits one's right to continue to debate, then their exploitation cannot be permitted in one kind of debate and prohibited in another coherently, and at the same time both these kinds of *Vāda* cannot simultaneously be treated to be equally interesting varieties of a philosophically appropriate debate. The prolonged exercise of rationalization through which *Nyāya* adherents take the prospective readers of their respective treatises seems to smack the rat of dogmatism, rather than allowing unbiased and free intellectual air to circulate.

(4) Generically determining conditions like *Apratipatti, Vipratipatti* or *Apratibhā* cannot be uniquely and unequivocally connected with occurrence of *Nigrahasthānas*. For, conditions like failure to comprehend, ignorance. irresoluble differences of opinion, etc. are hindrances in any epistemic enterprise, and debates indulged into with the intention of discovery of truth are not the solitary exception to it. Hence, to seek to reduce any *Nigrahasthānas*, no matter whether accepted by *Nyāya* or Buddhist adherents, to *Apratipatti* or *Vipratipatti* as Uddyotakara seems to do or its dogmatic defence is irrelevant and methodologically indefensible. Dharmakīrti's *Asādhanāṅgavacana* and *Adoṣodbhāvana*, on the contrary, seem to be more appropriate *Nigrahasthānas* in the domain of philosophically interest-

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ing debates leading to discovery of truth, no matter whether they are indulged in intra–systematically or inter–systematically.

(5) Lastly, coming to the consideration of *Hetvābhāsas*, *Naiyāyikas* seem to consider *Hetvābhāsas* on two levels, viz., as an independent *Padārtha* and as a kind of *Nigrahasthāna*. The only difference in their treatment is seen according to the approach from which they are considered, – i.e. in the context of *vāda Nigrahasthānas* are primary, but since fallacies of *Hetu* (*Hetvābhāsas*) arise in arguments, which opens the possibility of *Vāda*–context, *Hetvābhāsas* too need to be considered. Thus, upto Udayana and under his influence upto Vardhamāna in in the *Nyāya* tradition *Hetvābhāsas* are subsumed under *Nigrahasthānas* particularly in the context of *Vāda*, while, on the other hand, they were treated to be an independent *Padārtha*. No one till Viśvanātha did even faintly suspect that there is a serious kind of double-think in this. Rather everybody kept on mixing between reverence (for Gautama) with truth (what should defensibly be the case). At the hands of Viśvanātha, for the first time in the entire *Nyāya* tradition, a serious question of methodological impropriety came to be raised in his *Vṛtti*.[62] But he too, unfortunately, did not stick to this point till the end, and in consequence seems to have failed in understanding the implications of it; otherwise he would not have blindfoldedly reiterated the tradition while explaining the nature of *Hetvābhāsa/s* as a kind of *Nigrahasthāna/s*.[63]

Dharmakīrti, on the contrary, seems to be succinctly clear in so far as he never allows the distinction between *Hetvābhāsa/s* and *Nigrahasthāna/s* to be undermined or subsumption of the former under the latter, especially because whereas the former has something basically to do with validity of an argument, the latter with the methodologically appropriate decision as to

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when does one forefeit one's right to continue to participate in a philosophically interesting debate. In other words, while the former revolves around the logical aspect of an argument, the latter with its rhetorical use in debate. The determiners of each of them are different, i.e. *Hetvābhāsas* arise due to the non-fulfilment of the condition of *Trairūpya*, viz. *Pakṣa Sattva*, *Sapakṣa Sattva* and *Asapakṣāsattva*,[64] whereas *Nigrahasthānas* arise due to either *Asādhanāngavacana* or *Adoṣobhāvana*. Hence, the attempts of both Vardhamāna and Viśvanātha not only of imbibing but of mixing between these two important considerations appear to be both misleading and indefensible.

Turning to the differential points brought forth by Vardhamāna and Viśvanātha. For fear of undue length of the essay we shall concentrate on one representative point from each of them. First turning to Vardhamāna. The point of appropriate definition and classification of *Nigrahasthānas* is pertinent as far as it goes. But in so far as it amounts to be a sophisticated rationalization of the view handed down by the *Nyāya*-tradition, it smacks more of dogmatic defence rather than unbiased acceptance of the views even of a philosophical adversory, in so far as they merit subscription to it. To say that what Dharmakīrti and his followers say does not deserve serious attention in so far as it is indefensible is one thing; to refuse to accept it, however reasonable, smacks the rat of dogmatism – and that too on the part of adherents of that school of philosophical thought which claims itself to be exclusive custodian and forerunner of any defensible methodologically appropriate consideration. This is something which is unfortunately deplorable and indefensible as well, being unconducive to genuine conceptual growth.

With reference to Viśvanātha too one does not notice unfortunately a differential trend. Consider for instance, the reason

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as to why Gautama might have dealt with the theme of *Nigrahasthānas* and the subsumption of *Hetvābhāsas* under *Nigrahasthānas*. He claims that this is more paedogogic and educative interest, serving the need more of novices and sophomores. But if this is so, is similar consideration at stake with reference to other *Padārthas* as well ? If not, why are topics which merit advanced treatment and those which are meant for the convenience of beginners treated on par in the same treatise ? Unfortunately, Viśvanātha or any other later *Nyāya* adheraent has no satisfactory answer. Thus, the so-called differential points raised both by Viśvanātha and Vardhamāna too unfortunately lapse into dogmatic and sterile retionalization and defence of the tradition.

We pointed out above the combined and distinctive shortcomings of the exercises carried out by Vardhamāna's *Anvīkṣā* and Viśvanātha's *Vṛtti* to respond to Dharmakīrti and his followers, and assessed their intellectual worth. Before we close we turn below briefly to outline the morals to be learnt from the point of view of the growth and development of philosophical ideas from such instances :

(a) Merely *prima facie* imbibing the view of a philosophical opponent without appropriate modification in one's own substantive position – even at the cost of incurring wrath of fellow adherents – or continued rationalization of the tradition is intellectually less rewarding as compared to undogmatic and open–minded acceptance of the views of a philosophical adversary. For, the latter is more conducive to intellectual growth than the former.

(b) Through dialogues, discussions and debates are important from the points of view of intellectual advancement it is too rigid to claim that any intellectual development worth the name

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is impossible to be brought out without such debates. For, although *Vāda-Sabhās* did contribute their mite to conceptual growth and clarification, it would be too idle to claim that with their stoppage such a phenomenon would automatically come to an end. Newer modes of dialogue and discussion continue to be devised rather than gathering under one roof at a specified time and indulging in prolonged debates.

(c) Establishment of truth is not a monopoly of the adherents of a particular school/system, nor does it depend upon age. Quest after truth is unending, although better and better modes of articulating various facets of truth would continue to surface and may perhaps outwit the hitherto accepted ones. No one can legitimately claim to have chanced upon any final and irrevocable truth, although quest after truth is interminable and discovery of better and better truth always possible, final truth being no one's exclusive property.

(d) Though the sixteen *Padārthas* accepted by the *Prācīna-Nyāya* came ultimately to be reduced to the seven *Padārthas* accepted by *Navya-Nyāya* the relative importance of such traditionally *Padārthas* as *Nigrahasthānas* etc. came to be missed in the process and their contribution to the conceptual growth and development came either to be sidetracked or ignored altogether.

One, however, interesred in studying and assessing the relative importance of such exercises from the point of view of intellectual growth cannot afford to be dogmatic or blind to the nuances which contributed to such a kind of development. In this essay we hoped to concentrate on such aspects and bring to surface their importance to the extent to which it deserves serious attention. Assessment as to what extent we have

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succeded in our task be better left to the judicious discretion of the competent and conscentious scholars.*

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NOTES

1. Those interested in the *Nyāya* reactions to Dharmakirti's *Vādanyāya* prior to Udayana or of Udayana as well, may please refer to my book *Vādanyāya : A Glimpse of the Nyāya–Buddhist Controversy*, Sri Sadguru Publications, New Delhi, 1988, Ch. VII, pp. 166–205.

2. Henceforth abbreviated as the *Anvīkṣā*.

3. Henceforth abbreviated as the *Vṛtti*.

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4. Even though in the *Navya-Nyāya* tradition the *Padārthas* like *Vāda* or *Nigrahasthānas* are considered in the works like *Dinakarī*, *Nīlakanthī*, etc. we are not going to consider them here. For, there they are dealt with from an altogether a different i. e. reductive perspective. To consider those works here, lies outside the scope of the present paper. We hope to return to the issue sometime later.

5. Advent of *Navya-Nyāya* is understood with Gangeśa's *Tattvacintāmaṇi* being written.

6. Henceforth abbreviated as the *Tātparya-ṭīkā*.

7. Henceforth abbreviated as the *Pariśuddhi*.

8. See *supra* note 5 on Gangeśa's *Tattvacintāmaṇi*. The various commentaries written on it also subscribe to *Navya-Nyāya*,

9. Henceforth abbreviated as the *Pariśiṣṭa*.

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10. Although Udayana considers the nature and status of *Nigrahasthānas* in his two different works, viz. the *Pariśuddhi* and the *Pariśiṣṭa*, it is clear from the number of references to *Pariśiṣṭa* occurring in the *Pariśuddhi*, that the latter is chronologically posterior to the former.

11. Henceforth the *Bhāṣya*.

12. Henceforth the *Vārtika*.

13. Pramāṇaprameya .... tattvajñānānniḥśreye yasādhigamaḥ / the *Nyāya-Sūtras*, I. i. 1 (p. 28).

14 *Dravya*, *Guṇa*, *Karma*, *Sāmānya*, *Viśeṣa*, *Samavāya* and *Abhāva*. For this see relevant sections of such works as *Tarkasangraha* and various commentaries on it or *Bhāṣāpariccheda* and various cummentaries on it. For reduction issue see *supra* note 4.

15. This could be seen from the second *Pariśiṣṭa* of the *Anvīkṣā*.

16. In the *Prācina-Nyāya*, works like *Tātparya-tikā* advocate the views of the *Bhāṣya*, whereas works like the *Pariśuddhi* defend the view of the *Vārtika* on the nature and status of *Nigrahasthānas*.

17. See *infra* note no. 30.

18. Just as Uddyotakara's *Vārtika* opens with this very contention that the aim of writing this treatise is to criticise opponents like Dinnāga, one at least *prima facie* does not see any such moto of *Anvīkṣa*, though if one reads it in between the lines this could be seen very well. Be that as it may.

9. Tadida ṁ caturvidham ... svoktisambhavaḥ / the *Anvīkṣā*, p. 103.

0. Pram āṇatarkasādhanopālaṁbhaḥ ... vādaḥ / the *Nyāya-Sūtras*, I. ii. 1. (p. 335).

21. ... Kathakoddśya ... nigrahasthānatvam / the *Anvīkṣā*, p. 77.

2. Yadyapi chalajātīyāni ... lakṣaṇārthamāhnikārthaḥ / *Ibid*, p. 76.

3. ... v ādipuruṣanigrāhakatvāt / .. puruṣaṁ nigrāhayati / *Ibid*, p. 78.

4. Navā sarvatra nigrahasthāne ... ca sambhavāt / *Ibid* p. 76.

5. Tasmādvākyamavākyaṁ vā puruṣaṁ nigrāhayati / *Ibid*, p. 78.

26. Athoddeśyakathāka ... vipratipattiḥ / *Ibid*, p. 76.

27. ... prasajyapratiṣedhaparyudāsāl hyē ṁ ... bhāvaḥ / p. 78 and also, ... Atra paryudāsanayā ... nigrāhyaḥ / p. 115.

28. Na caiva ṁ nigrahasthānāntarāṇāmapi ... niyamāt / *Ibid*, pp. 4-5 and also
Hetvābhāsāḥ ... sūtrārthaḥ / *Ibid*, p. 126.

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29. *Ibid*, pp. 126–27.
30. *Ibid*, pp. 78–88, 89–98.
31. Saugatā ... dvayornigrahasthānatvam / *Ibid*, p. 78.
32. Tarhi yathā apratipatti ... virodhaḥ / *Ibid*, p. 78.
33. *Ibid*, p. 78.
34. *Ibid*, p. 78.
35. *Ibid*, p. 78.
36. ... prakārabhedena pratipādanaṁ śiṣyabuddhi .... / the *Vrtti*, p. 57.
37. *Ibid*, pp. 57–58. Note also that Viśvanātha refuses to accept subsumption of *Hetvābhāsas* under *Nigrahasthānas* – see p 58 of the *Vṛtti*.
38. See for instance the *Nyāya-Pariśiṣta*, p. 94.
39. the *Vṛtti*, p. 57–58.
40. *Ibid*, p. 1179.
41. *Ibid*, pp. 1183–84.
42. *Ibid*, pp. 1195–96.
43. *Ibid*, p. 1198.
44. See commentary on the *Nigrahasthāna* called *Nyūnam* in the *Vṛtti*, p. 1185.
45. The *Vṛtti*. pp. 1101–02.
46. *Ibid*, p. 1159.
47. *Ibid*, pp, 331–34.
48. *Ibid* p. 1200.
49. *Ibid*, pp. 58, 1200.
50. *Ibid*, pp. 343–44.
51. *Ibid*, p. 57.
52. *Ibid*, pp. 1191–92.
53. Chalavyavahārd 'pi ... satāmācāraḥ / the *Vādanyāya*, p. 68.
54. *Ibid*, pp. 66–69.
55. See also Viśvanātha's *Vṛtti*, p. 1179.
56. Tattvarakṣaṇārthaṁ ... nakhacapetaśastra praḥārādipanādi ... tattvarakṣaṇopāyaḥ / the *Vādanyāya*, p. 69.
and ... anyattu na yuktamiti neṣ yate / p. 5.

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57. Tasmājjigiṣatā ... nirākartavyāḥ / *Ibid*, p. 71.

58. Asādhanāṅga ... neṣyate / *Ibid*, pp. 4–5.

59. ... tadabhyupagamya apratibbhyā ... vā / *Ibid*, p. 5.

60. See for instance their explanation respectively of the *Nigrahasthāna* called *Nyūna*.

61. Vātsyāyana; Agamaḥ pratijñā, heturanumānam, udāharaṇam pratyakṣam, upamānamupanayaḥ, sarvesām ekārtha samavāye sāmarthya pradarśanam nigamamiti / *Nyāpa Bhāṣya*, 4. i. 1.

62. The *Vṛtti*, pp. 57–59.

63. *Ibid*, p. 1200.

64. ... trirūpahetuvacanasamudāyaḥ ... / the *Vādanyāya*, p. 59.
or ... sādhanasya siddheryannāṅgam – asiddhah, viruddhaḥ. anaikāntiko vā hetvābhāsaḥ ... / p. 64.

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THE AVAILABILITY OF A MARXIAN CRITIQUE OF TECHNOLOGY

> "Nothing so corrupted the German labour movement as the belief that it was swimming with the current, a current it located in the dynamic of technological development".
>
> — *Walter Benjamin*

The paper* briefly looks into the prospects of a Marxian critique of Technology whose significance it seeks to locate in the context of the third world. In doing so it underscores Marx's idea of human nature and acknowledges the need for existentially grounding that idea in the colonial reality such that the Marxian critique of technology stands related to the colonial man's search for a counter-consciousness in his struggle against the cultural imperialism of the West.

Apart from this broad concern, the paper has an academic point to make in connection with the relation between philosophy of science and philosophy of technology. Our understanding of technology is always determined by our construal of scientific rationality for the simple reason that the content of technology is scientific rationality. Till recently the dominant view of scientific rationality has been positivistic. The construal of technology which may be called technicism looks upon technology as inherently progressive and precisely for that reason beyond all critique. The axiomatic status of our belief in the inherent progressiveness of technology and the dominance of

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positivistic construal of scientific rationality have nourished each other. It may be recalled that positivism in emerging as a conglomeration of the most influential answers to some time-honoured questions in philosophy of science re-shaped philosophy of science into a logical reconstruction of scientific knowledge. The process of retreat of positivism on the one hand and the metamorphosis of philosophy of science from logical reconstruction to existential deconstruction of scientific knowledge on the other, are two sides of the same coin. The development of a critique of technology and the development of an anti-positivistic construal of scientific rationality are continuous with one another. By implication if Marxism needs to develop an anti-positivist theory of science such an attempt must go hand-in-hand with an attempt to develop a critique of technology. Marxian philosophy of science will then acquire an identity and definiteness which it does not have to-day owing to its ambiguous position in a spectrum whose two ends are constituted by the Anglosaxon tradition that confines the task of philosophy of science to an explication of the aim and method of science and the continental tradition according to which philosophy of science must set for itself the grand task of a critique of science.

However, we can set the stage for the discussion of our central themes, viz., the prospects of a Marxian critique of technology by briefly responding to two basic questions :

a) Why philosophy of Technology ? and

b) Why Marxian philosophy of Technology ?

The relation of philosophy to technology can be traced to the very origins of philosophical thought. The pre-socratic philosophers aimed to reconstruct the world, at least partly, in the image of technological process involving combination,

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separation, steering, production, transformation of the raw stuff into finished products as well as decomposition into original elements. In Plato the technological metapher takes a fuller shape especially in *Timaeus* where he presents his cosmological theory on the basis of his theory of Forms. Out of matter, the formless receptacle, the world comes into being as a result of the realization of Forms – through the activity of demiourgos. As Wartafsky points out, "The demiourgos is plainly an engineer, and the world is an artifact created by this engineer by working up of raw material in accordance with mathematical ideas".[1] Similarly, "Aristotle's four elements, earth, water, air, fire clearly recognize the solid, liquid and gaseous states of matter and their changes by the intervention of energy. His elemental qualities had both origin and application in observation of properties of matter as they were exploited artisans".[2] The influence of craftsmen over the metaphysical ideas is even more palpable in the case of the eastern thinkers. This is especially so in the case of the chinese philosophers. To quote Cyril Stauley Smith, an eminent metallurgist who more than anyone else laboured to lay bare the philosophical and aesthetic dimensions of Metal technology, "Was not their fundamental yin–yang approach to difference and change a natural outgrowth of the inversions between model, mold and casting so beautifully exploited by the Chinese foundryman? Perhaps even his play with continuity and discontinuity in the arrays of relief and intaglio lines in the lei wen pattern, commonly used for space–filling on the surfaces of ceremonial bronzes, led to the invention of the hexagrams that form the potent permutations in the *Book of changes (I Ching)*"[3]

Until the rise of modern science and modern philosophy, the role of technology in philosophising confined itself to providing suggestive analogies in the form of teaching or learning aid s.

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With the mechanisation of the world–picture the role of technology underwent a radical transformation. The central technological entity, the machine, became constitutive of our construal of Natural World such that the world was cast in the image of machine, and like machine, it is taken to be constructed in mathematical terms which provide it a deductive structure and thus, like machine, it became 'reconstructible'. The role of machine–image was further extended to the realm of social relations which, because they were reduced by industrial civilization to the relations of abstract and quantitative exchange of commodities, were sought to be explained in mechanistic terms. The mechanistic image, then, enters as a further natural extention, the realm of the human individual. Two related processes that obtain at this stage are of special importance. With the coming of the computer for the first time in history man is being considered to be an extention of machine whereas till now machine was considered to be an extention of human ability. This is evident from the very idiom that is used in the description of 'the mental'. Secondly, and consequently, those processes that were identified till now with human choice are pushed into the domain of automatic control mechanism The evolution of technology must be construed in terms of the changing roles of machine as suggestive analogy, cognitive archetype and surrogate for human choice. The last phase brings out in a particularly vivid manner the progressive appropriation of our cognition by machine. It is this phenomenon which has provided philosophy of technology an intellectual significance and urgency not possessed by any other philosophical sub-discipline.

Some brief remarks on the question 'why a Marxian philosophy of technology?' are in order. In its struggle against imperialism the third world confronts modern technology as the most powerful bulwark of imperialism both in terms of power

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and exoticism. Here also, we find, as elsewhere, an attempt to develop a counter-consciousness in terms of an indigenous reflection over relevent technology. But such an indigenous reflection, by the very fact of its being 'reflection' can not be content with relativism. For reflection by its very logic involves global concepts. The search for indispensible global concepts compels the colonial man to look at the available global theories which are supposed to be the repositories of the required concepts. But he finds only Marxism to be promising since other global theories are most conspicuously eurocentric and manufactured for the sole purpose of justifying imperialism. If we don't grant this credit to Marxism we can not explain the appeal of Marxism felt by those who are fighting imperialism in political, economic and cultural domains. Since modern technology has been proved to be the most powerful means of subjugating the third world and since Marxism has at least the initial plausibility in providing the indispensable global dimension to the indigenous reflection that would lead to a liberating praxis, a Marixian philosophy of technology in the form of a critique of technology has a seminal significance for the third world.

But this hope is belied by the failure of the Marixist tradition in providing a critique of technology. Though the word 'technology' never fails to figure whenever Marxism is called upon to state its first principles, technology itself is never deemed to be an object of critique. Unlike religion, law, economics etc., technology is placed beyond the pale of critique. As Monika Reinfelder so aptly puts it, "just as political economy exhausted itself with the insight that the content of the value-form is labour, so Marxism exhausts itself with the view that the content of technology is 'scientific rationality'. Thus, one can say of Marxism's perspective on technology what Marx

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said of political economy's perspective on value : namely, that "it has never once asked the question why this content has assumed that particular form". Thereby, the dominant Marxist understanding of technology remains at the level of immediate appearances, and the prospect of a critique is foreclosed".[4]

By foreclosing the possibility of a critique Marxism erects a theory of technology which, like its bourgeois counterpart, systematically hides the class character of technology. Though Marxism admits that the class societies develop the means of production for the narrow interest of the propertied class which lies in extracting maximum surplus labour from immediate produces, this interest is said to unwillingly promote the transcendental goal of the means of production., the technical mastery of Man over Nature. The social relations of productions, on this view, are attendant circumstance of the technological process which is the 'inner essence' of the historical development. The assumption of an independent 'telos' of technology pushes Marxists to embrace the shallow theory of use–and–abuse of technology whenever they confront the dehumanizing effects of technology.

The failure of Marxism to provide a critique of techology is, therefore, the immediate result of a teleological view of technology. Related to this is the positivistic construal of scientific rationality. The refusal of Marxism to raise the question, 'why has the content of technology, viz. scientific rationality, assumed that particular form?' can be explained by the fact that scientific rationality is construed in positivistic terms that do not allow such a question. For positivism, scientific rationality can be explicated (in terms of the canons put forth by it) but not explained since all explanation presupposes that rationality. Further, the repudiation of the very idea of human nature as an

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irreducible ontological entity for the fear that such an idea renders Marxist theory metaphysical and therefore unscientific, further contributed to the failure in working out a critique of technology. A full blown theory of human nature could have provided, in terms of certain norms of appraisal, some safeguards against the dogmatic belief in the inherently progressive and unconditionally emancipatory character of technology. The revulsion of Marxists against such an allegedly metaphysical notion is not so much due to the anti-historical character of metaphysical thinking as it was due to its incompatibility with the positivist construal of rationality. Thus, the teleological view of technology, the positivist construal of scientific rationality and repudiation of the very idea of human nature reinforced each other in stalling a Marxian critique of technology. The tendency to take technology at its face value and browbeat any attempt at its critique has been so rampant in the Marxist tradition that those Marxists like Castoriadis who refuse to adopt an ambivalent position on technology are led to repudiate Marxist theory itself. According to them a revolutionary attack on capitalism, instead of taking over the existing technological ensemble, must attack that very ensemble along with its canons of scientific and technological rationality which enslaved even Marx.

But the method, content and the leit motif of Marx's own theoretical undertaking at once bring to surface the unwarrantedness of such a charge. The method he adopted in studying the structure and dynamics of capitalist society stands directly opposite to the canons of positivism. Apart from the ideas of critique and historical approach that stand at the heart of Marx's method and that can hardly find a place within the positivist framework, Marx's repudiation of the primacy of observation over theory, the central doctrine of positivism, puts

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the nail on the lie. Marx writes in connection with his critique of political economy "Science, unlike other architects, builds not only castles in the air, but may construct separate habitable storeys of the building before laying the foundation stone".[5] Hence classical political economy is criticised not in terms of its failure to correspond to "objective" facts or in terms of its inconsistency with "empirically established" theories but by showing its limit through jaxtaposing it with a new theory that establishes its own credibility by the very process of bringing to light the limits of the old theory and by a decision to legitimate certain questions that are not sanctioned by the old theory. Secondly, Marx's analysis of the relation of machinery to labour further lays bare his departure from the technicist orthodoxy. According to him, upon the formal subsumption of labour under capital effected by the social relations of capitalistic production, technology erects the real subsumption of labour under capital. The alienation of labour and its subservience to capital that remains incomplete at the manufacture phase of capitalism is rendered complete under large–scale industry "which makes science a potentiality for production which is distinct from labour and presses it into the service of capital",[6] "the dead labour that dominates and soakes up living labour power".[7] But Marx's most direct indictment against machine comes not in his recognition of the inversion of worker employing conditions of work into the conditions of work employing the worker – an inversion made technical and palpable by machinery, but in his earlier work – *Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts*, where a deeper inversion is recognised– the inversion of Man feeling human in animal activity and feeling animal in the peculiarly human activity of economic production. Such an indictment has at its core a conception of human nature that propels a description of technology as essentially dehu-

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manizing, unless it is guided by our understanding of human needs and capabilities.

The thrust of the above discussion is to point to the existence of Marx's critique of technology, in however embryonic a form. A full fledged Marxian critique of technology, therefore, involves the development of these three dimensions, viz., his anti-positivistic methodological orientation, his indictment of technology as the instrument for subsuming living labour under dead labour and his conception of man. Of the three, the third must constitute the leit motif or nucleus for a Maryian critique of technology for the following reasons. The analysis of machine in its relation to labour and the consequent indictment is made by Marx within the specific framework of the capitalist mode of production. This specificity renders somewhat precarious any *general* critique of techology based on such an analysis. Hence, Marx's analysis of machine-labour relation cannot be the nucleus of a Marxian critique of technology. Equally, Marx's anti-positivistic methodological practice cannot play the role of the leit motif of a critique of technology. A theory of scientific rationality constructed on the basis of Marx's methodological practice must follow from a theory of being for the very requirement of its being anti-positivistic. It is to Heidegger's credit that he recognized that one of the fundamental assumptions of British empiricism (which it shared with neo-Kantianism) is that the problem of knowledge rather than the problem of being is the central problem of philosophy. Hence, the sumbsumption of the problem of being under the problem of knowledge must be set at naught if we want to develop an anti-positivist theory of rationality. So the answer to the question, "what is rationality"?, in the anti-positivist framework, presupposes the answer to the question "What is being?". If, as Heidegger thinks, "only in man can Being be domiciled", then the question "what

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is the nature of human being ?" is prior to the question concerning the possibility and nature of rationality. If the anti-positivistic theory of rationality locates rationality in the human being, it implies that ideally speaking all explanation must not only be didactic but also normative since in its framework progressiveness, objectivity and rationality make sense only within the context of human needs, and possibilities. If all explanations, ideally speaking, must be both didactic and normative, explanation in natural science, where normativity is at its minimal, must be treated as the limiting case of ideal explanation rather than as its paradigmatic case, as it is the case in the positivist framework.

The contention that Marx's idea of human nature is basic even for his idea of science can be more convincingly brought out in the following way. Marx's anti-positivist methodological injunction that Political Economy as science must penetrate the veil of appearance (form) and unearth the essence (content) was something more than a mere application of a metascientific principle perceived by him as best embodied in well-established sciences to the realm of the science of society. According to him, such an injunction inherently suits the object of Political Economy such that, as Norman Geras points out, " The relation between methodological injunction and object of study is no longer one of externality, as is the case with an abstract rule applicable to any content whatever. It is, rather, what may be termed, a *relation of adequacy* between object and method, the character of the latter being determined by the structure of the former ".[8] The object of Political Economy exhibits an internal rupture between what is and how it is experienced. Marx's central notion of 'Fetishism of commodities' denotes the most basic fact of capitalism as a system of commodity production viz, in it the social relations appear to agents as relations bet-

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ween commodities. It is this mystification of social relations as commodity relations that necessitates, according to Marx, a conscious application of his methodological injunction. The demystification does not lie in showing that such an appearance is an illusion. For it is not since human (social) relations in capitalism *in reality* have taken the form of relations between things. Rather, the demystification lies in laying bare the historical specificity of commodity fetishism. In doing this the demystificatory Political Economy counters the Bourgeois Political Economy that dehistoricizes value and surplus value, makes them products of nature and presents the objective forms of capitalist relations as the most natural state of affairs. It may be questioned how, given the centrality of the concept of historical specificity in the framework of Marx's ideas of aim and method of Political Economy, can one bring to bear his somewhat apparently essentialistic idea of human nature? If unanswered, this question leaves the rupture between the *Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts* and the *Capital* in tact. However, the concepts Marx uses to specify the essential features of capitalist society fulfil their cognitive function not by 'saving the phenomena' but by demystifying them. But, as Geras points out, "if, in order to do this, and in the process of doing this, they refer us to 'standards entirely foreign to commodity production', then they are at the same time critical concepts".[9] It is because of this criticality Marx's analysis contains "an accusation and an imperative". It is Marx's idea of essential human nature that provides the standards entirely foreign to commodity production. In short, Marx's critical method with its explicit methodological injunction to reach out for essences beyond appearances is parasitic upon his idea of human nature.

Coming to our present concern, it follows, therefore, that since a theory of rationality itself is dependent upon a theory of man. it is Marx's theory of man rather than his theory of

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scientific method/rationality that should constitute the nucleus of a Marxian critique of technology.

But the dominant trend in the Marxist theory has been untiringly repudiating the very idea of human nature and denies that Marx ever entertained a theory of man. This trend is very old and its Althusserian version is perhaps the most recent and the most refined. Such a repudiation throws to winds not only the most pregnant insights of Marx into human nature at the early stage of his intellectual development but also his repeated invocation of the concept of human nature in his later (which is less philosophical and therefore more scientific !!)[11] period–be it in his negative remarks on Bentham or in his positive remarks about Ricardo and on many other occassions. However, the fact of repudiation at once explains the failure of the Marxist tradition in providing a fullblown critique of technology. Such a stance is traceable to the belief that any idea of human nature is metaphysical and hence unscientific. It is not difficult to see how much this belief is embedded in positivism. Apart from sharing the positivist denial of any metaphysical element in scientific theorising, it shares the positivist dogma that any general idea, because of its generality, has to be metaphysical i.e, that it is impossible to generate a non-metaphysical theory of man. It is here Heidegger has a lesson to teach by his philosophical practice of attempting to construct a theory of being which is non–metaphysical. The repudiation of the idea of human nature also explains the perpetuation of the myth of man–centred universe by Marxism, an indictment that Heidegger is so right in making. By repudiating the very idea of human nature, Marxists emptied that idea of all content. However, because it is left without content in the hands of Marxists, whenever it figured by itself or by proxy in Marxist theorising, that idea took the content in accordance with the dominant ideology

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(termed 'Bourgeois' by Marxists) whose idea of man as fundamentally a consumer justifies and whitewashes most debasing fetishism of commodities characteristic of capitalist economy and culture.

So, an attempt to build a Marxian theory of Man should steer clear of the nominalist construal of Man that repudiates the very idea of an irreducible human nature and also the essentialist construal which under meterialistic interpretation produces an understanding of man that is same as "the abstract meterialism of Natural Science, a materialism that eludes history and its process".[12] Such a theory of man, among other things, is constituted by a theory of human needs, i.e., a theory of *puruṣārthas. A Marxian critique of technology, therefore, must specify the conditions under which technology seeks to satisfy an imaginary need in the real world, just as religion seeks to satisfy a real need (need to escape from estrangement) in an imaginary world.*

In spite of such a specific or specifiable orientation and task, the Marxist theory of Man might remain at the level of mere anthropological generalities. Hence the need for existentially grounding it in that reality which we mostly palpably experience. So far as at least the third world is concerned that reality is colonial reality. Hence the need for building a Marxian theory of colonial man. It may be noted that the colonial man is real entity. For his existence is axiomatic in understanding the socio–historical location of the third world. Yet, to the extent his characterization is made in terms of the fabricated theories that distort his history by inventing, among other things, the myth of precolonial barbarism, the colonial man is an unreal entity. He is both real and unreal like *Māyā*. Like *Māyā* the colonial reality is grounded in *Avidyā*–the false–consciousness acruing from the mis–identification of both coloniser and coloni-

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zed. By existentially grounding its theory of man in the colonial man, Marxism becomes capable of identifying the specific modes in which technology produces and perpetuates a false-consciousness in the colonial world. It then learns to recognise, that the colonial man's struggle against technology is motivated by something more than 'nostalgic romanticism' and that the idea of *Swadeśī* is a weapon against a false-consciousness that lies at the root of that strange tropical surrealism called the Third World

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NOTES

* Revised version of paper presented at the Seminar on 'Technology, Ecology and Heideggerian Ethos' organised by the Department of Phliosophy, Goa University in December, 1988.

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THE CONCEPTS OF MAN AND NATURE IN MARXISM

It is very significant that the central theme of the 28th World Congress of Philosophy held at Brighton in 1988 was man. Due to the tremendous scientific credo, man has, perhaps, somewhere overreached his scientific ambitions, giving rise to what Alvin Toffler termed 'future shock'. The 'scientific age' is no more ; it is the 'age of man'. It is time now to redefine the two categories—man and nature. And Marxism has something original to offer by way of explaning the two concepts. In this paper* an attempt will be made to explain, from Marxian view-point, the concepts of man and nature, and also the desirable relationship between the two.

According to Marxism, man "is a unique phenomenon within the universe."[1] Man is not only a unique phenomenon, but also a complex phenomenon. The ancient naive or crude or vulgar materialistic man = machine theory (of Lao Tsu, Yang Chu, Wan Chung, Lokāyata school, Heraclitus, Anaxagoras, Empedocles, Democritus, Epicurus and others) and the Cartesian automaton theory have been rejected by Marxism as simplistic. Marx did not jettison Hegelianism root and branch like Ludwig Feuerbach, but retained two of Hegel's most important concepts—the trilemmatic dialectic schema and the spirit. In fact, "Marx always remained in some sense a Hegelian."[2], and consequently Lenin was right when he wrote : "It is impossible to fully grasp Marx's *Capital* and especially the first chapter,

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if you have not studied or understood the *whole* of Hegel's Logic Consequently, none of the Marxists for the past half a century has understood Marx ![3]. What is wanting in the non–Marxian materialism is the 'movement'. This 'movement' brings out consciousness as well as self–consciousness from the womb of matter–in–motion, the primordial nature where motion is the mode of existence of matter.

Marxism has conceived of consciousness not quite materialistically, for like epiphenomenalism it does not admit of only one–way traffic between mind and body, but advocates that consciousness has relative independence and that consciousness can influence body. Further, Marx said that "conceiving, thinking, the mental intercourse of men" are "the 'efflux', i.e., a *separate, non–material* outflow which originates and derives from material behaviour."[4] According to J. A. Shaffer, Marxism here deviates so much from materialism that Marxism is "not materialistic in our sense."[5]

The active nature of consciousness is clearly emphasised by Marxism. "As a product of matter and as its reflection, consciousness does not remain passive, but *actively influence* the world. It is in this sense that Lenin wrote that 'man's consciousness not only reflects the objective world, but creates it'".[6] Perhaps Lenin here laid stress merely on the praxis of consciousness and not also on the cognitive aspect, and so if we could include the cognitive aspect as well, we could find that Marxism is not far from the intentionality of phenomenology which pleads that the object-world is the creation of consciousness. Consciousness operates on the external world or nature via the agency of the body and thus changes it, creating what is called in Marxism the 'second nature' : "Since the advent of man and social material production, the environment increasingly ceased to be purely natural, elemental, or 'virginal'.

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Since ancient times, a 'second nature' (or man–induced nature) established itself in the environment and was the material body of civilization."[7]

As we have seen above, man is a unique phenomenon. Man is a part of nature and yet he is not. He is part of it because his body is a part of nature, and his consciousness is a 'quality' of the matter that is his body. But he is not a part of nature because his consciousness has acquired *relative independence* of nature in so far as his relatively independent consciousness can change nature. Here Marxism rejects crude materialism and spontaneous materialism as well as scientism, the last believing that human sciences require no methods other than those of the natural sciences. Soviet scientific credo stops short, and very justly, of the mechanical view of man, handed down by Descartes and Co. There is an unbridgeable gap between man and machine. Soviet scientists "believe that there is a 'complexity threshold' [between man and machine—SKS] based on intellect's social nature, for man is a product of not only biological but of social evolution as well. His intellect's 'social component' is governed by will and motivation, as well as by the 'collective' nature of the cognitive process—a factor that makes man a system with a practically *infinite number of degrees of freedom* [which a machine does not possess—SKS]."[8] Inspite of the long scientific strides, man will never be able to make man or rather a human being with a capital H : "It is clear that machines can imitate the activity of the human brain only to the extent that it can be described in algorithms and programmes, and only in corresponding areas."[9] The programmed function and the feedback process of even the super–electronic gadgets will never be able to vie with the free–functioning of the human brain. There is something more in the human intellect than the Pavlovian reflexology.

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The Marxian conception of man repudiates the biologization of human beings. In the contemporary scientific world, there is a tendency to reduce human spiritual elements to biological factors. Thus Edward O. Wilson in his *Sociobiology* opined that "ethics cannot be constructed through logical means alone, for it is associated with interpreting human behaviour, a phenomenon rooted in the biological evolution of man primates." [10] Richard Dawkins in his *The Selfish Gene* also expressed the same view. Huxley, Freud and Foss are all advocates of biological reductionism. But Jacques Monod, a prominent nuclear biologist, perhaps, went farthest in this regard. He reduced all the spiritual heritage of human beings to genetic codification : "man possesses an inborn, genetically encoded need to search for the meaning of existence, a need that has brought to life all know myths, religions, philosophic systems, and even science itself." [11] This is an extreme example of bio–reductionism [which Monod and others could not establish — SKS] against which Marxism raises its vociferous protest, because " To Marx it was clear from the outset that the essence of man is not 'its abstract physical character, but its *social quality*' ".[12] To emphasise this social moment in the human, Marxism differentiates between an 'accidental individual' or 'abstract individual' and a person or 'real man'. The abstract individual is the biological datum–line of a human being whose real essence lies in his social moment or dimension. Marx said that the essence of man " ' is no abstraction inherent in each single individual. In its reality it is the ensemble of the social relations ' ". [13]

The social essence of man originates in human activities— in labour; because it is in labour that man " really proves himself to be a species–being. " [14] Marxism has emphasised the integral aspect of man. A. G. Myslichenko in his essay " Man as an Object of Study in Philosophy and Applied Sciences "

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said that so far man has been viewed from differen perspectives—anthropological, biological, psychological, and social, and he advocated "joint efforts of all natural sciences and Humanities" (*infra*) in an endeavour to understand man and that "philosophy must provide the basis."[15] What Myslichenko had in mind has some releeance to what Lenin wrote in his *Philosophical Notebooks* : "The one-sideness of one philosophic principle is generally faced by its opposite one–sidedness, and, as everywhere, totality at least is found as a dispersed completeness."[16]

The concept of man in Marxism is not devoid of the 'movement' — the essence of dialectics, because human nature changes continually coming into interaction with nature and society. Marx said that "all history is nothing but a continuous transformation of human nature."[17] The relationship between man and nature is organic : ' Humanity is organically linked with the natural environment in which it exists, above all with the planet Earth and its biosphere "[18] Man has two sorts of relation with nature. "A biochemical metabolism started between man and nature, but, with the advent of man, a qualitatively new relationship between living things and nature came into existence, which is man's work or material production."[19] The relationship between man and nature is dialectical via labour. "Labour is, in the first place, a process in which both man and Nature participate, and in which man of his own accord starts, regulates, and controls the material re-actions between himself and Nature. He opposes himself to Nature as one of her own forces, setting in motion arms and legs, head and hands, the natural forces of his body, in order to appropriate Nature's productions in a form adapted to his own wants. *By thus acting on the external world and changing it, he at the same time changes* his own nature." (emphasis added)[20]

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Nature will not allow man reign supreme over herself. Engels cautioned us : "Let us not, however, flatter ourselves overmuch on account of our human victories over nature. For each such victory nature takes its revenge on us... Thus at every stop we are reminded that we by no means rule over nature like a conqueror over a foreign people, like someone standing outside nature—but that we, with flesh, blood and brain, belong to nature, and exist in its midst, and that all our mastery of it consists in the fact that we have the advantage over all other creatures of being able to learn its laws and apply them correctly." [21] So we can control nature only by obeying it.

Man interacts with nature not only singly but also collectively. The 'society–nature interaction' is also very important. Society has so far not been monotonous but dichotomous—the bourgeois or the exploiter class (not necessarily the rich) and the exploited or the expropriated class (not necessarily the poor). The two classes are in continual conflict over the shares of the productions of nature. "It is because of class antagonism that the practical mastering of natural forces and new natural sources culminates in the new social disasters, such as wars, the enslavement of nations, mass unemployment, poverty, and the development of more and more powerful weapons of mass destruction of people and the fruits of their work." [22]

Three relatively unknown elements of Marxism are spiritual production, ethics and humanism. By spiritual production Marx meant artistic and cultural elements of the 'immaterial sphere' [23] which is ultimately dependent on the material sphere that is historically determined. Marx in his *Theories of Surplus-Value* wrote : "In order to examine the connection between spiritual production and material production it is above all necessary to grasp the latter itself not as a general category but in *definite*

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historical form ... Further, from the specific form of material production arises in the first place a specific structure of society, in the second place a specific relation of men to nature. Their state and their spiritual outlook is determined by both. Therefore also the kind of their spiritual production." [24]

In the sphere of ethics, Marxism rejects absolutism, and proposes that the ethical value is also dependent on the mode of production of the material condition of life or society. Nikolai Lenin's (not V. I. Lenin) reading of communistic morality may not be tantamount to Marxian concept of morality. According to Nikolai Lenin, "A communist must be prepared to make every sacrifice and, if necessary, even resort to all sorts of schemes and stratagems, employ illegitimate methods, conceal the truth, in order to get into the trade unions, stay there, and conduct the revolutionary work within ..." [25] Marxism does not believe in approbative, evolutionary, normative or theological morality. Marxism does not speak of any moral specifics, but says that communist morality is "the aggregate of principles and standards of conduct based on the ideals of communist society." [26] Ethical principles are applicable only within the confines of the society. Morality is an affair between one conscious being and another. But Soviet communism or Marxism–Leninism has surpassed this limit in the ethical sphere. It assumes some ethical norms even between man and 'potentially conscious' or even unconscious objects. Thus, Soviet scientists have objected to inhumane biological experiments : '. The first area concerned experiments in introducing genes of oncogenic animal viruses and toxins into bacteria. The second concerned the cloning of genes of higher organisms in bacteria.' [27]

This same attitude bespeaks of the humanness of Marxism. It is different from non–Marxian humanism in that "It is based on Marxist–Leninist philosophy and the theory of scienti-

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fic communism, which postulates liberation of the working people from social oppression and the building of communism as an essential condition for the allround and genuine freedom of the individual."[28] In recent times this human value of Marxism is emphasised by Mikhail Gorbachev who aspires after a "truly humanitarian system serving and elevating man" and "a society for people, for the flourishing of their creative work, wellbeing, health, physical and spiritual development, a society where man feels he is the full-fledged master and is indeed that."[29]

Marx did never turn his eyes away from "the meaning of life" and 'humanness'. He believed in the richness of human nature and set as our task "*the development of the richness of human nature as an end in itself.*"[30] Lenin, in his "Conspectus of Hegel's *Science of Logic*", also wrote : "The notion (=man), as subjective, again presupposes an otherness which is in itself (= nature independent of man). This notion (= man) is the *impulse* to realise itself, to give itself objectivity in the objective world through itself, and realise (fulfil) itself."[31] (nosce teipsum, know thyself). But Marx perhaps did not give us an idea of the *ideal man.* And this was so because in a continually dialectic scheme no finality or no idea of a finality is possible. This failure of Marx was compensated by Lev Tolstoy who said that the meaning of life, or, to make it more precise, the ideality of man lies in the relationship of man with the infinity whence man is to seek 'guidance for his acts.'[32] Tolstoy said that the knowledge of this infinity and that of man's relationship with this infinity is the supreme knowlege : "that knowledge has universally been perceived as the most important knowledge, and has been viewed with the greatest respect. Most often it has been called religion but sometimes wisdom."[33] Marxism has spoken of humanness but perhaps has failed to

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definitely define what humanness is or where it lies. It has also failed to define the ideality of life. But Tolstoy is outspoken. He said that love is " life itself; but not a mindless life that is perishing, but a life that is serene and infinite.. It is life's most joyful activity. "[34] Tolstoy said that the movement of life is towards harmony—all–compassing harmony—and that harmony is the highest good.

But this harmony is not absent in Marxism. Marxism is an ' integral system '. It is a lie to tell that Marxism speaks of only economic determinism—this is only the half–truth. Though Engels, in his essay *Karl Marx*, emphasised two factors of Marxism—class conflict and exploitation,[35] Marxism means much more. Frolov wrote that the opponents of Marxism and reformist bourgeois ' Marxists ' " have always either sought to represent Marxism as a strictly *' economic teaching '* devoid of independent philosophical foundations, to juxtapose it to its inherent practical revolutionary content (particularly with regard to the Leninist stage of Marxism) or else to ' discover ' Marx as a ' utopian prophet ' who, allegedly had addressed the problem of man and humanism in his early works and then assertedly reversed himself and developed a teaching from which man simply ' vanished ', to be replaced by a rigorous ' economic determinism ' and an absolutization of the ' socium '. It is true that at various stages of Marxism's historical development numerous genuine proponents of Marxism, for a number of reasons, occasionally *interpreted it in such a way that only one of its facets would appear, thus distorting its nature* as an integral system."[36] Frederick Engels was very clear on this point. In his letter of 21 September, 1890, to J. Block in Konigsberg, Engels wrote that according to the materialist conception of history " the *ultimately* determining factor in history is the production and reproduction of real life. Neither Marx

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nor I have ever asserted more than this. Hence if somebody twists this into saying that the economic element is the *only* determining one, he transforms that proposition into a meaningless, abstract, senseless phrase."[37] In fact, Marx was not so much interested in economics as he was in ethics, law and politics, as is evident in his Paris Manuscripts. "He complained frequently to Engels of the time he was forced to spend studying economics."[34] Engels candidly arrogated the cause of this misunderstanding about Marxism partly to Marx and partly to himself : "Marx and I are ourselves partly to blame for the fact that the younger people sometimes lay more stress on the economic side than is due to it."[39]

To sum up, Marxism emphasises the following points regarding the concepts of man and nature, and regarding relationship between man and nature. Firstly, Marxism deems man as a unique phenomenon. Man is a part of nature and yet he transcends her limitations. Secondly, Marxism protests against biologisation of man. Thirdly, Marxism also protests against scientism. Marxism says that the methodology of natural sciences is not applicable in the sphere of ethics and spirituality. Fourthly, Marxism does not say that man is absolutely an economic being. And lastly, Marxism holds up humanism high.

However, inspite of its flawless complexion, Marxism lends itself to the following important criticisms. Firstly, consciousness came into being from unconscious matter, through several antosse, to use a term of Schelling. If this is so, we can conceive of something higher or superior to consciousness (superconsciousness or something like that) coming out of consciousness in the future through the future succession of antosse. But Marxism stops dead at the stage of consciousness only, Secondly, Marxism conceives of a "complexity threshold" between man and the rest of the biosphere. But the promising progress in

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cybernetics speaks against this shyness of Marxism. Thirdly, Marx and Engels frequently spoke of the 'real man' and the 'abstract man'. The 'abstract man' is a man from whom his *free* endeavour towards production has been abstracted (or deducted). Marxism looks forward to a society of real men. But the real man is not necessarily a human man. Further, what does humanness consist of? Marxism is not clear about this. Fourthly, the concept of labour is very important in Marxism. Man accosts nature and via labour changes it for his benefits, and thereby changes himself as well. But we think that the concept of 'communist labour' is pius but irrealistic. Communist labour is "labour performed gratis for the benefit of society, voluntary labour, irrespective of quotas; ... labour performed ... without reward as a condition, labour performed because it has become a habit to work for the common good, and because of a conscious realisation (that has become a habit) of the necessity of working for the common good ... labour as the requirement of a healthy organism."[40] This has an unearthly air! And lastly, according to Marx, philosophy is *partisan*. But if the task of philosophy is to disclose truth and if truth is unitary, how can philosophy be partisan?

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ARTIFACTS, ESSENCE AND REFERENCE

The new theory of reference has popularised the idea that proper names (such as 'Jane' and 'Rahim') and natural kind terms (such as 'cat' and 'gold') do not refer in virtue of associated definite descriptions but because of some real connection between the user and an individual or a kind that the term stands for. The relation between a singular term and an object or individual is described by some philosophers like Kripke as such that when a certain term is used first to refer to a particular object or individual, the reference of the term is 'fixed'. That means after that first occasion, whenever that term is used, it refers to one and only one object or individual. Proper names, on this view, are 'rigid designators', i.e., the same name refers to the same individual in all possible worlds in which it exists Names for natural kinds (such as 'gold' and 'water') also are rigid designators, because these are used as indexicals.

If this view is correct, then the philosophically nontrivial cl ss of analytic statements is very narrow. That means 'Gold is a yellow metal' is not analytic as Kant thought. It is mainly due to Putnam, that this acconut of singular terms seems to extend to many kinds of noun and other parts of speech. One of the classes of nouns is the class of terms for artifacts. Putnam regards these terms also as indexical.

I shall first discuss the view (held by Putnam, Donnellan and also in some degree by Kripke) that 'pencil' and 'table' are rigid designators and that, therefore no special treatment is

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necessary for them. On this view, these terms are not different from natural kind terms. Contrary to this, Schwartz maintains that artifacts are different from natural kinds in not having any essential properties. From this he concludes that 'pencil' and 'table' are not indexical. These terms are only associated with some definite descriptions. He thinks that Putnam is wrong about extending his theory to artifact–terms. I would like to consider this view to examine whether Schwartz's criticism can make a serious impact on Putnam's stand on artifact-terms

I

As I said before, both Kripke and Putnam regard terms like 'chair' and 'table' as rigid designators. Just like 'gold', 'water', 'tiger' or any other natural kind terms, artifact–terms also stand for a shared nature or at least we presume that they do. "When we use a word 'pencil', we intend to refer to whatever has the same nature as the normal example of the local pencils in the actual world."[1] In a similar vein Kripke maintains that a material object like a table has something essential about it, without which it would not be that table, So artifacts also have some shared essential property. Kripke says that anything coming from a different origin would not be that very object.[2] "If a material object has its origin from a certain chunk of matter, it could not have had its origin in any other matter".[3] This however is not the crucial point. The crucial point is that a table is essentially a table just as a cat is essentially a cat. In addition to the origin, the *substance* of which it is made is also essential for the object.[4] Not only that, if the very block of wood from which the table was made had instead been made into a vase, then the table would never have existed. So being a table is an essential property of the table in the same way as being human is essential for Nixon. The arguments for saying that proper names for individual and natural kind terms are

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rigid designators are extended in the new theory of reference to 'table' and 'chair' in the same way. It is tantamount to holding that 'table' and 'pencil' are as indexical as 'gold', 'water' and 'Nixon'. Although there may be some characteristics associated with them, the use of these terms is only to pick out some individual kind of objects named so. Yellowness, for example, is an obvious physical property of gold; it also has some referential element, for yellowness is picked out and rigidly designated as the physical property of the object we call 'gold'.

Putnam as well as Kripke hold that natural kind terms are used only referentially. The meaning of these terms, on this view, is not given by a conjunction of properties semantically associated with the term as thought by the descriptivists. Of course, the features associated with such a term serve as an indicator of a real essence or nature that tells us what it is to be a member of the natural kind, That is discovered by scientific investigation The extension of the term is part of the meaning, but criteria specifiable in terms of superficial propertics are not. In a similar way, pencils and tables have artifactual nature. It is not a matter of language, but matter of fact that they have artifactual nature. Being an artifact is part of the definition of pencil, that is why we cannot discover that pencils are not organisms or that they do not have chemical or biological nature.

Putnam argues that since in the actual world pencils are artifacts, it is necessary that they be artifacts; and this will not be disproved by counterexample. Pencils are 'artifacts manufactured to be written with..." From this it follows : "That 'pencils are artifacts' is necessary in the sense of true in all ...5

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possible worlds – metaphysically necessary".[5] Now, this point has been violently opposed by Schwartz, and I think his argument has a certain force. He argues that if 'pencils are artifacts' is corrigible (as Putnam would surely agree) then how can Putnam be so sure that pencil is not a natural kind, not found somewhere 'growing in the trees'? Given that all the local pencils are found to be artifacts, it does not follow that there could not be any non–artifactual pencils or ones produced naturally by some other device. Of course a critic might accuse Schwartz of confusing epistemological and metaphysical questions. It is an epistemological question if "water = H_2O' is corrigible. But once fixed by scientific discovery, the essential property of water shall be H_2O so long as water is defined that way. One possible move to block the oddity of pencils 'growing in the trees' is to offer some genetic code or atomic structure of it which will enable it not to be anything but pencils just as it is metaphysically impossible for water not to be water (by virtue of its structure H_2O) except ceasing to exist. But neither Putnam nor Kripke speak of any underlying nature in case of pencils except the trivial assertion that pencils are essentially pencils.

II

Schwartz agrees with Putnam that natural kind terms are rigid and that these terms have underlying features which all the members of the class share. But he disagrees with him when Putnam extends his direct reference theory to general terms like 'pencil' and 'table'. The latter kind, Schwartz thinks, are subclasses of nominal kind terms. Let us see what he exactly means by "nominal kind terms". Nominal kinds differ from natural kinds in that the latter have underlying traits and we can have 'stable generalizations' about them. Nominal kinds have no such traits, and we cannot have 'stable generalizations'

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about them like 'water is H_2O.' Nominal kinds are not picked out by essence but by some superficial features like form and function.[6] 'Barbed wire' for example, he says, is an artifact–term. So 'barbed wire is metal' is not stable. That means we can easily imagine barbed wire made of some non–metallic snythetic material even though all the barbed wire found are actually metal. 'Whales are mammal' is stable; that means if we find a whale–like fish, it will not be a counter–example of whale, but only a fish which is very much like a whale but is *actually not* "The big difference between artifact kinds and water is that we do not presuppose that there is any underlying nature that makes something to be the artifact that it is".[7] Unlike natural kinds, nominal kinds have only superficial characteristics apart from which artifacts have no hidden common nature. By nominal essence he means something like Lockeean kind of nominal essence (abstract idea)[8] which, Schwartz says, 'are the workmanship of the understanding rather than nature', meaning perhaps that nominal essence is metaphysically different from essential property.

I think Putnam would grant Schwartz all these, but the fact remains nevertheless that Putnam might say that all these are irrelevant to whether 'pencil' is indexical,

For 'A' is 'B', we can have

1) an A is essentialy an A

2) an A is essentially a B

"Water" and "Barbed wire" seem both to to befit (1) but differ with regard to (2). Even Schwartz concedes this. But then it is (1) which is crucial for rigid designation and not (2). So even if Schwartz is right about artifacts having some underlying traits that does not by itself justify artifact–terms being of a different kind.

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Schwartz also uses another expression 'synthetic class' to distinguish nominal kind from natural kind. Something is a synthetic class if it satisfies a certain description, for example 'pet' is a synthetic class term whereas 'cat' and 'dog' are natural kind terms. Something is a pet not because of its *nature*, but because of its relationship to others and its function as a role. All artifacts are synthetic class; therefore artifact-terms are non-indexical, for artifacts satisfy (to be a synthetic class) a certain description. As nominal essence is not real, Schwartz argues that artifacts do not have any real essence (as presumed by Putnam) to be discovered by scientific investigation.

To sum up : Schwartz concedes to Putnam that

1) Natural kind terms are indexical
2) Natural kinds have some essential property apart from the superficial ones
3) Essential property of natural kind can be discovered by scientific investigation.

But he *denies* that

1) artifact-terms are also indexical
2) artifacts have essential properties
3) These properties are *necessarily* true of artifact terms.

He suggests that the "correct approach to ordinary language is to combine both Putnam's insights and the traditional approach" Putnam is right, Schwartz thinks, about natural kind terms and the traditional theory is right about artifact-terms. According to him, it is a mistake of both the theories to extend it to the realm of the other kind.

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III

If Schwartz is right about his charges against Putnam that artifact terms need a different treatment than natural kind terms, then we cannot dismiss the distinction between analytic and synthetic propositions. The extension of the direct reference theory to more classes than proper names and natural kind terms tends to make the class of non–trivial analytic propositions shrink. If Schwartz claims that the theory is not applicable to artifact–terms then it would make the analytic–synthetic distinction important again. Moreover, if Schwartz is right, then a large number of general terms (nominal kind terms) would be nominal and not indexical, as Putnam claims. It will be wrong, then, to assert that most terms of natural language are indexicals.

Schwartz seems to be right about artifacts having no essential property. Some superficial traits are the necessary and sufficient conditions for their being pencil or table. One might also go further in a Wittgensteinian way to deny any set of conditions whatsoever for calling pencil a 'pencil' except a family resemblance of some agreed upon similarities. I shall come back to the issue of these 'conditions' for artifacts later. But one should note that it is not so with natural kinds. Any arbitrarily chosen molecules of water will be necessarily composed of hydrogen and oxygen. This observation captures our intuition to a great extent. Take the case of mass production of any artifacts like toy–cars or bicycles. These things have exactly the same *properties* (except the relational ones of course). Which one is *essential ?* To have wheels, engines or the key or the brake ? It is difficult to decide. If we take the example of parts of a machine, the point is more apparent. Nuts, bolts or pegs have exactly similar form and function. Suppose again that a massive pencil is made, say six feet long with two feet diametre which does not write like Putnam's 'local pencil', nor made of the

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usual things, (wood and graphite), but we do use the term 'pencil' for this one also, although the usual material or function is absent in this case. Or take the example of a fancy T. V. like pencil–sharpner, 'Eiffel–Tower' pencils etc., or 'Mermaid' or 'Venus' candles (which have a short wick, but are not meant for lighting). These things are bad in 'function', or sometimes without any function (as in the last case). So there is no essential nature to settle what kind of artifacts they are, statue or candle in the last case? It is arbitrary and difficult to decide except by reference to our particular objective. Or else we might opt for the Wittgensteinian way by denying any essential criterion whatsoever for such decision except recognising some vague resemblance to call them 'pencil' or 'table' whatever is the case.

The superficial traits for artifacts are the only way to recognise them. That is why we can know a boat or a table from a picture or a bad model or if made of different type of material. There is no essence that needs to be known by scientific investigation. Schwartz gives an example. If a scientist is engaged in a research project to know the essential property of wasps and insects, nobody would find it strange. But imagine a scientist saying that he is trying to know the essential nature of chair. We shall surely think it is very strange.

The entire force of Schwartz's argument against Putnam comes from his insistence that artifacts do *not* have any underlying nature. Indeed they do not. And any theory of reference which requires that artifacts be picked out by the same sort of underlying nature is utterly mistaken. But that is not what Putnam's theory requires by any means; not even for natural kind terms, against which Schwartz has no complaints. The direct reference theory never requires that individuals and objects are picked out on the basis of essential properties. The theory only

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requires that names of objects are rigid designators. That means once the reference is fixed (by convention or by scientific definition) the name would necessarily refer to whatever individual or kind it stands for. Of course there are some properties associated with the names. Among these properties some are essential in the sense that without them, the objects would cease to be what they are.

Contrary to his starting point (which is anti-essentialist), Schwartz tries to give an 'underlying nature' for an artifact, namely 'form and function'. But as I have pointed out before, 'form and function' also can be very different among the same kind of artifacts. The fact is that, most artifacts have well-known features and functions; so some traits are always found to be associated with them. But suppose that the archeologists have discovered some artifacts which are very strange and wholly unknown as to their form and function according to our standards. Any names can be given to them and once given, they will be referred to by these names, just like newly discovered elements, plants and animal species. Moreover, in the present fast pace of scientific advancement, 'form and function' also are changing so rapidly that there will hardly be any superficial common nature among members of the same kind which they satisfy according to Schwartz.

Putnam has already pointed out that he can refer to beech trees by using the name 'beech' without any distinguishing features of them. In the same way we can refer to wedgewood (the famous English pottery) or Chippendale (furniture) without any knowledge of true definite description of them. It is possible on the basis of experts in our language community who have such knowledge. One might think that Putnam requires some definite description (Schwartz's 'nominal essence') given by the experts, by which the objects can be picked out.

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But Putnam would reject even this weak nominalistic account of natural kind terms in favour of this *realistic* account of theoretical terms.

Peter Geach talks of a kind of ' nominal essence ' by suggesting an ostensive kind baptising an object by applying a sortal property, which will clarify the reference and its correct identity over time. For example, if we point to a man and say ' This man's name is ' X, to exclude the possibility of referring to his nose or a time–slice.[9] Geach's nominal essence possibly is to be understood as aprioricity and not necessity So ' X is a *man*' or ' Plymouth is a *car* ' are apriori truths and therefore not real, but nominal. This is a good move, but Schwartz surely would not buy this account for its apriori ground.

To come back to Schwartz's allegations. Even if we grant him that the properties of an object which make it a member of a particular artifactual kind are not matters of fact to be investigated by scientists, this would not establish that they are analytically associated with the name of that kind because, as I said before, pencils and chairs are so common that some descriptions are always associated with them But it will be different if we take a rare kind of obsolete or ancient kind of artifact (about which we have no knowledge). In this case we have to depend on experts and follow their use of a name for a particular referent. The point would be more clear if we take into account the sophisticated inventions of science. Everyday there are additions of newly invented gadgets and instruments for which we have to depend entirely on experts' knowledge and follow the use of the names attached by these scientists to a particular referent. So Schwartz's illuminating arguments, some of which are very forceful, do not really disprove the central claim of the direct reference theory nor establish that artifacts

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do not have any essential property. If being gold is essential for gold, then being a table is essential for a table [10] except ceasing to be a table. The direct reference theory can at least establish this form of trivial essentialism. To go further in a metaphysical way from a theory of language, however, leads to serious difficulties.

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NOTES

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9. This is discussed in S. Kripke; *Naming and Necessity*, fn. 58.
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GOD AND GODLINGS IN AFRICAN ONTOLOGY

A study on the above theme definitely borders on African metaphysics. Metaphysics is " that which comes after physics " the letter being the study of nature in general. Thus the questions of metaphysics arise out of, but go beyond, factual or scientific questions about the world. [1] William James defined metaphysics as " nothing but an unusually obstinate effort to think clearly ".[2] Some would define that term as " anti–dialectic method in thought and cognition which considers things and phenomena final, immutable, independent of one another and free from internal contradiction. "[3] The term metaphysics covers a wide range of issues in philosophy. Metaphysical thinking is an attempt to understand clearly any object of thought whether physical, intentional or spiritual. " To think metaphysically is to think, without abitrariness and dogmatism, on the most basic problems of existence. " [4] This piece is an attempt to bring metaphysical thinking to bear on African understanding of God and to put into proper perspective the vitiated and misleading thought that African culture is atheistic and polytheistic.

A discussion of this kind is about the nature of God and the way Africans understand it. There are several postulates concerning the nature of God. One of the views about the nature of God is theism which is the belief in the existence of " a supreme personal being–Distinct from the world and creator of the world " [5]. The opposite of this view is atheism which holds that there is not Supreme being or Creator of the Universe.

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There is also the view that God exists but that He has no power over the world and this is called Deism. There is again the view that the belief in God is a matter of faith and belief. This view is called Fideism. We have those who are called the Sceptics that is those who neither believe in the existence nor non-existence of God. Pantheism according to Chambers 20th Century Dictionary is " the doctrine that identifies God with the universe; the worship of all gods..."[6]. I wish to argue that African culture is close to Pantheism but is precisely panpsychic and theistic in cheracter. Pantheism should not be construed as atheism as some people might think. I wish to delineate clear conception of African panpsychism and theism.

African World View: *Pantheism or Panpsychism ?*

Pantheism is one of the philosophical and religious doctrines which attempts to explain the nature of God and how it is related to the universe. It is commonly understood as the identification of God with the universe. It is a doctrine that usually occurs in a religious and philosophical contexts in which there are already tolerably clear conceptions of God and the universe and the question has arisen of how these two conceptions are related"[7]. History of thought has shown that pantheistic understanding of the universe and God is discernible in the ancient Greek and Western philosophy generally. This is not to say that they have a monopoly of the thought. I shall show later that a similar concept (Panpsychism) is equally a feature of the ancient African philosophy. It seems of best to believe that the pantheistic and panpsychic views of the world are as old as man.

In the ancient Greek philosophy, some pantheistic views have been ascribed to the Eleatists and Xenophanes. Thales and Anaximanes identified the objects in the world with a divine

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power of substance which conferred life and movement. In Indian thought, there is some element of pantheism. The notion of *Brahman* " is the single, infinite reality, indefinable and unchanging behind illusory changing world of perceived material object .. our ordinary knowledge is such that knower and known, subject and object, are distinct... But to know *Brahman* would be for subject and object to become identical". [8] This Indian thought tends to distinguish between ordinary knowledge and real knowledge. Ordinary knowledge is the knowledge of changing and distinct elements and entities while the real knowledge is to know that all is one or that there is a unity of all things in *Brahman*. Socrates and Plato's unchanging real world and the changing physical world have roughly the same pantheistic element. In Plato's *Republic,* the physical universe and all that it contains are imitations of the things in the real world. In other words there is a unity of all things in the real world controlled by Demiurge (or God.)

In Western philosophy, pantheism has been adopted, upheld and studied in various ways by various scholars. Among these philosophers were Scotus Erigena, Giordano Bruno, Jakob Boehme and so on. According to Scotus Erigena, " the whole nature is composed of four species of being : that which creates and is not created, that which is created and creates, that which is created and does not create and that which is not created and does not create". [9] The first is God as the creator and the last is God again as that into which all created beings have returned. The second and third are created universe which is in the process of passing from God in His first form to God in the last form. The essence of Erigena's pantheism is that all flows from God and goes back into him. This doctrine is similar to Gnosticism and Indian *Brahmanism* which teach the doctrine of the development and re–unification of the soul to the ultimate or the great *Brahman*.

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Another pantheist, of anti-christian kind, is Giordano Bruno. He "conceived God as the immanent cause or goal of nature, distinct from each finite particular only because he includes them all within his own being".[10] It has been observed that Erigena and Bruno's pantheism portrays the universe as an all inclusive system. Another pantheist, Jakob Boehme, saw the foundation of everything in the divine. Boehme made no distinction between nature and spirit. He saw nature as entirely the manifestation of Spirits

Another person whose doctrine of pantheism is very prominent in western philosophy is Spinoza. In his pantheism, he sought to discover the 'Supreme good independent of all the ordinary contingencies of chance and misfortune'. According to Richard Schacht, "only that which is capable of completely filling and occupying the mind can be the Supreme good in Spinoza's sense".[11] And the only knowledge which would satisfy these requirements would be that the mind is part of the total system of nature and is at one with it when recognising that everything is as it must be. Spinoza sees the whole universe as a single connective system. This portrays him as a determinist and of course he is one. He speaks of 'nature' 'Substance' and 'God' as interchangeable concepts. In a pantheistic sense he talks of the totality of universe as being synonymous with nature or substance or God. He, therefore, sees God as the totality of the universe which he calls substance or nature. Nature, according to Spinoza, is the cause of itself and its existence and characteristics follow from its essential nature. Spinoza's idea about the nature and properties of God is summed up in the following statements of his; "I have shown that he necessarily exists, that he is one : that he is; and acts, solely by the necessity of his own nature; that he is the free, cause of all things, and how he is so; that all things are in God, and so dependent on him;

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lastly, that all things are pre–determined by God, not through his free will or absolute fiat but from the very nature of God". [12] There are many other philosophers who have expressed pantheistic view about the universe and God. Schleiermacher and Fichte are among them. Pantheism primarily is about the identification of the universe with God or the explanation of the universe as one logically or necessarily interconnected system.

From the foregoing diversity of the meaning of pantheism, one will observe that Panpsychism and Pantheism have close relations in their meanings. Panpsychism according to Chambers 20th Century Dictionary, is "a theory that all nature has a psychic side." What one easily infers from this theory is the view that everything in nature is divine. In African culture, there is the view that every object or thing in the physical world has a divine substance. Similarly, we observe the same divine nature of things in Thales, Anaximanes, Socrates, Plato and Jacob Boehme's Pantheisms. While these thinkers are Pantheistic in the sense that they see the unity of the divine entities in God, they can be seen to be panpsychic in the sense that they postulate spiritual life in every observable phenomenon.

It is logically inferable that the concept of Pantheism is based on the concepts of theism and panpsychism. It is theistic in that it upholds the existence of God and Panpsychic in the sense that it maintains that there is life in every object or phenonmenon. Pantheism might not afterall be atheistic as some people might think.

The question, "Is African World–view Pantheistic or Panpsychic?", is very crucial. I have the inclination to think that in some senses, especially in the pantheistic senses of Jacob Boehme, Socrates, Thales and so on, African Culture is pantheistic. But Pantheism as the identification of the Supreme

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being with the universe does not properly accord with the African cosmology. But there is no doubt that African culture is Panpsychic. Panpsychism is the fundamental basis of African religion and philosophy. On the other hand, while African ontology and cosmology is basically Panpsychic, it is equally Theistic in that its idea of God is transcendental, being seperate from the universe it created. Therefore, Theism and Panpsychism are equally important features of African Ontology In the Panpsychic or Ontological order of the Africans, the supreme being is at the head followed by divinities, gods, deified human beings, spirits, ancestors, plants, waters, phenomena and objects. Every one of these entities is believed to have a psychic dimension.

Theistic Panpsychism :

I believe that Africans have a Panpsychic and Theistic view of the universe. This is shown by their understanding of the relationships between the Suprem God and lesser gods or divinities, man and natural objects. African Panpsychism is the belief that everything in the universe is spiritual and that spirits, divinities, man, plants, animals, physical objects, rivers and waters are creatures of God, the Supreme being. In line with the thought of Bruno and Erigena, the Africans believe in the all inclusive universe created by one God. Just like Jacob Boehme and Spinoza they see the foundation of everything in the divine. Altogether, the Africans believe in the immanent God mnnifesting Himself in the things which He created.

Africans regard this universe as a religious one. God is believed to be immanent in every object and phenomena " It has been suggested that the Yoruba and other west–African groups think of God both as Creator and as ancestor. He transcends the world and humanity, acting upon them from without; but

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he also is immanent, acting within and through nature and man ".[13] The pantheistic sense here is the idea of universal unity of being, manifested in the variety of the human and natural worlds.

In Africa, it is believed that divinities or gods are the personifications of God's activities and manifestations. God's activities and manifestations are also discernible in natural phenomena and objects, nature, spirits, deified heroes and mythological figures. "Divinities are on the whole thought to have been created by God, in the ontological category of the spirits. They are associated with Him, and often stand for His activities or manifestations either as personifications or as the spiritual beings in charge of these major objects or phenomena of nature. Some of them are national heroes who have been elevated and deified, but this is rare, and when it does happen the heroes become associated with some function or form of nature".[14] In African panpsychism, everything, whether spiritual or physical, flows from God. Things are either manifestation or personification of God. In other words, behind every object or phenomenon is a spiritual essence which is a part of God. The Ashanti of Ghana have a pantheon of divinities which are believed to be part of God. So do the Yoruba of Nigeria.

In trying to locate the importance and place of God in African Ontology one will invariably touch on the relations between God, pantheon and man. While pantheism is the doctrine that identifies God with the universe and the worship of all gods, pantheon has been defined as a temple of all gods. Pantheons and mythologies were common features of Babylonians, Greek, Roman, Egyptians and ancient African religions. There was a Rotunder created on the site of Agripa of 27BC, now the church of Santa Maria. This place was a burial place of great Italians and was a

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great pantheon of deities. It seems that the earliest belief of man's civilization is the belief in many gods. But Africans do not only believe in gods, they also believe in the existence of the Supreme deity who manifests Himself in the divinities and gods.

In African thought, a pantheon is capable of explaining a people's cosmology and ontology. In every African pantheon, there are the following forces at work; the Supreme Being, nature–gods, divinities, ancestors and deified heroes. There may be a sense in which these religions believe in angels, spirits and holy–ghosts all of which are the manifestation of God. But this sense is different from pantheism as the indentification of God with the universe. It is a narrower conception of it, if at all it is accepted by Islam and Christianity.

African panpsychism is a philosophy of consolation and love. It is self–explanatory and empirical. It is empirical in the sense that the gods and divinities are believed to exist in the midst of the people while providing them with their needs, hopes, aspirations. These gods also check the unwanted and immoral behaviours of the people.

An average African temple or Pantheon is not a magnificent building like Western or Islamic Churches and Mosques respectively. It is a groove in the forest or a small house made from local–raw materials. Inside the pantheon or temples are symbols of different gods, divinities and spirits. Inside the temple one will find black and white chalks, some sacrificial animals like chicken, goat, cow and so on. It is not unusual to discover a body of rules and regulations governing the mode of worship, sacrifice and offering in a pantheon or temple. In a pantheon, while there are various images of different gods, Africans do not have a conceptual image of God. Thougha conceptual image of

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God was absent, the presence of God in all activities of life is very much felt.

There is a popular myth in Africa which says that there was a golden age when men walked with God. But a woman is blamed to have brought the ' dyllic state ' to an end. One of the versions of these myths, is the one told by the Margi of Nigeria that in the past, the sky could be touched and there was no need to work because God filled men's calabashes without their working. Unfortunately, a woman put out a dirty calabash and infected the finger of one of the sky-children. God, out of anger, returned to a distant place God, by this and other numerous actions, demonstrated His majesty. Africans came to hold God in high esteem and instead of approaching him directly, they approach him through the lesser gods and divinities. The traditional cosmological argument against the existence of God do not apply to African God. This is because whatever evil or misfortune that occurs in the world cannot be blamed on God. The blame goes to the lesser gods whom God has left the administration of the universe with. And the lesser gods themselves do not just cause misfortune or evil to befall man. They do so when the ontological equilibrium between man and gods is disturbed by man by flouting any of the moral code that binds the society together.

The supreme deity is understood as the creator, the giver of rain. He is omnipotent and omniscient. He is seen as father or mother. While some communities in Africa had a temple for God, other communities had not. The Ashanti of central Ghana had temple for the Supreme being which is served by the priests.

African God is everywhere. He is omnipresent. He is certain and real to the people of Africa. It is wrong for some people to say that God did not reveal himself to the African. There is

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no anthropological and historical account to show that God did not reveal himself to the Africans. Again, the account that Africans once worshipped one God alone, and that they hence degenerated from monotheism to polytheism needs clarification. For one thing, Africans did not and never abandoned the worship of one God. What they did was the veneration or worship of lesser gods in addition to their worship of the Supreme God. The Supreme deity had retired to a distant place and they had to approach Him through the lesser gods. So the idea that the African are worshiping many gods or that they are polytheistic is rather a cultural advancement which recognises the existence of super–sensible forces and this makes their lives more meaningful. Under the worship of many gods, they fear and propitiate the gods. "Belief in the gods seems to have its roots in human desire and fears, particularly those associated with self–preservation. Like all other creatures human beings have a profound will to live, which is what mainly gives one's existence a meaning from one sun shine to the next". [15] African belief in gods is an acknowledgement of the immediate and direct influence of gods on people's life. However, the power of God is supreme; everything flows from him and inheres in him. Godlings and ancestors are intermediaries; prayers and offerings made to them may be passed on to the source of all". [16] The relation between God and the lesser gods is represented by a triangle. God is seen as being represented by the apex. The base is sometimes personified as earth godess, the producer of food. Man lives on earth.

On one side of the triangle are ancestors, while on the other are gods and natural forces. This philosophy or the arrangement of forces is what I will call Theistic panpsychism. Some would call it philosophy of forces.

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In the West Africans the pantheons of gods are the expression of the forces of nature which, " men fear or try to propitiate." These gods have their own temples and priests and they are ubiquitious and have numerous shrines. But these gods are neither imprisoned in or synonymous with shrines. Divinities according to J. Mbiti ' cover personifications of God's activities and manifestations of natural phenomena and objects, the so called ' nature spirits ', deified heroes and mythological figures " [17]. Some believe that these divinites were created by God, while some would say that they are emanated by God. Whichever one is the case, they were the manifestations of God in African panpsychism. Each of the divinities have specific functions to perform.

It is said that the Ashanti of Ghana have a pantheon of divinities through whom God manifests Himself. The Yoruba people of Nigeria are believed to have the largest collection of divinities in Africa. ' Orisanla ' is the Supreme divinity in the Yoruba country. He acts as God's earthly deputy in creative and executive functions. Most divinities are manifestations of natural forces. Let us look at some of these gods and divinities.

The Sun and the Moon Gods :

The cult of sun and moon are found in some parts of Africa. It is obtainable in Egyptian mythologies. Among the Ashanti of Ghana, God is called Nature. And He is personified by the Sun. According to Parrinder, He is symbolised by the four limbed cross, indicating the four points of the compass and by golden desks, scarabs and binds.

Some communites among the Ibos of Nigeria have cult of sun, who is a child of the Supreme God. The symbol of the god is a branch of a tree planted outside a dwelling hut and sometimes a dish in front of the house is said to represent the sun's

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disk. The Ibos believe in the cult of the moon too. When an Ibo sees the new moon, he says, holding up his hand, "New moon ! protect me as the last moon protected me." He asks the moon to bring for him good things and so on.

Storm God

Gods of storm are identifiable in many parts of Africa. The Ibos and Yorubas of Nigeria have high respect for god of storm, lightening and thunder. The Yoruba divinity of lightening is known as Shango. The people worship him In his temples were ancient implements like stones that are believed to have come down from heaven when a house was struck by lightening. Shango is not only a storm god, it is also a deified hero, believed to have been the 4th King of Oyo, the ancient Yoruba Capital.

Mother Earth

The earth is constituted into a cult because it is the mother of plants, animals and men. African people revere it so much just like the ancient Greeks. The cultic nature of the earth arose from the belief of some African communities that it possesses a mystical power. The earth forbids blood–shed. There are earth shrines where social groups can go and worship. Among the Ibos of Nigeria, the earth deity is called ALA or ANI. It is said that this ANI is comparable to Egyptian Isis and Italian madonas. Ani is regarded as the owner of all men and she is responsible for public morality. Public sacrifice is made to ANI before sowing and planting the land and at harvest.

Water Gods

Water god is considered sacred by many cultures in the world. In Egypt as well as in Africa, water is used in many rites. Christians use water for baptism by immersion. Wells, springs, rivers, lakes and the sea are believed to have spirits dwelling in them. The Ashanti of Ghana have a river god called Tano.

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Tano is the head of a pantheon comprising of his wives, sons, brothers who are other streams and watery places. The Yoruba of Nigeria have a sea god, OLOKUN. OLOKUN is represented by one of the famous Ife bronzes.

These divinities and gods are the forces or tentacles through which the African Supreme deity or God manifests His powers. An interesting analogy can be drawn between God and the Unified field theory and, between the divinities or gods and the forces of gravity, the force of electromagnetism, the force of weak neuclear interaction and the force of strong nuclear interaction. These four forces are components and aspects of the Unified field just as the divinities or gods are aspects or manifestations of the African God. That is why it seems to me that Einstein's theory of relativity is a Scientific model of African Panpsychism. The unified field and its forces are pantheistically related.

Conclusion

There are three major conceptions of the divine nature in Western tradition of philosophical and religious thought. (a) There is a conception of divine self transcending the world and interpreted in personal terms (b) the conception of God as an immanent order or power to which all finite reality is subject. (c) There is the monistic idea of God as the Absolute or all–embracing totality. The first of these conceptions if mostly found in Judeo–Christian tradition and Islamic thought. The second conception is found in the thoughts of philosophers like Spinoza and others of mystical tradition, while the third is found in the thought of Hegel and in modern absolute idealism.

African traditional belief in God is a peculiar one. It seems to be ironically a combination of the first and second concep-

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tions. Africans often interpret God in personal terms and as transcending the world. They at the same time see God as an immanent power whose powers are observed in various aspects. Objects, men and phenomena have spiritual causes which are part of God and subject to him. This is African Panpsychism which is genetically related to pantheism. [18]

All postulates about God or Supreme being are culture–bound. Culture is a force that influences people's or individual beliefs; it moulds and refines people's belifes. Besides that, an uncultured person can conceive the idea of a divine being. All in all, conceptions of God are as many as there are many cultures.

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NOTES

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18. Ever since the inception of the concept of Pantheism into the philosophical lexicon, some thinkers have suspisciously viewed it as being atheistic. In every sense of the term it *is* thiestic. It is analytically true because imputing atheism into pantheism is a contradiction. The difference between Pantheism and theism border on the nature of the divine being. This paper is an attempt to clearly identify God in African Pantheism.

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ARE THERE REALLY PERENNIAL PHILOSOPHICAL DISPUTES?

> Principles taken upon trust, consequences lamely deduced from them, want of coherence in the parts, and of evidence in the whole, these are everywhere to be met with in the systems of the most eminent philosophers, and seems to have drawn disgrace upon philosophy itself.. (E)ven the rabble without doors may judge from the noise and clamour, which they hear, that all goes not well within There is nothing which is not the subject of debate; and in which men of learning are not of contrary opinions. The most trivial question escapes not our controversy, and in the most momentous moments we are not able to give any certain decisions (Hume, 1960, pp. xvii–xviii).
>
> The first to present his case seems right, till another comes forward and questions him (Proverbs, 18.17).

If Hume's description of the state of cognitive discord of the discipline of philosophy is correct, then the question should be immediately asked: 'is the Western tradition in philosophy a degenerating research programme (or research tradition) (Laudan, 1977)?' Alternatlvely: 'in the face of the *problem of perennial philosophical disputes* (PPPD), how can philosophy as cognitive enterprise be considered to be both *progressive* and *rational?*' This is a major problem for anyone who understands philosophy as that discipline which attempts to formulate and justify *Weltanschauungs*, that is, world views (Kekes, 1980), (Smith,

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1984). Such *Weltanschauungs* attempt to give an account of the furniture of the universe, a view of human nature and an outline of the place of human beings in the scheme of the world. Philosophy, unlike most literature and poetry, *must* support its conclusions by reasoned argument It is not enough merely to describe the world; the description must be justified and shown to be more satisfactory and preferable to other competing descriptions, with respect to various cognitive standards such as truth, consistency, comprehensibility and simplicity, among others (Rescher, 1979). If philosophy is a rational enterprise, it should give us *knowledge*. If philosophy is a cognitively progressive enterprise, it should give us increasingly more knowledge over time. Yet, the existence of perennial philosophical disputes seems to indicate that in its 2500 year history, philosophy has produced no knowledge and not a single philosophical problem has been satisfactorily resolved. Not only does the history of philosophy seem to be little more than the successive refutation of previous philosophical *Weltanschauungs*, but in more recent times when the bulk of published basic research in philosophy has appeared in specialised journals, it is not uncommon to find criticisms of an author who has published a paper in a particular journal, criticised in the very issue in which the target paper appeared. From an anthropological perspective, philosophy may be seen as a discipline torn by unending disputes, agonised by pluralism and unachieved consensus, and humiliated by the success of the natural sciences. The disagreements and failures of the past and present, *should* weigh like a nightmare on the brains of the present generation of philosophers (Smith, 1988).

In this paper I consider two objections to the problem of perennial philosophical disagreements which derive from post-empiricist philosophy of science. These objections attempt dissolve our central problem by showing that there are no perennial

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philosophical disputes. These objections will now be outlined, and after doing this I shall try to show that both replies are unsatisfactory on historical grounds.

The first objection *loosely* derives from the work of Kuhn (1970) although some may wish to call this criticism the Hegelian response. According to this view problems and standards are historically variable, hence philosophical solutions and their adequacy are also historically variable. As a result, perennial philosophical disputes do not really occur. Philosophers living in different contexts may use the same worlds, but they mean quite different things by them. Stated more formally this argument is as follows :

(K_1) Philosophical problems and standards of adequacy change over time.

Therefore,

(K_2) Solutions to philosophical problems and standards of adequacy change over time.

Therefore,

(K_3) Perennial philosophical disputes do not occur.

A second objection, which is a variant of the above argument, has been given by Ruth Barcan Marcus (1985). Marcus argues that on historical grounds we can see that most past philosophers are displaced, so there must be substantial agreement about which philosophical theories are rejected. Philosophical theories do not endure (*ibid*, p. 325) :

> "There are more than 700 Western philosophers judged worthy of notice in Paul Edwards' *Encyctopedia of Philosophy*. Many of them had a period of substantial recognition. Most have ceased to be studied or read except for occasional recondite scholarship. Very few will even fleetingly be

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a continuing part of any philosophical canon. Far from never having suffered rejection, most wane and are largely ignored. They fare no better than abortive or rejected scientific theories. Nor is the eclipse due to their failure to achieve the fullness and richness of holistic speculative systems as is sometimes claimed. A perusal of the literature falsifies the suggestion. I am reminded that my first awareness of speculative philosophical systems was through happening upon some imposing volumes by John Elof Boodin with titles like *The Realistic Universe, Time and Reality*. In the early years of this century Boodin was seriously studied. His post–humous papers were published as late as 1957 by the University of California Press. Where is he now ?"

Boodin is of course dead, but it does not follow that the issues which he dealt with, such as the problem of realism and the nature of time are dead. The sort of historical argument employed by Marcus is insufficient to show that there are either no, or very few, perennial philosophical disagreements. What must be shown is that *all* philosophical proplems, or all of the most important philosophical problems, change over time, along with the standards of adequacy. This qualification needs to be added to the argument cited above before it can be regarded as being valid. It is the soundness of this argument which I wish to question by questioning the truth of its premises.

First, I shall show that there is an example of a philosophical problem which has been discussed since the dawn of western philosophy in Greece – the problem of formulatiug a consistent view of change in the light of Zeno's paradoxes – which whilst changing in formulation over two thousand years remain with us still. As Wesley Salmon has put it in his introduction to a

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volume of essays on Zeno's paradoxes (Salmon [ed.], 1970, pp, 43-40).

> "It would, of course, be rash to conclude that we had actually arrived at a complete resolution of all problems that come out of Zeno's paradoxes. Each age, from Aristotle on down, seems to find in paradoxes difficulties that are roughly commensurate with the mathematical, logical and philosophical resources then available. When more powerful tools emerge, philosophers seem willing to acknowledge deeper difficulties that would have proved insurmountable for more primitive methods. We may have resolutions which are appropriate to our present level of understanding, but they may appear quite inadequate when we have advanced further."

According to this point of view even though Zeno's original formulation of his paradoxes makes these paradoxes seem like little more than sophisms, the paradoxes have been reformulated over time to escape previous solutions and revive the difficulties which Zeno first saw with the concept of change and plurality. This means that a problem may very well change over time, as might the standards of adequacy by which solutions to the problem are judged, and yet enough continuity exists between the original problem and its reformulations to say that we are considering either the *same* problem, or the same *family* of problems. This means that the mere fact that philosophical problems are reformulated, modified and rethought does not show that there are no perennial philosophical disagreements or disputes. This fact is consistent with philosophical problems becoming *more difficult* over time, as if we have opened one door and found a thousand before us. The problem of the nature of the self has been complicated by a century of neurophysiological discoveries; the semantical paradoxes such as the Liar

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paradox, which puzzled most great philosphers from the dawn of Western philosophy, have been supplemented by an array of powerful logical paradoxes discovered by modern formal logicians and arguments such as the ontological argument for the existence of God have been revived through the use of new formal systems of modal logic. It would require a discussion which would be more lengthy than necessary to fully document my case by considering all of these philosophical problems. Hence, I shall concentrate on the example of Zeno's paradoxes to make my point.

Zeno's paradoxes are a particularly good example to choose because they enable us to deal with this objection on its most favourable grounds: that philosophers in different contexts may use the same words, but they mean quite different things by them. Certainly concepts of space, time and motion have radically changed over the last two thousand years. But Zeno at no point attempted to define 'motion' or 'change.' He devised paradoxes which he thought, rightly or wrongly, would threaten any conceivable general metaphysical theory of motion or change. To see this I shall concentrate my discussion upon the best known of Zeno's paradoxes: *Achilles and the Tortoise.*

Aristotle in his *Physics* VI, 9, 2396 formulates Zeno's paradox of Achilles and the Tortoise in the following fashion (paraphrased): Achilles can never beat the slow Tortoise in their race, for given the Tortoise's lead Achilles must first reach the place from which the Tortoise started. But by then the Tortoise has a further lead, so that the slow Tortoise must always be in advance, however small. If this is so, then there can be no occasion when a body can reach its destination, for after any distance there will always be another distance to cover. Hence, motion is impossible. This argument is based upon the premise that space

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and time are *continuous* and thus is explicitly advanced by Zeno as an attack upon continuous theories of space and time.

Another of Zeno's paradoxes, the so–called Stadium, attacks the notion of discontinuous or atomistic space and time. Given that space and time are either continuous or discontinuous, Zeno concludes that reality is unchanging. Zeno is certainly not unaware that it appears to our senses that change occurs and that Achilles passes the Tortoise. He has taken the criterion of logical argument to override the evidence of the senses. This then is the first response which can be made to Zeno's paradox: accept the conclusion and deny the possibility of motion and change. This view has only been opted for by a handful of Western philosophers : F. H. Bradley's *Appearance and Reality* (1930), whilst making no explicit textual reference to Zeno, uses Eleatic arguments to establish that space, time and motion are contradictory appearances.

Another solution which a few philosophers have taken is to accept that Zeno's arguments are sound, and also that motion is possible, so that reality is seen to have inherent contradictions. This position was taken by Hegel in his *Lectures on the History of Philosophy* (1829, pp. 261–278) when he rejected the universal validity of the law of non–contradiction. This position has also been taken by modern dialectical logicians such as Graham Priest (1985). The dispute between Priest and Zeno could only be resolved by examining the question of the validity of the law of non–contradiction : differences in viewing the validity of this law account for the radically different metaphysical positions of these philosophers, even though both groups accept Zeno's arguments as being valid, and in fact sound.

Other philosophers attempted to use Zeno's paradoxes to prove particular speculative metaphysical theses. Henri Bergson, ...7

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in *Creative Evolution* (1911), for example, accepts that change or becoming is continuous, but denies that either methematical analysis or logical rsasoning are capable of enabling us to understand motion and change. This style of solution, if it can be called that at all, is certainly not the most common solution to Zeno's paradox. Many philosophers have felt that Zeno's paradoxes, especially Achilles and the Tortoise rest on simple mathematical errors. Russell (1929, pp. 182-198) and Whitehead (1929, p. 107) were both critical of various paradoxes of Zeno on mathematical grounds. It is worthwhile considering their respective views on the problem with Achilles and the Tortoise.

Russell reformulates the Achilles paradox methematically and attempts to show a mathematical flaw in the argument. If Achilles overtakes the Tortoise it must be after an infinite number of instants have elapsed since the beginning of the race. Russell accepts that this is true. He then argues that Zeno's view that an infinite number of instants must make up an infinitely long time is not true, and so Zeno's conclusion is refuted. Russell at no point shows that this proposal – that an infinite number of instants add up to an infinitely long time – is either accepted by Zeno or is essential to his argument. It is hardly likely that Zeno accepted Russell's proposal, since in Zeno's paradox of plurality he considers what he might describe today as the difficulty of constructing the extended linear continuum out of unextended elements. Nor is Russell's reconstruction of Zeno's argument satisfactory in so far as it makes the source of the difficulty of the Achilles plain. We shall see the real source of this difficulty after examining Whitehead's response.

Whitehead argues that the Achilles should be analysed in the light of the modern mathematical theory of convergent series. By use of these series we can show, given the appropriate distances and times, when and where Achilles overtakes the

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Tortoise. According to Peirce, "...this silly little catch presents no difficulty at all to a mind adequately trained in mathematics and in logic" (Peirce, 1935, p. 177). Not all philosophical minds trained in mathematics and logic have agreed with Peirce. Max Black (1950-1951) has argued that the notion of a limit shows that these distances and intervals of time may approach zero but that they do not become zero as Zeno's original paradox seemed to require. The mathematical solution is fundamentally irrelevant.

Max Black's paper is very interesting for its attempt to show that the expression "infinite series of (performable) acts" is self-contradictory by means of the notion of an infinity machine. It may be thought that there in no logical impossibility, but only a medical impossibility in performing an infinite number of tasks and in fact motion consists in the performance of an infinite number of tasks. There is never a time at which we are ending our motion, but there is a time at which we would have already reached our destination. The infinity machine is used to show that this proposed solution to Zeno's Achilles paradox cannot succeed. The following example comes from James Thomson (1970, pp. 94–95) :

> "There are certain reading lamps that have a button in the base. If the lamp is off and you press the button the lamp goes on, and if the lamp is on and you press the button the lamp goes off. So if the lamp was originally off, and you pressed the button an odd number of times, the lamp is on, and if you pressed the button an even number of times the lamp is off, Suppose now that the lamp is off, and I succeed in pressing the button an infinite number of times, perhaps making one jab in one minute, another jab in the next half minute, and so on, according to Russell's recipe. After I have completed the whole infinite sequence

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> of jabs, i. e. at the end of the two minutes, is the lamp on or off? It seems impossible to answer this question. It cannot be on, because I did not ever turn it on without at once turning it off. It cannot be off, because I did in the first place turn it on, and thereafter I never turned it off without at once turning it on. But the lamp must be either on or off. This is a contradiction."

The extensive literature dealing with infinity machines (Salmon [ed], 1970) shows that Zeno's Achilles paradox is far from being trivial, and far from being satisfactorily solved if space, time and motion are accepted as being continuous. I have now supplied an example of a philosophical problem which is perennial–being discussed by many great philosophers since the dawn of Western philosophy–and which through recent reformulations, has become even more difficult. So a philosophical problem can change over time, yet still be perennial. What is important is the sort of change. I have considered internal changes in a problem's formulation in my attempt to refute this objection. I now wish to consider the view that perennial philosophical disagreements do not exist because entire problems are abandoned.

It is true historically that many philosophical problems were the product of the interest and acceptance of certain philosophical systems, and once they were abandoned, the problems went with them. A good example of this is the problem of the nature of the Absolute: when absolute idealist philosophical systems were abandoned at the turn of this century this problem ceased to be of central interest to philosophers. But the problem of the Absolute is not a "grand" philosophical problem arising from speculation about the basic fabric of reality and the fundamental concepts involved in understanding, such as the problem of universals, the nature and justification of knowledge, the nature of causation and the freewill problem. In what follows I shall

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give one example of a philosophical problem which has not changed in its formulation since the dawn of Western philosophy, and where contemporary philosophers usually begin their discussion of this problem by citing and relying upon the ancient formulation of this problem.

Sextus Empiricus in *Outlines of Pyrrhonism*, II, chap. IV gave a precise outline of the *diallelus* problems of justifying a standard of truth, justification or knowledge (Sextus Empiricus 1933, pp. 163–165):

> "...in order to decide the dispute which has arisen about the criterion, we must possess an accepted criterion by which we shall be able to judge the dispute; and in order to possess an accepted criterion, the dispute about the criterion must first be decided. And when the argument thus reduces itself to a form of circular reasoning the discovery of the criterion becomes impracticable, since we do not allow them (the Dogmatic philosophers) to adopt a criterion by assumption, while if they offer to judge the criterion by a criterion we force them to a regress *ad infinitum.*"

This argument attempts to establish that an adequately justified standard of knowledge is impossible. Given that there can be no particular knowledge claims without some general standard used to justify or show that what is claimed to be knowledge is in fact knowledge, it follows that there is no knowledge at all unless the *diallelus* can be escaped.

Richard Popkin (1664, p.xi) points out that the Pyrrhonic form of scepticism was unknown in the west until the rediscovery of the manuscripts of Sextus Empiricus in the sixteenth century. Popkin's book *The History of Scepticism from Erasmus to Descartes* is a detailed historical treatment of the impact of Sextus

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Empiricus' arguments upon theology and philosophy during the period, 1500–1650, which we can draw on here to develop a critical historical argument against Marcus' objection.

Popkin points out that the full impact of Sextus Enpiricus' *diallelus* argument was first felt in the dispute over the proper standard of religious knowledge. The problem of finding a criterion of truth, reinforced by Sextus' argument, was later raised regarding natural knowledge provided by the new natural sciences of the day. This led to what Popkin describes as the *crise pyrrhonienne* of the early seventeenth century (ibid, p.1).

The conflict between Martin Luther's views and his quarrel with Erasmus illustrates the difficulties raised by the *diallelus* in a theological context. In writings such as *The Appeal to the German Nobility* and *The Babylonish Captivity of the Church,* Luther denied that the Church is the criterion of religious knowledge and at the Diet of Worms, pleased that the correct criterion of religious knowledge is conscience conditioned by a reading of the Scriptures. In outlining a new criterion of religious knowledge, Luther directly challenged the authority of the Church. This challenge was met by Catholic theologians, particularly Erasmus of Rotterdam, by a sceptical defense of the faith. Erasmus in *De Libero Arbitrio* argued that Scripture is not as clear and uncontroversial as Luther had supposed : theologians have argued about the meaning of certain Scriptural passages and the correct solution of certain theological problems for centuries without any sight of solution. Now Luther claims that he has within his grasp the *true* meaning of Scripture : but how do *we* know this ? This whole debate is too difficult to resolve, Erasmus maintained, so it is best to accept in good faith the traditional teachings of the Church. Luther replied to Erasmus in *De Libero Arbitrio* arguing that scepticism was inconsistent with Christianity as the Scriptures are not composed of unjus-

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tified hopes, but of God-given *truths*. Some of these truths may be difficult to know, but there are basic truths which are clear and evident. These truths serve to illuminate the meaning of "darker" passages (*ibid.* pp. 5-7). Nevertheless Luther left it unclear as to why that which our religious conscience convicts us in believing as true, when reading the Scriptures, is in fact true rather than false. Calvin attempted to answer this problem by maintaining that our inner persuasion (if we are a Christian !) about what is true and false in religious matters is given to us by the Holy Spirit, an all-knowing and all-powerful entity who would not deceive us. Nevertheless, the Catholics argued in reply that Calvin did not escape the *diallelus* as the criterion of religious knowledge is inner persuasion, and this is authentic because it is caused by the Holy Spirit, and we know this because of inner persuasion (*ibid,* p. 9)

The rediscovery of the manuscripts of Sextus Empiricus extended the *diallelus* problem from theology to philosophy. Gian Francesco Pico della Mirandola in *Exam Vanitatis Doctrine Gentium* first made use of Sextus' arguments to destroy the foundations of rational philosophy which he saw supplying philosophical justification for various pagan world views. He hoped to lead the sceptically-devastated pagans to rest with the Christion revelation. This course of action was also recommended by Francisco Sanchez in *Quad nihil scitur* and by the better known Michel de Montaigne in his *Apologie de Raimond Sebond.* Montaigne gave a restatement of the *diallelus* problem which has been a particularly influential statement of this problem. Here for example, is a paraphrase of Montaigne's French given by Roderick Chisholm (1973, p. 3) :

> "To know whether things really are as they seem to be, we must have a *procedure* for distinguishing appearances that are true from appearances that are false. But to know

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> whether our procedure is a good procedure, we have to know whether it really *succeeds* in distinguishing appearances that are true from appearances that are false. And we cannot know whether it does really succeed unless we already know which appearances are *true* and which ones are *false*. And so we are caught in a circle."

Montaigne's version of the *diallelus* was accepted by P. Coffey in *Epistemology or the Theory of Knowledge* (1958), part I, a work first published in 1917. Montaigne's essay is thus a crucial link between the seventeenth century considerations of the *diallelus* problem and twentieth century considerations. It is hardly possible here to discuss the *diallelus* problem in the work of all major philosophers from the seventeenth century onwards, and nor is this necessary to rebut Morcus' this objection and historically illustrate the perenniality of a major philosophical problem. Rather all that we need to show is that the *diallelus* problem was discussed in both the seventeenth century and the twentieth century. Even if it was not given the same intensive discussion in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, it does not follow that the *diallelus* problem is not a perennial philosophical problem. All that this shows is that at certain times philosophers do not discuss certain problem : it does not show that the problems have been either rationally resolved or rationally abandoned.

Coffey felt that the *diallelus* argument was based upon an equivocation, although he by no means felt that this problem was a trivial one. The argument assumed that the criterion of truth must always be extrinsic to the judgement the truth of which it is the test, but (*ibid*, p. 144) :

> "... since we have the power of reflecting on our judgements, what if we find that some judgements contain *in themselves* and *inseparable from themselves*, a characteristic

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> which is the test, or criterion, of their own truth : so that by one and the same intuition we see the *truth of the judgement,* and simultaneously, – not antecedently, or subsequently or by a distinct judicial act, – the *validity of the criterion ?*"

Another philosopher, Leonard Nelson, writing a few years before the publication of Coffey's book, was not confident that the *diallelus* argument could be solved in this fashion. Arguing before the Fourth International Congress for Philosophy at Bologna in 1911, Nelson maintained that it was impossible to give reason to believe that our knowledge is objective. He gave the followiug version of the *diallelus* to show this (Nelson, 1973, p. 6) :

> "In order to solve this problem, we should have to have a criterion by the application of which we could decide whether or not a cognition is true : I shall call it briefly the "validity criterion". This criterion would itself either be nor not be a cognition. If it be a cognition, it would fall within the area of what is problematic, the validity of which is first to be solved with the aid of our criterion. Accordingly, it cannot itself be a cognition. But if the criterion be not a cognition, it would nevertheless, in order to be applicable, have to be known, i.e., we should have to know that it is a criterion of the truth. But in order to gain this knowledge of the criterion, we should already have had to apply it. In both cases, therefore, we encounter a contradiction. A "validity criterion" is consequently impossible, and hence there can be no "theory of knowledge".

The above statement of the *diallelus* argument is virtually a paraphrase of Sextus Empiricus' ancient formulation, although Nelson nowhere acknowledges this. The only difference is

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Nelson's use of the term 'cognition', which means 'true judgement' or 'true proposition'.

In the writings of Chisholm (1973) and Rescher (1973 (b); 1979, 1980) the formulation of the *diallelus* also follows the classical source of Sextus Empiricus and Montaigne. Both authors, who have considered the *diallelus* problem in more detail than any other modern philosophers, also add refinements to the classical argument to make the argument clearer. This, as we shall now see, does not materially change the problem, but rather makes the difficulties posed by the *diallelus* argument more evident.

Rescher in *The Coherence Theory of Truth* (1973 (b)) gives the following analysis of the *diallelus* argument after citing Sextus' formulation. This clearly indicates that Rescher believes that he is dealing with the *same* problem that Sextus dealt with. A criterion of truth (or knowledge) (Rescher, 1980) is of the form : whenever a proposition p meets the requirment R, then p is true :

$$(C)\ (\forall p)\ (R(p) \rightarrow T\ (p)).$$

Now to establish the truth of p is to give a deductively sound argument: C & R (p) $\rightarrow$ T (p). Now if this argument is sound, then it must be both formally valid, and have true premises. Consequently if C & R (p) is to be established as true we must establish T (C). To give a deductively sound argument for T (C) by taking C to be self–applicable, is to give an argument of the form C & R (C) $\rightarrow$ T (C). To establish T (C), it is necessary that the truth of C is established, i. e. T (C), and we thereby fall into vicious circularity. If C is not self–applicable, then T (C) is established by use of another criterion C_1 & R_1 (C) $\rightarrow$ T (C). For this argument to be accepted, it must be established to be deductively sound. To do this, we must establish

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that T (C_1). To appeal to another criterion C_2 leads us into an infinite regress.

Roderick Chisholm (1973) also begins his discussion of the *diallelus* by citing a classical source, this time Montaigne. He then adds the following analysis of the problem. We may distinguish between two fundamental epistemological questions : (A) What is the *extent* of our knowledge ? What do we know ? and (B) What are the *criteria* of our knowledge ? How are we to decide whether in fact we do know ? *Methodists* claim to be able to answer question (B) and on the basis of this provide an answer to question (A). *Particularists* claim to be able to answer question (A), and on the basis of this answer question (B). Sceptics on the other hand argue that (1) it is necessary to first solve the question of the extent of our knowledge in order to solve the question of the criteria of our knowledge and (2) it is also necessary to first solve the question of the criteria of our knowledge before we can solve the question of the extent of our knowledge. This, however, is a vicious circle. Consequently, the sceptic concludes, knowledge is impossible.

Chisholm and Rescher both supply elaborate responses so the sceptic's *diallelus* argument. It is much of a tangent to consider their solutions here, just as it is an unacceptable tangent to detail the importance of the criterion problem for other leading philosophers in this century such as Russell and Popper. My aim has been to outline one alleged perennial philosophical dispute and show that this problem has been discussed since the dawn of Western philosophy in much the same form as it was originally stated. Whilst I do not pretend to have written a treatise on this issue, the reader should be able to see a broad historical link between figures such as Sextus Empiricus, Montaigne and Rescher and Chisholm. This places the burden of proof upon the critic to show that despite the use of common formula-

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tions of a problem which they believe is the same, these thinkers are really dealing with different problems. Therefore I conclude on the basis of these historical examples of "deep" philosophical problems, that the "Hegelian" or "Kuhnian" argument, for the non–existence of pernnial philosophical disputes, fails.

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BOOK-REVIEWS

I

Griffiths, Paul; *On Being Mindless : Buddhist Meditation and the Mind-Body Problem;* La Salle, Illinois : Open Court Publishing Co., 1986; xxii+220 pp.

This book deals with an important consequence of advanced meditational self–culture as admitted in several traditions within the Buddhist religion, namely, the " attainment of cessation " *(nirodhasamāpatti),* and is offered as a " case study in the relationship between philosophical theory and soteriological practice in Indian Buddhism." Griffiths considers *nirodhasamāpatti* as an alterd state of consciousness, and the overall aim of his inquiry is to elucidate the distinctive terms in which it was " described, recommended, analysed and discussed " in the Theravāda, Vaibhāsika, and Yogācāra traditions (Sautrāntika positions also receive some consideration, albeit in a less details fashion). *On Being Mindless* is not only addressed to " Buddhologists, those who are professionally concerned with the history of Buddhist thought and practice ", but also to two other types of reader — those engaged in the study of the mind–body problem as it figures in Western traditions and students of the history of religion. Reflecting the title, the most distinctive task the book as a whole seeks to accomplish, however, is to increase critical understanding of the way " in which the relationship between the physical and the mental was conceived in early Indian Buddism ". As will be indicated in the sequel, there is

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room to criticize some of Griffiths approaches and conclusions in this book. Still, the inquiry it presents — which subjects a highly recondite inner detail in Buddhist meditational practice to close intellectual scrutiny in an innovatively comparativist framework — contains much that merit both philosophical and larger scholarly attention. *On Being Mindless* helps to highlight the existence of technically argued philosophical stadpoints within the Buddhist textual corpus in a spirit that is sensitive to some of the concerns of cross-cultural philosophizing; and this, to be sure, is significant, given the reluctance on the part of certain noted European exponents of Indian Buddhism (as Griffiths himself indicates at the outset), to even acknowledge any semblance of a philosophical drift in Buddhist writings.

The exposition in this short work (organized in four chapters, followed by a glossary and three appendices incorporating relevant textual material and translations) is engagingly complex. Both Pālī Nikāya texts and ancillary commentarial literature (of Buddhaghoṣa and Dhammapāla) are identified here as some of the prime sources for Theravāda articulations on *nirodhasamāpatti*. Griffiths considers the latter to be represented in these contexts as a condition without mental events, distinguished from death itself "only by a certain residual warmth and vitality in the unconscious practitioner's body", *Nirodhasamāpatti* as admitted in the Theravāda tradition was of course attained through specialized meditational techniques. In Griffiths' inquiry two such techniques, "cultivation of insight" (*vipassanā-bhāvanā*) and the "cultivation of tranquility" (*samathā-bhāvanā*) are emphasized and examined and they are interpreted as being respectively, "analytic" and "enstatic" on phenomenological grounds. However, he does not regard Theravāda stances on the mind-body interactions that arise from this traditions's explanations surrounding *nirodhasamāpatti* persuasive (though he

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concedes that they are illuminating in several ways, offering above all, evidence of philosophical positions inplicit in Buddhist soteriological discussion. In particular, the emergence of consciousness from the state of "cessation" as expounded in classic texts is held to generate intricate conceptual complications. The philosophical difficulties that come to the fore at this and other levels, according Griffiths, are for the most part traceable to the "Theravāda tendency towards a profound dualism in regard to mental and physical events, a dualism which perceives these as different in kind, capable of interection of various kinds but not of acting as direct efficient causes of one another". Griffiths identifies the commitment to strict impermanence and the need to account for continuity (both of the mind, and again accross lives, given belief in rebirth) as another source of problems and dilemmas. All of them, in his view, remain unresolved because of "philosophical pressures without and hermeneutical pressures within" the Theravāda tradition.

The Vaibhāsika tradition's explanations on "cessation" (which are identified as being located in several sources within its textual corpus, though Griffiths' focus falls mostly on the *Abhidharmakośa* and its commentaries), are likewise held to have been developed under certain constraints. These, it is held, are fidelity to tradition (even, Griffiths argues, when some elements in it were no longer understood, persuasive or significant), and the general Vaibhāsika commitment to "create a system" to "account for everything". He in fact regards this tradition's interpretation of "cessation" (which was treated as a *dharma*) and the emergence of consciousness from that state (accounted for in terms of the *samanantarapratyaya* conception of causality) to exemplify "intellectual acrobatics", and does not find them "entirely satisfactory, even in terms of the intellectual system

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within which it operates". The Sautrāntika position on these matters (woven around the central idea that mind and body "mutually seed one another") is identified as providing yet another philosophically interesting varient interpretation : yet this, according to Griffiths, tends to entail the suggestion that "there really are mental events in the attainment of cessation; even if they are mental events which are, in some undefined sense, inactive or unmanifest".

The texts Asaṅga and Vasubandhu are the sources for the study of the Yogācāra tradition which sought to interpret the universe in uniquely mentalistic terms. Understandably enough, Yogācāra stances on the book's central theme are clarified against the background of this tradition's key philosophical emphases woven around the notion of *ālaya-vijñāna* ("store-consciousness"). The inner details of the Yogācāra explanations concerning "cessation" (which are shown to interface on occasion with the positions taken in the other traditions), are finally located within the intricate interpretations given to the above notion. In fact Griffiths takes the view that "one of the main reasons which prompted the Yogācāra theorists to devote so much intellectual energy to the question of the store-consciousness was just this need to account for entrance into and emergence from the attainment of cessation".

Griffiths turns to evaluate Buddhist standpoints on the mind-body problem in the light of the above accountings of the *nirodhasamāpatti* in the book's final chapter. Despite its terseness (this chapter is just under seven pages), the discussion here projects some philosophically interesting conclusions which are especially noteworthy. There are, in his view, pan-Buddhist acceptances as regards the approaches to this problem : avoiding substantialist differntiations such as are ingrained in Cartesian thought, for instance, all Buddhist traditions saw the mind-body

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connections as causal relationalships that obtained "between sets of transitory events", and this, he rightly insists, was even true of the Yogācāras (who refused to admit an ontological distinction between the mental and physical). But considering other underpinnings of Buddhist reflectivity in this sphere (such as the separation of the physical and the mental and the avoidance of reductionism), the overall Buddhist stance on the mind–body connection is characterized as "a non–substantivist event–based interactionist psycho–physical dualism". Though he is mindful of the limitations of the various Buddhist explanations of the "attainment of cessation" he has highlighted, Griffiths does not dispute the internal coherenece and consistency of Buddhist philosophical contributions to the study of mind–body interrelations. What he does question, rather, is something else—their sufficiency to deal with "certain observable phenomena". And significantly, this circumstance, it appears, is ultimately traced to the Buddhist commitment to exclude substance–metaphysics altogether.

This book succeeds notably in establishing through its study of *nirodhasamāpatti* that Buddhist soteriological discussions do encompass philosophical standpoints which merit recognition as contributions to the debate on the mind–body problem. However, the criticisms Griffiths advances against these standpoints, it is well to remark, are not entirely unanswerable. Admission of a mental substance might help overcome some of the difficulties highlighted, but they also generate still others to which experientially grounded epistomologies in particular have long been sensitive. Put baldly, the issue to be confronted here is this : on what basis can one admit such a substance ? Clearly, Buddhism's exclusion of it, it must be recognized, was based on findings both instrospectional and meditational. Besides, there is room to argue that many of the complications in textual

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articulations on *nirodhasamāpatti* which Griffiths highlights might after all be more cogently clarified within a conceptual framework fashioned around an explicit recognition of the insignts that twentieth century analytic and linguistic philosophers—Wisdom; Ryle, Strawson. Malcolm and others — have generated in their contributions to philosophy of mind in particular. Indeed, the failure to draw their insights into a critical inquiry which deals with so many intricate issues that fall within the purview of this latter field of study could even be viewed as a methodological shortcoming, especially by compratitivists who are conscious of the deeper possibilities of East–West philosophical dialogue. But the book's exposition appears, in case, to encompass other questionable features of a more basic nature. To those who view the meditational background to Buddhism's soteriological teachings with even a modicum of empathy, *nirodhasamāpatti* itself will no doubt represent a unique manifestation of beatific ataraxia, prefiguring a state of nirvāṇic release, free of the trammels of mundane existence. The possibility of coceptually entertaining such an altered and elevated state of consciousness, it is well to observe, seems to well–neigh exist even within certain secular frames of philosophy : the perspectives of evolutionary epistemology (which, among other things, allow full scope for "imageless thoughts—thoughts that occur without any sensory or imaginal content", cf. W. W. Bartley, III, "Philosophy of Biology versus Philosophy of Physics", ed. by G. Radnitzky and W. W. Bartley, III, in *Evolutionary Epistemology, Rationality and Sciology of Knowledge*, La Salle III. : 1987, pp. 15, 26) are perhaps especially noteworthy in this connection. Yet, in Griffiths investigation, significantly, *nirodhasamāpatti* tends to be regarded in the narrowest terms of physicalistic reductionism : he finds a "model" for interpreting the physical status of one who has "attained cessation" in the ondition of a "mammal in the deepest stages of hibernation",

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and as for such a person's mind, he identifies an analogy for that in cataleptic trance states — " the kind of condition manifested by some psychotic patients and long-term coma patients ". Few readers, I think, will take this as a philosophically edifying interpretative stance. Finally, Griffiths investigation as a whole is also susceptible to a general objection of a mainly religious character. Viewed from the angle of Buddhist spirituality, the propriety of studying the nature and implications of a unique, inner religious experience wholly from outside—in this instance on the basis of a mere examination of certain textual elaborations on it, even though this is backed by the application of considerable linguistic and exegetical skills—does remain open to question. Committed Buddhists can fairly argue that though explanations dealing with *nirodhasamāpatti* are amenable to intellectual study, their full scope has to be finally understood in a context of meditational concentration rooted in spiritual self-culture. Whether the presumption implicit here—that commentators on matters meditational must also be adepts in meditation—is practically realizeable in the world of secular learning is of course highly debatable. Still, as one admires the technically useful discussions in *On Being Mindless* it is well to point out that a case can indeed be made for some appreciative understanding of Buddhist meditation even in purely textual-philosophical studies of classic elaborations of the consequences of such mediatations. It is indeed a matter for some regret that this notable work is not grounded on such an appreciative understanding.

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II

R. SUNDARA RAJAN, *Innovative Competence and Social Change,*
Indian Philosophical Quarterly Publication No. 10 (Pune, 1968), pp. 130, Rs. 25/–

———, *Towards a Critique of Cultural Reason,* OUP, (New Delhi, 1987), pp. 144 incl. Index; £ 5.95.

Sundara Rajan is perhaps the first Indian Philosopher who has been attempting to be deeply sensitive to the nuances of culture and politics in the South Asian Sub–continent. His astute scholarship has tried to link and operationalise the abstract notions of theory into possible implementable policies for national integration. Thus, the two works are a prelude to the third in print *The Primacy of the Political* : *Towards a Theory of National Integration.* For over a decade Sundara Rajan has grown to believe and work out the framework of analysis in the field of social philosophy and concern for the operation of the political domain.

It is often the practice of the reviewers to review a book/books from the perspective of its presentation, purity of discipline and to identify newer methodologies adopted by the author to indicate fresh evidence of interpretation. Thus to state that *Innovative Competence and Social Change* is written to raise certain meta–philosophical issues by a ' detailed application of the paradigm of the four causes to the domain of philosophical reasoning ' on the one hand and the linkage with a philosophical frame work to create a ' theory of innovative competence ' on the other would be merely traditional in approach. Similarly to state that *Towards a Critique of Cultural Reason* indicates Sundara Rajan's attempt to move from a Marxian view point to a deeper commitment to Kant and his central notion of ' What is Man,' will

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result for the reviewer to be engrossed in the details of technicalities relating to understanding of meaning, contextuality, functions of exemplars on one side and the study of the inter–relationship between meaning and action on the other side. Rather the canvas over which Sundara Rajan paints is vast and scholarship displayed in the discussion which connects Kant's notion of aesthetic idea with Ricoeur's perspective on speech and textual discoures are indeed original. Thus to be universal in such nuances and enjoy the intellectual organistic heights would be to relegate Sundara Rajan's real contribution in the field of applied Philosophy to identify the real cause of his inquiry which has far reaching consequences in the area of development and developmental strategy which incorporates not merely the socio–economic aspects around man but the far more complex issues of culture and politics. Unwittingly Sundara Rajan provides a wonderful mosaic of culture in politics transcending into politics in culture and thereby making the work closer to the domain to compare established notions of Western Philosophy with the ancient Indian philosophical work of Arthashastra in the third work to come i. e. *Primacy of the Political : Towards a Theory of National Integration,* which analyses that political problems as a " search for a legitimate authority " with the aim to protect " the social order and the arts of life. " He identifies two contextual problems (a) the autonomy of the new nation–states in the context of encroaching dominance; and (b) the internal integrity of the state *vis–a–vis* various groupings and ethnic pressures and pulls.[1] Thus, Sundara Rajan brings out his real intentions to articulate politics in culture through a sophistication by which both the students of moral philosophy on the one hand and the practitioners of policy formulation on the other would find equal joy to digest the complex themes of the Kantian notion of Critique, Husserl's reflections on life–world, Dilthey's articulations of

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Hermeneutics of Historical Reason, Ricoeur's perspective on speech and textual discourse or Noam Chomsky's logic of languages on the one hand and the viscissitudes of Kautilyan deliberations towards administering of stafecraft by the monarch with rules to acquire, preserve, develop and provide social justice to achieve the right blend of nationalism leading to national integration on the other.

Frankly speaking, the articulation of such technical texts in a single sweep of the painting brush of Sundara Rajan will often lead even a serious reader to utter dismay for there is no single theme on which Sundara Rajan stops to articulate at any one single moment. His scholarship does not only sweep in a multidisciplinary parameter but also builds the intradisciplinary linkages with philosophical abstruseness built around the maxim that an intellectual need not be apologetic towards his articulation and only those should read or digest who possess the capability to do so. Sundara Rajan is r ight as well as wrong at the same time. Right in the sense that his work is ideal for judgement in posterity, wrong in the sense that the intellectual capacity of those who matter to incorporate his ideas into practice at least in South Asia are below the levels of mediocrity to understand or less even to take cognizance of the wealth of truth present in Sundara Rajan's work. This latter part has been the cause of misery even to great masters like Socrates and we hope Sundara Rajan also does not believe to be part of historical repetition by remaining like a pure piece of perfect diamond more to be used to enhance the beauty of a crown rather than being used as an industrial tool for nation building process.

The world of today is fast changing both in the form of governance and linkages between nation states to develop new notions and difinitions of ideologies to determine new parame-

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ters of power structure aimed once again towards Balance of Power rationale. Ideologies are no longer confrontational which hence opposes what has been articulated by Sundara Rajan. Tolerance is not only a methodological norm for Philosophy but also of ideology. What Sundara Rajan claims in terms of contestability in Philosophy implying availability of alternatives and respect for them leading to the notion of tolerance has emerged in the revised Marxist maxim of Glasnost and Perestroika. Nowhere is self reflexivity more profound than in political ideologies foreshadowing the 21st century. Serious students of Politics and Philosophy have to be extremely cautious to understand the viscissitudes as well as the convergences emerging to encompass the nuances of strategic Thinking and the philosophical dimensions incorporating developmental strategies if new notions striving to reinterpret perhaps the thematic forms in Kant, Marx or Wittgenstein so ably vitalised by Sundara Rajan.

Over a decade and a half back sitting as a graduate student in Charles Taylor's course on Hegel, I made the remark that notion of justice for Hegel was nothing more than '*good will*'. I need not incorporate what Professor Taylor did to me for the next three days in his class for the sacrilege committed. I learnt my lessons then and I incorporate them today. Sundara Rajan's work of the past nine years cannot be similarly notional. It has a deep commitment to society at large. A philosopher who does dare to articulate the unmanageable without being unconventional. The world of Philosophy in India and in the sub–continent is richer by Sundara Rajan's contribution and we hope to see much more of his abstruseness in print than simple populist articulations which are merely meant for mass consumption. The books reviewed are, thus, an important addition to the growth of

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knowledge not only in the domain of Philosophy but also for the students of Public Policy and Administration.

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NOTE

1. R. Sundara Rajan, "Primacy of the Political : Towards a Theory of National Integration" in *Journal of Indian Council of Philosophical Research, Vol. V, No. 1* (Sept.–Dec. 1987), p. 136.

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PHILOSOPHY OF RESERVATION

I. Introduction

The policy of reservation as it is practiced in India sets out certain quotas of jobs, positions and seats in educational institutions for scheduled castes, scheduled tribes and other backward castes to be alloted on the bsais of merit among them without any means test. The practice of this policy has suddenly devided the country in two opposite camps. The so called pro-reservationists are resisting any introduction of means test, accepting caste as legitimate criterion for preferential treatment and demanding ever increasing percentage of reservation in vacancies. The so called anti-reservationists are questioning the wisdom and constitutionality of caste-based preferential treatment, demanding introduction of means test at some stage and reduction in the percentage of reservation in vacancies. The two camps have fought the issue not only through newspapers, magazines and journals but also on the streets. The violent debate is likely to raise its ugly head once again in the next general election as some national leaders have racked up the Mandal Commission Report in their public utterances. This is the impasse we find ourselves in. And intellectuals like by-standers unanimously point their accusing fingers at politicians for this mess. In my opinion it is the intellectuals in India who from the very beginning looked at the issue of reservation from a wrong perspective and thereby misled the politicians as well as the public to the garden path.

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If we look at the debate we find three significant propositions either asserted or aecepted implicitly as premises in the perspective from which intellectuals in India have seen the issue of reservation. Firstly, the objective the reservations seek to achieve is the equality of status and opportunity. Secondly, positive discrimination becomes necessary by government when certain groups have been disadvantaged or made backward by the present or past behaviour of society. And lastly, if backwardness is not due to any action of society at large but some failing in the individual or group, there is no obligation on society to confer favours on that individual or group; nor can governmental action cure the defects which cause this backwardness. To me it appears all these three propositions are wrong.

II. Critique of Equality of Opportunity as the Legitimate State Purpose Behind Policy of Reservation

If the purpose of reservation is to achieve equality of opportunity then the criterion of preferential treatment i.e., caste (scheduled or backward) runs afoul of equality clause as it suffers from ill-fit as it is a suspect classification. Not only there are people not belonging to the preferred caste, who suffer present competitive disadvantage but also there are members of the preferred caste who suffer no such disadvantage. Can this ill-fit of the alleged purpose for which the policy of reservation is adopted and the criterion on the basis of which reservation is made be justified on ground of administrative convenience ? The answer again is in the negative. For, administrative convenience will not serve as a defense when the so-called upper caste rather than the backward castes are the preferred caste. So why should this defense be accepted in one context and not another ? Will not this be perceived as discriminatory ? Of course one may like to argue that the society is taking one step at a time, today the society is removing the competitive disadvantage of some people,

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tomorrow it will remove the competitive disadvantage of some other people. This defense at best can justify why some people, who are at a competitive disadvantage, have been left out, but it cannot justify why some people are given preferential treatment who suffer no competitive disadvantage.

It is precisely this belief that the benefit of preferential treatment is going to the affluent among the preferred caste that has flared up the emotion of the anti–reservationists and led justice Chandrachud to say, "It is ... necessary to apply the 'means test' at some stage in order that the benefits of reservation are not monopolized by affluent families.[1]

Not only this, one step at a time argument is acceptable only on administrative grounds and not on political grounds. Hence, the inexorable logic of the defense proposed in the first proposition leads one to perceive that persons who should have been receiving preferential treatment to achieve equality of opportunity have been left out because they could not muster enough political pressure while persons who should not have been receiving preferential treatment have been included because they have been able to put political pressure. It is this argument that critics are alluding to when they point out that preferential treatment policy is a "poll gimik" or that it aims at creating "vote banks" etc.

The proposed defense creates, as shown above, the feeling that reservation is against the constitutional provisions of equality and its constitutional validity can be saved and in fact has been saved, according to many, by making the policy of reservation an exception to the equality. No doubt to many this saving of the constitutionality of the reservation policy appears to be ad–hoc arrangement devoid of any sound thearetical justification. Articulating this opinion of the section of the citizens Girilal Jain wrote, "As is well known, the constitution is based on the

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concept of the individual being the basic constituent of the political order. It does provide for an exception in the case of scheduled castes and tribes. This was an expression of a sense of guilt on the part of the Hindu intelligentia towards these communities. This sense of guilt has by now worn pretty thin and most Hindus would love to see the social preferences for the scheduled castes and tribes to be abolished.[2]

If the critics of the present reservation policy find the argument from the goal of achievement of equality of opportunity handy to cast doubt on the legitimacy of the caste based policy of reservation and to support their demand for introducing means test, the pro–reservationists also find it suitable for their demand for increasing the quantum of reservation. Their argument is straight forward. The inequality of opportunity that a candidate from the scheduled castes or backward castes faces is due to the existing low level of employment among them compared to the level of employment among other castes and groups. The low level of employment prevents the children of these castes to get nutrition, education, medical care etc. comparable to forward castes and hence they lose out in competition to them. So equality of opportunity can be achieved only if the level of employment of the scheduled castes and backward castes is raised to the level of the forward castes. Now it is a matter of simple calculation that given the low percentage of vacancies in government jobs per annum, given the high level of unemployment among the scheduled castes and backward castes, it will take not less than another century to raise the level of employment among forward castes if we continue at a low rate of reservation. So no doubt the pro–reservationists are demanding a very high level of reservation to shorten the period of coming to the level of equality of opportunity.

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So the current demand of the reservationists to raise the level of reservation and the current demand of the anti-reservationists to impose means test follow from the same justification which is accepted by both. So it appears to me it is an impasse we have reached because we started with a very wrong justification of the policy of reservation to give it a lofty image.

III. Critique of Rectification of Past Injustice as the State Purpose Behind Reservation

Probably it is this realization that has led the Indian intelligentia to include another defense in the second proposition. This defense appeals to principle of compensatory justice. Since the members of scheduled castes and backward castes have been the victim of injustice and oppression for centuries, not only justice but also decency demands that some amends be made by the members of the dominant caste now. This argument is equally wrong headed. If the argument is from past or present injustice done to individuals, then all the victims of injustice, irrespective of the caste to which they belong, should get the preferential treatment, and no person who has not suffered injustice even if he belongs to the preferred caste, should get the preferential treatment. To put it in a nutshell, the caste as a criterion of preferential treatment even on this new justification suffers from ill-fit due to under-inclusion as well as over-inclusion and the entire argument of the last section down to the last line can be run over once again for this new justification too.

This second justification suffers from additional problems too. For argument's sake, even if it is assumed that all the members of the presently preferred castes and only the members of these castes have suffered past injustice, even then preferential treatment is unsatisfactory way of compensation. As is well known compensatory justice must satisfy proportionality principle,

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which says that the compensation received must be commensurate with the injury suffered. But preferential treatment by setting quotas and awarding them on the basis of merit among the members of the preferred caste violates the proportionality principle. For no connection has been made out between merit of the members of the preferred caste and the amount or degree of injustice or injury suffered by them. Not only that, that the burden of the compensation is paid by individuals of the upper caste who are marginally qualified for admission or jobs. It is they who pay the compensation by losing the job or the seat due to preferential treatment policy being pursued. Why should they bear the burden ? Why should all the members of the advanced castes not pay the compensation ? These questions will inevitably arise once we accept past injustice as ground for compensation through preferential treatment. One wonders whether these alleged justifications are advanced to support or ultimately discredit the entire reservation scheme.

Of course any body who advances the argument from compensatory justice may defend his position against these awkward questions by the following reply.

The meritorious candidates of the preferred caste are selected for the reserved seats and jobs, because it is they who have lost the most by past injustice. The members of preferred caste, high in the scale of merit, who otherwise would have got job or admission, have been denied these benefits now as effect of past injustice. The members of the preferred caste, low in the scale of merit, could not have received the job or could not have got admission even if there had been no injustice.

Similarly, it may be argued that the marginally qualified members of the non-preferred caste pay the compensation because it is they who benefit the most due to past injustice. Had there

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been no past injustice and no lowering of the merit of the members of the preferred caste as consequence, the marginally placed individuals belonging to the non-preferred group could have got the jobs or admission. So they must pay the compensation.

Unfortunately this reply will presuppose the principle of desert which says that every individual has a right to be judged by his merit or the quality he naturally possesses and that he must get the reward for his merit. I think it is this principle that the persons with greater natural endowment deserve greater share in the distribution of goods in society, that lies behind the third proposition accepted by the Indian intelligentia.

But a liberal democratic society is not a scheme of competition designed to reward the naturally endowed. For, no one deserves his place in the distribution of natural endowment as it is arbitrary from a moral point of view. It is merely a chance outcome of the natural lottery. Liberal democratic society is a co-operative venture in which the natural endowments of persons are seen as common assets to be made use of by society for mutual advantage. But for the society the abilities and talents of an individual cannot develop and take a particular form. Individuals of course will not be willing to make use of their greater natural endowment for the sake of benefit of others because of their limited sympathy and because of the autonomy of the individual society is prevented from making use of force to make the naturally endowed person to work for the benefit of others. Hence, the society gives incentives by allowing them to have a larger share in the social benefits, so that they will be willing to work for others. So the greater share in the benefits is given to the naturally endowed not because they deserve greater share and not because they must be rewarded for greater talent, but because

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they must be given incentive to make use of their talent for achieving the goals of society.

Hence, the principle of desert is a wrong principle to appeal to for saving the policy of reservation from the charge of violating principle of proportionality, if the aim of reservation is to compensate past injustice.

IV. Critique of Group Equality as a Ground of Policy of Reservation

The search for the legitimate state purpose to justify the caste based reservation policy has been in vain so far. The failure to find this legitimate state purpose has led many thinkers question the very understanding of the equality in the constitution.

The understanding of equality principle in the constitution as prohibition of discrimination has great appeal to individualistic temperament in whose opinion our constitution is based on the ideal of individualism, understood not merely in the sense that all rights are vested in individuals, or that individual is the basic constituent of the political order, but in a strong sense that the claims and interests of individuals merit consideration in society in their own right and not beeause the individual belongs to this or that group. According to individualism group membership is irrelevant to the worth of the claims that individuals make on society. Anti-discrimination interpretation of equality does not determine the permissibility of classification on the basis of natural classes, where 'natural' refers not to be biological origins of the class, but rather to the fact that it is not formally created by the law in question to further the interest of the individuals. Anti-discrimination principle is not in any way dependent on recognition of social classes or groups. It has avoided making of groups the basic societal unit or giving weight to the interest of individual because of his membership to some class or group.

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Thinkers like M.P. Singh question the wisdom of understanding equality in individualistic terms. Rather, he will like it to be understood as group equality. To be fair to M P. Singh it must be mentioned that he has not clarified whether he wants equality to be understood as group equality or he will like the group to be the legitimate state purpose retaining the individualistic understanding of the equality clauses in our constitution. His claim that "right to equality is always an individual right is not wholly true"[3] and that "group concept of equality is clearly implicit in the very principle of proportional equality that equals are to be treated equally and unequals differently"[4] put pressure towards interpretation of article 14 as group equality. But there are many passages and the very tone of section F of his essay "Jurisprudential Foundations of Affirmative Action..." give the impression that he accepts group equality as legitimate state retaining the individualistic understanding of equality.[5]

The strongest argument that M.P. Singh gives is that our constitution uses group terms like "women" "castes", "Tribes", "class", "sections" etc. Hence, the group concept is not alien to Indian constitution and hence there can be no objection to group equality since special provisions are made for these groups in the constitution.[6]

To me it appears use of group terms is not sufficient to say that our constitution accepts group rights. Here this information is pertinent. During the period of slavery there were many laws in America which were clearly formulated in individualistic terms. For example, the Slave Trade Clause provides : "The Migration or Importation of such persons as any of the state now existing shall think proper to admit, shall not be prohibited by the Congress prior to the year one thousand eight hundred and eight, but a Tax or duty may be imposed on such Importation, not exceeding ten dollaras for each person". (Article 1, Section 9,

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Class 1). See also Article 1, Section 2, Clause 3 ("three–fifth of all other Persons") and Article IV , Section 2, Clause 3 ("Person held to service or Labour"). Inspite of the fact that these laws were formulated in individualistic terms, they were interpreted as group laws. Even while adopting these laws the issue of circumlocution was debated in the original convention in connection with the Slave Trade Clause, some arguing that the generality of the word "person" would have unintened effects [7]. What I intend to point out is that *group* laws were adopted and formulated with full knowledge in individualistic terms. If this could happen in America, is it far fetched to look for *individualistic* interpretation even though the constitution apparently used group terms like 'children' 'women' etc. in India ? In fact our constitution is based on the political morality based on individualism and hence these groups must be seen as permissible classifications to achieve legitimate state purpose retaining the individualistic understanding of equality. But no doubt it puts us under a burden to discover the legitimate state purpose to justify these classifications, which is yet to be achieved.

We cannot accept group equality as the legitimate state purpose behind reservation for it will require that all groups and castes except the one which is most advantageous be given reservation benefit so as to achieve equality of groups. No doubt something like group equality is behind the Karnatak government policy of granting reservation benefit to all but a few castes so as to include almost 90% population as the beneficiary of reservation.

If group equality is accepted as legitimate state purpose and all but a few castes must enjoy the benefit of reservation to achieve equality of groups, we will have to grant almost 100% reservation in vacancies for another century or so to achieve the goal, which is a priori not acceptable.

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I think it was this implication for policy that has prevented M. P. Singh to look for implemental aspects of his affirmative action theory in his paper. He writes, "We have carefully avoided the implementational aspects of such action, not because they are less important but because we did not want to mix up the two."[8] Why not? The prepostrous nature of the theory can be exhibited by the unacceptable implementational aspects. If we go by M. P. Singh's theory then I do not know if we will achieve the desired goal but we will surely lead India to destruction.

As the survey of the alleged justification of the policy reservation shows it is not politicians but the intellectuals who have opined on the policy of reservation are leading India to brink by their misguided analysis of the issue of reservation.

V. An Alternative Analysis of the Policy of Reservation

The common thread uniting all the approaches to the policy of reservation surveyed so far is that the entire policy of reservation has been seen as aiming at benefiting the persons of the backward castes and scheduled castes who get the reserved job or seat. Both pro-reservationists as well as anti–reservationists look at the policy of reservation in this light and draw conclusions favourable to them. But seen in this light it is nothing but a sort of charity, requiring means test in the eyes of anti–reservationists. In my opinion the persons who get the reserved jobs do benefit but the aim of reservation policy is not primarily to benefit the recipients of the reserved jobs or seats. The situation is similar to any other job, like medical profession. The persons who become doctors do benefit but the primary aim of medical establishment is not to give jobs to the doctors but to provide medical service to people. There we require no "means test" to make some one a doctor. So there is no question of any "means test" to fill the reserved job or seat.

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So the question that needs to be emphasized is : What is the service the scheduled caste and backward caste members who occupy reserved posts provide to the society at large ? The answer is this. Their very presence in these jobs and seats will help in reducing the caste prejudice. This is based on the principle of social psychology that group prejudice can be reduced by putting members of the group against whom there is prejudice, in roles incogruent with their social stereotypes. So the category of reserved job is like any other service in the society. But the very nature of the goal which is being sought to be achieved i.e., the reduction of caste prejudice, is such that it can be achieved by reserving jobs for scheduled castes in various other services. So the reserved jobs themselves are like any other service in society. And now we can see why the demand for " means test " is simply out of place, as it is inapplicable in selection for other services.

The social goal itself determines what endowments are to be recognized as merit for the purposes of giving incentive. The natural or social endowment that helps in achieving the desired social goal is the merit recognized. Merit may be greater medical knowledge in doctors, ability to teach in teachers, smartness and beauty in air hostesses and if in future we have computers which can be triggered by particular type of smell of the persons then that smell of the person in computer operators will be counted as merit. There is no a priori recognition of some endowment as merit. Not only some endowments hither to unrecognized as merit may be so recognized and given incentive in future, some endowment now recognized as merit and given incentive may be derecognized and given no incentive in future. This is the reason why some talents highly prized in past get hardly any incentive now.

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So the vital question that must be asked is : Can't 'caste' be recognized as 'merit' and given incentive? Is caste necessarily irrelevant to achieve any social goal? I think the answer is in the negative. When there is wide-spread prejudice against the scheduled and backward castes and the aim of society is to remove this caste prejudice, the 'caste' of the individual is not irrevalent to achieve the social goal.

It may be a good policy not to notice an undesirable trait in a child to allow it a natural extinction, but that is not the case in the case of society. The policy of turning the Nelson's eye to the caste prejudice and adoption of formal caste-neutral standards for admission and jobs, will not make caste less important in society; rather it will aggravate the situation. So persons of that caste against which there is prejudice must be placed in high visibility, high paying jobs incongruent with the social stereotype of that caste to reduce caste consciousness in society.

It is the failure to see this point that has led to the dominant interpretation of the preferential treatment clauses as exception to equality clauses in the constitution. But this is erroneous. If my argument so far has been correct then there is no ill-fit between the caste as criterion of benefit and the desired social goal and hence the preferential treatment by way of reservation on caste criterion does not offend the equality clause and hence these are not exceptions. In my view the interpretation advanced by Justice V. R. Krishna Iyer in state of Kerala Vs. N. M. Thomas [9] is correct as against the dominant interpretation. In words of justice Iyer, "Article 16 (4) serves not as an exception but as an emphatic statement, one mode of reconciling the claims of backward people and the opportunity for free competition the forward sections are ordinarily entitled to. True, it may be loosely said that Article 16 (4) is an exception but,

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closely examined, it is an illustration of constitutionally sanctified classification... Article 16 (4) need not be a saving clause but put in due to the over–anxiety of the draftmen to make matter clear beyond possibility of doubt."

This defense of the 'caste' as merit will invite a chorus of protest that it amounts to compromise in the standards of expertise in doctors, engineers and other professions, which undermines efficiency. First of all, efficiency is not the only desired virtue in a social system. The social goal to decrease the caste prejudice against backward caste may require compromise with efficiency. In fact, if we have a choice between efficient but caste prejudiced society and a society which is not caste prejudiced but less efficient it is not a forgone conclusion that the choice must be the most efficient society irrespective of other features in it.

Secondly, there is always compromise with standards in one service or industry whenever some other service or industry is in demand. And we realise that talent available for teaching is less than adequate because they are going to medicine or administration etc. But this falling standards in academics cannot be an argument to stop administration or medical services. Similarly, falling standards in some service cannot be an argument to scrap the policy of reduction of caste prejudice in society.

And thirdly, efficiency is goal–relative. A Society may be efficient in eradicating caste prejudice with some compromise with efficiency in providing health service, administration etc. In fact it is the realization that statutory prohibition of discrimination on the basis of caste, statutory abolition of untouchability, remedial measures like special training programmes, or tutoring and financial support will not help in removing the loss of self esteem, self confidence, motivation, and ambition in the members

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of the backward castes that policy of preferential treatment is adopted. The policy of reservation is based on the belief that by providing more backward caste members as classmates for forward caste members, the prejudice against the former among the latter can be reduced through professional association, that by providing examples for future backward caste aspirants, their motivation for achievement can be sustained. It is the realization that reservation is the only efficient method to remove the caste prejudice that it was accepted.

One must add to this defence that the charge that the effect of reservation on the efficiency of the public services is marked, is itself an outcome of prejudice that the policy of reservation seeks to remove. So far we have had no systematic study of *in service record* of the efficiency of those who come through reservation or competition. At the most this charge is based on a priori argument that since people with lower marks in examinations come to the services through reservation they may be blamed for all the falling standards of efficiency that we observe or this charge is based on a few personal experiences without any backing from systematic inquiry into the inservice record through out India or a representative sample of the service population in India. Of course, I do not claim that the reservation will have no effect on efficiency, but to have categorical assurance of the truth of the proposition and the magnitude of inefficiency it causes, we need systematic evidence and not a priori conviction born out of pejudice.

Does this policy of reservation violate any one's moral or constitutional right ? My answer is in the negative. It may be argued that it is not only constitutionally but also morally wrong to discriminate on the basis of caste alone. Those candidates who belong to non-preferred caste, who might have been selected on the basis of merit had there been no policy of reservation,

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but were rejected due to the existence of reservation, have been victims of discrimination on the basis of caste alone. In other-words, the policy reservation amounts to reverse discrimination. This argument, although on the face of it appaars as formidable, is in fact unsound. Those candidates marginally meritoriousl who might have been selected had there been no policy of reservation were in fact rejected not because of their caste alone, but because their exclusion is necessitated by the social goal of reduction of caste prejudice. They were not rejected on the basis of the caste alone, for had they been more meritorious like the more fortunate members of their caste, they would have been selected. So the alleged exclusion on the basis of caste in the context of reservation is no different from exclusion on the basis of intelligence, age etc., which is not considered as discriminatory.

And of course exclusion on the basis of intelligence itself may become discriminatory if intelligence is irrelevant in the particular context. Consider for example inoculation of children with high intelligence only or granting of personal liberty to intelligent persons only. So, it all depends on whether caste is irrelevant or relevant in determining the inclusion or exclusion from certain benefit. If my justification given before is correct then caste is not irrelevant to remove caste prejudice.

It may be argued that by accepting reservation on the basis of caste I myself am going against individualism on which our political order is based. Individualism prohibits any subordination of the right of the individual to an alleged right or interest of the collective entity like caste, race or nation. Reservation policy, it may be argued, subordinates the right of an individual to the interest of some caste.

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Any criterion of admission or selection for jobs will exclude some individuals who fail to satisfy the criterion. Since 'caste' being relevant to achieve a social goal, exclusion on the basis of caste does not violate any one's rights. Why do we want to remove caste prejudice for which 'caste' is very relevant ? It is because the individuals who happen to belong to the backward castes suffer the consequences of prejudice and in fact a society without caste prejudice is better in the sense in which a tolerant society is better or a society with high literacy is better etc. This argument is similar to the reason one will give to answer the question why should society provide medical service ? It is to alleviate the suffering of the unhealthy persons and a society with a healthy population is better. Had the argument for reservation been on the basis of superiority of the backward caste, or intrinsic worth of the backward castes, then it would be dangerous inviting the charge of anti–individualism. But this is not the reason behind reservation policy.

It may be argued that even though the preferential treatment to backward castes is intended to decrease and in the long run to eliminate caste prejudice, this policy in fact has harmed the goal more than it has advanced it as it has been indicated by the caste conflict that has erupted in some parts of India, and the caste tension that prevails in other areas, and the sustained chorus of protest that the policy of reservation has invited from the forward castes.

Before we evaluate this argument it must be noted that recently in India we are witnessing an ever increasing tendency of the people to take recourse to agitation and thereby to increase the cost of pursuing a policy disliked by it, beyond its benefits, to force the hand of the government to abandon it. In

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a democracy it is the democratically elected representatives to the legislature who have the responsibility to decide policy issue. Even if a section of the public thinks the policy to be utterly wrong and ineffective in achieving its goals, even then it has no right to agitate to increase the cost of the policy it does not like, to force the hand of the government, unless some very important principle of right is involved or a matter of conscience is involved. This is not to claim that the section of people have no right to express their resentment against the policy but it must be done in a manner to persuade the government and not to escalate the cost of the policy. If we accept the legitimacy of the agitation of some to escalate the cost of policy to force the government to abandon it we are conceding in principle that some minority rather than the majority must in the end decide the policy issue which is contrary to all democratic norms.

If we keep the above fact in mind then the fact of agitation has to be discounted in ethical evaluation of the policy to the extent that some people are agitating to escalate the cost of policy to force the government to abandon it. If the agitation has majority support then it must wait in keeping with the democratic norms, till the next election to change the government. Be it noted that my argument does not apply when people adopt persuasive strategies but applies when people adopt strategies to escalate the cost of policy. In a democracy they have the right to persuade but no right to force. The above argument depends on the fact of the cost increasing agitation and not persuasive symbolic demonstration.

The second factor that we have to keep in mind is that the policy of reservation has two tendencies. It has the positive tendency to reduce caste consciousness by giving opportunity of professional association between the forward and backward castes, it raises the aspiration of the backward caste by giving

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examples for achievement which they lacked before which is so vital for progress and it instills confidence among the backward castes that the society cares for them which again is necessary for integration of them in the mainstream. But the policy of reservation has also simultaneously exactly opposite tendency. Since the reservation policy recognizes 'caste' as 'merit' and gives it incentive it has the inherent tendency to maintain caste consciousness. Since 'backward' castes are given incentive the policy inherently generates pressure to include more and more castes as backward castes. Now there is a critical level of reservation upto which the positive tendency dominates the negative tendency but if reservation is pushed beyond that percentage it is the negative tendency that overtakes the positive tendency and wipes out all the benefits of the policy of reservation.

Now critics are correct to point out that the policy of reservation has done harm to the goals it seeks to achieve. That is because we have been all along having a very high percentage of reservation guided by wrong analysis of what the reservation policy is all about and we have not only wiped out expected benefits but also have succeeded in escalating caste consciousness. So, if we want to operate the policy of reservation to reduce caste consciousness we have to remain below the critical level, in fact much below the critical level so that the negative tendency remains below the positive tendency. I am no social psychologist. It is for them to suggest what exactly is the level of reservation that we must pursue. But my hunch is that it will be quite low. It cannot be as high as 50% or above,

It may be argued that the above analysis of the policy of resarvation makes use of controversial empirical hypothesis regarding the various tendencies of the policy of reservation and their strength. It is of course impossible to attain the certitude of laws of physics in mattess social. The above analysis makes

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use of the hypothesis regarding the causes and consequences of group prejudice as advanced by social psychologists and the hypsthesis regarding supply and demned as advanced by economists. But it is true that it is not yet clearly established what is the optimum level of reservation to reduce caste consciousness. Nor is it clearly established that there is such a optimum level of reservation. But it is also certainly true that Indian experience is no guide for the establishment of the absence of the optimum level nor is it sufficient to show that at all levels of reservation the negative tendency dominates the positive tendency.

So there is a need to have further research about the impact of the reservation policy on the social psychology of group prejudice. Unfortunately those working on this issue of reservation so far guided by wrong analysis of the policy tend to collect data regarding whether the reserved jobs have gone to the affluent among the backward castes or not, which simply is irrelevant to the cost benefit analysis of the policy. But pending a difinite answer to the question of whether the policy of reservation benefits or harms the society, there is all the more reason why the issue must be settled by a democratic process and not by forcing the issue on the streets.

My emphasis that the issue of reservation be allowed to be settled by democratic political process will probably be objected to. It may be claimed that the motivation for the ever increasing reservation is not the benefit of the ostensible beneficiaries but is purely political. Increasing the quantum of reservation and including an ever widening number of castes in the definition of backward is of electoral benefit to the political parties. The first objection from the failure to benefit the ostensible beneficiaries is of course, as argued before, dependent on the wrong view which somehow has come to be espoused by many that the reservation is primarily aimed at benefiting those who

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receive the reserved jobs or seats. The second objection that ever increasing reservation is for political benefit is simply wrong. If intellectuals justify reservation by appealing to equality of opportunity, compensatory justice or group equality etc. which require high level of reservation with means test included and if politicains implement that how can we blame them ? It may be remembered that in Andhra Pradesh the government increased the level of reservation with means test included as required by kind of justification generally advanced by intellectuals as examined in the first half of this essay. Thirdly, it is not possible to understand what is the force of the argument from electoral benefit. If political parties do not aim at electrol success by formulating policies which will win them the maximum vote within the limits of the constitution what else is democracy ? I firmly believe that democratic process is good enough to yield sound decisions provided intellectuals feed proper suggestions for democratic decision. The new analysis which I have tried to outline in this essay can be a basis of such a democratic decision in future.

Before I conclude, an objection must be considered. The objection is that by rejecting justification of the policy of caste–based reservation on the grounds of lofty ideals like equality of opportunity and appealing to only mundane goal of removal of caste prejudice, I am lowering the ethical importance of the policy of reservation. But this objection is mistaken. Although I did not mention it in the paper the important aim of legislation is the ethical requirement of raising the welfare of the least off in the society. But at the level of policy this primary ideal is translated into many subgoals. One of the subgoal is the removal of the structural barriers in the society that prevent the raising of welfare of the least well off. One such structural barrier is the prejudice against certain castes. So the subgoal mentioned above,

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again, is translated partly into the goal of removal of caste prejudice. Now when the society justifies a classification as required by the understanding of equality clauses, it is not required to appeal directly to the ultimate goal, for that may lead to many practical difficulties and misunderstandings. What state is required to do is to appeal to the appropriate subgoal for which the legislation is intended. Hence, my appeal to the removal of caste prejudice does not lower the ethical importance of the policy of reservation. *

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TRUTH, INTERPRETATION AND CONVENTION T

The present essay is an attempt at a critical understanding of the theory of truth and interpretation developed by Donald Davidson.[1] There are two distinct aims of this essay : (1) to bring out the supposed foundations of the new semantics and (2) to critically analyse the latter's claim to be an extension of Tarski's semantics. I shall argue that the new semantics is non–Tarskian in its aim and method.

I. Truth Theory and the New Semantics

An absolute theory of truth with an axiomatized structure is the main contention of the semantics developed by Davidson. It has two co–lateral theoretic frames : one which builds up an absolute theory of truth for natural languages modelled on the Tarski–requirement of Convention T,[2] and the other which constructs a theory of interpretation for natural languages modelled on the theory of truth itself. These two frames together constitute a frame of understanding natural languages with a finitist structure and a holistic method.

The theory of truth which is the basic component of the new semantics can be called the base–theory T_1. It has the following structure :

(T_1) Truth is a primitive concept[3] of a semantical system for a language L. Therefore a truth theory provides a theoretical framework for understanding the concept of truth within axiomatized structure for a language L.

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T_1 has the following two requirements :

(1) T_1 has to be axiomatized, because it yields theorems of the form 'S is true iff p' for every sentence p of the language L of which S is the name in a metalanguage M.

(2) The object language L must have a finite structure since a finite language alone can guarantee the needed axiomatization. The natural languages do have a finite structure which can be mapped up and learned.

The axiomatizability requirement is the basic demand of Davidson's semantic theory, since for Davidson a truth theory is an absolute theory, and not relative to any model or interpretation or possible world.[4] A model–relative truth theory entails relativization of the concept of truth to the extent of making the latter a derivative concept. Davidson writes, "My thesis is only that there are important differences between theories of relative, and of absolute, truth and the differences make theories of the two sorts appropriate as, answers to different questions".[5] Whereas a theory of relative truth argues for a trnth–predicate applicable to a selected or accepted model, an absolute theory globally applies to all models of the classical sort which fit into the logic of the natural languages.

The key to axiomatization of T_1 is the availlability of T-sentences which are generated from the Tarskian Convention T : 'S is true iff p'. The T–sentences which follow for every sentence of the language L can themselves be treated as axioms,[6] and to that extent they are necessarily and globally true of the whole of the language L which, for Davidson, is none other than a natural language. Thus, the axiomatic availability of T-sentences is the *sine qua non* of an absolute theory of truth because by bringing out the intuitive strength of the concept of truth, the T-sentences pin it down as a primitive concept such

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that no explicit definition is called for. This entials for Davidson two consequences :

(1.1) Truth–definitlon fulfilling the Tarskian Convention T *need* not demand a syntactically rich metalanguage and so the syntactic resources of the metalanguage M need not be proliferated.

(1.2) Truth–definition is recursive in the proposed semantic system without demanding an explicit character in terms of more primitive semantic concepts.

So far as the first consequence is concerned, Davidson's kind of semantic theory does not presuppose the distinction between formalized natural languages, and therefore the Tarski–requirement of richness [7] of metalanguage for any formalized object language is not sought to be seen as a primary requirement. The natural languages which guarantee T–sentences have the required syntactic resources to carry on truth–definition. The second consequence, on the other hand, makes truth–definition easily accessible to all natural languages because the notion of 'true-in-L' is as much available for a natural language as for a formalized one. Admissibility of truth-definition in terms of satisfaction in no way dilutes the primitivity of the concept of truth and hence its recursive character.

In the light of the axiomatizability requirements the finitist demand, as mentioned above, is proposed as another demand of the natural language semantics. A finitist need is recognizably a syntactic need which is tagged onto the need to absolutize the concept of truth for mappable language. Davidson is aware of the syntactic availability of the finite vocabulary which provides the resources to build up infinite sentences of the language.[8] Natural languages eminantly fill the bill sofar as the need of constructing infinite sentence is concerned. However, the finitist

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constraint on the basic vocabulary is the built in constraint which is common to both natural language and formal language semantics. A language after all is intended to be mappable and so learnable to the extent it is endowed with a structure of rules.

An absolute theory of truth, as Davidson intends it to be, imposes finitude for the following reason :

(2.1) Since T–sentences exiomatically extend over the whole of natural language L, there must be presupposed the constructibility of the infinite sentences. But the latter itself is the result of a finitely mappable language.

The above reason contains, in fact, two significant dimensions of the axiomatized truth theory. They are :

(2.1a) Truth theory is holistic insofar as it entails T–sentences for all the infinite sentences of the language L.

(2.1b) T–sentences are basically *entailed* by the internal syntactic resources and therefore those resources must be internalizable by the native speakers of the language L.

Both these dimensions are integrated into the truth theory, since in its holistic form it makes T–sentences available globally for the language L, and in its learnable aspect it puts truth theory closer to natural language, and thus makes it applicable to the latter. It is the latter fact which explains why Davidson builds up a semantics for natural languages which makes truth theory a central component.

II. Truth and Interpretation

The test of a truth theory, according to Davidson, lies in its empirical applicability [9] to natural languages and thus in having the empirical constraint which complements the formal constraints already mentioned. The empirical constraint is of the nature of

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the "fittingness" to the natural language which a truth theory necessarily has. The theory which emerges out of the empiricalisation of the T–sentenees is called the theory of interpretation for a language L to be referred to as T_2. We can formulate it as follows :

> (T_2) T–sentences like "snow is white" is true if and only if 'show is white' strictly represents what the native speakers of the language L hold as true, and thus represent what they believe and mean in uttering sentences of L.

T_2, thus succinctly put, transforms T_1 into a theory of *interpreting* the native speaker's sentences so far as the latter fit into the truth theory. This fittingness is *empirically generated* through the maximization of the agreement in holding sentences true in the circumstances empirically given but remaining normal in not subverting the working of the system of beliefs of the native speakers. The following two constraints are necessarily imposed on T_2 :

(T_2.1) The principle of charity[10] works up the maximization of agreement to the extent of securing the slack between what is in fact true and what is believed to be so.

(T_2.2) Theory of interpretation takes account of what the native speakers *actually* believe and mean in holding the sentences true, and thus the speakers' belief–system constitutes the bedrock on which the radical interpretation of the speakers' utterances stand.

The principle of charity is an empirical principle standing as a base–level principle for making interpretation, and so translation of the speakers' utterances possible. It extends the 'holding true' of sentences as far as practicable without eliminating the possibility of error completely.[11] However, the radicalisation of

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interpretation depends not on the principle of charity but on what the principle tries to embed truth–holding in i.e., the rock–bottom beliefs. This completes the process of situating interpretation at the centre of interlinguistic communication which has been a central problem of natural language semantics.

As indicated earlier, both T_1 and T_2 constitute the frame–work of understanding of natural language. This involves working out a theory of meaning. But Davidson claims that once truth theory and the theory of interpretation are available the theory of meaning takes care of itself. That is, meaning is constituted by the truth–conditions [12] of the sentences as uttered by the speakers and as embedded in their belief–system. If the radically interpretable T–sentences are holistically available for the natural language, the availabllity of the meaning of the sentences of the language is necessarily guaranteed.

III. *Convention T and its Non–Tarskian Use*

Davidson's semantics, as brought out in I and II above, has made Tarski's Convention T its central concern. It is claimed to be the foundation of the finite axiomatizability of truth theory and its interpretative applicability to natural languages. Davidson writes : "Central to interpretation ... is a theory of truth that satisfies Tarski's Convention T (modified in certain ways to apply to natural language). Such a theory may be taken as giving an interpretation of each sentence a speaker might utter."[13] Given this thesis, it necessarily follows that Tarski's Convention T which is proposed originally as the material adequacy condition [14] of any truth–definition is not only fulfilled by truth theory in the Tarskian sense but is taken beyond its formal limits to be embedded in an empirically testable theoretic structure. As far as its empirical embeddability is concerned, it is the resulting T–sentences which are having empirical parameters and are directly the vehicles of interpretation of sentences.

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As claimed by Tarski, Convention T entails T–sentences which are of the nature of biconditionals for all sentences of the object language L in a syntactically rich but finite–order metalanguage M. For Tarski, it is necessary that each of the infinite sentences of the language L has its T–sentence in the metalanguage M, and it is the test of adequacy of a truth–definition if the extension of the truth–predicate is secured throughout L. There are, however, two Tarskian constraints on Convention T :

(Ta) T–sentences entailed by Convention T must be of finite order such that the former are of finite length and are embeddable in the metalanguage M which homophonically contains the object language L.

(Tb) T–sentences are not axiomatized in M but are syntactically available in the hierarchy of languages.

The constraint Ta is of immense strategic importance since only finite–order languages can have an explicit truth–definition. If the object language has infinite–order expressions, then the metalanguage which includes the object language will be of infinite-order and thus will not be richer than the former and so has to contain its own truth predicate. In that case only an axiomatic treatment of truth is called for. Tarski writes, "... with respect to formalized languages of infinite order, the consistent and correct use of the concept of truth is rendered possible by including this concept in the system of primitive concepts of the metalanguage and determining its fundamental properties by means of the axiomatic method."[15] The constraint Tb makes it obvious that T–sentences so far as they are available only in finite–order metalanguage are not axiomatized. There are no T–sentences in infinite–order languages and so no explicit truth–definition is possible therein.

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Given the above Tarskian framework, it seems that Davidson's proposal to axiomatize the truth theory for finite-order languages where T-sentences are available is non-Tarskian. As remarked earlier, Davidson is eager to absolutize the concept of truth and hence he faces the need of axiomatization. But now following Davidson's proposal if truth is taken as a primitive concept which the axiomatic method demands, then the Tarskian need of explicit truth-definition ceases to be important and the resulting semantics gets a different orientation.

The Tarskian thrust of semantics is entirely formal, since the emphasis is on how to explicitly define truth for formalized languages of finite order in a syntactically richer metalanguage. Given this framework, truth-definition is attempted for the formalized language with the help of the semantical concept satisfaction so as to make explicit how the truth-predicate is ascribed to the sentences on the latters' being satisfied by infinite sequences of objects.[16] The condition of satisfaction is laid down by Tarski as follows : "X is a correct (true) sentence in the individual domain *a* if and only if $X \in S$ and every infinite sequences of subclasses of *a* satisfies the given X in the individual domain a". A Tarskian metalanguage, thus, ensures the material adequacy of the above truth-definition for the object language sentences within a chosen domain of objects, sofar as the definition is squarely based on Convention T. For Tarski though truth is defined for particular languages relative to individual domain of objects, the metatheoretic results apply to all languages of the finite order, and thus the theory of truth is based on globally available semantic foundations.

Davidson's proposal, which convincingly extends the Tarskian results to natural languages, nevertheless, makes departure from the strictly Tarskian demands of a truth theory. This consists, as Kripke[18] notes, in making truth theory less formally demand-

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ing so far as the metalanguage is concerned and in providing a finite axiomatizability for the theory. This results in the following modifications of the Tarskian programme.

(T_{m1}) Truth theory is axiomatized in the sense that from a finite set of axioms T-sentences are derived as theorems. Thus, truth is taken as a primitive concept in the meta-language.

(T_{m2}) The resulting theorems i.e., the T-sentences are required to be empirically tested insofar as they are extendable to the natural language context.

The T_{m1} is a decisive point of departure from the available Tarskian requirements of a truth theory. The requirements of axiomatizability not only diminishes the scope of the Tarskian metatheory but also makes the richer metalanguage for truth-definition dispensable.[19] Truth being accepted as a primitive concept, the need of higher-order expressions in the metalanguage is shown to be an extravagance. Besides, Tarski's distinction between finite and infinite order languages and the requirement of axiomatizing truth theory for the infinite order languages alone is not taken due note of in Davidson's programme. It is assumed all the while that though the truth theory is designed for the finite order languages, it nevertheless, has to be axiomatized. This may be viewed as a non-Tarskiam result.

The T_{m2}, however, equally makes a dent in the Tarski-requirement of Convention T. Convention T which, according to Tarski, accounts for the material adequacy of truth-definition is a rigid requirement so far as the finite order languages are concerned since the T-sentences following from Convention T are necessarily true in the hierarchy of language and thus true sentences constitute a consistent and complete system[20] so far as they are deductively characterizable, i.e, can be decided to be true at a

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fixed point in the metalanguage. However, T_{m2} makes the Tarskian Convention T open to the following criticisms :

(C_1) Convention T and the resulting T–sentence cannot be extended to the natural languages unless the latter fulfil the minium extensional requirement.

(C_2) T–sentences may not be available, unless a richer metalanguage is ensured, and even if the required metalanguage is available, the T–sentences may turn out to be contingently true if the extended model of truth–definition is non–classical.

C_1 makes Davidson's extension of Tarski's Convention T vulnerable to theoretical difficulties since the natural languages do not admittedly have a formal structure, i.,e. an extensional structure which is the paradigm structure of formalized languages. Davidson, however, intuitively accepts that natural languages are no less formal, but this assertion may be true only of fragments of natural languages. So far as natural languages entertain intensional structures involving belief and intentions, it remains doubtful if the Tarskian results on the Truth–definition will be valid at all.

C_2, however, closely follows the Tarskian injunction that T–sentences are not available for the natural languages, since the latter are inconsistent so far as they remain semantically closed. This makes it imperative for any truth-definition to be embedded in a higher order metalanguage. Since Davidson claims that a higher–order language than the natural language is not necessary and that truth–definition is still available for the natural languages, it can be inferred that for Davidson object language and metalanguage are coextensive. But, as Tarski warns us, this will lead to semantic paradoxes. The following passage

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from Davidson confirms that Tarski's warning is not properly heeded to : "But if we understand our metalanguage, we are using a system of concepts and a language which is the one for which we *reolly* want a theory, for it is this richer system that is our natural one. And fortunately the richer system does not raise difficulties for a truth theory satisfying Convention T, for it is extensional."[22] The claim made here is to the effect that natural language, being a rich extensional system, can appear as both metalanguage and object language. This is symptomatic of semantic monism which makes Tarskian results invalid.

Besides, given the fact that all models of truth–definition may not be classical, i.e., two–valued and extensional, the rigid availability of T–sentences cannot be guaranteed.[23] Therefore, all extended models must ensure that if T–sentences are to be necessarily true, there cannot be any departure from the classical Tarskian models. Davidson's extended model has been claimed to be Tarskian in the core, but given the fact that there can be serious discrepancy between a formalized language and a natural one, it cannot be guaranteed that there will not be considerable weakening of the T–sentences in the Davidsonian model. Since the complete formalization of a natural language is still an open question, the scope of the above criticism remains open.

It is beyond doubt that Davidson models his semantical results on Tarski's Convention T, but the thrust of his results is non–Tarskian to the extent that the latter are intuitively wider in scope and empirical in motivation. The theory of interpretation which is derived from the theory of truth is sought to bring out the desired fit between the T–sentences and the linguistic behaviour of the community. Thus, the empirical constraints imposed

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on truth theory do suggest that Davidson wants to achieve more than what Tarski's truth theory was designed to achieve.

IV. Empirical Constraints and Interpretative Truth Theory.

The empirical constraints which mark off Davidson's truth theory embed it in the natural continuum of speech behaviour. This embedding brings together two frameworks already referred to and builds up a holistic theory which not only shows the truth-structure of sentences but also the conditions under which those sentences are held true by the speech–community. Thus, the holistic requirement and the requirement of empiricalisation go together. The following may be treated as the Davidson–requirements :

(DR_1) The formal structure of T–sentences must be embeddable in the speech–behaviour so that the former represents the internalized rules of holding sentences as true, e.g. 'Snow is white' is true iff snow is white.

(DR_2) The theory of interpretation that naturalizes truth theory must be available for the whole of natural language since it completes the process of empirically embedding the truth–structures.

The requirment DR_1 brings about relativization of truth to the speaker–time,[24] nexus in the way of a deliberate design to produce T–sentences for all sentences including the ones involving indexicals. The speaker–time relativization is a part of the attempt to bring truth–structures closer to the speech–habits of the native speakers. Once this is secured, the formal constraints are relaxed so as to prodnce the interpretation structures for the sentences whose T–sentences are available. DR_2 is a constraint on interpretation rather than on truth. It shows that if we know the conditions under which the native speakers

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hold sentences true, we can also know what they mean by those sentences as true.

Davidson's credit lies in putting DR_1 as the foremost constraint which makes truth theory the foundation of a theory of meaning and interpretation. A theory of meaning necessarily involves, according to Davidson, a method of interpretation, since meaning can be situated only in an interpersonal and interlinguistic framework where the speech-behaviour of the native speakers is interpreted and understood by the interpreters according to some common parameters. The basic parameter is the maximal agreement on what is held as true by both the native and the alien speakers. Given this framework, one can map the truth–structures within a given language system onto its interpretative structures. That is to say, one can coalesce the truth–conditions of sentences in a language with the conditions of meaning of those sentences.

But does this 'grand design', in the words of J. A, Foster,[25] stand? Foster's objection to Davidson's scheme is that though the letter is formally an extensional framework, yet while being mapped onto an interpretative scheme it gets itself involved in intensional idioms.[26] Davidson's reply to this criticism has made it clear that if a theory of interpretation involves intensional concepts like belief and intention, it is not a sign of its weakness but rather of its strength,[27] since it corroborates the fact that a theory does not need to be exclusively extensional. That is to suggest that the resources of a theory cannot be restricted to the resources of what the theory is about. In this sense, it may be claimed that though the truth theory is extensional the theory of interpretation can offord to be intensional. But one can ask how can there be perfect fit or matching between the t–structures and i–structures of the sentences if the two theories so widely differ? Since the matching between t–structures and i–structures

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is already taken for granted, what remains to be justified is the method of matching between the two theories. Davidson's way out of this problem is the holistic method of cementing the divergences between the extensional and intensional languages. This method succeeds to the extent there are mechanisms to correlate these two languages. Davidson champions holism on a larger scale to accommodate divergent tendencies in the theories of semantics.

But can holism ultimately dissolve the differences between a truth theory (T_1) and the theory of interpretation (T_2)? There are two ways of answering this question from the holistic point of view :

(H_1) There are no two theories T_1 and T_2 ultimately since at a semantic level truth theory and the theory of interpretion collapse into each other. Therefore, the so-called intensional structure of I-theory is resolvable into the extensional structure of T-theory.

(H_2) Even if T_1 and T_2 differ in their semantic resources, they do not differ in their theoretic content. Truth and its semantic characterization being the theoretic content of both, what I-theory adds to T-theory is the network of beliefs and intentions which are embedded in natural language. But what is added is only a matter of form and not of content.

H_1 is closer to Davidson's own answer to the above mentioned question, since T_1 and T_2 can be maintained to be the same theory at a deeper level. But it seems to rob the I-theory of its special significance. Besides, resolving the intensional language of T_2 into the extensional language of T_1 is a far too difficult task which has not been undertaken so far. In this respect, the solution offered by H_2 is of a more liberal character. The I-

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theory is given a speciality of its own which is derivable from its contribution to the general structure of the T–theory as applied to natural languages. Davidson seems to recommend the innocuous character of the intensional language of T_1 insofar as the latter does not detract from the theoretic content of the truth theory. But the inner conflict between T_1 and T_2 can still be detected in the structural content of the theories. The difference in the form is no small difference.

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NOTES

1. Donald Davidson; *Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation*, (Clarendon Press. Oxford, 1984).
2. See Davidson, 'In Defence of Convention T' *Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation*, pp. 65–75.
3. Davidson, 'Semantics for Natural Languages', *Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation*, pp. 55–64.
4. cf. Davidson, 'In Defence of Convention T', pp. 68–69.
5. *Ibid.* p. 69.
6. cf. Davidson, 'Semantics for Natural Languages' p. 56.
7. Tarski, 'The Concept of Truth in Formalized Languages' *Logic, Semantics and Metamathematics*, — trans, J. H. Woodger, (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1956), pp. 152–278.
8. See Davidson, 'Semantics for Natural Languages', p. 56. And also his 'In Defence of Convention T', p. 70.
9. cf. Davidson, 'Radical Interpretation', *Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation*, pp. 125–139.

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10. See, Davidson, 'Thought and Talk' *Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation*, pp. 155–70.
11. cf. *Ibid.*
12. See Davidson, 'Truth and Meaning' *Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation*, pp. 17–36.
13. Davidson 'Thought and Talk', p. 161.
14. See Tarski 'The Concept of Truth in Formalized Languages', pp. 152–65.
15. *Ibid.*, p. 266.
16. *Ibid.*, p. 195.
17. *Ibid.*, p. 200,
18. See Saul Kripke: "Is there a Problem about Substitutional Quantification?" in *Truth and Meaning* eds. Gareth Evans and John McDowell (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1976), pp. 337–40.
19. cf. *Ibid.*
20. See Tarski, "The Concept of Truth in Formalized Languages', p. 198.
21. *Ibid*, pp. 132–65.
22. Davidson, 'In Defence of Convention T', p. 73.
23. Anil Gupta; 'Truth and Paradox', *The Journal Philosophical Logic*, II (1982) pp. 5–15.
24. See Davidson, 'Truth and Meaning', pp. 33–35.
25. cf. J. A. Foster 'Meaning and Truth Theory', in *Truth and Meaning* eds. Gareth Evans and John McDowell, p. 23
26. *Ibid.*, pp. 21–23.
27. See Davidson 'Reply to Foster'. *Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation* pp. 171–79.

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THE GENERALIZED OTHER AND THE CONCRETE OTHER : A RESPONSE OF MARIE FLEMING

I

Marie Fleming's "The Gender of Critical Theory" repays careful study and I have considerable sympathy for much of what she has to say.[1] I also think that the objects of her exposition, elucidation and critique are thinkers of considerable importance who deserve careful and critical attention. That is to say, Jurgen Habermas's version of a critical theory and his attempt to articulate a communicative ethic plainly deserve much more attention than philosophers in the Anglo–American philosophical tradition have been willing to give them and Seyla Benhabib's critique, development and integration with feminist thought of Habermas's work seems to me of central importance to our understanding of social life and to our construction of a social theory with an emancipatory practice.[2] Fleming helps us to see the importance of that work including the way Benhabib builds and improves on Habermas.

My difficulties begin with Fleming's criticisms of Benhabib's laundering of Habermas. I am inclined to think that Benhabib's laundering is well done and that for the most part, and now speaking broadly and not of whatever finetuning might be required, Benhabib's account seems persuasive and importantly pushes social thought along. I am not convinced that it has the weaknesses and ill effects that Fleming believes she unearths

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including its alleged conservative thrust. I shall proceed by inspecting her criticisms one by one.

II

Fleming finds it paradoxical that feminist theorists such as Benhabib and Nancy Frazer find much to learn and indeed to build on from Habermas's theory of modernity, given "his insensitivity to issues of contemporary concern to women." That does not seem puzzling to me in the least. There can be and often is general or at least different features of a person's thought that are available and important to others even where they sharply disagree with that person on other matters or find her thought radically incomplete. V. W. Quine is notoriously conservative but radical philosophers have found his holistic, fallibilistic anti-foundationalist theory of very considerable value indeed. C. B. Macpherson was an incisive critic of liberalism yet his own positive account importantly builds in important respects on liberalism. Sibyl Schwarzenbach and Susan Moller Okin are important feminist theorists who reveal gender biases in the work of John Rawls [3] Yet they go on in important ways to develop basically Rawlsian accounts of justice and moral theory which overcome those biases and give us, within a broadly contractarian and Rawlsian framework, a genderless theory of justice. Similarly Seyla Benhabib both builds on and corrects Habermas. I see nothing surprising or untoward in this. Habermas could be blind to women's issues while his conceptions of communicative rationality, undistorted discourse and a communicative ethic could be of vital importance for feminist thought.

III

I also have difficulties with what Fleming says about Benhabib's treatment of the private / public distinction and with her

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conceptualization of generalized other/the concrete other distinction and with her employment of the tricky 'false needs' distinction. What Fleming says about those distinctions themselves seems to me problematical and she seems to me to relate them, perhaps even run them together, in ways that seem questionable.

Fleming, as does Benhabib, rightly and importantly, points out that the public/private distinction has widely functioned as an ideological instrument in the oppression of women. Historically speaking, it has been a tool in legitimizing the segregation of men and women. Women were excluded from the public realm of justice : a political realm where history is made. They were instead relegated to the private, personal space of the household. The public/private distinction reflects a normative ordering of the lives of women and men in what in reality is an oppressive sex-gender system.

All this, as a matter of sociological fact, is sadly and ubiquitously true. That is, given the world as we have it now, this is the way things go. But it does not follow from this that in a genderless world, where relations between men and women would at long last be genuinely human relations (relations that among other things were fair and non-oppressive), that there would in such a circumstance be no need for a private/public distinction and that there would in such a circumstance come into being a human condition where law would wither away so that there would be no need for the notions of rights and entitlements. From the fact that contract theories get articulated, sometimes by sexist males against the background of the oppressive social reality of sexist society, it does not at all follow that contract theories cannot be genderless while still retaining the private/public distinction and some conception of rights and entitlements.

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Carol Gilligan has well taught us that in moral reflection and moral action there are different strands.[4] Some of our thinking centres on considerations of rights, entitlements and justice, but there is also a different strand concerned with care and resposibility and a sensitivity to human needs and aspirations. The latter strand tends to be more contextual and narrative. It worries less about an individual's rights and boundary crossings and stresses more the interconnectedness between human beings and the importance of such interconnectedness. Historically speaking at least in societies such as our own, the first strand has been more the concern of men and the second more of women. But this is a historical point. It does not say anything about how men and women *must* be in any society anywhere anywhen. It does not say anything about how, a distinctive socialization aside, men and women are constituted. Gender aside, these different strands are important elements in the moral life and in our pervasively male dominated society the second strand has among theoreticians until recently been extensively ignored and sometimes even devalued and the first, with its stress on rights, entitlements and justice gets identified with the public sphere and sometimes–revealing a not inconsiderable ethnocentrism–even with very taking of the moral point of view.

IV

Fleming commends Benhabib for historicizing the moral point of view and for introducing her conceptions of the generalized other and the concrete other. Yet she feels that these very distinctions also give rise to difficulties in Benhabib's account. To take the standpoint of the generalized other is to view each person as a rational being with entitlements to the same rights and duties as we claim for ourselves. What constitutes our moral dignity is not what differentiates us from each other but rather what we "as speaking and acting rational agents, have in

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common." The concrete other, by contrast, is a perspective on human beings where we do not, in viewing them as moral agents, abstract from their concrete identities but view each and every rational being as an individual with a concrete history, identity and affective-emotional constitution. In viewing people from this perspective are concerned with them as specific individuals with specific needs, talents and capacities.

The moral categories associated with the generalized other are rights, obligations and entitlement, those with the concrete other are responsibililities, bonding and caring. So the generalized other and concrete other get associated with those distinct strands of moral discourse.

Fleming thinks, mistakenly I believe, that there is something incoherent about Benhabib's conceptualization of the concrete other. The at least putative incoherency is in our talk of abstraction from what constitutes our commonality. She does not think that it makes much sense to derive an abstraction from an abstraction. She does not believe that the concrete other has much in the way of content. Perhaps I am missing something but I do not see that. It is a common characteristic of normal human beings (infants aside) that they are language users. But very general feature may for certain purposes not be the thing on which we need to focus. We might instead need, or at least want, to be rather more concrete and to focus on the specific language at a specific time and how it is used by native speakers. Alternatively, we might wish to be more specific still and look at a specific individul's idiolect. Moving from the generalized other to concrete other is analogous. There is nothing incoherent about it, contenless or, as far as I can see, suspect. *At most* Benhabib has used the word 'abstraction' in a somewhat eccentric way. But it is, that possibility notwithstanding, prefectly clear what she is talking about.

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It is important for us to recognize, as Benhabib does, that every generalized other is also a concrete other and to stress the importance, against the grain of most non–feminist moral theory, of moving in thinking about morality to thinking about the concrete other. (This, of course, does not exclude thinking 'the generalized other' as well). This helps us to see a way in which we can integrate the normative features of Habermasian critical theory with the concerns of feminists. Every generalized other is also a concrete other and both standpoints are important and indeed complimentary. And adequate feminist critical theory will enable us to mediate between the perspectives of the generalized and concrete other : synthesizing justice with care, autonomy with connectedness and thereby giving a more adequate picture of the moral life. Our moral images of the world are of central importance to us and Benhabib's focus on the concrete other in addition to the generalized other gives us a more adequate one than is characteristically given in orthodox moral theory. We have in Benhabib's account both contextuality and a more abstracted perspective working together in harness to yield a more adequate moral image of the world. There is, moreover, no need to abandon the assumption that morality requires *both* impartiality and caring. Again I do not see how or even that Fleming has undermined these rather commonsensical claims.

V

I want now to turn to a consideration of Fleming's worry about an alleged implicit, though surely unintended, authoritarianism once we subordinate rights to needs. Fleming is worried that if rights can be subordinate to needs that we can have no assurances that an anticipatory-utopian discourse will not, under the cover of liberation, actually be authoritarian. On the contrary, I would respond, we can have at least this assurance : among

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our fundamental needs surely will be a need for autonomy and a need for some sort of self-realization. Moreover, the latter need requires autonomy for its satisfaction and there just is, as well, this need for autonomy. In a needbased ethics with such needs being as central and strategic as they are, there can be no genuine worry on that account about authoritarianism taking us down the road to serfdom. Furthermore, I do not see that from the fact that traditional morality and a not inconsiderable amount of moral theory has been, in effect, if not in intent, oppressive to women that we have good reasons for believing that critical theory, particularly a critical feminist theory, will be oppressive to women and authoritarian.

VI

However, whether authoritarian or not, Fleming thinks that on Benhabib's account there is a real worry about relativism, for in thoroughly naturalizing Habermas–taking the Apel out of Habermas–and in exposing what she calls the rationalistic fallacy, Benhabib has in effect, Fleming claims, undermined Habermas's important distinction between language oriented to reaching understanding and the strategic use of language. But that (or so I am inclined to think) is not so, naturalism or no naturalism, rationalistic fallacy or not, there is a distinction that we can recognize, and see a point in acknowledging, between undistorted and distorted discourse. The former is discourse whose underlying governing role or aim is that this discourse is to be constrained by what will, under conditions of equal autonomy, be agreed on by rational agents reasoning or deliberating in a certain way under conditions of unfettered inquiry. 'That certain way' is constituted by certain constraints on their reasoning. The sole admissible motive for discoursing, when reasoning under such constraints, is the search for truth where the deliberation so structured would be governed by what would be accepted under

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those conditions on the basis of the best arguments or the most adequate deliberation.[5] All other motives are excluded. Such discourse is contrasted with discourses—indeed our ordinary discoures—that do not meet those conditions. Such idealizd discourses just are conceptually distinct from discourses which do not meet those conditions and have by contrast only a strategic aim or where the strategic aim is dominant. That the former is more utopian and occurs less frequently than we would wish is no news to Habermas and Benhabib and does not undermine the distinction. Indeed even if they never occurred—if the whole thing were counterfactual—it would not undermine the distinction. We have a conception, heuristically valuable, to put it minimally, between undistorted and distorted discourse. And that in turn helps us in sorting out what is ideological and what is not.

VII

Finally, let us consider the charge of conservativism. Benhabib's intentions to the contrary notwithstanding, her account, Fleming maintains, is in effect politically conservative. This is so because Benhabib, Fleming would have it, accepts too much state intervention and allows that a communicative ethic is intimately linked to the vision of the distinctively democratic, public ethos in late capitalist societies. But state interventionism in a thoroughly social democratic but also liberal society (say Sweden) need not be conservative and a transitional socialist society also *need* not, with its extensive role of the state, be conservative. That Habermas *starts* from the democratic ethos of capitalist societies (those capitalist societies that unlike South Africa or Chile are actually democratic) in articulating norms of communicative rationlity does not mean he must remain there. Socialism builds on capitalism and all liberal beliefs need not be anathema to socialists.[6] There will be superstructural parallels to the base. Benbabib's defense of a communicative ethic affords

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one a model which shows us some of what is to be done if we are to transcend bourgeois individualism in the direction of a socialist society of the future. That is its emancipatory intent and there is nothing in it which undermines that interest or, in some other way, has a conservative thrust.

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AFRICAN PHILOSOPHY : PAULIN J. HOUNTONDJI— HIS DILEMMA AND CONTRIBUTIONS

The debate over the existence or non–existence of a philosophy that can be qualified as African has been on for over four decades. The professional philosopher in Africa today operates in a situation of cultural, political, social and economic tension. Moulded by and in the fineries and principles of Western philosophic tradition, he is constrained by the vast body of opinion (doxa) and beliefs entertained by the majority of Africans of whom he is essentially a part Torn between the philosophic traditions of the West and the abject socio–political and economic conditions of Africa, his dilemma is understandable.

One such philosopher is Paulin J. Hountondji, a scholar whose influence in the Francophone African countries is remarkable but who remains largely unread, or not well read, or understood in Anglophone Africa mainly because of the language barrier. In the following passages I briefly summarise his endearing contributions; I then present another view of philosophy different from Hountondji's and finally situate his philosophic programme.

II

Hountondji's contributions presented with much vigour, earnestness and disarming logic can be found in his articles publi-

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shed in the following journals, among the many others.

1. "An Alienated Literature", *Diogenes*, No. 71, 1970.
2. "History as a Myth", *Presence Africaine*, No. 91, 1971.
3. "African Philosophy; Myth and Reality", *Thought and Practice*, Vol. 1, No. 2, 1974.
4. "Philosophy and Its Revolution", *Cahiers Philosophiques Africaines*, Nos. 3–4, 1974.
5. "The Idea of Philosophy in Nkrumah's Consciencism", *Daho-Express*, No. 1235 (15, September 1973).
6. "True and False Pluralism", *Diogenes*, No. 84, 1973.
7. "The Pitfalls of Being Different", *Diogenes*, No. 131, Fall 1985.

The articles from number one to six have been collected, retouched and published in a volume titled *African Philosophy: Myth and Reality*[1] in 1983, though the French version was published as far back as 1976. Some of the references are to this book and where appropriate, to the articles themselves. Hountondji's contributions in general and specifically to the debate can be summarised briefly as follows :

1. There are no philosophers in Africa because what is generally referred to as African Philosophy is not essentially different from ethnophilosophy.[2]

2. African ethnophilosophy has its roots in the works of the Flemish Missionary, Placid Tempels[3], who without "terminological scruples" mistook ethnophilosophy for philosophy. The work of Alexis Kagame[4] while exhibiting another feature(s) in terms of nomenclature, strictly speaking, is in line with Tempelsian tradition with only this difference : that Kagame sought to extract "a complete philosophy from the

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grammatical analysis of Bantu languages."[5] These works are, for Hountondji, "ethnographic works with philosophical pretensions."

3. Nkrumah in his *Consciencism* believed in the existence of a "traditional African philosophy and by integrating Islamic and Euro–Christian contributions, sought to create on this base a new philosophical and ideological synthesis which could be unanimously espoused by all sons and daughters of revolutionary Africa."[6] Nkrumah ended up disastrously by enthroning "unanimity as a value to be promoted in the political and scientific life of contemporary Africa." Against this "pretentious" unanimity, Hountondji calls attention to the virtue of pluralism and essential contradiction as the motive force in the history of African peoples.[7]

4. In the light of the foregoing, Hountondji calls for an adequate, proper, incisive and painstaking evaluation of all that is so far taken as African philosophy which has its roots in ethnography. The understanding and appreciation of African past does not have "to become a simple rumination, a pleased satisfaction with or a resignation to the present, but that it be guided by an actual project, a clear vision of the present and the future," Without this, Africans of today may simply forget about rational procedures on the pretext and understanding that their ancestors have already done so. It is only when African thinkers abandon reliance on ethnographic and cultural anthropological works, and embrace rational procedures that Africans can "discover the adventure of a single and same humanity."[8]

The works under reference cannot be treated or understood in isolation from much earlier works by Hountondji, especially his *African Philosophy : Myth and Reality*. In the various essays

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in the book, Hountondji vigorously maintains that African philosophers in various tones and modes "struck up the Tempelsian theme whereas they should have been mindful of the massive and blinding fact that Tempels, by his own admission, was addressing not them but the European public."[9] In his opinion, African thinkers and philosophers need to redefine their mission, reorient and re-relate themselves. They should cease to write for an European audience interested in and craving for exoticism. "They must write first and foremost for an African public."[10]

Hountondji further argues that the term African philosophy is a misnomer mainly because what is usually taken as such (collectively) in the literature that is so far massively available is "African Pseudo-Philosophy",[11] which has no explicit formulation because of its total reliance on the ethnographic works of Tempels, Kagame and others. He then wonders whether the word philosophy, when qualified by the word African, still retains its usual meaning, that is the universality of the word in terms of "its possible geographical applications."[12]

His position is that this universality has to be preserved not because philosophy must necessarily ask the same questions or has the same themes from one geographical area to the other but essentially because "the differences of content are meaningful precisely and only as differences of content, which as such refer back to the essential unity of a single discipline, of a single style of inquiry."[13] The phrase, African Philosophy, has been subjected to mythological exploitation retrievable though, but not for the purposes or services of "a fiction of a collective system of thought but to a set of philosophical discourse and texts."[14]

In the process of retrieval, Hountondji proposes a new concept of African philosophy which remains behind and beyond

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the ethnographic pretexts.[15] But this retrieval effort cannot be grounded in ethnophilosophy "which claims to be the description of an implicit, unexpressed world–view, which never existed any where but in the anthropologists imagination.. a philosophy which has no rational justification but shelters lazily behind the authority of a tradition."[16] Against this, Hountondji believes that philosophy has its locus in the "world–view described" and in "the description itself", that African philosophy does exist not in ethnophilosophy as its *locus classicus* but in a new sense "as a literature produced by Africans and dealing with philosophical problems."[17]

To this extent the much acclaimed work of Tempels is not African philosophy because the author is not an African. "African philosophy is African philosophical literature."[18] The difference is not because one is qualitatively better than the other, it is not as a result of racial, religious or cultural factors but because the "geographical variable" must be accounted for–geographical variable understood "as empirical, contingent, extrinsic to the content or significance or the discourse and as quite apart from any questions of theoretical connections."[19]

Consequently, Hountondji rephrases his definition of African philosophy to include moral tales, didactic legends, aphorisms and proverbs; all constitute an intrinsic part of this philosophy. Conceding the inadequacy and inappropriateness of his earlier positions, he declares : "the absence of transcription certainly does not devalue a philosophical discourse, but it prevents it from taking itself into a collective theoretical tradition and from taking its place in a history as a reference point capable of orienting future discussion. There may therefore have been African philosophers without an African philosophy."[20] Until this precise moment of transcription African memory cannot

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liberate "itself for the critical activity which is the beginning of philosophy, in the only acceptable sense of the word." [21]

This, then, is what Hountondji's philosophic programme and problematic in relation to the debate over African philosophy amounts to. Inspite of his formidable intellectual output, rigorous and arresting arguments couched in an enchanting language, is his position, generally speaking, sustainable ?

III

Philosophy is a very old science. It is as old as man himself. What I mean is that as man became able to think, to question, to reason, to reflect, argue and debate, he began to philosophise. To philosophise or to refuse to do so is also to philosophise because one needs to show why one should not. This is because the human intellect is naturally and perpetually thirsty for knowledge of all kinds. Durant was referring to this fundamental yearning for knowledge when he suggested "that there is a pleasure in philosophy and a lure even in the mirages of metaphysics, which every student feels until the coarse necessities of physical existence drag him from the heights of thought into the mart of economic strife and gain." [22]

By philosophy is meant the intelligent and reflective search for the first causes which justify the rise of the phenomena of the world and life. During the earlier part of human history and development, the search for causes was made more of imagination than of reason. Thus, two stages may be distinguished :

(a) The age of universal animism, when the world was conceived of as a living being performing the different phenomena of nature;

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(b) The age of anthropomorphism, when the world was conceived of as being full of gods and geni. These gods and geni were conceived as men but having a superior nature, and all things were explained by the intervention of some of the goods and geni. The universe itself was conceived of as a production of the various gods (theogony).

Beliefs in gods, spirits and occult forces have often been suggested as constituting the parameters of African philosophy. Such beliefs are not specific to Africa. Similar beliefs are held by the masses in all cultures and societies all over the world and in all ages. Even the vast majority of people in the developed countries still cling to some vastiges of such beliefs. These beliefs have been subjected to intensive philosophical examination, particularly within the areas of philosophy of religion and logical fallacies. The result of such examination is that under "primitive" conditions where natural processes involved in good and bad fortune remain largely unknown and uncontrollable by practical means and in the absence of a coherent body of scientific theory and naturalistic explanation, men have at all times rationalised their fate by postulating mysterious agencies in nature and among their fellow men. Thus, gods, spirits and magical forces beyond the community, together with witches and sorcerers within it are postulated in explanation of the working of the universe, of the incidence of benefits and misfortunes, and of the strains of life itself. However, there is always a moment of rupture between the forces constituted by these mysterious agencies and the attempt to rationalise them. Perhaps this is what Hountondji has called the moment of transcription. The more the rationalisation taken on a scientific valence, he believes, the more the rupture is accentuated.

Incidentally for the West, the poem of Hesiod, *Work and Days* [23], may be taken as the last work of mythology in the long

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history of the development of Western thought. After Hesiod, came the Ionian thinkers to dwell once more on the problem of the rise on the world, but in a completely new fashion. Their coming perhaps indicated the departure from the period of mythology and magic to that of philosophy.

Hountondji has shown conclusively that until this moment of departure is identified, much of what is now regarded and taken as African philosophy is not much different from the age old attempts of men everywhere to rationalise their fate in the complete absence of a scientific culture. For him proponents of African philosophy tend to forget or in fact consciously neglect the obvious difference between science, myth and magic. According to Guiculescu, all three are components of knowledge, are three types of human activity in man's interaction with his surrounding environment in an obvious attempt to accommodate himself to the constraints imposed by the environment. But the three kinds of activity do not amount to the same thing or point to the same direction. In his words, "scientific thinking has in common with myths the fact that it presumes to explain the nature of things; in common with magic is the fact that it aims to predict events in such a way as to act effectively on them. But unlike both of these earlier practices, science attempts to go beyond the world of appearances ."[24] But does it follow that the non-identification of this moment of rupture, of departure ultimately renders all philosophic systems of the non-Western type implausible ? Certainly not.

Hountondji, like Wiredu, thinks that the absence of transcription, the lack of rupture between myth, magic and science in African traditional thought renders all such thought systems unphilosophical. There cannot be advancement of knowledge without a progressive puncturing of illusions, myth, magic etc. In other words this advancement is not possible without the

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evolution of critical consciousness. African thought systems are still eminently located at the pre-scientific and pre–philosophical periods. Hence, for Hountondji, so much needless attention has been devoted to the works of ethnologists and cultural anthropologists. While these works may be of philosophical interests, they are, in the main, not philosophical works, in his sense of the word. Wiredu, like Hountondji, has argued that "if you want to know the philosophy of a given people you do not go to the aged peasant or fetish priests or court personalities, but to the individual thinkers in person or in print."[25] Both Wiredu and Hountondji seem to believe that there is something inherently unphilosophical in relying on the memory of aged peasants and court personalities in order to reconstruct and record African traditional philosophy. It would thus appear that their problem is not the essence of African traditional philosophy but the method. The issues associated with methodology have been allowed to becloud the essence and distinctiveness of this philosophy. In the main, Wiredu and Hountondji are misled by their own philosophical orientations : Philosophy as a critical, theoretical and analytic enterprise. Omoregbe has suggested that contrary to Wiredu and Hountondji African traditional folk thought systems "are not gratuitous assertions for the original authors of these ideas and views obviously had their resons for holding and advancing them. They are not bald assertions but the fruit of reflection, the conclusions of a reasoning process. They did not put their reasoning in the form of Aristotle's syllogism or Russell's logical form but they evidently had their reasons."[26]

Hountondji's pre–occupation with critical philosophy has become stifling and dogmatic. These traits are, to say the least, not the hallmarks of a robust philosophic temper. Critical and analytic philosophy is but one sense of philosophy, it is just one other way of doing philosophy but all other ways cannot be

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reduced to it without cultural harm. There is first order level of folk thought system which is of no less importance. According to Bewaji this first order level "consists in the general body of beliefs and sentiments which the individual in a culture holds in common with other members of his society. In this sense the general intellectual temper of a culture–its characteristic mode of thought, its pervasive world outlook, its unquestioned assumptions constitute its philosophy."[27] These assumptions, beliefs, and sentiments may not be systematically formulated or expressed but they do have considerable influence because for Sodipo "they make it possible for members of the society to communicate and exchange ideas and live in some agreement and common expectation of what is good and right or bad and wrong."[28] If members of a given culture are unable to transced this first order level their folk thought system is no less philosophical. Hountondji thinks otherwise. His basic discontent with those who espouse this traditional "folkish" approach is that it cannot aid the material, economic, social and technological development of Africa. But he seems to forget and consciously neglect the fact that the lack of transcription does not mean that the folk thought system is grossly impaired. Life based on this system, as evidenced in most parts of Africa, is still highly regarded. The lack of transcription does not mean that knowledge and ideas about all aspects of human life and predicament-from morality to law, from science to technology, from history to psychology, from superstition to organized or unorganized religion are unimportant in terms of their relevance to the problems of individual and social living.

It is important to note that myth as a peculiar form of knowledge is at the same time a source of mandatory rules and standards of behaviour which are to be strictly observed. It constitutes the basis of a totalitarian ideology unopposed by any

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rival notions, conceptions or doctrines. The doubts that may arise later as a result of long historical development which may find their expression in the rationalization of myth, testified for Hountondji, the beginning of its disintegration and collapse. It is not entirely correct, however, to suppose that myths are devoid of logos. The syncretic method of myth does not exclude logos and the view that folk thought systems are essentially illogical appears to be erratic. The essence of folk thought system should not be confused with the inadequacy of its method. In the words of Malinowski "Myth (folk thought systems in general) played an important social function. It justified the existing system, laws and moral values, expressed and codified, as it were, current beliefs, sanctified tradition, guided men in their practical activity and taught them the rules of behaviour."[23] Men do not live by bread and by science alone but also by myths. Francois Jacob is very correct when he argues that in certain aspects, myths, magic and science fulfil the same function. They all furnish the human spirit with a certain representation of the world and the forces that animate it.

IV

How does one situate Hountondji's entire philosophic programme and problematic? How plausible are his positions, and how sound are his arguments?

Hountondji's work is profound but not essily accessible. His various essays and articles demonstrate to a high degree that the salient issues, the dominant questions of, and the ultimate identity for African philosophy is ineluctably tied up with the social, political, economic, ideological and intellectual orientation of Africans themselves. The essence of his arguments is to deny the existence of African Philosophy in its present form. His position, generally speaking, has received much attention

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in these arguments. It is, therefore, hard not to share his perspective that a good deal of the debate over the existence or non–existence of African philosophy have run their course. In his approach he shares many things in common with E. A. Ruch who in various articles culminating in his co–authored volume *African Philosophy,*[30] sought to debunk the idea of an African philosophy.

However, contemporary exponents of African Philosophy, for example, do not claim that popular beliefs, traditional practices and a collective and an unconscious behaviour simply qualify as philosophy, though a philosophical system can be derived from them. As Ruch has emphasised, "tradition becomes a value in itself, not only because it safeguards the cultural, social and emotional unity of the group, but also because it expresses the ontological and eternal sameness of the real world which underlies the world of daily experience."[31]

To make the past relevant to the present and the future Hountondji, like Wiredu, has called for the acceptance and dissemination of rational procedures. There is nothing inherently wrong with this demand to the extent that there is the awareness that it is not, cannot be, the only pathway to truth. The danger is perhaps the fact that Hountondji may have accepted rational procedures not as the only pathway to philosophy but to truth. But truth of this kind as Breton contends "free tradition from its socio–cultural roots; it sterilizes it, empties it of all metaphysics and then puts it on the market of symbolic benefits as a collection of formulas."[32] Truth is not based only on science. Breton again proposes that it is also based on the "ancestral heritage of a cultural background. For an agreed–upon knowledge, resting on traditions and potentially shared by all the community cannot be meningfully substituted by the knowledge of specialists who alone claim to establish the criteria of truth,

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beginning with a set of impersonal rules that claim a validity that is independent of culture and history." [33]

If the persistent call for the acceptance and dissemination of rational procedures by Hountondji, Wiredu, Bodunrin and others is intended to produce "a cast of mind and attitude culminating in the scientification of the African, the manipulation of things", the destruction of community life and shared values which are rooted in "pluralism and vital contradiction", then it has to be rejected. The intolerance of the quest for rational procedures and critical inquiry has widened the gulf between two view of the world, since the essence of the debate is the conflict between two systems of intelligibility. The humanity of the African, his destiny and his experience is sufficient basis for philosophical opinion.

There is another much more insidious deduction from Hountondji's arguments : for X to quality as philosophy, X must conform to the valid paradigm and measure, the reference point provided by Western European philosophic tradition. African philosophy is X; X does not conform to this (Western) paradigm; therefore African Philosophy is not philosophy but mythology or somthing other. The logic underlying this is spurious. It is not much different from the assertion of Levy–Bruhl, the French Anthropologist, that Africans are mythical while Europeans are rational. It is also not very different from Leopold Sedar Senghor's metaphysical call for a "Universal Humanity", a kind of "Universal Civilization" where the different races co-exist. These are nothing but a betrayal of ignorance. As Anyanwu contends "by subordinating African cultural facts to the assumptions, concepts, theories and world–view suggested by Western culture and developed by Western thinkers, confusion ensues. The idea of a Universal, scientific or theoretical philosophy does not make sense." [31]

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About the concepts of African Philosophy and Religion, one cannot help asking what is particularly and intellectually obscene about ancestor worship, about being in harmony with the cosmic forces. What did the ancient Greeks and Romans worship at the time their gods and goddesses were anthropomorphic and begetters of man ? The Greeks and Romans did not debunk this aspect of their early history and development; they did not have to look elsewhere to validate their philosophy. As civilization bulldozes its way not only through African forests and jungles but also through the hearts of Africans, change is imperative but this can only be qualitative to be meaningful. There is need for caution on the part of African philosophers when calling for the use of Western European Philosophy as a reference point for African philosophy. But even this minimal demand is not justifiable. After all, the Chinese, the Indian, the Middle Eastern (Arabs mainly) philosophers do not in any way consider the Western paradigm as the measure or the reference point for their own philosophic traditions.

There is also the need to distinguish the essence of African philosophy Religion from the external expression of that essence. The sound of the African drum at a Catholic mass, for example, does not confer upon the ceremonies a traditional African character. Where angels and saints sit in the places reserved for demi–gods and departed ancestors, and Christian baptism replaces traditional initiation rites, then obviously something is wrong. Would Western European Philosophers consider their culture healthy if a white congregation were to invoke their ancestors and pour libation on a "pagan" shrine with the *tantum Ergo* in the background ?[35] Obviously not.

Doubtless, there is indeed a universal craze for European type of culture and civilization. In the face of this rapid technological and cultural invasion from "abroad", the African is,

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now, in a dilemma in the sense of alienation of "a man who lives in a world not made for him, whose own is slipping away, dying, being destroyed, beyond any recall."[36] However, while other peoples (Indians, Chinese, Arabs etc.) are extremely cautious about this invasion, African peoples, interestingly her intellectuals but embarrassingly her philosophers, are in the forefront chanting the virtues of this invasion and arguing for it. But who has ever heard of Nigerian "Peace Corps" or Tanzanian "Volunteer Service Overseas" or Ivorian "Cooperants" charged with teaching African languages and traditional medicine, African melody and dance, or even the much vaunted mysticism and cosmology in European and North American primary and secondary schools ?[37] Who has ever thought of including wrestling, Okonkwo-Amalinze[32] style in the Olympic games ? Essentially the main weakness of Hountondji's position is perhaps the unwitting fulfilment of Jean–Paul Satre's prediction that "it may be demanded of the coloured (black) man and of him alone to give up pride in his colour."[39] Otakpor has suggested that "loss of pride in one's colour, culture, tradition, etc., is loss of pride in one's self. And for any man, this is moral death,"[40]

By denying vehemently the basis of African Philosophy, Hountondji relieves this philosophy of its relative and cultural dimension, whereas this dimensions forms and provides the reference point he is in quest of. Accounting for this relative and cultural dimension in no way obliterates the essence of that philosophy, because the fundamental issues and questions remain universal irrespective of this dimension and the "geographical variable." Hountondji's rational universe is inhabitable only when this cultural and relative dimension is missing. Rural knowledge, observed Breton "has never lost its socio–cultural anchorage. To this day it has continued its underground course, legitimated by the word of mouth. Shut up for centuries in

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the rural (traditional) classes, its influence has not ceased to grow." [41]

Hegel had much earlier upheld this cultural and relative dimension. As he put it, "men do not at certain epochs merely philosophize in general. For there is a definite character which permeates all the other historical sides of the spirit of the people. The particular form of philosophy is thus contemporaneous with a particular constitution of the people among whom it makes its appearance, with their institutions and forms of government, their morality, their social life and their capabilities." [42] Therefore, from "every philosophy has a universal appeal", it does not follow that there is a neutral world philosophy applicable to all cultures in the world.

Finally, Hountondji's contradictory definitions of African philosophy ("a set of texts, specifically the set of texts written by Africans and described as philosophical by their authors themselves; as a literature produced by Africans and dealing with philosophical problems; African philosophy is African philosophical literature", etc.) clearly indicate a lack of systematic approach. Conceptual definitions, for example, involve the purpose for which the concept is to be applied (C. Power). His mystified and often mystifying language constitutes a problem. This beclouds rather than illuminates. Perhaps this style of writing best fits his own epistemological and linguistic views, but I find his notions of "world–view described" and "the description itself", "African Pseudo–Philosophy", etc., problematically vague and his contradictory definitions unsatisfactorily resolved.

V

In assessing a contribution of this sort and of major works full of polemics as these, oversimplification on one hand and

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exaggeration on the other hand are perhaps unavoidable but doubtlessly indefensible. I have tried to maintain a blance between both. The interesting arguments, though obviously contestable, no doubt raise issues that are profound and significant, issues that are fundamental and of lasting importance. Hountondji's contributions to the debate are immense and powerful and remain so even when stripped of most of the frivolous claims. They are all provocative essays that in essence seek to reorient our conceptions of African philosophic enterprise, as well as reshape its practice. For Hountondji, African philosophy is at a crisis point because of its lack of specification, its unattainable goals, while its projects are irrelevant to the significant and basic human concerns of Africans. He, therefore, vigorously challenges the basic premises of several issues and problems that are current in the debate over African philosophy. If he is right then many of the assumptions and presuppositions are not worth the intellectual effort put into them.

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PROF. G. R. MALKANI ESSAY COMPETITION

Essays are invited for the Prof. G. R. Malkani Essay Competition **either in English or Hindi** from undergraduate or post-graduate students below the age of 25 years studying in any Indian educational institution on the theme "The Sāñkhya Concept of Mūlaprakṛti" for the First and Second prizes to be awarded respectively of Rs. 200/– and Rs. 100/– to the essays adjudicated to be so by a panel of referees appointed for the purpose. The prize–winning essays would be published in course of time either in Students' Supplement of the **Indian Philosophical Quarterly** or **Paramasa** (**Hindi**), quarterly journals published by the Department. The conditions governing submission of essays for the competition are as follows :

1. The essay typed in double space on one side of the paper must be submitted in duplicate.
2. The essay must not be longer than 2500 words.
3. The essay must be accompanied by a certificate signed by the Head of the Institution/Department where the student is studying to the effect that
   (a) the student is studying in that institution and is below the age of 25 years, and
   (b) the essay is written by him/her.
4. The essays should reach Dr. Mangala R. Chinchore, Philosophy Department, Poona University, Ganeshkhind, Pune 411 007 not later than 31–5–1990.
5. The decision of the panel of referees shall be binding on all the competitors and that no correspondence of any kind would be entertained on that count.

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THE THEORY OF COMPLIMENTARITY AND MIND-BODY DUALISM : A CRITIQUE

The theory of complimentarity[1] is an attempt to solve the perennial problem of mind-body dulalism, and it has been propounded by Nicholas Bohr, a great Physicist of the 20th Century. Let me first make clear what do we mean by 'complimentarity'. Complimentarity means a relationship or situation, specialty in Physics, the capacity of the wave and particle theories of light together to explain all phenomena of a certain type, although each separately accounts for only some of the phenomena.[2] 'Complimentarity' has been manifested in the *Sāṁkhya* philosophy also. For *Sāṁkhya* the application of *Puruṣa* and Prakṛti represents the complimentarity of two universal aspects of reality, 'Essence' and 'Substance'. Bohr is convinced that it is possible to solve this perennial problem by applying his theory of complimentarity. He claims that, his theory can be extended to fields other than physics.[3] His theory, as regard physics, is as follows.

1. Bohr introduced the principle of 'complimentarity into physics'[4] in order to overcome certain conceptual difficulties due to the fact that the fundamental principles of macro-physics appear to be false when applied to micro-physics. In micro-physics, micro-objects or events are situated such as electrons. In macro-physics, macro-objects or events are situated such as a stone. The conceptual difficulty can be exemplified as follows. According to physical theory, the precise position and the precise

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momentum of a macro–object can be determined (in the limit) simultaneously, but, according to Heisenberg's Uncertainty Principle, such a determination is not possible for a micro–object.

Another such difficulty is often referred to as 'the duality of matter and light'. According to macro–physics any micro–object that is corpuscular (C) and not wavelike (W) at the same time will always be C and not W, irrespective of the experimental arrangement by means of which it is investigated. Similarly, any macro–object that is W and not C, at the same time will always be W and not C, irrespeetive of the experimental arrangement by means of which it is investigated. According to macro–physics, the properties C and W are incompatible, i.e. a macro–object can have either the property C and not W or the property W and not C but not both properties.

According to Bohr's theory, the properties of C and W are not incompatible when assigned to micro–objects; rather they are non-compatible, that is, C and W can be conceived of as dispositional properties such that a micro–object can have both the property C and not W and the property W and not C. However, only one of these properties can be presented at a given time. Which of the two properties is present depends upon the kind of experimental arrangement by means of which tha micro–object is investigated at that time. For example, electrons having as their manifestations a click in a Greiger counter or a track in bubble chamber are C and not W. Electrons having as their manifestations diffraction pattern when reflection from a nickel crystal, or a diffraction pattern when passing through a thin film of gold, are W and not C.

2. Each of the conceptual difficulties mentioned above represents what we call, for reason to be given presently, a paradoxical situation. But in what follows, we shall deal only with

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that which involves the relation between C and W, because it is this relation which provides the basis for our discussion of complimentarity with refernce to the mind–body problem.

The paradoxical situation created by the fact that the relation between C and W for macro–object is different from the relation between C and W for micro–object. That is for macro–object the relation is that of incompatibility, whereas, for micro–object it is that of non–compatibility. The situation is paradoxical, because the conceptual unity of physics seem to be violated in that the relation of C and W are different in macro–physics and micro–physics and because there exists the separate and apparently exclusive conceptions of the same micro–objects.

3. Bohr attempts to remove the paradoxical situation as follows. He notes that phenomena that are explained as assigning the property C and W to the micro–object are invariably different from phenomena explained by assigning the property W and not C to that micro–object. These phenomena are in turn obtained by the use of mutually exclusive experimental arrangements. Bohr assumes that there are two mutually exclusive classes of experimental arrangements, which may be used to investigate such micro–objects as electrons. When such a micro–object is investigated by means of members of one of these classes, the resultant phenomenon is explained by assigning the property C and not W to the micro–object. The members of the other class result in phenomena that are explained by assigning the property W and not C to the micro–object. Bohr highlights the paradoxical situation by insisting that the assignment of the properties C and not W or W and not C to a micro–object is related to the experimental arrangement used to investigate the object. Thus, for Bohr, to assign categorically to a micro–object C and not W or W and not C without relativization to an experimental arrangement is elliptical and meaningless.

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According to Bohr, such an assignment is meaningful only if these properties are used to characterize not the micro-object as such but someting else which includes both the micro-object and the experimental arrangement used to investigate it.

The paradox is removed because the terms C and W are no longer used to characterize the same micro-object but rather to characterize what may be conceived of as two different things, that is, a micro-object investigated by two different experimental arrangements. Thus, the relation between the terms C and W in micro-physics may be conceived of as that of incompatibility. As a result, the conceptual unity of physics is, in this respect, not violated. In addition, there are no longer two mutually exclusive conceptions of the same micro-object.

4. He now defines the complimentarity in physics between C and W as follows :

C and W stand in relation of complimentarity if the following conditions obtain.

a) According to macro-physics, C and W are incompatible.

b) According to Bohr's micro-physical theory, C and W are non-compatible.

c) The resulting paradoxical situation is removed if a micro-object is conceived of as being either C and not W or W and not C only relative to the experimental arrangements by means of which it is investigated.

Now I would like to discuss the way in which Bohr applies complimentarity theory to solve mind-body problem. His theory of complimentarity as regards the mind-body problem is as follows.

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Bohr states that the problem arises due to some of the conceptual difficulties about these two concepts. But these conceptual difficulties could be removed if we can understand the distinction between mental entities and physical entities clearly. This distinction can be drawn in the following way.

Firstly, 'mental entities' permit privileged access, i.e. mental entities can be experienced only by the person to whom these entities are attributed. And secondly, 'mental entities' do not have any location in any part of body, i.e. mental entities can never be experienced as having a location in some part of the body. An entity in order to be a 'mental-entity' must fullfil these two conditiuns.

Smimilarly, bodily entities also posess two different characteristics which are as follows :

Firstly, 'bodily-entities' do not permit privileged access, for 'bodily-entities' can be experienced by more than one person. And, secondly, bodily-entities do have a location in some part of the body of a person to whom these entities are attributed. These locations can be hypothetically observed or assigned to that entity. An entity becomes bodily entity if it fulfils the above two conditions.

Bohr states that, all private experiences are 'mental entities' and all 'mental entities' are synonymous with experience. He defines 'mental entities' as 'entity M' and 'M entities do not contain any reference to any statement about scientific psychology. That means, a person's having an 'M entities' can be known simply by means of the reports which he utters about his own private experience. 'M entities' are defined by Bohr as $entity_1$.

On the other hand, 'bodily-entities' contain some reference to any statement about scientific psychology. All the members

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of the bodily entities are theoretical posits or are entities inferred from observation only. Bohr calls this type of entities as entity.$_2$

It appears from the above consideration that both entities 'M' and 'B' possess totally different characteristics and hence both 'M–entities' and 'B–entities' are incompatible to each other. But a proper examination makes it clear that, though 'M–entities' and 'B–entities' are incompatible to each other, these two entities are also in the same way non–compatible to each other. Bohr proves the incompatibility and non–compatibility of these two types of entities in the following way.

I would first like to consider the conditions by which it will be possible to establish that both 'M–entities' and 'B–entities' are incompatible to each other.

Bohr states that the property–M and the property–B are incompatible when applied to entities$_1$. That means, an entity$_1$ can have either the property–M and not B or the property–B and not M at any given time, but not both the properties. If an entity$_1$ is assigned to any one of these properties, there are circumstances that would not permit one to assign the other property to the entity$_1$. That is, there is no current psychology or philosophical theory known to us that would contradict his belief in this incompatibility.

Two possible objections have been raised against this as noticed in the 'Identity theory' of J. J. C. Smart and H. Feigl[5] and in the Dulney's[6] 'Theory of Awarness'.

For Smart, 'M–entities' and 'B–entities' are the same; yet 'B–entities' are not entities$_1$ in any sense. Whereas 'M–entities' are entity$_1$. Smart asserts that 'sensations are brain states'. But Smart is not correct here because one can treat brain–state

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not as entity$_1$ but as entity$_2$. Feigl more explicitly indentifies mental–entities as entity$_2$ dealt within neurophysiology and not with any entity$_1$. One such theory is Dulney's Theory of Awareness. Dulney gives the following illustration in order to prove the same. I would like to state the whole experiment here.

There are theories according to which a posited or inferred entity is not experienced or observed by the person making the statement about the entity, but the entity is assumed to be an experience of the person to whom the entity is attributed. In order to explain the behaviour of human subjects in experiments involving changes in verbal behaviour as a function of rewards and punishments, Dulney has developed a theory dealing with awareness, where what the subject is aware of is conceived of as a series of propositions developed by the subject in the experimental situation. Inferences are made about those propositions and numerical values are assigned to them. Theoretical rules are the basis of these inferences. The answers given by the subject to the post–experimental questionnaire are assigned in a law–like manner. Using this theory, Dulney is able to predict, with a high degree of accuracy, the responses of each of his subjects.

Two important points follow from the above consideration. First, the entities are mental, since these are assumed to be experiences and since they permit privileged access by the person to whom these are attributed. Secondly, the entities are theoretical because the entities are referred to by statements that are part of a theory belonging to scientific psychology viz. Dulney's awareness and they are not assumed to be observed or experienced by the person who makes a statement about them.

The above assertions are sufficient enough to prove that M–entities and B–entities are incompatible when applied to entities$_1$.

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Let me now consider the conditions by which it will become possible to prove that entities-M and entities-B are non-compatible when applied to entities$_1$. That means, an entity$_1$ can have both the properties M and B, but it can have either one of these properties at any given time. This assertion can be justified in the following way.

For this purpose, we can take 'hunger' as an example. The question areises : what is hunger ? Do we have any psychological theory of hunger ? Generally, it is believed that 'hunger' can be experienced as some theoretical state of an organism which is not experienced by the psychologists. 'Hunger' is in this context assumed to be created by certain accidental conditions, e.g. food deprivation, and, further, assumed to manifest its presence in the form of such 'observable behaviour' as eating behaviour. These observables are the manifestations of hunger. The question arises again, 'To which entity does hunger belong?' It is believed that under certain conditions 'hunger' is an 'M-entity' and under other conditions 'hunger' is a B-entity. Let use see what would follow if we treat hunger as an entity$_1$. In order to bring out this point, it is worth giving the whole experiment here.

We start with the conditions in which 'hunger' is a 'B-entity'. Contemporary psychologists assign a decisive role to two centres in the hypothalamus (a 'satiety centre,' and a 'eating behaviour'). There is a debate among psychologists as to the mechanism that is involved. One theory dealing with this problem is the 'glucostic hypothesis',[7] according to which, there are glucose receptors in the centres which respond to the difference between the concentration of glucose in the peripheral arterial or capillary blood and in the peripheral veins.[8] When these differences in glucose concentration are large, the glucose receptors in the satiety centre cause that centre to be active. In such

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a case 'hunger' is diminished. Thus, in the context of this theory, hunger can be conceived as the relation of the activity in these two centres. Changes in hunger, so conceived, will be manifested by various observed changes in eating behaviour and/or verbal reports about experience of hunger and/or diversef psychological changes, which are taken as manifestations o 'hunger' e. g. stomach contractions.

In an experiment designed to test this theory, Slunkard, Itallic and Reis [9] injected glucogen intravenously into human subject. They found difference in the concentration of glucose, rapid decrease in the reported experience of hunger, diminution of stomach contractions etc.

In this experiment the phenomenon to be explained is the diminution of 'hunger' following the injection of glucogen. In order to explain the phenomenon, the psychologists use the 'glucostic hypothesis' and with that the theory of hypothalamatic centres. In the context of this theory, 'hunger' is essentially assigned to have a location within the body of a person and is not assigned to the property of permitting only private observation in as much as a person clearly cannot privately observe the activity at his hypothalamus. Hence, 'hunger' so conecived may be characterised as B and not as M.

We should, now, consider the conditions under which 'hunger' can be considered as an 'entity–M'. This can be explained by the use of 'cognitive dissonance theory'.

Cognitive dissonance [10] is a psychological state that a person tries to eliminate. It is that state which is created when an individual has two cognitive elements A and B, where A implies not B. A classical example of this would be the following.

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According to some new psychological theories. the characteristics of an entity, are such that they would permit us to assign the property M to them. Thus, there will be many entities, which will be M and not B under certain conditition and B and not M under other conditions.

The above experiments are sufficient enough to re-establish the claim that M and B when assigned to entities, are incompatible, and when assigned to entities, are non–compatible. Bohr states that this difference in relatation creates a paradoxical situation which is structurally homologous to the situation existing in psychology. He states that the paradoxical situation can be removed in a way which corresponds to the theory of complimentarity which he applies in physics. His principle of complimentarity in the psychological distinction between mind and body runs as follows :

M and B stand in relation of complimentarity, if the following conditions obtain,

a) When applied to entities$_1$, M and B are incompatible.

b) When applied to entities$_2$, M and B are non–compatible.

c) The resulting paradoxical situation is removed if an entity, is conceived of as being either M and 'not B' or B and not M.

Some psychologists do not accept the relation of complimentarity between M and B as a correct reconstruction of trends in modern psychology. In fact, we find a great deal of controversy regarding the role of M and B entities in the psychology of science. There are four logically possible non–complimentarity theories with respect to this issue. These are as follows :

a) Neither M nor B, for example, Tolman [11] holds the view that explanation in psychology should never be psycho-

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logical. In addition, on the basis of behaviouristic position, he refuses to refer in any sense, even a theoretical one, to the experiences of subjects.

b) Only B, for example, Hebb[12] asserts that explanation in psychology should be psychological only.

c) Only M, for example, Snygg and Combs[13] believe that all behaviour is determined by 'phenomenal field' which is in our terminology an entity$_2$, that is B.

d) Both M and B should simultaneously be employed because such a position involves the use of the terms 'M' and 'B' in a way different from ours, since such usage would be mentally exclusive in our terminology.

In addition, there is another theory according to which the entity, the organism as a whole, is itself neither M nor B. Entities that are either M or B are two different aspects of something more fundamental – the organism as a whole.

From the above considerations it becomes clear that Bohr's theory of complimentarity has not been accepted by many psychologists. They point out that Bohr conceived complimentarity as a theoretical principle, that is, required and valid for physical knowledge only. Thus, it is entirely possible that future development in science might supersede complimentarity, Further, if we ignore complimentarity as a physical principle, and accept it as a philosophical theory, then we find that there are some major difficulties which are very prominent in this theory of complimentarity. Bohr mis–stated his theory by bringing the notion of incompatibility and non–compatibility in order to solve mind–body problem. This assertion can be justified in the following way.

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Let me first consider the incompatible theory. Two things are incompatible when these two things belong to the same category. But Bohr infers incompatibility between 'mental entities' and 'physical entities' which belong to two different categories. In the opinion of Levison to bring the incompatibility between mental entities and physical entities involves *non-sequitor*. Levison is worth quoting here,

> The fallacy seems to consist in inferring the incompatibility of being mental with being physical, which are first order properties of concrete phenomena, from the incompatibility of being corrigible with being incorrigible, which can only be higher order properties of statements and propositions. [14]

I do agree with Levison on this point. Though it is true that mental qualities and physical qualities are different from one other, yet without relating to physical body it is not possible for a mind to perform any kind of mental function. If the mind does not will it is not possible to do any deliberate action. So incompatibility thesis can be rejected.

Secondly, Bohr commits a mistake by bringing the notion of non–compatibility between the mental-physical distinction. He claims that the properties M and B when applied to entities, are non–compatible to each other. That means, neither the property M nor the property B shares any characteristics similar to each other. The question arises here : 'If it is the case, then how can two processes, which are totally different from each other, can act, react and interact upon each other ?' There must be some link or connection between these two processes. 'What is this link or connection ?' This has not been answered by Bohr. Further, to say that both mental and physical possess two different characteristics is not also acceptable. Though these

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two entities possess different characteristics or these two are different in kind, yet both of these entities are dependent upon each other. In fact, there exists some kind of compatibility between these two events instead of possessing two different characteristics. So, either to take these two entities into the 'same category' or to take these into 'two totally different category' is not admissible at all.

Thirdly, Bohr contradicts himself by stating that there are entities that are mental, but mental entities do not have any location in any part of the body. We know that mental entities do not just fly in the air; they need some background where they may be contained. Can there be a grain without a life ?

Fourthly, to answer the question how should we know that there are mental events, and a person having a particular mental events ? Bohr states that there is no other way of knowing a particular mental event except the reports which he gives about a particular feeling of his own. The only criteria of knowing a person's mental events are only the 'first person contemporaneous reports' of his own mental states and processes. In my opinion, this view is not also justified for the following consideration.

i) There are mental events which are not always reports, for example, feeling of love, feeling of hatred, feeling of happiness,

ii) All mental events of my own are not always a report to me.

iii) Some mental entities are private and hence are not reports i.e. my particular feeling towards a particular person is not a report but I know that I have that feeling, say, jealousy. These considerations make it clear that there are mental events

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which are reports, but there are also mental event which are not always reports, still these are mental events. Thus, it can be said that Bohr restricted the scope of his theory by maintaining that mental events can be known by person's reports only. In this connection, it can be said that Bohr tries to develop a kind of linguistic philosophy in order to uphold mind-body problem. But we know that besides a person's linguistic expression, he has some private mental events which it is not possible for an external observer to know or to know properly. This crucial problem is ignored by Bohr.

In conclusion, it can be said that though there are many philosophical difficulties inherent in this theory of complimentarity, yet, it is a powerful theory which wants to get rid of certain difficulties involved in the theories of dualism. We know that either to treat both mind and body as two 'distinct concepts' totally different from and independent of each other or to treat both mind and body as 'same concept' creates problems for us, because we can neither separate them nor conjoin them. And if it is the case, then ultimately we have to accept complimentarity between mind and body. Though Bohr fails to prove the same, credit must be given to Bohr for providing an alternative approach. It may be possible to remove the difficulties that are inherent in his theory, However, such an exercise is outside the scope of this paper.

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THE LATE MRS. GERTRUDE SACHS MEMORIAL ESSAY COMPETITION

Essays are invited for the Late Mrs. Gertrude Sachs Memorial Essay Competition **in English** from students below the age of 25 years studying in any Indian educaional institution on the theme "Inter-religious Understanding : Obstacles and Prospects" for the Firss and Second prizes to be awarded respectively of Rs. 300/– and 200/– to the essays adjudicted to be so by a panel of referees appointed for the purpose. The prize-winning essays would be published, in course of time, in the Students' Supplement of the **Indian Philosophical Quarterly,** a quarterly journal of the Department. The conditions governing submission of essays for the competition are as follows :

1. The essay typed in double space on one side of paper must be submitted in duplicate.
2. The essay must not be longer than 2500 words.
3. The essay must be accompanied by a certificate signed by the Head of the Institution/Department where the student is studying to the effect that
   (a) the student is studing in that institution and is below the age of 25 years, and
   (b) the essay is written by him / her.
4. The essays should reach Dr. Mangala R. Chinchore, Philosophy Department, Poona University, Ganeshkhind. Pune 411 007 not later than 31–5–1990.
5. The decision of the panel of referees shall be binding on all the competitors and that no correspondence of any kind would be entertained on that count.

The Head,
Philosophy Department
University of Poona, Ganeshkhind,
Pune 411 007.

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DEVELOPMENT OF COLLINGWOOD'S CONCEPTION OF HISTORICAL OBJECT

It is commonly held that historical study has double aspects : inquiry in respect of the totality of past events and the inquiry in respects of the way of dealing with them. The first is called the objective aspect of history and the second, the subjective aspect of history. The ambiguity is important because it at once saddles the philosophy of history with two possible channels. The study may occupy itself with the actual course of historical events or it may be confined to a discussion of the processes of historical thinking. The former nestles in discovering either in the over–all course of events or in the general nature of the historical process, some meaning or significance that transcends the intelligibility achieved by ordinary historical work. In contrast, the latter makes a philosophical reflection on historiography : that is, the epistemological analysis of what the historians do. The over–all study of historical events is called as speeulative philosophy of history while the study of historical thinking is known as critical philosophy of history although the contrasts such as substantive and analytical, material and formal also are not uncommon.

Collingwood hardly made any sharp distinction between these two aspects of history. He attempted to define the nature of historical thinking through the nature of historical object. After all, thoughts about historical thought must be thought about the object of historical thought as well. Hence, for Collingwood,

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philosophy of history must be both epistemology of history and metaphysics of history. "Philosophy cannot separate the study of knowing from the study of what is known" (I H 3). The German movement with its prejudice against metaphysics evaded the task of inquiring into the objective nature of the historical process and took interest only in the historian's subjective mental process, with the result that, it conceived that process as a natural process to be mere spectacle for the historian's mind (IH, 184). Accordingly, while considering the nature of historical object in *Speculum Mentis* which is regarded as a kind of 'phenomenology of Mind' Collingwood could hardly ignore the problem of knowledge and its relation to the object.

In his earlier works, Collingwood maintained that history is concerned with given fact. Showing filial piety to his teacher Cook Wilson, Collingwood held that the sole business of history is to apprehend fact although he did not wait long to break the the tradition and come out of the realistic shell.

In *Religion and Philosophy*, Collingwood held that "History is that which actually exists" (p. 49). History is concerned with asserting fact which has independent existence. Historical fact is "something independent of my own or your knowledge of it". Yet the fact did not mean for him a fact, fact limited by space and time, here and now. The appetite for the concrete together with spiritual ideal of lofty indefinite whole gleamed in Collingwood. After some seven years Collingwood wrote :

> The object of history is fact as such. To determine facts far distant in space and time is not the essence of history but its climax, the very heroism bravado of historical spirit in its defiance of empirical limitation (*SM* 211).

The object of history is to transcend the empirical limitation and reach at the total fact as such. Thus, from the very begin-

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ning of his career Collingwood showed his non-realistic penchant.

Collingwood advocated this queer conception of history by employing a clear-cut dichotomy : hypothesis on the one hand and assertion on the other. The former is the trait of science and the latter is the trait of history. Science makes abstraction of fact and eventually falsification of it. As Collingwood writes :

> ... scienttfic fact is a fact purged of its crude and scientifically scandalous concreteness, isolated from its historical setting and reduced to the status of a more instance of a rule. It is a fact which has been turned from an individual into a particular. The facts which empirical science concerns itself are facts thus de-individualized, defactualized and this is what distinguishes the sense in which even the most empirical science uses that word 'fact' from the sense it bears in history (*ibid,* 186).

For historical consciousness fact is a concrete fact. The scientific consciousness simply denies the concreteness of fact and makes it a mere abstract instance of an abstract principle But,

> To abstract is to consider separately things that are inseparable. ... One cannot abstract without falsifying. To think apart of things that are together is to think of them as they are not, and to plead that this initial severance makes no essential difference to their inner nature is only to erect falsification into a principle (*ibid.,* 160).

Scientific statement is thus an abstraction but historical statement however is a categorical one that asserts something which *is*. As supposition of fact science is hypothetical while as assertion of fact, history is categorical. Science, therefore, implicitly presupposes history. The inevitable transition from science to

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the form next 'above' it, namely, history occurs due to a realization that the abstract must rest upon the concrete; that scientific hypotheses must have a categorical basis.

> The triumph of the Renaissance scientists lay in bringing the implicit presupposition to light, in discovering that science was the abstraction from the concrete reality of history (*ibid,* 185).

We should note here that Collingwood here considers only the *theoretical* aspect-constructions of hypotheses and theories-but fails to consider the *descriptive* aspect–ascertaining and discovering fact–scientific inquiry. In his enthusiasm to distinguish between science and history he assumes theory–building to be the sole function of science.

In the *Speculum Mentis,* Collingwood attempts to analyse the mental acts. "All thought is for the sake of action" (*ibid.*, 315). Each theoretical activity therefore has a practical aim in conduct. The type of action corresponding to art is play; that of religion obedience to commandments; that of science is utilitarianism; that of history and philosophy is autonomy and freedom. Philosophy arises at the last and final stage. Genuine 'philosophical' action will therefore be a plethora of art, religion, science and history together. Philosophical action is directed towards achieving that complete knowledge which the worlds of art, religion, science and history were invented to promote.

What is the need of this dangling display of fact and mind? Because the mind can never know itself in a direct way : it can only know itself through the mediation of external worlds. Works of art, religion, science, structure of historical fact, codes of law, systems of philosophy and so on ad infinitum– is the only way by which the mind can acquire the self-knowledge

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which is its end. And this self-knowledge of the *Speculum Mentis* smacks the Advaita Vedantic conception of self-knowledge in Indian Philosophy. According to the Advaita conception, self is really the Ultimate reality or the Brahman. When an individual forgets itself it takes itself to be limited self or jiva. And when an individual regains its self-knowledge, it gains the knowledge af the Ultimate Reality or the Brahman. But the Hegelian influence is more apparent. The 'contradiction' to be found in each world, considered in abstraction from the rest, arises only in so far as that world claims to be the whole of reality. The knowing subject must submerge into the object. The alienation between the subject and the object is to be transcended. And once the ideal of totality of fact is reached, there is hardly any room for cognitive activity on the part of the subject.

Thus, in the *Specalum Mentis,* Collingwood attempts to show the dialectical development of mind In a footnote of the book. he relates (*ibid,* 108) that the conception of the book stems from an effort to deal with the inadequacies of *Religion and Philosophy.* But actually, the book was not merely an effort to correct mistakes of a previous book or to justify his own versatility in showing the *rapprochment* between history and philosophy. It offers a remedy for discontents with the existing explanations of human nature. To Collingwood, all forms of knowledge have corresponding actions and all these actions help getting true knowledge of mind. Collingwood makes this clear at the outset :

> All thought exists for the sake of action. We try to understand ourselves and our world in order that we may learn how to live (*ibid,* 15).

Characteristically, Collingwood envelopes his concern with present problems into a philosophical loin :

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> All thought exists for "the freer and more effectual revelation of (our) nature in a vigorous practical life" (*ibid*, 15).

The message which Collingwood preaches to our present woes is the unity of the mind. *Speculum Mentis* embarks on a search for the lost unity of the mind. It finds this unity in the growth and collapse of successive systems of thought, which mirror momentarily what the mind believes to be the ultimate truth. Once the mind learns that each new system is but an exercise in mind's self-construction of the world, each system collapses in turn. Each collapsed system leaves traces in the form of an error, which being overcome, persists in the mind as "an element in the point of view from which the mind raises its next problem". The life process of the mind is the raising and solving of problems (*ibid*, 317). Each solution of a problem gives rise to new problems and new efforts at solution. The unity of the mind consists in the fact that it is the mind which creates both problems and solutions. These problems and solutions form a kind of mirror in which the mind can see the unfolding in one continuum the growth of self-knowledge. Sufficient growth in self-knowledge causes the mind to recognise itself as the power which creates both problems and solutions. The quote Collingwood :

> ...the external world is not a veil between the mind and its object, but a picture of itself (the mind) drawn to aid its own self-vision (*ibid*, 313).

The sub-title of the book *Speculum Mentis* is 'The Map of Knowledge'. The book is an attempt to accout for the relationships that the various branches of human knowledge, namely, art, religion, science, history and philosophy have to one another. The relationship is taken to be dialectical and in the course of his account of the essential feature of each-except, of course,

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philosophy, the last resort–Collingwood shows how it points towards the essential character of the next. With the advance of knowledge, each reveals its limitation. It is therefore small wonder that the discussion of history in *Speculum Mentis* ends in section V entitled, 'The breakdown of History' Following the Hegelian maxim that truth is the whole, Collingwood shows the limitation of history. The weak point of history is its dogmatic assertion which is provisional as ultimate. Assertion of fact is not complete until it is viewed in an all embracing context. But the historian is here and now and consequently, his perception is limited by both space and time. In comes the spartan philosopher with the finest element of human being, namely, the power of thinking. Here occurs a crucial change in Collingwood's conception : a change from fact to thought. We do not perceive except by thinking. Errol E. Harris writes :

> It is because the fact is an inter–relation texture of things and events that we cannot perceive it except by thinking–by developing in our thought the inter-connections of the given datum with its context and with its past.[1]

Even in our daily experience we find this to be true. When a person perceives a table, the table is not given in its totality. The subject possibly perceives a sign, an indication of a table. Nevertheless, the subject perceives the given to be a table because the present perceived sign is compatible with other estabiished evidences of the table previously perceived. In perception we are confronted with individual fact, but we are not confronted with the total fact in sensation. What I see are colours and sound but what I perceive is a person, thing and event. It is now clear that perception is interpretation of a sensation in the light of a complex context. Just as an ordinary table cannot be perceived short of its totality, similarly a fact cannot be known without its texture. But fact in its totality can be grasped only

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by thinking, which is outside the scope of history. *Speculum Mentis* thus proclaims historical scepticism.

> ...If history exists, its object is an infinite whole which is unknowable and renders all its parts unknowable. ...We must claim access to the fact as it really was. The ... is inaccessible. History as a form of knowledge cannot exist (SM, 234, also 238).

But historical scepticism does not amount to scepticism of all knowledge. Collingwood thought that totality as an all embracing context can be grasped by philosophy alone. Philosophy emerges where inchoate history fumbles. Philosophy is the last resort of dialectical transcendence when history relinquishes.

Thus Collingwood came to realise that in the fact of perception, mind is not indolent and perception is as much dependent on the perceiver as on the object perceived.

Collingwood first realised the importance of thought in understanding a fact in the papers of 1923 and 1925. Therein his contention was that there was no fundamental difference between sensation and thought.[2] In 'Sensation and Thought' Collingwood claimed that sensation is not alien to thought; rather it itself involves thinking. Again, in 'The Nature and Aims of Philosophy of History'[3] he further maintained that perception is an interpretation and answering a question, namely, what is that which is perceived? History too attempts to interpret evidences of the past event. Collingwood therefore held that there is no qualitative difference between perception and history except in degree. History is simply perception raised to highest power because :

> ... in all perceptions we are making a judgement, trying to answer the question what it is that we perceive and all

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> history is simply a mere intense and sustained attempt to answer the same qnestion.[4]

From *Religion and Philosophy*, thus there, is both ontological and epistemological shift. By this time, Collingwood's point of view regarding object and subject has radically changed. (a) Fact is no longer understood as given in a naive way. Fact is total context. (b) From the point of view of subject, historical object is no longer just assertion, it is rather interpreted perception and as such manifestation of a cognitive activity. There is an inter-connection between these two changes; since the fact is not given it is in a way created through the act of perception.

This change of view enabled Collingwood to avoid the much echo about historical scepticism. The object of history is no longer defined as independent of knowledge. "The historical data consist of what he is able to perceive" said Collingwood in the 1925 paper.[5] Since the object is not independent of knowledge, no one therefore can any longer doubt the ability of history in knowing object. Collingwood himself believed in his early life that history was vulnerable because he identified fact with the "given" which involves no "thought". In this paper, history is taken to be too important to be abandoned so cheaply. It is interesting to notice his ingenious solicitation.

> Ideally, historical thought is the apprehension of a world of fact. Actually, it is the presentation of thought to itself of a world of half-ascertained fact : a world in which truth and error are at any given moment inextricably composed together. Thus, the actual object of actual historical thinking is an object which is not 'given' but perpetually in process of being given.[6]

The above description shows that Collingwood anticipated what he would be saying in *The Idea of History* about historical

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construction. That perception involves interpretation and that fact is not given but "perpetually in process of given" is not unexpected from a thinker who is increasingly rejecting realism on the one hand who so much began to recognise the importance of historical imagination in the reconstruction of the past on the other. Just as in ordinary perception, the object is a construction, in history also the past event is constructed. Thus, Collingwood discovered the same nature in what at first sight may appear to be two disperate modes of exparience. The only difference between, what we ordinarily call perception and what we ordinarily call historical thinking is that the constructive work is quite implicit in perception but can be made explicit only by reflective analysis while in history the constructive work is quite evident and cannot be overlooked.

In *The New Leviathan,* Collingwood's view of the nature of historical object changed further. He began to regard history as a discourse to human actions. Facts are hereafter regarded not as "given" or "perpetually in process of given" but as "things made" (*Facta gesta,* things done). As Collingwood writes :

> A study of mind on the historical method involves two renunciations. First, it renounces with Locke all 'science of substance'. It does not ask what mind is; it asks only what mind does (9.16) ...Secondly, it renounce all attempt to discover what mind *always and every where does,* and asks only *what mind has done* on certain difinite occasions (9.18) (*NL,* 51).

This bold statement wiped out the last vestige of realism which was still there when Collingwood said that historical fact was gradually given. History can study only the human deeds and their thoughts. In *An Autobiography* also, he said that his-

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tory is knowledge of the world of human affairs and consequently there is no a-mental historical fact. To quote Collingwood :

> Since history proper is the history of thought there are no mere "events" in history : what is miscalled an "event" is really an action, and expresses some thought (intention, purpose) of its agent (*A*., 127).

The same view is echoed elaborately in *The Idea of History* There Collingwood's concept of history is that it is a "science or answering of questions; concerned with human actions in the past; pursued by interpretation of evidence; and for the sake of human knowledge" (*IH*, 10). History deals with past human action. But the real impetus for actions start from thought. An historian therefore should study past thought. In fact, history is a study of thought, not things thought about. In this sense, geology although is a study of the ancient world, is not history. Indeed, there cannot be a history of Nature because historians can never discover by whose agency or rather which thoughts have resulted in the creation of Nature. As Collingwood points out :

> The only condition on which there could be a history of nature is that the events of nature are actions on the part of some thinking being or beings and that by studying these actions we can discover what were the thoughts which they expressed and think these thought for ourselves, This is a condition which probably no one will claim is fulfilled (*IH*, 302).

Thus, in *The Idea of History*, Collingwood came to view that historical knowledge is not acquired by acquaintance but by mediation, contradicting what he earlier upheld. While advoca-

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ting the constructive theory of history. Collingwood was quite vocal in denying the givenness of historical fact :

> ...the past is never a given fact which he (historian) can apprehend empirically by perception (*IH*, 282).

proper historical knowledge is to be constructed upon the re-enactment of past thought.

Why Collingwood changed his points view about history from a study of given fact to the re–enactment of past thought ? This shift occurred, because he gradually came to realize that on realistic assumption the historian and the object remain in two unbridged poles. The realists contend that the world of fact is only revealed to the knowing mind but fail to satisfactorily explain how the relation between the two is established. On realistic assumption, the historian remains "the spectator of a life in which he does not participate; he sees the world of fact as it were across a gulf which, as an historian, he cannot bridge."[7] The difficulty led Collingwood to hold that the object of historical study is not a world of fact independent of the knowing mind, but is constituted by the historians own thought.

Thus Collingwood's theory of history is a story of continual change–both ontological and epistemological. In *Religion and Philosophy*, he held that historical object is the given fact, in *Speculum Mentis* he came to regard historical object as fact as such; in *The New Leviathan*, in *An Autobiography* and in *The Idea of History*, he finally held that historical object is human action and its thought. Thus his realistic stand–point rose to its culmination in *Speculum Mentis* that resulted in scepticism which however could not be a convenient position for a man who was born and brought up in an historical atmosphere. Previously, he held historical fact simply to be independent of mind, but here he held historical object to be "individual, concrete, infinite, no

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arbitrary abstraction or unreal fiction, but reality itself in its completeness" which was (sought in vain in other spheres of knowledge) however beyond the grasping power of history. Since that idea led to 'breakdown of history, Collingwood came to hold that object of history was thought. Thus, from 'Absolute Realism' (if we are allowed to use that word) Collingwood shifted to a sort of idealism. Objectivity of historical fact, however, could not be denied. The historical object must have some independent status. The historian's search is not a search through fantasy : he seeks to know what he has never known, to discover something which he assumes is 'there' to be discovered. Realism on the other hand could not be acceptable to him. In his mature thought, Collingwood said that realism is a theory of knowledge that "is based upon the grandest foundation a philosophy can have, namely, human stupidity" (EM, 34). In *The Idea of History*, therefore, he came to view that althogh object of history is a thought, nevertheless, it is an universal thought and hence is both subjective and objective. As Collingwood writes :

> The act of thinking, then, is not only subjective but objective as well. It is not only a thinking, it is something that can be thought about (*IH*, 293).

From the cognitive point of view, too, his views changed from time to time. In the beginning of his career he held that history is an assertion; then he came to realize that there is thought element in historical assertion and finally, he held that history is an inference, and its object is past act of thought and not something given (*IH*, 305, passim).

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NOTES

1. E. E. Harris; "Collingwood's Theory of History", *Philosophical Quarterly*, 7 (1957) 38.
2. R. G. Collingwood; "Sensation & Thought", *Proceedings of Aristotelian Society* (1923).
3. ———; "The Nature & Aims of Philosophy of History", *Proceedings of Aristotelian Society* 25 (1925).
4. *Ibid*, 168.
5. *Ibid*, 120.
6. *Ibid*, 161,
7. 'The Nature & Aims of Philosophy of History', 165.
   Idea of History has been referred to as IH. New Leviathan has been referred to as NL, An Essay On Metaphysics as EM, and Speculum Mentis as SM.

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COMMUNICATION, GRICE, AND LANGUAGELESS CREATURES

1.1 *Introduction*

Language with its complex syntactic and semantic structures is perhaps the most obvious mode of communication. However, it does not follow that it is the only one. In this paper it will be shown that the possibility of languageless creatures communicating in the full sense (i.e.. in the human sense) under relevant circumstance does exist. And to this end an account of the meaning of an utterance (vocal or non–vocal) will be explicated in terms of the utterer's (sender's) intention to produce an effect of a broadly cognitive or epistemic kind in an audience and the audience's recognition of this intention–a position that draws heavily on Grice's paper 'Meaning'. Further the relevant circumstances under which the languageless creatures could be said to communicate will be given. This will be done under the headings (1) communication and transmission of information, and (2) communication and intention.

1.2 *Communication and Transmission of Information*

The notion of communication is central to many disciplines like mathematics, biology, and ethology. Communication is generally regarded as transference of information by means of emission, conduction and reception.

However, there is variation between disciplines over the origin or destination of information, the nature of the information

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and so on. Each discipline difines communication according to its own needs; this makes the nature of communicative behaviour correspondingly ambiguous. This results in disagreements over the nature of communication such that what is termed as communicative behaviour in one discipline need not be accepted by the others. For instance, communication may refer to :

(1) interaction between A and B where A and B are not living things–for instance, interaction between pebble A and pebble B.

(2) action of organism A on organism B-for instance, sexual activity amongst spiders.

(3) interaction between individual A and individual B as in human action.

So, any interaction between A and B regardless of the nature origin or destination etc. might count as communication, depending on the definition relied on.

In the present context, however, I would like to draw a distinction between interaction amongst living things and interaction between non–living things. Living things are negative entropy systems [1] and are not the same as physical objects like rocks, tables and so on. A pebble and a slug are similar in that they both possess or are material bodies that exist in space and time which enables us to say that the pebble and slug have physical existence. A slug, however, is different from a pebble in that it is organised in a way that enables it to behave in a manner that is conducive to the achievement of certain ends–namely, the survival of the individual and survival of the species. Accordingly, interaction amongst organisms are such that they contribute to the achievement of certain ends. By contrast, interactions between non–living things–for instance, between pebble A and pebble B–are purely physical interactions

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and are not directed towards survival or any other ends. That is, when non–living things interact with one another there is physical contact and an exchange of energy that may result in a change of state (for instance, breaking, chipping, or cracking) depending on the force with which the contact takes place. In other words, when there is a physical interaction there is an input of energy emanating from source (pebble A) resulting in an output in the terminus (pebble B) that is in proportion to the input. However, since the resulting output is in relation to the input the output may be said to carry information about the input. As a consequence, physicists may refer to such interactions as communication. To talk of communication between non–living things may be convenient in some contexts–i.e, in the context of the physical science; however, this does not lead us to conclude that non–living things may communicate in the further sense that communication is interaction directed towards the achievement of certain ends.

Interactions that are directed towards the achievement of ends like survival of the individual and survival of the species, however, are not always intentional. As just stated, all living things are negative entropy systems and survive to delay thermodynamic equilibrium by constantly interacting with their environment. The information exchanged during these interactions is such that it allows the selection of the appropriate response by the organism. However, the information–transmission and information reception are not the sort of transmission and reception that occurs in human communication in that the interacting organisms do not have an insight into the ends served by their behaviour. In other words, the behaviour exhibited by organisms during interactions, resulting in various activities like feeding, predator attack, sexual reproduction, and territorial protection is not intentional. On the contrary, their behaviour may be

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drawn from a behavioural repertoire that is endogenous to the members of a species as in the case of the new born gull that responds immediately after birth to certain visual stimuli like the red spot on the adult gull's beak (cf. Alcock, 1975). Or the behaviour could be a learnt response, that is, the organism could have acquired the responses due to neural mechanisms present in its brain that allow it to store information about situations that are biologically significant–i.e., in situations that contribute to its fitness for survival–as in the case of toads that learn to distinguish millipedes from flies, ducklings that learn to recognise their mothers a few days after hatching (cf. Alcock, 1975) and so on. The transmission and storage of information that occurs in such interactions – for instance, between a millipede and a toad – however, is not an intentional exchange as in the case of x informing y that he – i. e. x – is a Sumo wrestler.

Communication in the sense it occurs amongst humans (in what I will call the full sense) is the transference of information that is intended to affect the recipient's belief system and is seen by the racipient of the information as so intended. That is to say, it is an intention–dependant activity where the transmitter (sender) means to do something by means of audience–directed utterance; that is, to produce a belief in an audience. And, communication becomes possible when the intention of the transmitter is recognised by the audience. To put it another way, communication in the full sense is an interactive process where the purpose of the sender (x) is to induce/alter the belief (b) of the receiver (y) and recognised as so intended on the part of x by y. For instance, when x informs y that nuclear weapons are hazardous to human life and the environment he is doing so with the intention of inducing belief b–namely, nuclear weapons are hazardous to human life and the environment.– in y; and communication in the full sense is an interactive process that

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involves the intention to affect another whether by way of getting something done, showing approval, disapproval etc.

It follows from what has been said so far that there are (apart from the purely physical sense) two levels of communication – namely, communication in the weak sense and communication in the full sense. Communication in the weak sense refers to behaviour directed towards certain ends i.e., survival of the individual and survival of the species – where the party (parties) is (are) not aware of and so have no insight into the ends towards which its (their) behaviour (behaviours) is (are) directed. This level of communication is to be found in all living organisms that strive to delay decay by interacting with the environment and amongst animals in activities such as territorial protection, sexual reproduction etc. And communication in the full sense (as it occurs amongst humans) is an intentional activity where the parties to it are aware of the goals.

1.3 *Communication and Intention*

In the previous Section I described communication in the full sense in a manner which suggests it is possible without the use of language, the meaning of a sound or gesture being unpacked in terms of the intention of the sender. In this Section I shall give an account of the notion of meaning in terms of that of intention (a version of what is known as communication–intention theory) in order to provide a framework for commuication which does not presuppose linguistic meaning or, therefore, the use of language.

Most of what follows in this Section is derived from the approach that has been developed by H. P. Grice in his paper 'Meaning'. However, before going on to present this specific theory of meaning I would like to say a little more about the

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approach of communication – intention theory. Generally the communication–intention theorist presents his arguments in two stages :

1) an account of communication–intention is given that does not presuppose any notion of linguistic meaning;

2) an account of linguistic meaning is then developed which makes use of that account and which also includes other elements, including an account of convention.

Only the former account of communication–intention is relevant here. The fundamental notion in that account is the utterer meaning something on a particular occassion by an audience-directed utterance. The utterance can either be vocal or non-vocal; for instance, it could be some sort of behaviovr like a grimace, shrug and so on. What is meant by an utterance is further unpacked in terms of the intention with which it was produced and is seen as being seen as produced by the intended audience.

According to the first stage of the communication–intention theory an individual acts on his intention to communicate with regard to an audience by uttering x; if he is successful in fulfilling his intention by producing an effect in an audience it can be said that he has been understood by the audience. Once an individual has been successful in communicating through an utterance on one occasion, further attempts to communicate the same information in the same way are likely to succeed more easily. A habit of communicating in this way is thus set up. This in turn suggests the possibility of establishing convention-based utterances.

The foregoing remarks of a general nature set the stage for putting forward Grice's theory of meaning.

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Grice starts his paper by drawing a distinction between natural and non–natural meaning (the latter being abbreviated to meaning NN). The natural/non–natural distinction is formulated specifically to replace the traditional distinction between natural and conventional signs. Examples of signs that mean naturally are :

a) "smoke means fire" ;
b) "black clouds mean rain" ;
c) "spots mean measles" etc.

and examples of signs that mean by convention are :

a) raised hand to stop traffic ;
b) thumbs pointing upwards to mean OK; and so an.

He finds the distinction unsatisfactory on two counts :

a) Some things – for instance, gestures which mean NN something are not signs and some things which mean NN are conventional only if the term is stretched to a great extent – for instanre, an index finger pointing at the sky might mean "kill the prisoner" ;

b) some things that mean naturally are not signs of what they mean – for example : "those clouds mean you won't be able to get to Lancaster on time".

> This question about the distinction between natural and non–natural meaning is, I think, what people are getting at when they display an interest in a distinction between 'natural' and 'conventional' signs. But I think my formulation is better. For some things which can mean NN something are not signs (e. g. words are not) and some are not conventional in any ordinary sense (e.g. certain gestures); while some things which mean naturally are not signs of what they mean.
>
> Grice, 1967:41

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Grice, therefore, prefers to talk in terms of a natural/non-natural distinction. Examples of natural meaning are :

a) "those spots mean measles" ;

b) "the recent budget means we shall have a hard year" ;

and examples of non-natural meaning are :

a) "Three rings on the bell means that the 'bus is full'."

b) "That remark, Smith couldn't get on without his trouble and strife', means that his wife was indispensable."

ibid, 39

On Grice's distinction between natural and non–natural meaning, the meaning can be contrasted in five ways :

1) N (natural) – "x (those spots) means p (measles)" does entail p.

NN (non–natural) – "x (three rings) means p (the bus is full)" does not entail p.

2) N – From "those spots mean measles" I cannot argue to some conclusion about "what is meant" by those spots.

NN – From "three rings..." I can argue to some conclusion about "what is meant" by this statement – i e., three rings ...

3) N – it cannot be argued that someone meant somthing or the other by those spots.

NN – it can be argued that someone meant the bus was full.

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4) N – the example cannot be restated in which the verb 'mean' is followed by a form in sentence or phrase in inverted commas; one cannot say, "these spots mean 'measles'."

NN – the example can be restated where mean is followed by a phrase in inverted commas : "Those three rings mean 'the bus is full'".

5) N – an approximate reformulation can be found beginning with the phrase "the fact that..." : "the fact that he has those spots means that he has measles."

NN – the reformulation with the phrase "the fact that..." does not give the same meaning. "The fact that the bell has been rung three times means 'the bus is full'" is not a restatement of the original example.

Grice next undertakes the task of attacking Stevenson's causal account of meaning. According to the Stevensonian account, of meaning for a sign x to mean something non-naturally x must fulfill the following :

(a) x must have a tendency to produce in an audience some attitude; the attitude can be cognitive or otherwise.

(b) x must also have tendency, in case of a speaker, to be produced by that attitude; these tendencies are dependent on an elaborate process of conditioning attending the use of sign x in communication.

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Grice, however, objects to the theory on three grounds :

(1) Consider the following :

Many people put on a tail-coat when they think they are about to go to a dance. And it is also the case for people generally, when they see someone with a tail-coat, to surmise that he is going to a dance. The tail-coat has thereby the tendency to produce an attitude, in this case cognitive, in an audience. Yet though such a cognitive attitude is produced, according to Grice it is not at all clear that putting on a tail-coat means that one is going to a dance. Neither is it of any help to invoke dependence on an elaborate process of conditioning attending the use of the sign in communication; for, if the latter phrase is taken seriously this leads to circularity. That x has meaning in the non-natural sense if used in communication cannot be denied However, this does not tell us anything about the nature of meaning. In Grice's words,

> Let us consider the case where an utterance, if it qualifies at all as meaning NN something will be of a descriptive or informative kind and the relevant attitude, therefore, will be of a cognitive one, for example, a belief.. Does this satisfy us that putting on a tail-coat means NN that one is abbout to go to a dance...? Obviously not...if we have to take the second part of the qualifying pharse ... then the account of meaning NN is obviously circular. We might jus as well say 'X has meaning NN if it is used in communication' which though true is not helpful.
>
> *ibid* : 41

(2) The second difficulty is this :

To say Jones is an athlete generally tends to produce the belief that Jones is tall since as a matter of fact most athletes are tall. However, that Jones is an athlete does not entail that

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Jones is tall. How is the irregularity as expressed by the example to be avoided ?

According to the Stevensonian account, meaning is being explained in terms of attitude – that can be cognitive or otherwise. Applying this to the example, calling Jones an athlete produces the cognitive attitude that Jones is tall. If this is the case, this is equivalent to saying "Jones is an athlete" means that Jones is tall. However, that Jones is athlete does not entail that Jones is tall. Equally, saying "Jones is a non-tall athlete" involves one in self–contradiction, according to the given account of meaning. Yet, it is a fact – a contingent one – that most athletes are tall.

Stevenson resorts to linguistic rules in order to circumvent this difficulty; a permissive rule that allows one to say "athletes may be non-tall" – meaning thereby that one is not prohibited by rule to speak of "non–tall athletes". But, as Grice replies,

> ...why are we not prohibited ? Not because it is not bad grammar, or is not impolite – so on, but presumably because it is not meaningless...
>
> *ibid* : 43

However, this invocation of linguistic rules produces a circularity, for rules of meaning are precisely what are at issue.

3) Finally, the causal theory provides one with an account of the *standard or general* meaning of a sign :

> A further deficiency in the causal theory just expounded seems to be that, even if we accept it as it stands we are furnished with an analysis of statements about the *standard* meaning or meanings in general of a 'sign'
>
> *ibid* : 42

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It does not tell us anything about what a particular sign means as used by a speaker on a particular occasion :

> No provision is made for dealing with statements about what a particular speaker or writer means by a sign on a particular occasion (which may well diverge from the standard meaning of a sign); nor is it obvious how the theory could be adapted to make such a provision...the causal theory ignores the fact the meaning (in general) of a sign needs to be explained in terms of what users of the sign do mean by it on particular occasions; and the latter notion which is unexplained by the causal theory is in fact the fundamental one.
>
> *ibid* : 42

Having rejected the causal account of non–natural meaning, Grice proceeds with his own formulation – namely, the view that the meaning of a sign can be explicated in terms of the utterer intending to produce some effect in the receiver by means of the receiver's recognition of this intention. The account can be broken into three related intentions which are called I1, I2 I3 respectively. Accordingly, x means something by utterance U (which may be vocal or non–vocal) if :

a) I1 – intends to produce a certain effect in an audience y by uttering U.

b) I2 – intends that y shall recognise x's intention I1.

c) I3 – intends that this recognition on the part of y of I1 shall act as y's reason for the occurrence of such an effect.

According to Grice, an analysis of meaning is to be carried out in terms of three intention–operations I1, I2 and I3. I1, the first of the three intention–operations is self–evident, giving that U means something if U is intended by x – its utterer–to

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produce a certain effect in an audience; to state what the effect was will be to state what was meant by U. However, I1 on its own will not suffice for meaning.

I might leave B's handkerchief near the scene of the murder in order to make the audience y (in this case, the detective) believe (the effect) that B is the murderer. This fulfils the intention–operation as specified in I1. But it would be incorrect to arrive at the conclusion that the handkerchief meant anything or that I meant that B was the murder by leaving the handkerchief since, even if the detective inferred from the presence of the handkerchief that B was the murder, it would be independent of a knowledge of my intentions.

> ...we should not want to say that the handkerchief (or my leaving it there) meant NN anything or that I had meant NN by leaving it that B was the murderer.
>
> *ibid* : 43

An analysis of meaning, therefore, needs the second intention–operatation I2. Not only must the intention–operation I1 be fulfilled but I must also intend I2 that I1 be recognised.

> ...we must...add that, x to have meant NN something, not merely must it have been uttered with the intention of inducing a certain belief but also the utterer must have intended an audience to recognise the intention behind the utterance.
>
> *ibid* : 43

That is, I must iniend I2 that the detective shall recognise my intention I1–my leaving the handkerchief near the scene of the murder to make him – the detective – believe that B was the murderer.

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This is still not enough. According to Grice, one can be described as deliberately and openly letting the detective know that B was the murderer even when one is not telling him this. How is 'deliberately and openly letting someone know' be distinguished from 'telling'? Grice considers the following example :

a) I show Mr X a photograph that pictures Mr Y exhibiting undue familiarity to Mrs X.

b) I draw a picture to this effect (Mr Y behaving towards Mrs X in a certain manner) and show it to Mr X

Grice argues that in (a) the photograph cannot be regarded as meaning anything NN despite the fulfillment of intention-operations I1 and I2; whereas, the drawing in (b) is to be regarded as meaning NN something.

Example a : In this example my intention to make Mr X believe that there is something between Mrs X and Mr Y is irrelevent. Mr X would have been led to the same belief had the photograph been left lying around.

Example b : In this example my intention will make a difference to what Mr X comes to believe. Whether Mr X considers my picture to be a work of art or as alluding to Mrs X's relationship with Mr Y is essential to the effect that my picture will have on his beliefs. This is not so in the case of my showing a photograph to Mr X.

This introduces the third intention–operation I3, where x (utterer) intends that the recognition on the part of y (receiver) of I1 shall act as y's reason for the occurrence of such an effect. So in meaning NN something by that picture, I must intend not only I1 and I2 but also I3 that Mr X's recognition of my intention will count as the reason for the intended effect

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occurring–in this case, the belief of a relationship between Mrs H and Mr Y.

Grice regards the three intention conditions I1, I2 and I3 as jointly sufficient conditions for communication. However, Strawson in his paper 'Intention and Convention in Speech Acts' argues that the three intention conditions are not sufficient for communication. Such a situation – where the three intention conditions are satisfied but which is not an instance of communication–is elucidated by Strawson in the following manner :

a) Satisfaction of I1

x intends by a certain action to induce a belief that p in y.

b) Satisfaction of I2

Accordingly, x arranges convincing looking evidence that would induce the belief that p in a place where y is bound to see it. At the same time x knows that y is watching him at work – i.e. arranging evidence – and also knows that y does not know that x knows that y is watching him arranging the evidence. However, x realises that y will not take the evidence arranged by him as natural evidence that p; on the contrary, he realises and intends that y will take his arrangement of evidence as ground for thinking that x intends to induce in y the belief that p. In other words, x intends y to recognise his intention I1.

c) Satisfaction of I3.

x knows y has grounds for thinking that x would not wish to make him – i.e. y – think that p unless it were known to x to be the case that p. Consequently, y's recognition of x's intention to induce in y the belief that p will be a sufficient reason for y to believe that p – which satisfies condition I3, namely, x intends

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that y's recognition of his intention I3 will function as y's reason for the occurrence of such an effect.

As it stands, according to Strawson, x's utterance may have succeeding in bringing y to acquire a belief; however, it is not a case of attempted communication. That is to say, the audience-y-may assume that x is trying to make him believe something but he will not see x as trying to tell him - i.e. as communicating to him – something. Similarly, x may have intended to produce the belief and may have intended y to recognise that intention. Also he may have intended that this recognition would act as part of y's reason to have the belief. But x cannot be said to be communicating because he cannot even be said to have tried to communicate. Accordingly, Strawson introduces the further intention condition I4 where x not only intends y to recognise his - i.e. x's – intention to get y to think that p but also intends y to recognise his – i.e. x's – intention to get y to think that p. So, for x to have meant NN something by his utterance x must have intended I4 that y should recognise his I2 intention. So x means NN something by his utterance U if x :

I1 : intends to produce a certain effect (belief, response, etc.) in y,

I2 : intends that y shall recognise x's intention I1,

I3 : intends that this recognition on the part of y shall act as y's reason for the occurrence of such an effect, and

I4 : intends that y shall recognise x's intention I2.

Besides Strawson, one of the major critics of Grice is Searle. In his book *Speech Acts* Searle claims that Grice's account is incomplete since it fails to take into account the notion of convention. In other words, meaning is not just a matter of intention but also of convention. For instance, when x utters U

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there is not only the intention to produce some effect in an audience – y – by means of the recognition of this intention but there is also a connection between what x utters and what U, which x has uttered, means in the language according to the convention governing that language. It is this connection – i.e., the connection between x meaning something when he utters U and what U means in a language – that Grice has failed to show,

> . it fails to account for the extent to which meaning can be a matter of convention. This account of meaning does not show the connection between one's meaning something by what one says and what that which one says actually means in that language.
>
> Searle, 1969 : 43

Searle illustrates this failure in the Gricean account with an example. An American soldier – x – is captured during World War II by Italian troops. He would like his captors – y – to believe that he is a German soldier. He could make y believe that he is German by telling y that he is German in German or Italian but he does not know either language. However, he does remember a line of a German poem that he memorised at school. Hoping that y does not know German he utters U – "Kennst du das Land, wo die Zitronen bluhen?" ("Knowest thou the land where the lemon trees bloom?") with the intention of deceiving y into thinking that he is a German soldier.

According to Searle, in applying the Gricean notion of meaning to the American soldier example one is led to conclude that the meaning of "Kennst du das Land, wo die Zitronen bluhen?" is "I am a German soldier". However, this is incorrect, since according to the conventions of German "Kennst du das Land, wo die Zitronen bluhen?" means "Knowest thou

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the land where the lemon trees bloom?" and not "I am a German soldier". Moreover, part of what is involved in uttering is not just the production of some effect in the audience (what Searle calls the perlocutionary effect) but also getting the audience to think that this is what the words actually (i.e., regularly) mean in the language in which the utterance is uttered – in this case German. Accordingly, Grice's account fails since according to the account any sentence can be uttered with any meaning as long as the speaker utters it with the intention to produce some effect in y.

Searle is correct in so far as he points out that linguistic utterances are closely related to the conventions governing the use of words in that language (i.e., language in which the utterance is uttered). Linguistic utterances normally rely on the conventional meanings of the words uttered and the hearer's knowledge of these conventions. Accordingly, the analysis of the notion of linguistic meaning must include an account of the connection between the utterance and what the utterance means in the relevant language.

Searle, however, is unfair in his criticism of Grice's account as being incomplete on the grounds that it does not include an account of how utterances are related to the conventional meanings they originally have in the language in which they are made, since Grice is not offering an account of linguistic meaning. What Grice is offering in his paper 'Meaning' is an account of meaning that does not presuppose lingnistic meaning, or, therefore, language. In other words, it is an account of what a particular utterer means by an utterance (which may be verbal or non-verbal – for instance, gestures – and which does not presuppose any conventions governing their use) on a particular occasion. That is, the account is an account of occasion mean-

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ing. And since the account is one of occasion meaning it need not include an account of convention.

Even though the Gricean account deals with pre-linguistic meaning it is, however, possible to elaborate it into one of conventional meaning. In so far as communication without language is possible it is not the most efficient means of communication, being liable to error, since the meaning of of a piece of behaviour is dependent on what the sender intends it to mean and in the absence of convention the receiver has to discover what the sender's intentions are, perhaps through a process of trial and error. For instance, when x hops a number of times and points to the forest x could mean any of the following by his behaviour :

a) " Let's have a hopping race to the edge of the forest ";

b) " Let's hunt for a rabbit in the forest ";

c) " Have you seen my rabbit ?" and so on.

For communication to take place in such a situation (that is, where the meaning of the behaviour of the communicator is unclear) y in the first place will have to discover what x intends to convey by his behaviour. He could do this by responding in a way that would suggest to x what he takes his – i.e., x's – intentions to be. If x behaves in a manner that suggests to y that x is not satisfied with y's response y could vary his response and through this process discover what x intends to convey by his behaviour. (Of course, x and y may be given to deceit and lying; but at this stage I am assuming that x and y are honest individuals and do not lie. Unless there is this assumption it is difficult (conceptually) to see how x and y could communicate anything at all.) Y, for instance, on seeing x hopping and pointing to the forest can respond by hopping to the edge of the forest. If x joins him in hopping to the edge of the forest then

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y may conclude that x did mean "Let's have a hopping race to the edge of the forest" by his utterance U. However, if x does not join him but carries on hopping and pointing to the forest y could vary his response by bringing his bow and arrow. If x picks up his bow and arrow and starts walking towards the forest this suggests that x's intentions were "Let's go and hunt for a rabbit in the forest".

The discovery of the sender's intentions on the part of the receiver is made simpler when the sender and receiver are not strangers and the receiver knows something of the sender's personality. For instance, if individual y knows of individual x that he (i.e., x) is a coward and never goes hunting (alone or with others) he may not consider "Let's go hunting for a rabbit in the forest" as one of the intentions that x may have been trying to convey to him through his behaviour. However, if x and y are total strangers the process of discovering x's intentions for y becomes more difficult, though not impossible.

Once x succeeds in communicating his intention "Let's go hunting for a rabbit in the forest" I_H through his behaviour B_H – hopping a number of times and pointing to the forest – he may hope to communicate I_H with B_H on a later occasion, thereby setting up an individual habit of communicating I_H through B_H. Over time other members of x's group may adopt the same habit of communicating I_H through B_H. So now there is a habit of communicating a certain type of intention through a certain type of behaviour amongst the members of a community. Even though there might be such a habit in itself it is not a convention. However, over a period the habit may acquire a normative aspect so that this becomes the correct way of expressing that intention. In this way, a system of conventional meanings might be set up, making possible the contrast between

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the meaning of what was said (for example "Knowest thou the land where the lemon trees bloom?") and what the speaker meant to convey in saying it (for example, "I am a German soldier").

In the above paragraphs I have suggested a possible direction in which the Gricean account may be elaborated into conventional meaning. What I have given is not in any way a detailed account of the development from occasion meaning to conventional meaning since the aim of this paper is to suggest the relevant circumstances under which languageless creatures may be said to communicate However, in giving the rather brief account of how conventional meaning may be developed from meaning that holds between sender and receiver on a particular occasion I have indicated the way in which this thesis might be extended to include an account of the genesis of language. A more detailed account of the move is given in H. P. Grice: "Utterer's meaning, Sentence-meaning and Word-meaning" and Jonathan Bennett: *Linguistic Behaviour*

Besides criticising the Gricean account of meaning as incomplete, Searle raises another criticism against it According to the Gricean account to say that individual x meant something by his utterance U is to say that x intended to produce some effect in the audience – y – by means of y's recognition of this intention. In other words, what is involved in uttering U is a matter of eliciting a state of mind in or appropriate behaviour from the audience; that is, it is a perlocutionary act. However, according to Searle not all sentences have perlocutionary effects associated with them. There are many kinds of utterances where what is intended by the utterer is an understanding on the part of the audience and not the production of a state of mind or action in the audience. That is, what is involved in saying something and meaning it in such cases is an illocutionary act and

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not a perlocutionary act. For instance, there are no perlocutionary affects associated with greeting, promising etc. To cite one example, when x says "Hello" to y amd means it what x intends to produce or elicit in y is not any state or action but the understanding that he – i e., y – is being greeted. However, there are (Searle admits) some expressions which have perlocutionary effects associated with them. These are expressions like "Get out", "Sit there" etc. For instance, when x says "Get out" to y and means it it is intended by x to produce a certain effect in y – namely getting y to leave. Accordingly, Grice's account at best only handles sentences like "Get out" and not sentences like "Hello", "I promise" and so on :

> ... Grice's account seems to suit only the last of she three sentences, "Get out", since it is the only one whose meaning is such that in the ordinary case the speaker who utters and means it intends to produce an 'effect' on the hearer of the kind Grice discusses. The meaning of the sentence "Get out" ties it to a particular intended perlocutionary effect namely getting the hearer to leave. The meanings of "Hello" and "promise" do not.
>
> Searle, 1989 : 49

Searle may be correct in pointing out that there are sentences that have illocutionary effects rather than perlocutionary effects associated with them. Searle, however, is unfair in his criticism of the Gricean account as being adequate for dealing only with sentences like "Get out" that have perlocutionary effects associated with them, since Grice is not offering an account of what sentences conventionally mean but one of occasion meaning. Moreover even if one wants to distinguish illocutionary effect (understanding) from perlocutionary effects in non-linguistic communication amongst non-language users there

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seems to be no behavioural criteria for establishing whether the audience – y – simply has an understanding of what sender x utters, in contrast to acting. To put it another way, in the case of linguistic communication it is possible to say of y that he may have understood what x has uttered even though he does not exhibit any action on the basis of knowing that he understands the language. In the case of non-linguistic communication amongst non-language users there are no such conventions. Consequently, it becomes difficult to establish whether y has an understanding of x's utterance unless y exhibits some sort of action (what Searle calls perlocutionary effect). Accordingly, it is fair to say that the audience has to exhibit some sort of action in the case of non-linguistic communication between non-language users.

According to the account presented above the meaning of an utterance can be unpacked in terms of the intention with which it was produced. And, since the account concentrates on the nature of the sender's intentions, communication in the full sense through means other than language is possible only if one person can know what another person's intentions are through means other than through the medium of language. It must be possible, therefore, for one person to acquire knowledge of the intentions of another person on the basis of his observation of the other's behaviour. This will be possible, however, only if the behaviour concerned is of the relevant kind i.e. if it is intentional. Not all behaviour, however, is of the required kind. A great deal of the behaviour of living things is goal-directed without being purposive or intentional in the relevant sense. And behaviour of that kind provides no basis for communication; since it involves no intentions there is no possibility of an observer learning what intentions are involved in it.

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All living things as living things exhibit behaviour that is teleologically explicable in terms of ends or goals; that is, their behaviour is goal-directed. The behaviour of living things is conducive firstly, to the maintenance of the organism and secondly to the continued existence of the species to which it belongs. That is to say, it is the nature of living things to exhibit goal-directed behaviour : and, regardless of whether an organism is an amoeba, a bug or a caterpillar it will exhibit behaviour drawn from the repertoire of responses available to it as a member of a certain species in responses to varying stimuli which fall within its normal environment, responses that are directed towards certain ends : i.e. the continuation of its own individual existence and that of the species to which it belongs.

However, the goal-directed character of these behaviours should not lead us to conclude that they are intentional or purposive; that is, the organism cannot be said to have an insight into the ends served by its behaviour. To put it another way, the notion of goal-directedness need not always involve purpose (in the sense that the organism has an insight into the ends served by its behaviour) even though purposive behaviour is goal-directed towards ends. As a consequence, some of the behaviours exhibited by animals may be classed as goal-directed though not as purposive. As Taylor says,

> .. those lower species to which the concept 'action' has no application... are nevertheless such that their behaviour can only be accounted for by teleological although non-purposive laws.
>
> Taylor 1964 : 71

Intentional or purposive behaviour is different from the goal-directed behaviour of living things as living things in that the goals towards which the behaviour is directed are intended by

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the organism. In other words, the notion of purposive behaviour carries with it the suggestion of mental awareness of the goals towards which the behaviour is directed. Accordingly, the organism must have some conception of the situation and of the goal towards which it is directing its behaviour so that its behaviour can be appropriate to the achievement of the goal in the light of the situation. In such cases it is natural to say that the behaviour appeared to be mediated by an internal model or picture of the situation in which the behaviour took place, although giving an acceptable account of the internal model is a matter of great difficulty. Consider the following :

a) A baby toad encounters a tiny bug, opens its mouth, flips out its tongue, strikes the bug, and withdraws the tongue with the prey stuck to it.

b) Smith gets the ladder out of the garage, places it under the apple tree, climbs the ladder, picks apples from the tree and places them in the basket.

Both are instances of behaviour that are goal–directed. The first example may be an instance of stimulus–response behaviour of a living thing as a living thing – in that it is a response to a stimulus in a given situation that aids, in this case, the survival of the individual; or, it could be a learnt response due to neural mechanisms present in the brain of the toad that enable it to store information in biologically significant situations and use this information to respond appropriately. The nature of the behaviour in the second example is different in that it involves behaviour that is conducive to striving after a goal retained as an idea. That is, the behaviour is purposive. To put it another way, Smith's behaviour, besides involving bodily movements (for instance, movements of the arms) and directed towards certain ends, is mediated through beliefs. Not only had the behaviour

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a certaion goal (collecting apples) but it was guided by beliefs like 'There are apples on the tree', 'The apples can be reached with the ladder' and so on.

To pursue purposes is to attempt to bring about a change in the existing state of affais (or stopping the existing state of affairs from changing) – a change that is so intended by the actor. (There are changes in the state of affairs even when animals behave instinctively as in the case of the amoeba that engulfs an alga and ingests it, since the alga is no longer present. The change, however, is not intended by the amoeba even although its behaviour is directed towards that end.) Intended changes, however, cannot be brought about unless the actor, wishing to bring about the change has some conception of his situation; one that allows him to form some idea of the way he intends to change that situation and to choose means that are appropriate in bringing about the intended change. In other words, the actor must have a conception of his surroundings – that is, of objects around him, the relations between them, how they behave and so on. So purposive behaviour is geared, not directly to the world, but to the actor's inner model of the world – i.e., the actor's beliefs about the world. Accordingly, it can be said that the notion of intention cannot be separated from the notion of belief.

Returning now to the purposive behaviour involved in communication, this is geared to get an audience (y) to believe or do something, to change y's beliefs; and communication becomes possible when y recognises x's intentions. In other words, communication becomes possible only when there is mutual perception of intentions. Mutual perception of intentions, however, is possible only if the parties to it see others as having intentions and beliefs, and see themselves as being seen by others as having intentions and beliefs. That is to say, it is not possible

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for x to convey his (x's) intention to change y's beliefs to y if x does not see y as having intentions and beliefs like himself and also sees himself as being seen by as having intentions and beliefs; likewise, y can receive x's intentions as directed towards him by x only if he sees x as a creature like himself as being seen by x as having intentions and beliefs. In short, communication – a purposive activity on a sophisticated scale involving other purposive beings – is possible only if the parties to it have self-awareness and reciprocal self-awareness.

However, before languageless creatures can be credited with the ability to communicate it is essential, in the first place, to establish whether the notion of purpose can be introduced to the behaviour of languageless cretures–i.e., whether languageless creatures possess a conception of their surroundings in the light of which they pursue purposes (the subject matter of a paper I will present at the World Philosophy Congress, 1988). To put it another way, the notion of information exchange in the full sense can be applied to the behaviour of languageless creatures only if the creatures have beliefs and can acquire beliefs in the first place. For instance, it will not be possible for x–a languageless creature – to transmit information intentionally to y that it is going to rain and how y could shelter from the rain etc. if it does not have some beliefs of the sort, 'Black clouds mean rain', 'Caves are good shelters' etc.

1.4 *Conclusion*

It follows from what has been said that communication in the full sense is an intentional activity and communication is possible through behaviour (i.e, without the use of a language) if the behaviour involves intentions. To build a framework for communication amongst languageless creatures it must be possible to see the behaviour of languageless creatures as involving

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intentions. To behave purposively is to be guided by beliefs, for it is not possible to pursue a goal with the intention of doing so if one does not have a conception of one's surroundings.

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NOTES

1. See Schrodinger, E. : (1945) *What is Life ?* Cambridge University Press.
2. For a detailed account see my paper "Languageless Creatures and Communication" in *Logical Foundations* edited by Indira Mahalingam Carr and Brian Carr to be Published by MacMillan.

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ROOT OF MAN : A NOTE

I

The view developed here is contingent upon the acceptance of a particular concept of man, namely as a conscious or, if one likes to be more meticulous, a living and conscious creature. If this notion of man is challenged or rejected, the present thesis would lose its credibility. But it must be confessed that in what follows nothing is said in defence of the alleged concept of man. In other words, the thesis propoed here assumes, rather uncritically, that the element of life and that of consciousness constitute the crucial characteristics of any being who should be regarded as a human being.

Again, to make another confession, this essay may appear to tackle a rather serious question in a somewhat sketchy and unexciting manner. And for that matter the arguments broached in the sequel might appear not so intricate as is usually expected in the philosophical arena. But still, I believe that there is a sense, as it may be clear when we shall go through the arguments themselves, in which they can be called *philosophical.*

It might be agreed that man is a temporal being and hence possesses what may be called a 'history' which, in all likelihood has some bearing upon his nature and existence. If so, then it might be useful to conjecture about the 'root' of our being. This obviously would not explain why at all we *are*, but might

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shed some light on why we are *what we are*. It may be pretty clear that to think of the 'root' of man is not to enquire about the origin of the universe, but rather to speculate on the nature of the 'elements', within the universe, which the human species could be traced to.

Clearly we – the existing men – cannot literally re-live the process through which we have become what we now are. But the trouble is that it is we – the existing men – who are to explain the nature of this process, if any such attempt is to be made at all. One way out may be suggested: we may try to understand *hypothetically* the nature of the said process by reflecting on states and processes *we* undergo. We may, that is, try to develop an idea, in consonance with the nature of our present being and existence, of what could be the most plausible account of the said process. We may, thus, attempt *a* rational re-construction of this process. This task we undertake in this essay.

One point of caution may be made before proceeding further. As is already hinted at, the basis of our account would be mainly *conceptual*. By this we mean that it is primarily certain *conceptual* constraints that have led us to believe in the position that we shall try to develop and defend in the sequel, and hence the viability of our view must be judged purely by conceptual considerations. Being primarily based on *conceptual* arguments, our account would contain no or little 'factual data' often adduced in explaining the being of man. Not that these factual details are unimportant, but, as it should be clear, such factual details would not be of any real relevance with regard to *our* arguments.

II

Now to the arguments We may begin with an important cue from modern science. Modern science teaches us that a tangible

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entity is *either* living *or* non–living. Taken this *either-or* in its exclusive sense which it clearly betrays, the immediate conclusion follows that a tangible entity which is *utterly* life–less in the sense that it does not contain even any embryo of life, can *in no way* grow into a living one. The acceptance of this would evidently make it difficult to maintain that primordially there were *only* life-less entities – if and once it is admitted that at present there are *living* entities. If this be the case, it would be more reasonable to hold that it is only that *kind* of entities endowed with some *potency* of life which through stages and suitable conditions have grown as fullfledged *living* members of the earth. It might be argued that the circumstances of the most primitive earth were such that it was impossible altogether that *life* should be present in any of the–then entities. Such an argument would lose its force if and once the distinction between '*potential* living entities' and '*living* entities' is well taken. The acceptance of this distinction would weaken the necessity of tracing existing living entities to *living* entities. It is often pointed out that an entity exhibiting no sign of life may, under suitable conditions, develop into a living one. But the fun is that facts of this kind really betray the legitimacy of drawing the distinction of '*potential* living entities' and '*living* entities'. This is because it appears unintelligible to hold that an entity which carries even no germ of life and which cannot possibly get any such germ from outside, can develop into a living entity. The point needs elaboration.

To say that life originated from or (as Darwin would like to put it) 'was first breathed'[1] into the purely physical entities would be to say either (1) that life was eventually put into the physical entities *from outside*, or (2) that the purely physical entities *themselves* eventually gave rise to life. Now each of these

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alternatives on analysis would seem to contradict the very statement that it purports to establish, namely, that primordially there were *only* non-living physical entities (from which living entities did emerge). But this original assertion, as I understand, could be made intelligible only in terms of any of the two aforesaid interpretations, consequently the very assertion should be suspect.

It is evident that the first alternative tacitly leaves room for the existence of living entities, when it admits of an 'outside domain' from which, as it holds, life entered into the life-less entities. This 'outside domain', then, must have contained life in some form or other, for otherwise how from this domain *life* could at all enter the life-less? Thus, the first alternative fails to establish or contradicts the original assertion that primordially there were *only* life-less physical entities.

The second alternative needs a bit more analysis. If self could arise from *within* the self-less physical entities, we can legitimately ask whether the alleged physical entities did already contain an inner drive to evolve life. If the answer is, Yes. the alleged physical entities could no longer be regarded as purely physical.' If, on the other hand, the answer is, No, then the said drive must have to come from somewhere *else*, and in that case the independent existence of 'living domain' would be implied. The second alternative, too, thus fails to establish or contradicts the original assertion that primordially there were *only* life-less physical entities. To telescope the whole point : to explain the nature of life in exclusively material terms would ultimately imply either that a living organism is not alive, or that a purely material entity is not purely physical, none of which is clearly acceptable. This seems to be the ground or at least one major ground why life cannot be explained in material terms alone. As Charon puts the point : " ... life is never a mere extension

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of matter : it is always something different ... an object is never 'half-alive'; it is either not alive (that is to say, matter pure and simpile) or it is alive : there are no intermediate stages".[3] Those who argue that there were primordially *only* physical entities out of which living entities *incidentally* emerged, inescapably face the rather insuperable difficulty of bridging the gap between life and matter. I must confess that I for myself am yet to get an *exact* idea of the alleged kind of 'incidental transition' from matter to life. Some have tried to settle the issue by introducing a 'missing link'[4] type of entities, but do not, as far as I know, offer the exact nature of these entities. Some other have proffered a 'somehow' explanation – a notion which, I must confess again, escapes my comprehension when I try to unpack it in exact terms. These views appear unsatisfactory mainly on the ground that they fail to *specify* the character of the alleged transition phase. And one may observe here that to acknowledge this difficulty is not to imply a need for *anyhow* overcoming it.

In view of the above considerations, it seems reasonable to conclude that the existence of the human species–admittedly a *living* one–is to be traced at least to that kind of entities which intrinsically contained some 'seed of life' however latent. Now let us see whether anything more may be required to account for the existence of the phenomena of man.

III

Here also we may take a cue from science. Modern science tells us that in regard to a living entity there is a sense in which it may be said that *it changes itself*, that it is able to change itself to an extent *by itself*. This is another way of saying that, while, a non–living entity is entirely devoid of any capacity, lying within itself, to change itself, a living entity possesses such

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us *inner force*. Not that a living entity is immune from external influences; but its changes may not be invariably accounted for *exclusively* in terms of these external forces : its changes may well be due, at least occasionally and partly, to what we have called its *inner force*.

Certain living entities appear to possess something more. While some living entities bring changes of themselves automatically or instinctively, i.e., in full accordance with the drifts of their organism, certain other living entities own and exert a sort of non–instinctive potency in bringing changes of themselves. The latter ones thus are not totally vulnerable to the demands of their instincts or the drifts of their organism. These entities in this sense may be said to enjoy a sort of freedom – the freedom due to their release from the bondage of instincts. This release from instincts is possible with them as they are endowed with what is usually called *potency to reflect* or *consciousness*. In virtue of this reflective potency, any such entity ceases to be a helpless victim of its biological nature, but is able to *deal with* its instincts; does not just naturally grow, but grows with a *sense* of growth and to that extent with a sort of perspective of its own. All this is possible because of, and in that way this possibility is expressive of, its *reflective* potency. If, then, entities of this kind – the conscious entities – are admitted to exist now, it would clearly be difficult to account for their existence, unless the rudiment of consciousness be admitted to have been there in certain primordial living entities. Almost the identical types of difficulties that we have noted to arise in connection with tracing life to purely non–living physical entities, would also arise if attempt be made to trace *consciousness* to *utterly* non–conscious living entities.

Now if we grant that man *is* a living *and* conscious being and if our arguments are so far all right, then the following conclu-

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sion seems inevitable : *human* existence is due to those kinds of entities that owned a rudiment of life *and* consciousness. This, if accepted, betrays a very important point about man, namely, that man's reflective potency is *original* with him. The same point may be put in a slightly different manner; the time-honoured view about man that he is a rational animal may be taken to characterise the most *fundamental* nature of the human species.

It may be important to emphasise in this connection that *life endowed with consciousness* becomes a *process* in a distinctive manner – with no *final* horizon. On the one hand, the cells divide, and this act of division is ceaseless; every cell doubles itself and goes on doubling itself; and this act of multiplication of the cells not merely increases the number of the cells but brings some general change in the *structure* of the cellular species. The element of consciousness, on the other hand, in its course of development, brings some fundamental change in the very *nature* of the entities which contain it potentially. In this way the development of the living *and* conscious entities signifies a double-dimensional process – quantitative as well as qualitative. And through such a two-dimensional developing process, we suggest, man has come into existence out of certain potentially living *and* conscious entities.

IV

By way of making some concluding remarks, we may give an idea of what our thesis does *not* imply. It is commonly accepted that the present earth is inhabited by, *broadly speaking*, three distinct *kinds* of being : purely inanimate ones (material objects); the living but not conscious ones (non-human animals), and the living and conscions ones (human-beings). *If* this view is accepted, then two philosophical views become almost immedia-

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tely doubtful. The first one is what is known as *hylozoism* which holds that all matter is animate. But this view would clearly come in conflict with the view that there are purely material objects The second view is known as *hylosoism* which acknowledges consciousness in all sorts of beings. According to this view, consciousness does not emerge out of inanimate matter but is contained in any phenomenon and has always been present in nature. It is, as the view contends, 'sleeping' in the rock, water and the earth, is gradually awakening in trees and animals, and finally 'opens its eyes' in man. Only one portion, taken in isolation, of this view seems acceptable, namely, that consciousness does not emerge out of inanimate matter. But surely merely animate entities, as we have tried to show, cannot be said to give birth to conscious beings. Hence, consciousness cannot be said to be present in any form within those objects (trees and animals) that *are merely* living creatures. And for that matter, again, consciousness cannot be said to lie in any form within those objects (rocks, etc.,) that *are* life-less entities.*

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NOTES

1. Charles Darwin, *On the Origin of Species*, Cambridge, Mass. 1976, p. 484.

2. Dobzhansky once terms 'the emergence of life from non-living matter' as an example of 'evolutionary transcendance', (See T. Dobzhansky, *The Biology of Ultimate Concern*, New American Library, New York, 1967.) By 'transcendance' Dobzhansky means surpassing or going beyond the limits of previous organisation. It is, however, not clear from his argument whether such 'surpassing' allows the presence of life, in the form of rudiment, in the 'previous organisation'. But since 'living' and 'non-living' differ *in kind*, it is hard to see how life could emerge in any way whatsoever from something that *in no form* carries within itself the rudiment of life.

3. Jean E. Charon; *Man in Search of Himself* (trans, F. E. Anderson) George Allen and Union Ltd., London, 1967, p. 187.

4. Though in point of fact the case of 'missing link' is put forward, as far as I know, in connection with explaining the transition from living entities to conscious entities, it would not be, I believe, quite out of place to refer to it in the present context since the pertinence of the 'missing link' type of argument remains virtually the same in either case.

* An earlier version of this article was read in the Friday Seminar, Calcutta. I am grateful to its member for their comments and suggestions.

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Discussion

A REFUTATION OF JAGAT PAL'S DEFENCE OF ARISTOTELIAN SQUARE OF OPPOSITION

There is a long-drawn-out controversy between the traditional (Aristotelian) and the modern logicians concerning one of the fundamental doctrines of syllogistic logic, namely, the doctrine of square of opposition. The dispute seems to revolve solely around the tricky notion of "existential import" of propositions. Jagat Pal (Hereafter referred as JP) in a recent paper[1] has attempted to uphold the traditional interpretation of categorical propositions and the various relations involved in the square of opposition. For this purpose he has argued extensively against the modern logicians. He tries to show that the modern interpretation of general propositions, far from refuting the traditional square of opposition, supports it.

The purpose of this paper, in the present context, is to examine the veracity of some of the claims made by JP against the modern interpretation and to see how far he has succeeded in refuting this thesis. We desire to concentrate our examination mainly on two points : (i) According to JP, A and E propositions can be true together as claimed by the modern logicians only if they assume the domain of discourse as empty. But he adds in the same breath that for the modern logicians to be fair and consistent with tneir thesis it is not possible to assume the domain of discourse to be empty, and (ii) JP contends that a

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propositional function, even after being quantified, turns out to be neither true nor false, whereas for the modern logicians a quantified well-formed–formula is either true or false. If we warily reflect on and meticulously scrutinize these two points we can show that the interpretation undertaken by JP for the cause of the Aristotelian logic is altogether improper and utterly misleading.

JP holds that the modern logicians should presuppose an empty domain of discourse in order to refute the traditional square. According to him, the well–formed–formulas $(x)\ (\varnothing x \supset \psi x)$ and $(x)\ (\varnothing x \supset \sim \psi x)$ can be true together only if x in $\varnothing x$ refers to nothing. But it can be possible only if the domain is empty. However, JP endeavours to show that the modern logicians cannot admit an empty domain because the truth conditions of the quantified formulas are specified in terms of the substitution instances of the propositional function which has been quantified and a substitution instance contains individual constants which refer to individuals in the domain. In a word, in JP's opinion, modern logic cannot admit empty domain without involving inconsistency. As a result, the traditional square stands unrefuted. We shall argue against JP to establish that for refuting the traditional square by way of showing that A and E can be true together an exponent of modern logic need not admit an empty domain of discourse.

Many logical thinkers right from J. S. Mill consider the traditional A and E propositions as conditional, rather than categorical, in nature. So the forms or the logical structures of these two propositions are represented in predicate logic by the following formulas.

Propositions	Logical Forms or Structures
A	$(x)\ (\varnothing x \supset \psi x)$
E	$(x)\ (\varnothing x \supset \sim \psi x)$

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As a result, whenever general propositions like A and E are used they do not categorically assert any thing about any individual. On the contrary, they can be said to be uniquely specifying truth conditions of propositions.

JP rightly maintains (on p. 306) with the modern logicians that A and E propositions of the above form can be true together only if the antecedent, i.e., ϕx is false in both the cases irrespective of the truth values assigned to the consequent ψx as they are propositional functions of the forms $\phi x \supset \psi x$ and $\phi x \supset \sim \psi x$. But his interpretation in falsifying ϕx seems quite implausible. He claims that ϕx becomes false if and only if x in ϕx refers to nothing, i.e, to an empty class–a class devoid of any member. But we would like to submit, in this context, that this interpretation is not consistent with the modern logic in question. Or to put the matter differently, for the modern logicians it is not desirable to assume empty domain for explaining their position of the relation holding between A and E propositions. Since it appears that if ϕx does not have any true substitution instance, it is because of the fact that the predicate expression ϕ here refers to an empty class: thus whatever may be the referent of x, it fails to belong to the class ϕ (ϕ does not apply), and, accordingly becomes false. Professor I. M. Copi has rightly observed that, save contradiction, "...none of the relations in the square array...holds for the traditional A, E, 1 and 0 propositions, *even if we assume that there is at least one individual in the universe*" [2]. Thus it is evident that our interpretation of the falsity of $(x)\ \phi x$ is in conformity with the modern approach.

It might, however, be argued against us that if a non–empty domain is presupposed then it would no longer be possible to deny the existential import of A and E propositions. We may dispense with this objection with reference to George Boole's

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treatment of the forms of general propositions. It is conspicous that George Boole interpreted general propositions in his class-theoretical terminology which represented a particular proposition as asserting the non-emptiness of the product of one class with another class or its complimentary and a universal proposition as asserting the emptiness of the same. Thus, A and E propositions such as "All S is P" and "No S is P" can be interpreted as $S\bar{P}=O$ and $SP=O$ respectively where the 'O' symbol stands for 'null-class'. Both the propositions thus represented are *categorical* about the emptiness of the *product class*, viz., $S\bar{P}$ and SP respectively. But what is striking to note is that they are *non-committal*[3] about the existence of members of the classes denoted by S and P. That is why the existential import is denied of A and E propositions in general. Or, to put the matter alternatively, that to deny the existential import it is not necessary to deny the existence of individuals in the domain but to be non-commital about their existence.

We may advance another argument to fortify our thesis that for refuting the traditional square a modern logician need not presuppose an empty domain. Consider, for example, the proposition $(x)\ (\phi x \supset \psi x)$. A modern logician would admit it to be perfectly possible that even if the propositional function ϕx does not have any true substitution instance, ψx can have true substitution instance. But this can never be possible if ϕx fails to have any true substitution instance only on the condition that the domain is empty. Or, in other words, if ψx has true substitution instance there must be some individual of which it is true. In that case if ϕx fails to have true substitution instance it cannot be due the absence of individual in the domain but it must be due to the inapplicability of the predicate expression. And thus our contention seems to be valid.

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Another important point that demands to be highlighted in this context is that, contrary to JP's supposition that in an empty universe $(x)\ \phi x$ would be false, a good number of modern logicians would hold that it would come out true on this condition. W. v. Quine, among others, makes this point explicitly vivid. He maintains that " ... '$(x)Fx$' is bound to come out true for the empty universe (there being no objects for 'Fx' to be false of) ... ".[4] The same point has also been stressed by Patrick Suppes. In his opinion the well-formed-formula '$(x)\ \phi x \ \& \sim (\exists x)\ \phi x$' is inconsistent if the universe is assumed to be empty.[5] It is palpable to see that if the first conjunct of this formula comes out false in an empty universe (as has been assumed by JP) then the formula as a whole fails to be consistent even in empty universe, but if an empty universe makes $(x)\ \phi x$ true, then only the whole well-formed-formula can be consistent in that universe.

Thus it follows from the above that according to modern interpretation the well-formed-formula $(x)\ (\phi \supset \psi x)$ and $(x)\ (\phi x \supset \sim \psi x)$ would both be true if the extension of the predicate expression ϕ in the propositional function ϕx is empty. To be more precise, what a modern logician needs to presuppose for refuting the doctrine of traditional square is not an empty universe but an empty predicate (i.e., a predicate whose extension is an empty class). In fact, the controversy regarding the acceptability of the doctrine hinges on this issue. While the traditional logicians hold that every term in a categorical proposition stands for something which exists, the modern logicians claim that there *can be* terms designating empty classes. And on this point the stand taken by the moderns seems to be more reasonable than that of the Aristotelians. For, in the first place, the modern approach tallies with the semantic intuition of the speakers. Consider the speech act performed by a speaker in

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uttering the sentence. "All tresspassers will be prosecuted". Obviously, the speaker does not intend, in this particular context, his hearer to believe that there, in fact, are tresspassers; instead he is actually non-committal about the existence of tresspassers, but one can be non-committal about the existence of things only if one admits the possibility of both the existence and non-existence of the things in question : in admitting the possibility of having empty terms in general propositions modern logic thus reflects the application of the native speaker's intuition. Secondly, modern approach does not require us to impose unnecessary restriction on the scope of logic. Since the admission of the possibility of having empty general terms in general propositions is not inconsistent with the speaker's semantic intuitions, there is no reason as to why the scope of logic should be restricted only to such propositions consisting only of non-empty terms. To quote from Kneale and Kneale, "To modern logician this seems a rather curious restriction on the scope of logic. For, it is not at all difficult to construct a general statement in which at least one of the terms lacks application...".[6]

It is important to note that the modern analysis of general statements is not inconsistent even with that logico-semantic intuition of Aristotle which led him to admit that all general terms must have some application. On Aristotle's view a statement is true or false according as the predicate applies to the subject or not (as referred to by JP as the predicate criterion of falsity). Accordingly, this view requires that a subject term must refer to something about which the question of the application of predicate can arise at all. Now, if we shed some light on the modern analysis of the general statements we find that the general term, which appears as subject in Aristotelian statement, occupies the position of predicate expression in a statement of predicate logic, and, accordingly, even if these terms

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do not refer to any existent entity, the statement of predicate logic would not fail to be true or false. In the notation of predicate logic a variable stands for the subject of the general statements, and in so far as a modern logician assumes the existence of a non–empty domain of discourse, a variable always gets some or other object of domain as its value. So, we notice that the Aristotelian intuition that the subject term must have some reference is upheld by the modern logicians also. Consequently, it can ligitimately be claimed that modern analysis of general proposition is much more comprehensive than the Aristotelian approach.

It may, however, be urged that the Aristotelian logicians, talking about categorical propositions, not only deny the possibility of having empty terms in the position of subject, but they also deny this possibility in the case of predicate terms also, and accordingly it is not plausible to criticize this doctrine on the assumption that there can be empty predicate terms. Our submission on this point would be that the admission of the possibility of having empty predicates is consistent both with the semantic and logical requirements. We have already pointed out that there are cases in which semantic intuition of the speakers makes it plain that there are empty predicates. Now we are inclined to submit that even if we intend to confine ourselves to Aristotelian forms of propositions then also in some cases there would be a logical requirement for the admission of empty predicate. Consider, for instance, the statement : " No men are miser." A remarkable feature of this statement is that the predicate 'miser' here is a subset of the set designated by the subject, namely, 'man.' Now if we examine closely we find that this statement can be true. But the question arises : what constitutes the truth condition? The truth condition of this statement consists in that no member of the class denoted by

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the subject term should be a member of the class denoted by the predicate. But since the predicate class here is a subset of the subject class so whenever the statement is true, the class denoted by the predicate term must be empty. So an Aristotelian would have to admit either that this statement, viz, "No men are miser" is necessarily a false statement, or he would have to admit a paradoxical situation that if the statement is true then it is neither true nor false (due to the existence of the predicate that denotes empty class). But both of these consequences would be unwarranted. Hence, it can be claimed that for explaining the possibility of the truth of certain statements it is necessary to admit the existenee of empty predicates.

It may, however, be urged against our proposed defence that the well-formed-formulas of predicate logic that represent the forms of A and E propositions are neither true nor false, and, accordingly, the question of their being true together does not arise at all. This is in fact the other point in JP's thesis that we desire to contest. On JP's view, a propositional function is neither true nor false because the reference of the variables that occur in it is undetermined. He says, "since individual variables are undetermined expressions, $\phi x \supset \psi x$ and $\phi x \supset \sim \psi x$ are also undetermined expressions. As a result of it, they fall short of the categories of truth values" (p. 308). And he claims that even after quantifying the propositional function, the resulting well-formed-formula remains undetermined and so is neither true nor false. We agree with JP that both the propositional function and its variables are undetermined expressions, but in our opinion this in no way implies that the quantified well-formed-formula is also undetermined. The reason why a propositional function fails to have any truth value is simply that it is not possible to specify the truth conditions for a propositional function. It is true that a propositionol function

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$\phi x \supset \psi x$ would be true if either the antecedent is false or the consequent is true, but what is notable is that we cannot lay down the truth condition for the propositional function ϕx or ψx uniquely. Since a free variable ranges over any individual in the domain it is possible to get both true and false substitution instances of ϕx or of ψx. But these true or false substitution instances could throw no light as to the truth or falsity of ths propositional functions because we do not know what number of substitution instances we have to take into account for determining the truth value of these. But in the case of quantified formulas (if all the variables are bonnd) the picture is completely different. In a quantified well–formed–formula the truth condition of the well–formed–formula is uniquely determined. In the case of universally quantified variable each individual has to satisfy the propositional function and in the case of existentially quantified well–formed-formula at least one of the individuals has to satisfy the function. Since in the case of quantified well–formed–formulas it is possible to specify the truth conditions uniquely, the question of having one of the truth–values is relevant, and accordingly JP's allegation is unfounded.

To conclude our discussion, we would like to note that if a modern logician assumes an empty domain of discourse then he would not be able to refute the traditional doctrine of the square of opposition which runs contrary to JP's contention. For, in our opinion, if there is no entity in the universe then the proposition such as (x) $(\phi x \supset \psi x)$ wouid be neither true nor false or, in other words, is indeterminate : if there is no individual then ϕx cannot be claimed to be either true or false of any individual, and the case is same for ψx. Since a conditional is true if either the antecedent is false or the consequent is true,

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and since in the present case we cannot assert either to be the case, we cannot claim this universally quantified well-formed-formula to be either true or false in any empty domain.

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NOTES

We are deeply indebted to Dr. Chandidas Bhattacharjee, Dept, of Philosophy, North Bengal University, for his constant encouragement and critical comments at various stages in writing this paper.

1. Pal, Jagat, "Modern Analysis of Syllogistic Logic : A Critical Reflection", *Indian Philosophical Querterly*, Vol. XVI, No. 3, July 1989, pp. 303–317.

2. Copi, I. M.. *Symbolic Logic*, 5th Edn. (New York : Macmillan Publishing Co. Inc., 1979). p. 68. Italics ours.

3. This point has also been emphasized by W. v. Quine with reference to diagrammatic representation of categorical statements in whieh overlapping circles are used to represent the two terms of a categorical statement. The significance of shading of a particular region positively asserts *emptiness* whereas whiteness of a region signifies *lack of information*. Thus, in A and E propositions emptiness of the product classes *SP* and SP respectively is unequivocal but indicate mere lack of information about other unshaded regions. Please see W. v. Quine, *Methods of Logic*, 2nd Edn. (London : Rutledge & Kegan Paul, 1962), pp. 69–70.

4. Quine, W. v., *op. cit.*, p. 96.

5. Suppes, Patrick ; *Introduction to Logic*, (New Delhi : Affiliated East-West Press Private Limited. 1957), p. 68.

6. Kneale, W. and Kneale, M. *The Development of Logic* (Oxford : Clarendon Press, 1962), p. 60.

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DR. S. R. KAWLE

We are profoundly sorry to report the sad and untimaly demise of Dr. S. R, Kawale (13-9-1930 — 31-1-1990), Professor and Head of the Department of Philosophy, S. P. College, Pune-30. Apart from being a conscientious, dedicated and well-known teacher of Philosophy for the last thirty-four years, he was a humane administrator and above all an understanding and co-operative esteemed senior colleague. He was associated with Philosophy Department of Poona University in number of ways, and participated in various activities undertaken by it with utmost sincerity. Not only was he associated with the *Indian Philosophical Quarterly* since its inception but was also a member of its Board of Consulting Editors from volume VI The Quarterly was privileged to be profited by his timely suitable advice and encouraging counsel. In his passing away we have lost a senior respected colleague and the Quarterly has lost a well-wisher.

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HEGEL'S LEGEND OF SELF-DETERMINATION

"Freedom for Hegel is a faculty in human nature because man is Being–for–itself. This concept of freedom is described in his logic and has become a social power in the dialectic of Master–Slave. Whereas, Hegel's concept of mutual recognition and social justice in his Philosophy of Right is completely different and contradicts the previous ones. However, the deduction of mutual recognition is logically possible even in the dialectic of Master–Slave."

Ever since the rise of social philosophy human freedom has become a central issue, and that has divided the philosophers into two divergent camps, viz., Determinism and Indeterminism. The exposition of the first camp relies on the assumption that human life is conditioned by external forces (spiritual or physical). On the other side, the champions of Indeterminism attempt to break the chain of such external conditions by prevailing interpretative approach and arguments which depend on the belief that consciousness, unlike the physical objects, does not come under the sway of natural causes. Meanwhile some of them go further to trace out the ontological foundation of freedom through the denial of the existence of the supernatural being which determine human activities.

Hegel is one of the thinkers who has adopted a new approach which is entirely distinct from the dictums of both camps. As I understand, the legitimacy of freedom in Hegel's philosophy is

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in the ontological status of man, and then from there we can talk about the interaction among individuals in society, and the possibility of social justice. In this regard the category of Being-for–itself[1] carries all the secret of Hegel's legend. Man as a canscious being is aware of the objects in the world as well as of his own existence, and then he is for himself. In this case all distinctions between consciousness and its object will be concelled, man as a self–related being, as a unity becomesa self-determined being, having no external relation and condition. In this relation consciousness has no otherness, no limitation by anything other than itself and that is the necessary ground for freedom. The Cartesian Cogito for Hegel contains half truth; man is defined as a self–conscious being; not as a thinking being only. Then, since man is being–for–self, he is essentially free, or he is free by nature.

I disagree with Ritter to think that freedom to Hegel's philosophy is not a natural faculty but a structure of interaction between individuals in society and is the foundation of social justice.[2] It is more relavent to state that freedom is implicitly in human nature because man is for–himself, and it becomes explicit and actual when social life is established. That is what Hegel tries to sketch out with the concepts of Right and Duty and mutual recognition among individuals at another place.[3] And Hegel's theory of social justice, which is interpreted by Ritter, is paradoxical to master–slave relation described in *the Phenomenology of Mind.*

Hegel has developed three theses on freedom at three different places :

i) Freedom as self–determination.

ii) Freedom as activity.

iii) Freedom as social justice.

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The first thesis represents freedom as a faculty of consciousness and as something in the nature of man. Hegel, as it is mentioned earlier, has described this point in his logic with the category of Being-for-self. And he has solved the problem of determinism ontologically by converting it into self-determinism through the identification of consciousness with reality, finite with infinte and, more generally, subject with object. For Hegel, infinity is not transcendental in the classical sense; as something static and inaccesible to human cognition. But it is in the process of going beyond the external conditions and determinations. Man, accordingly, as a self-determined being, is an infinite being.

Such a kind of freedom, which is in the nature of man, becomes real in activity and practical life, for whatever is implicit necessarily becomes explicit, this situation pursues human beings to work and negate the extenal limitations. The actual freedom depends upon the activity and labour of human beings to nullify and preserve the external reality. Consciousness struggles to modify its object and possess it, and for that it manifests itself as Desire.[4] Hegel's concept of freedom here does not contradict the first thesis in *the Science of Logic,* but rather they supplement each other, they represent theoretical and practical aspects of one and the same term.

The dialectical movement of consciousness in *the Phenomenology of Mind* aims at the idealization of the external world through the process of its reduction into concepts, and finally consciousness arrives at the stage where all distinctions between them disappear. This process of conceptualization of the world is merely theoretical and incomplete. Its practical aspect is based on struggle of Desire to assimilate external reality. Consciousness, from one side, desires the given objects, and, on the other side, it is directed towards another desire. Both external limita-

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tions viz. the given objects and another desire, are mere facts which cannot be denied. We are always in the world–among the others, and we trascend perpetually towards them. Desire towards another desire is for recognition.[5] "I", as an individual desire, want to be recognised by another desire as an autonomous being having my own values and principles. I should make another desire to accept my values as his own, and should surrender totally to me, otherwise my freedom with his presence as an other remains uncertain and threatened. Then, the self-conscious being acts to subjugate the given objects as well as another desire. This pursuades both desires to face the battle of life and death. One of them risks life without fear and fights for recognition, whereas the other side does not go beyond life and the given objects, is afraid to die and prefers life in chains to death. At the end of the battle the recognized desire bccomes the master and an independent being who possesses the given objects and another desire. The defeated desire, on the other hand, loses essentiality and becomes a slave.

Hegel has not supported the dialectic of master–slave by any argument, and the commentators have interpreted this antisocial phenomenon differently. Findlay, for example, has given the metaphor of mirror, that if the recognizing desire is a living object, and exactly the same like the recognized desire, then it sees itself in it the way it sees itself in a mirror.[6] This interpretation, as Ivan Soll remarks, is too epistemological,[7] and Findlay has not given arguments from the original text of Hegel to support his metaphor of mirror. If a desire wants to see itself in another desire, then why should they fight for subjugation ? Alexander Kojeve has come with another interpretation, but it is not satisfactory too. He says,

> "To desire Being is to fill oneself with his given Being, to enslave oneself to it. To desire non–Being is to liberate

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oneself from Being to realize one's autonomy, one's freedom. To be anthropogenetic, then, desire must be directed towards another desire, another greedy emptiness, another "I"."[8]

I disagree with Kojeve on the point that desire for Being is enslavement, and for non-Being is liberation, because human activism is directed to modify Being into a humanistic world. Kojeve is right when he says that by going beyond Being we achieve freedom in the sense that we negate the indepenedent status of Being, but that is applicable and true also to the negation of non-Being The dialectic of labour is the birth-place of freedom, by no means that brings enslavement to human life. Freedom, for Hegel, without this practical aspect, without the modification of Being, is purely subjective and is without content. Then, what is the secret behind the subordination of one desire by another desire ?

The secret, as I have mentioned before, lies in the category of Being-for-itself, and its essential characteristic. Since consciousness as being-for-itself, is free by nature, it should not be limited by external condition, ".. the other's reality is presented to former as an external other, as outside itself; it must cancel that externality."[9] To be actually free desire must negate all kinds of limitations. Consequently, I, as being-for-itself, ascertain my freedom by subjugating another desire and forcing my adversary to recognise me as his master and the only free being.

The third thesis deals with Hegel's concept of social justice and theory of Right. Social Justice is the realization of freedom, and freedom is constructed on the mutual recognition among the individuals in society. That is what Ritter has developed in his essays on Hegel's philosophy of Right.[10] The concept of mutual recognition contradicts the two previous theses which

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are given in *the Science of Logic* and *the Phenomenology of Mind*. Hegel could easily talk about such recognition even in the dialectic of Master–Slave, and sweep out the anti–social character of recognized desire in his social theory through the deduction of True Infinite of desire.[11]

The relation between two individual desires resembles the relation between Something and Other,[12] Something is determined by an other but both of them like all opposition in dialectic are identical and different. The determination of something by an other turns to self-determination. Here, we have the same logical ground for the identification of two desires, The subordination of one man by another, the disunity among individuals will be moulded in harmonoius community. Another desire, at this stage, in not an external limitation, but a necessary condition for freedom.

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NOTES

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6. See : Findlay, J. N ; *Hegel; A Re-exemination*, George Allen and Unwin Ltd., London, 1958, p. 94.

7. Soll, Ivan ; *An Introduction to Hegel's Metaphysics*, Forwarded by Walter Kaufmann, The University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1969, p. 16.

8. Kojeve, Alexander ; *Introduction to the Reading of Hegel*, trs., by James H. Nicholas, edited by Allan Bloom, Cornell University Press, London, 1980, p. 40.

9. Hegel, *op. cit.*, p. 233.

10. See; Hegel, *Philosophy of Right*, pp. 37–40,

11. True Infinite is one of the most important categories in Hegel's logic see; the *Encyclopedia*, section 93, p. 187.

12. Hegel, *the Encyclopedia*, Section 92, p. 136.

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LOST BUDDHIST TEXTS : THE RATIONALE OF THEIR RECONSTRUCTION IN SANSKRIT

In this paper* I intend to spell out briefly the rationale of reconstructing in Sanskrit those philosophical and other Buddhist texts which, unfortunately, are not available in that language. Although such works are not available as they were originally written in Sanskrit, Tibetan or Chinese translations of many of them are fortunately extant. This is a gratifying and encouraging feature of the prevalent situation. We do not wish to go, in this paper, into the tricky question as to how far such Tibetan or Chines translations of the concerned Buddist texts are reliable. Instead, presuming that by and large they are reliable, we wish to concentrate on the problem of the necessity of their reconstruction in Sanskrit.

The present paper has three sections. In the first, an attempt is made to outline contours of the diversified culture within the framework of the broadly monolithic and unifying civilization that flourished in this sub-continent. We shall also attempt to sketch some salient features of such a civilization. In the second, importance of Sanskrit is taken into account as a common medium of intellectual exchange. We shall consider importance of this sort of medium, which contributed to the widening and deepening of the vistas of comprehension through feed-back– both positive and negative – without insulating and isolating one trend of thought from the others. In the last section, we hope to highlight some important aspects of the necessity of

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reconstruction in Sanskrit of those Buddhist texts which are unfortunately not available in it. This we intend to do in a two-fold way. On the one hand, we hope to bring to surface some important points of strength of such a venture which are decisive from the points of view of the history and growth of intellectual enterprise in this sub-continent. On the other hand, we also intend to show that the path of reconstructing in Sanskrit those Buddhist works which are not available in it is more likely to save us from succumbing to those modes of weakness and vulnerability which other avenues of articulting the content, if not of reconstruction, of the concerned Buddhist texts from their Tibetan or Chinese translations seem perhaps to be inherently open.

I

Inclusive Framework of the Monolithic Civilization and Varied Cultural Strands in it :

It is pointless to harp upon superficial similarity between animal and human modes of life. It is equally unilluminating to subscribe to the view that both animal and human lives are equally mechanical and passive in character. It is a fact that human life falls apart from animal life in certain marked important respects. One important distinguishing aspect of human life is that overall it is consciously purposive in character. Right from ancient times human life is seen to be geared towards realization of certain goals and aspirations. Their plurality has been held to be necessary for taking into account human life in its richness, variety and complexity. Unitary conception of human aspiration is held to be too simplistic in character. Consequently, it does not seem to be taken seriously, especially because it is unable to give satisfactory account of human life in its complexity. Man's initial conception of human aspiration might have been ambiguous and fraught with certain difficulties,

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But in course of time, man's conception of legitimate goals and aspirations of human life began to crystalise gradually and eventually different conceptions of legitimate goals and aspirations human life surfaced on the horizon and began engaging attention of the concerned. As we shall soon see, such a conception of legitimate goals and aspirations of human life is an important aspect of any worthwhile civilization.

The most ancient and the oldest concern of man must obviously have been satiation of needs. This sort of concern must have, as is evident, made man basically confined himself to the present–neither much bothering about the past (except in the sense of learning from the immediate and proximate past) nor about the distant future (except perhaps the immediate one). In course of time, however, the unitary aspiration of satiation of needs, geared basically towards the problems of survival and procreation, came to be replaced in this sub–continent, as also perhaps elsewhere, by a pluralistic conception of legitimate human aspirations.

Any worthwhile civilization must bring forth consideration of three important aspects of it – (a) the sort of legitimate aspirations and goals of human life it accepts, (b) the sort of orientation towards them and towards life in general that it adopts, and (c) the mode/s of realization of such goals in human life which it makes available, so that they do not remain merely utopian in character. In addition, there is one more consideration also which is at stake in appropriate conception of a civilization. However, to avoid digression at the present juncture of our argument, we shall return to it at a later stage.

We said above that every civilization, including the one which flourished in this sub–continent, must bring forth a certain pluralistic conception of legitimate human aspirations.

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Even restricting to the civilization which flourished in this sub-continent in ancient times, for fear of digression, we do not wish to go into the details of two questions in this paper. They are : whether (a) the same pluralistic conception of legitimate human aspirations – say the *Puruṣārthas*[1] – was accepted by various adherents of different trends of thought which flourished in this sub-continent from their commencement, and (b) the same pattern of interrelationship among them too was accepted by all of them. Leaving aside such issues of historically intricate concern we may proceed to highlight three important salient features[2] of the sort of monolithic civilization that flourished in this sub-continent and within the general framwork of which alone perhaps the whole exercise of the reconstruction of the lost Buddhist texts in Sanskrit could be made some satisfactory sense of.

(A) *Article/s of Faith and Belief not Falling outside the Jurisdiction of Bhāratavarṣa*[3] –

In this sub-continent, before the advent of people reared, nurtured and brought up in a different mould of civilization three principal groups of people with differential cultural perspective seem to have flourished. They are : (i) those who owed allegiance to the *Brahmanical* tradition in one form or the other, (ii) those who owed allegiance to what is known as *Śrāmaṇic* tradition, within which two important strands are discernible, viz. the *Bauddha* and the *Jaina,* and (iii) those which owed allegiance to neither of the first two perspectives. The latter, further, seem to fall into two main groups : (a) independents like *Cārvākas* and (b) tribals as well a aboriginals. In spite of such differences among them, however, all of them seem to have subscribed to one commitment. It is this that none of them ever accepted any article of faith and belief which did

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not fall within the jurisdiction of what may be called *Bhārata-varṣa* in the most inclusive and extended sense of that term.[4] Further, the article of faith under consideration may be abstract or concrete, proximate or remote, external or internal. That one subscribed to such an article of faith was considered to be a mark of identification, re-identification and recognition of anyone in this sub-continent to be belonging to Indian civilization. This sort of broad and flexible spectrum was sufficiently strong enough to supply a sort of unifying tie to the diversity of cultural and intellectual strands which flourished in this sub-continent. One could call it a sort of civilizational *Swadeśī*.[5] It is this sort of tie which seems to have ensured non-alienation of any group or cultural strand–no matter whether central or peripheral, *Tāntric* or religiously secterian, operative in mountains or plains, in the north or south, east or west. Today we fail to realise significance and importance of this kind of unifying tie – although in a sense negative in character – especially because we seem to have lost track of sensitivity to and sensibility as well of discrimination of what is native to our civilization and what is foreign to it. This point has number of implications. For fear of digression, however, we do not wish to pursue it here further.

(B) *Satisfaction as General Orientation to Life* : Various trends of thought and culture – no matter whether *Brahmanical*. *Śrāmaṇic* or *Tribal* – which flourished in this sub-continent, seem to be civilizationally united in yet other respect. It consists in holding that instead of mere survival or competition - and in the process outrunning the competetor by hook or crook– satisfaction should be the general unifying orientation to life. This seems to have been accepted by all people who flourished and operated within the framework of what could be held to be

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Indian civilization. It basically consisted in holding that so long as the possibility–proximate or remote–of deriving satisfaction in human life–individual or social–has not been obliterated there is a charm in living and continuation. The sort of satisfaction derivative in human life was never considered to be governed by or dependent upon material affluence. In fact, falling excessively a prey to the latter in any respect was considered to be detrimental and antithetical to the satisfaction orientation. A consideration of this sort one finds reflected, moderately or extremely, in various considerations concerning human life that have been articulated. This sort of satisfaction – orientation seems to have stood stubbornly in the way of both alienation and undue exploitation. Here it is irrelevant whether the exploitation is sought to be understood collectively or individually. In the former aspect, it may mean exploitation of one group by another, while in the latter it may mean one aspect of one's personality exploiting the other aspects. That is why such so-called traits of what is considered to be a mark of excellence as figuring one's name in Guinness' Book of Record had almost no value in the eyes of people who flourished within the framework of what could be called Indian civilization. This salient feature of Indian civilization could be said to be spelling out its ecology in the sense it stipulates as to within which sort of civilizational climate would legitimate human aspirations be allowed to be realised. It needs to be understood that this sort of satisfaction – orientation remained decisively important with various cultural and intellectual trends which flourished in this sub-continent in ancient times, especially before the advent in it of any persons or groups brought up, reared and nurtured in an alien civilizational framework. This unifying feature of Indian civilization is intimately connected with yet another such feature. It is to the brief consideration of it that we now turn.

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(c) *Moral Consideration of any Aspect of Life*

Various groups of people and different cultural strands which flourished in this sub-continent were civilizationally united on yet another count. It basically consists in holding that any aspect of human life – individual or collective – should at least be moral for its being considered to be acceptable. In other words, the most important distinguishing mark of human life, apart from its being purposive in character, was considered to be its being moral. Accordingly, this unifying trait has two important implications : (a) With regard to satisfaction – orientation concerning life it amounts to subscribing to the view that even if one may not be able to create satisfaction in someone else's life, he has no business to make the path of the derivation of satisfaction in someone else's life full of obstacles and difficulties.

(b) Similarly, with regard to realisation of legitimate goals and aspirations of human life too it has an important implication. It consists in subscribing to the view that even if we may not be in a position to help somebody in the realization of legitimate goals and aspirations in his life, we have no business to interfere and put obstacles in his way. In the same vein, it also abhored the tendency of using someone else as an illegitimate means of the realisation of one's legitimate ends. The question of the realization of illegitimate ends with fair or foul means simply did not arise, since mere illegitimacy of ends was enough to hold them to be unworthy of being realized. Thus considered, if satisfaction–orientation could be said to be spelling out civilizational ecology, then moral consideration of human life in all its aspects could be said to be stipulating the touch-stone or a sulphuric acid test on the basis of which concerning any aspiration of human life–individual or collective–it could be

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decisively decided whether it is worthy of being realised or not, its being moral alone being crucially decisive factor in its favour.

On the count of the three above-mentioned major civilizational features there appears to be least variation regarding the central conception of each of them among various cultural and intellectual strands which flourished in this sub-continent. This is not to underestimate or deny altogether variations in their varied cultural expression. However, such expressional variations do not seem to have undermined or obliterated their decisively unificatory civilizational character.

There is, nonetheless, one more civilizational feature and we had promised earlier to take it into account later. It seems to consist in holding, on the one hand, that human life-individual or collective-is constituted basically by three principal kinds of relations : (a) our relation to ourselves - both individually and collectively, (b) our relation with others - humans as well as non-human - and that too both individually and collectively, and (c) our relation with world around us at large.[6] On the other hand, it also amounts to subscribing to the view that in our coming to live life worthy of human beings three conceptions matter quite decisively : (a) our conception about ourselves, (b) our conception of others, and (c) our conception of the world.[7] With reference to these conceptions it seems to have been assumed that they are not isolated and that our conception about ourselves is bound to affect, in one way or the other, our conception about others or regarding the world at large. As it is obvious, these two above-mentioned aspects of the fourth salient civilizational feature are intimately and intricately interrelated.[8]

But on the background of this kind of general agreement concerning the fourth salient civilizational feature there sprang

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up different cultural and intellectual variations. For example, four major variational cultural strands could easily be mentioned on this count, viz. *Brahmanical, Śrāmaṇic, Tāntric* and Tribal. Within each of these strands there were internal variations. Consider for instance, one example of each of the first three strands that brings forth internal differences among the adherents of the same generic type. Within the *Brahmanical* tradition, such variations as approaches of *Sāṁkhya, Vedānta, Nyāya, Vaiśeṣika, Mīmāṁsā* etc. are significant. The *Śrāmaṇic* tradition embraces at least two major variations – the *Jaina* and the *Bauddha*. Within the *Tāntric* tradition, likewise, such variations as *Śaiva–Tantra, Śākta–Tantra, Bauddha–Tantra* etc. are noticeable. Again within a given strand further sub–species of it are also noticeable. For example, in *Vedānta* such variations as *Advaita, Viśiṣṭādvaita, Dvaita* etc. arose, while in *Buddhism* such variations as *Hīnayāna* and *Mahāyāna* originated. We need hardly to labour on such chains of variations. It is needless for our present purpose. The point, however, which needs very carefully to be noted is that through such variations differential conceptions concerning ourselves, others as well as world at large also came to be put forth. In this way, within the framework of certain generic civilizationally salient features quite a large cultural and intellectual variety came to be given rise to. This sort of variety also found differential expression through such culturally significant avenues as literature, music, dance, painting, architecture, etc. However, this sort of variety was bound up within the compass and jurisdiction of the unitary civilizational framework and its cementing salient features.

One more consideration also seems to have given rise to some important variations. It was generally accepted that human life–both individual and collective–aims at realization of certain

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legitimate goals and aspirations. It was further generally accepted that for this sort of realization one has to strive and that human life is required to be planned to ensure that other things remaining the same the possibility of the realization of legitimate goals and aspirations in it does not come to be obliterated.

But even when this is granted by way of general consensus, there emerges a question : whether individual and collective modes of human life are irreducible to each other or not, although the same legitimate goals and aspirations are to be realised in them. In answer to this question the *Brahmanical* and the *Śrāmaṇic* traditions seem to differ from each other very decisively. The *Brahmanical* tradition generally holds that individual and collective modes of human life are irreducibly different from each other. Even if the same goals and aspirations are to be realised in both of them, this cannot be done in the same way. This not to say that there are no points of convergence between individual and collective modes of human life. They, nonetheless, are not so decisive as to rule out any difference between them. Rather, the points of divergence between them are more decisive than those of convergence. For instance, in a given society some individuals–both men and women–can abstain from procreation. But this cannot be generalised, for otherwise continuity of human race itself would be endangered and jeopardised. And any society cannot adopt such a suicidal move. Therefore, the adherents of the *Brahmanical* tradition held that individual and collective human lives need to be planned and organised differently respectively through *Āśrama-Vyavasthā* and *Varṇa-vyavasthā*,[9] to ensure, in principle, that for any individual or group realisation of legitimate goals and aspirations of human life does not become impossible.

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The adherents of the *Śrāmanic* tradition do not seem to have upheld this view. Nonetheless, their opposition to the view of the *Brahmanical* tradition itself gave rise to a sort of discord among them.[10] It seems that the Buddhists generally held that individual aspect of human life alone is decisively significant, since society is afterall nothing else but collection of individuals. Since, in this way, society or group is a construct, there is no justifiable reason to hold society to be as primordial as an individual. For fear of digression we cannot probe deeper into this issue in this paper. The *Jainas*, on the contrary, seem to have held that it is the collective or social aspect of human life that is primary and an individual afterall being subsumable under a group, hardly needs to be considered to be as important as the group. Again, for fear of digression, we cannot probe deeper into this issue here. In this way, on the count of realisability of legitimate aspirations of human life three major strands seem to have originated in this sub-continent, one of them within the *Brahmanical* tradition, and the remaining two within the *Śrāmaṇic* tradition. This, again, happened within the framework of the same unitary general civilizational concern.

If our argument sketched above is generally right, then on the basis of it, it could be easily seen that within the framework of the same general unificatory milieu called Indian Civilization, there arose cultural and intellectual strands and brought forth different philosophical approaches, the adherents of which attempted to articulate variously what they held to be significant. It is further important to note that not only such various strands and approaches flourished concurrently but also that each of them remained in existence in this sub–continent over centuries. On the level of articulation, explication and elaborate explanation of their respective approaches on the one hand, and on the level of responding to the variant or rival approaches on the

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other, there emerged another highly intricate situation. It is to the consideration of it that we turn in the next action.

II

Sanskrit : A Unitary Medium of Communication :

As stated above, various philosophical, intellectual and cultural strands and approaches, which emerged in this sub-continent on the general background and within the framework of Indian Civilization, arose side by side and remained in existence over a prolonged period of time not in isolation from but rather in intimate contact with each other It could be surmised that their initial articulation and explication of the respective views and approaches might have been only oral in character. This is evident from the fact that no book authored by any *Ṛṣī* of the *Upaniṣads, Mahāvīra* or the *Buddha* is known to posterity. It is also quite likely that adherents of different strands and approaches might have preferred to communicate in a certain language. For instance, by and large, no important work by any significant adherent of the *Brahmanical* tradition is found to have been written in any language other than Sanskrit. Likewise, while the *Jaina* canons were written in Prākṛit / Ardhamāgadhī, those of *Buddhism* known as *Tipīṭakas* were written in *Pālī*. What perhaps might have prompted such a choice of a particular language as a means of communication could very well be surmised. Such factors as language of the region, the language in which intellectual communication was undertaken, the sort of persons for whom the works were mainly considered to be important and the sort of language they understood easily might have weighed with the concerned. That is why, roughly, up to the beginning of the Christian era at least three languages – Sanskrit accepted by the adherents of *Brahmanical* tradition, Prākrit accepted by *Jainas* and Pālī

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accepted by the *Buddhists* – remained in vogue in this sub-continent as media of scholarly and intellectual communication.

But in spite of the *Brahmanical* and the *Śrāmaṇic* traditions being in operation concurrently there might not have been frequent occasions of communication among them inter-traditionally especially because their respective adherents preferred to communicate in different languages. This is not to rule out the fact that however isolatedly and sporadically it might be at least some scholars of one tradition cared to read the works of the other tradition, though written in a different language. Otherwise it is very difficult to make sense of number of cross-references to works of other tradition found in both the *Jaina* as well as the *Buddhist* canons. Nonetheless, such cases were scattered and sporadic, and hence cannot be held to be a generally decisive trend. Hence, in spite of the *Brahmanical* and the *Śrāmaṇic* trends flourishing concurrently this kind of situation might have led to a certain kind of opacity in communication, isolation of different trends and lack of inter-traditional or inter-school communication.

But if the different traditions and strands, approaches and perspectives were to enter into effective communication with one another, respond to each other's stands and flourish as living trends, then it was necessary to end the above-mentioned kind of opacity and isolation in spite of their flourishing concurrently. For, mere simultaneity of trends does not automatically ensure meaningful communication among them. Perhaps seeing that Sanskrit was adopted by many scholars as effective medium of communication, adherents of the *Śrāmaṇic* tradition too might have begun to use it as a medium of articulation of their views, formulation of principles and entering into communication with adherents of trends of thought other than their own. What might have been initially adopted as a sort of

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compromise and means of arbitration, to end an impasse of lack of effective inter–traditional or inter–school communication and the resulting isolation from it, however, turned out to be a lasting feature in course of time.[11] This could very well be understood from the fact that once both the strands of the *Śrāmaṇic* tradition – viz. the *Jaina* and the *Baudhha*–shifted to Sanskrit as an effective means of inter–traditional communication, no adherent of any of these traditions wrote later on any worthwhile major treatise either in Prākṛit or Pālī. Thus, the break–away from their respective native and original medium of communication turned out to be decisive and complete. As a result of this, they began using Sanskrit as the only medium of effective communication, no matter whether the occasion was inter–school or intra–school communication. In fact, one can say that irrespective of whatever kind of significant communication they entered into and with whomsoever they entered into, means and medium of such communication remained Sanskrit, once switched over to it, however grudgingly initially they might have done it.

But with adoption of Sanskrit as a medium of articulation of their respective views and approaches by the adherents of the *Brahmanical* and the *Śrāmaṇic* traditions alike two decisively important consequences followed : (i) on the one hand, it ended an era of isolation and insulation of different cultural and intellectual traditions and strands, in spite of their flourishing concurrently, and exposed adherents of them to the view of their adversaries. Prior to the *Śrāmaṇic* tradition switching over to Sanskrit the sort of situation that prevailed in the then prevalent intellectual climate could be surmised to be the following : Among adherents of the *Brahmanical* tradition there could have been and indeed was a dialogue. Likewise, adherents of the *Jaina* and the *Bauddha* traditions could enter inter ento effective

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communication only with the co-adherents of the respective strands This kind of communication must have remained quite stale and non-turbulent in character. For, as it could be conjectured, points of agreement among the persons who entered into such dialogues might obviously have been overwhelmingly preponderent than those of disagreement. One can also surmise that such dialogues might have largely been either narrative or instructional in character as is seen to be the case in the *Buddhist* or the *Jaina* canonical literature on the one hand and the *Upaniṣads* on the other. (ii) But with the advent of different philosophical schools and composition of prominent treatises explicating their respective standpoints on the one hand, and the adoption of Sanskrit as a medium of communication even by the adherents of *Bnddhism* and *Jainism* on the other, a crucially significant phenomenon of decisive intellectual importance emerged in this sub-continent It is this that it ushered in an era of two major sorts of dialogue, debate and controversy : (a) intra-school and (b) inter-school. Thus, roughly from the beginning of the Christian era till almost the end of the twelfth century any major – and very many minor as well – work which adherent of any philosophical school in this sub-continent compiled or wrote at once attempted to score on two major counts : (1) taking cognizance of the views of fellow adherents of a particular trend of thought and bringing to the notice of the concerned as to whether and to what extent they agree with one another, and (2) responding to the views of the adversaries – no matter whether they belonged to the same trend of thought or a decisively different one. Thus, as there are large number of instances of dialogues and controversies among the adherents, say, of *Nyāya, Mīmāṁsa, Vedānta, Buddhism, Jainism* etc., so too there are various illustrations of prolonged debates, say, between adherents of *Nyāya* and *Mīmāṁsā, Jainism* and *Buddhism, Buddhism* and

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Sāṁkhya, Buddhism and *Mīmāṁsā, Mīmāṁsā* and *Vedānta Nyāya* and *Buddhism* etc.

With such a kind of prolonged and intricate controversies the current of Sanskrit as a medium of communication became quite turbulent in character. This was so much so that no major trend, significant work or important philosopher of the concerned period – irrespective of the school to which he belonged – could escape without its impact and independently of making any contribution to it, contribution either beneficial or belligerent, major or minor, central or peripheral. Every issue that was taken up for consideration was always sought to be located into the complex net–work of the different thought currents then operative in the prevalent intellectual climate. Every treatise that was written was transperently in response to the urgent demand and pressure of certain issues being considered one way or the other, and also in response to the views of predecessors and contemporaries, no matter whether they hailed from the same school and trend of thought or otherwise. One can see that many works written by first-rate philosophers during the period at once seek to accomplish the twin objective: on the one hand, to expose weakness and vulnerabilities inherent in the views of adversaries and to elaborately explain and vindicate predecessors' or one's own view or that of the school to which one belonged in face of objections raised against it. On the other hand, through this kind of prevalent situation during the time under consideration discussion of different major issues received a twin kind of feed–back – positive and negative. The positive feed–back bolstered up confidence of the concerned scholars in the views, doctrines and principles they upheld and defended. The negative feed–back, on the contrary, brought to their notice points of weakness and vulnerability in their exposition and explanation, and consequently forced them to be

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either more cautious and careful or else more refined and clearly articulate so that they do not fall a prey to attacks from their adversaries.

Through articulation and presentation of various thought-currents and philosophical approaches and perspectives in Sanskrit in this way, the language under consideration served as an effective unitary means of communication. It helped exposure of different trends to one another. But apart from this, it also contributed to the discussion of issues in wider perspective and on profounder level of their consideration. In the face of renewed objections, changed circumstances and situations, and refined modes of bringing to surface points of weakness and vulnerability implicit in a certain trend of thought, doctrine or principle concerted intellectual efforts were made to purify them of their crudities by bringing out in the process continued relevance and significance of them. An exercise of this kind contributed to more respectable interpretations of them, or at times exposed more glaringly weaknesses in them. It, thus, led to twofold growth and development of philosophical thought in this sub-continent : chronological over a prolonged period of time and intellectual – in the sense of bringing to the notice of the concerned not only the rationale of the acceptance of certain concepts, doctrines and principles, but also points of their strength and weakness, viability and vulnerability. That is why various issues, be they philosophical, cultural, civilizational, mundane or esoteric, commonsensical or scientific, are found discussed in that language. In short, no significant aspect of human life or no issue of decisive concern which was required to be considered in the then prevalent intellectual climate seems have been left out on account of either indifference or intellectual indolence. Sanskrit, thus, as a unitary medium of communication in this country contributed its hefty mite in two important

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respects : widening the vistas of comprehension and deepening our understanding of issues at stake.

With this sort of discussion in the background, the rationale as to why those Buddhist texts – philosophical or otherwise – which are not available in Sanskrit, but the Tibetan or Chinese translations of which are fortunately extant, need to be reconstructed in that language could be taken into consideration. It is to this issue that we turn in the next section.

III

The Rationale of Sanskrit Reconstruction of the Lost Buddhist Texts :

As stated above, accepting Sanskrit to be effective unitary means of communication number of Buddhist scholars originally wrote valuale treatises in that language on matters of great philosophical concern or otherwise. Though such works were originally written in Sanskrit, today unfortunately the only track of them which is available with us is in terms of their Tibetan or Chinese translations. That is, they are lost in their original Sanskrit, although they have not, for that reason, completely vanished into oblivion as is the case with regard to number of the *Nyāya, Vaiśeṣika, Sāṁkhya, Mīmāṁsā,* or the *Vedānta* texts. This has hppened because their original Sanskrit version is lost, and their translation in any other language is simply not available. So, except lamenting over the irrepairable loss nothing more could be done about them in the present circumstances. That is, our loss of them is full and complete and the only information we have about them is that they were written. The situation is so bad that in many cases we even do not know who their authors were. In case of many Buddhist texts the situation is not fortunately so hopelessly bad.

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Various factors might have contributed to the loss of many Buddhist texts as they were originally written in Sanskrit. Some of them could easily be enlisted : (1) Since printing was not then in vogue, a very small number of copies of many texts might have been in circulation at any time. (2) Due to climatic conditions, neglect, destruction on account of the sort of material on which they were written etc. many of them might have disappeared from the scene once and for all in course of time. (3) Due to conditions of insecurity and lawlessness that came to prevail in this country on account of external aggressions many valuable texts might have been burnt down, while some of them were carried along with them by those persons and scholars who fled from this country to Nepal, Tibet, China, etc. After they were translated in Tibetan or Chinese the original Sanskrit texts might have either been eaten away by worms or might have disappeared through their continued disuse and neglect, especially because of the absence of persons conversant with that language. (4) Some of the works remaining in this country after disappearance of Buddhism from here over a period of 700–800 years might not have been taken due care of and in consequence might have been destroyed – knowingly or unknowingly. Whatever be the cause, the fact remains that many valuable Buddhist texts are no longer available as they were originally written in Sanskrit.

Under such circumstances, it may be asked, why should one make any effort at all to reconstruct them in Sanskrit from Tibetan or Chinese translation ? It may be further argued that Sanskrit has ceased to be an effectively living language in the very country of the origin of such works and although it does continue to enjoy the status of the respected classical language, yet now–a–days no work of any great significance is ever written in Sanskrit. Given this, the argument continues, even

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if those Buddhist texts which were originally written in Sanskrit but are no longer available in it are reconstructed in that language from their Tibetan or Chinese translations, such an exercise would be a waste of time, valuable scarce resources and energy. For, even after their being thus reconstructed in Sanskrit hardly anybody may read them. Hence, the proposal of their reconstruction in Sanskrit is worthless and hardly deserves to be taken seriously. Instead, the argument concludes, it would be rewarding to study them in their Tibetan or Chinese translation and present their content – if not translation altogether – in a language which has greater acceptability, say, in Japanese, German, English, French or Russian.

The counter–argument presented above by way of *pūrvapakṣa* against the plea of reconstruction into Sanskrit of the Buddhist texts which are no longer available in it is brought in deliberately. It is presented to make the concerned aware as to what kind of objection/s against the intended move it would have to withstand and counter. The argument under consideration has two main parts. One the one hand, it pleads for futility and uselessness of reconstruction in Sanskrit of those Buddhist texts which are not available as they were originally written in it. On the other hand, it strongly pleads that presentation of the content of concerned texts from their Tibetan or Chinese translation is not only preferable but much more rewarding as well. We shall deal with these two main aspects of the argument in the reverse order. The reason of it, we believe, would be clear as we procceed. First, therefore, coming to the preference and the reward issue.

The preference under consideration may be sought to be understood via either convenience or wider circulation. The convenience and facility may be accounted for in terms of one's proficiency in the language other than Tibetan or Chinese in

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which the content of the concerned text could be presented, either via translation othrrwise. The plea under consideration is understandable, although methodologically it is vulnerable. Similar is the case about wider circulation, The problem of primary concern is neiter merely of articulation of the content of the text under consideration, nor of its wider circulation. Such moves may be important paedogogically, but they hardly increase research potential and pave thereby a way for enhanced intellectual illumination. For, such moves in themselves do not constitute, methodologically speaking, good research. By the same token, consideration of reward cannot be restricted merely to the gain accruing to the person concerned, Such considerations are important but only in the highly restricted sense of the term. They cannot, therefore, be substituted for genuine methodological and proper research–oriented concerns.

It needs to be understood clearly that each one of such a text was written at a particular juncture of time, circumstance, situation and in the intellectual and cultural climate of a particular sort – all of which were deeply anchored in the civilizational framework within which those sorts of issues were discussed. Moreover, the issues discussed in them were not sought to be considered, as argued eariier, in isolation from the views of the adversaries regarding them. Today the texts as they are available in their Tibetan or Chinese translations stand unfortunately doubly severed : on the one hand, they stand segregated from the sort of rich intellectual, cultural and civilizational background with which they were inextricably connected when they were originally written in Sanskrit. But, on the other hand, they also stand segregated from the sort of intellectual conditions prevalent in Tibet or China when they were introduced there in Tibetan or Chinese translations. Mere, therefore, presentation of their content in a language and conceptual frame-

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work, which are different from and unrelated to its original background, is more likely to bring in distortion, and make many concepts and notions, doctrines and principles sound either hacneyed, outdated or irrelevant altogether. Or else, they may be twisted, in the process, to make them sensible in our own intellectual climate. This may bring in double error: anachronism and distortion. Something of this kind has already, unfortunately, happened in attempts of presenting outlines of different trends of philosophical thought which flourished one time in this sub-continent in the language and concepts which nineteenth century theologians and students of philosophy or indology who came under their sway, for one reason or the other, alone could understand. We are yet to free ourselves from the impact and influence such a trend has exerted upon us over the decades. Therefore, however the argument in favour of preference, convenience or reward may be attractively presented, the whole project in favour of which it may be presented makes it fraught with many difficulties in face of which it could hardly be said to be warrantable. The question is not so much of spinning an ingenius argument in favour and defence of what we are accustomed to do or are inclined to accept. It is rather that of first deciding what is intellectually appropriate to be done and explicating methodologically defensible rationale of it. The task we are pleading for may be extremely difficult to accomplish. But the dividends it is likely to pay in the long run makes its burden bearable, in spite of hardship and great many difficulties in the way of its accomplishment. It is further arguable that although those Buddist texts whose Tibetan or Chinese translations are available could be translated into any other language like English or German, or content of the concerned texts could be presented in a language like Freneh or Japanes, yet none of these could be mistaken or substituted for their re-construction in Sanskrit. In fact, their intellectual

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cultural and civilizational re–construction in any language other than Sanskrit is neither feasible nor defendable.

If Buddhist studies are to become really intellectually rewarding in a methodologically defensible way not only in India but anywhere else as well, then mere articulation of the content of a given text from its Tibetan or Chinese translation can hardly be sufficient. Likewise, merely knowing at what historical point of time the given text was composed is scarcely satisfactory. These details doubtlessly are important. But, at the same time, it is important to realise that this much alone is insufficient. Sense of history is undoubtedly important. But what is utmost essential from the point of view of a concern for genuine research is to reconstruct intellectual history – both from the point of view of chronology as well as growth and development. For reconstructing intellectual history in this way issues discussed in different texts and by various philosophers would have to be made available. Their connections along two routes would have to be unearthed : on the one hand, connection of a concerned text or a philosopher with his predecessors and successors from the same trend of philosophical thought, and, on the other hand, with those from rival trends of thought. Going this way, many contours, curvatures and linkages so crucial to comprehend inter–school and intra–school dialogues and debates would become available. For this, conceptual framework of the issues discussed in the given text has to be formulated. It, further, has to be situated into the conceptual framework of the concerned philosopher. Futher still, such a coceptual framework of the concerned philosopher has to be located into the wider framework of the concerns of the school to which he belonged, and lastly this sort of wider framework of the school under consideration would have to be correlated with that of other schools from the same strand of thought as also with the thoughts and

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conceptual frameworks of philosophers and school of thought opposed to it. The task that lies in front of us is extremely complicated, and, hence, prolonged, concerted co–operative efforts, even inter–continental, are required to be made for its accomplishment.

It is important to remember that comprehension of growth and development does not automatically arise through locating points Ideas, concepts, doctrines, principles are important, But mere typology or narration of them is neither their history nor a methodologically satisfactory account of growth. Comprehension of growth and development seems difficult to make sense of without commensurability or comparability. And such comparability cannot be engineered through an apology, for although an apology has a grammatical form of a descriptive statement, it does not describe any state of affair in the world – past or present

For this kind of appropriately methodological considerations those Buddhist texts which are available in Tibetan or Chinese translation but are not available in Sanskrit would have first to be reconstructed in it. This would not only enable the concerned to situate them into the intellectual and cultural climate in which they were originally written but would also facilitate the study of the concerned authors' response to his predecessors and contemporaries – both intra–school and inter–school. Likewise, it would also enable the concerned to study responses to him of his intra-school or inter–school successors.

The great doyen of Buddhist studies in India, the late Pt. Rahul Sankrityayana had clearly seen the sort of need and necessity of reconstructing in Sanskrit the lost Buddhist texts in a way we are talking about. For he had clearly seen and visualised not only the rationale of such a kind of enterprise

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but also the rich dividends its accomplishment would pay. That is why he seems to have left no stone unturned in the sort of circumstances he functioned and operated for the accomplishment of the project under consideration. Our plea for such a reconstruction is a humble tribute to him and his vision. But it also originates from the need of our being able to reconstruct our intellectual history – both in its width and profundity – chronologically as well as from the point of view of its growth and development. In the absence of it we are more prone to get wrapped up into indological and philological nuances which alone can hardly lead to any philosophically worthwhile or intellectually defensible illumination.

Locating in this way the issues discussed in different Buddhist texts in their historical, cultural and intellectual context we would be able to understand properly the rationale of their being considered at all. But armed with this, we would also be able to comprehend their historically significant intellectual relevance. Starting from this we can also profitably proceed to take into account their contemporary relevance, if any, either with or without modification in them. In the absence of such an exercise our knowledge of Indian intellectual history is most likely to fragmented and philosophically unilluminative in character. Hence our strong plea for reconstruction in Sanskrit of such texts, the Tibetan or Chinese translations of which are extant.

One example may perhaps clarify the point we are labouring hard to make. It is not unless we reconstruct the text of Dharmakīrti's *Santānāntarasiddhi* in Sanskrit that we are in a position to understand what sort of considerations led him to tackle the sort of issues he discusses in it, in response to the

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views of such predecessors of his as Vasubandhu. But, likewise, without such a reconstructed text of the work under consideration we shall also be at a loss to make satisfactory sense of Ratnakīrti's *Santānāntarasiddhidūṣaṇa*.[13] Various concepts, doctrines, principles which figure in the treatise under consideration have not suddenly sprung from nowhere. They are situated in the respective conceptual frameworks and the latter, in turn, are anchored in the intellectual, cultural and civilizational climate of the time. Such clues which are valuable for the proper understanding of the import and significance of the concerned text would be lost if it is not re-constructed in Sanskrit. It is for these and such other reason that we have been pleading for the re-construction in Sanskrit of those Buddhist texts which are not available in it, although they were originally written in it. I might perhaps be humbly permitted to prefer to end my fervent plea for Sanskrit reconstruction of the lost Buddhist texts saying if a dose of theoretical anarchy, a little deception and slight of hand as to how evidence is to be interpreted, and some very impressive rhetoric are characteristic of good research then one should better abstain from it rather than recklessly indulge in it for whatever paltry and evanescent gain it may fetch.[14]

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NOTES

* I am profoundly indebted to Prof. M. P. Marathe for valuable discussion on number of points considered in this paper. I am also thankful to him for helping me in writing this paper at different stages of its completion.

1. It is very difficult, for example, to defend a view that four *Puruṣārthas* were accepted to be legitimate human aspirations in the *Brahmanical* as well as *Śrāmaṇic* traditions right from their inception. The problem of their inter-relationship, too, is equally complex, Additional issues, perhaps, would also have to be taken into account if we include the *Tāntric* and the tribal trends as well within the purview of our consideration.

2. I am thankful to Prof. M. P. Marathe for bringing these points to my notice.

3. The boundaries of *Bhāratavarṣa* were certainly not co-terminus with those of the present day India or *Bhārata*.

4. Perhaps at a later stage of history the term *Mleccha* was sought to be used generically to indicate any person or group whose article of faith and belief fell outside the boundaries of *Bhāratavarṣa*. We need not go into details of this issue here.

5. One wonders whether this feature of civilizational *Swadeśi* was later on converted into complecency and in consequence even crossing sea was considered to be indefensible.

6. On this count, again, it seems to have been accepted that unless our relation with ourselves is alright, our relation with others or that with world at large cannot be alright.

7. Hence, again, it seems to have been held that unless our conception about ourselves is tenable, our conception about others or that concerning world at large cannot be tenable and coherent with it.

8. Their joint consideration seems to bring forth the problem of *Duḥkha-nivṛtti* which engaged attention of the adherents of many philosophical strands, Buddhism not being an exception to it.

9. Here, perhaps, what *Vyavasthā* means is not mere organization but what Buddhist understood as *Viplava* as well.

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10. The situation here seems to be comparable to opposition of non-Euclidean geometries to the Euclidean geometry. In spite of this sort of common bond between the former, they differ among themselves fundamentally in certain respects.

11. Something of this kind seems to have happened in social sphere later on. In face of external aggression and situation of lawlessness and uncertainty which prevailed as a result of it, requisite modifications in the *Varṇavyavasthā*, in response to the changed circumstances, did not come to be introduced. Serious thinking about the matter concerned had come to a halt. There was hardly any occasion for exchange and clash of different views. In such a circumstance marks of external discrimination like the sort of dress one wears, the sort of manners and etiquettes one adopts etc. themselves came to be used as identificatory marks of different groups as a temporary measure. But since the condition of uncertainty did not end in short span of time such marks of external discrimination themselves lasted as identificatory marks over a prolonged period of time, no one bothering to consider what values one cherishes and how does he seek to realise them in his life. This is an illustrious example which shows that history continues to repeat with vengence so long as we stubbornly refuse to learn anything from it.

12. In this context it would be rewarding to consider Prof M. P. Marathe's article : "Some Perspectives of Research in Indian Philosophy", *Journal of the University of Poona*, Humanities section, Vol. 39, 1974, pp. 11–18.

13. We hope to work along this line on Dharmakirti's *Santānāntarasiddhi* in the years to came.

14. Paper contributed to an International Seminar on "Buddhist Translations : Problems and Perspectives" held in New Delhi from 20th to 24th February, 1990.

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A CASE AGAINST THEISTIG MORALITY

Sometimes the word 'moral' is used to indicate the specific nature of some judgements which are distinguished from factual or descriptive statements. In this sense the opposite of the term 'moral' is 'non–moral' rather than 'immoral'. This sense may, therefore, be called 'neutral' or 'non–evaluative'. But when we employ it for judging human beings and their conduct, we use it in an evaluative' sense. The opposite of the word 'moral' would then be 'immoral'. I shall use 'moral' in this sense while explaining the meaning of 'morality' and presenting my arguments against theistic morality in this paper.

Morality is a system of certain customs, rules, principles, values and ideals for guiding and regulating man's conduct and his relations with his fellow–beings with a view to ensure human well–being This means that morality is necesarily a social institution evolved by mankind. Man, as Aristotle rightly declared long ago, is by nature a social being, and he always lives in some kind of community or society. We cannot even think of man's life in isolation from society, for his very existence and survival wholly depend upon some kind of social order. Each individual's actions directly or indirectly influence the lives of his fellow–beings who, in their turn, influence his own life by their actions. It is this fact pertaining to the social nature of man which gives rise to the need of morality for establishing and maintaining peace and security in society. Thus, morality is necessarily a product of society which needs it for its own

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survival and growth. In fact, morality can have no meaning for a man existing in isolation from society, if this is at all possible.

The objective of morality, i.e., social well–being, does not exclude the well–being of an individual, for society is nothing but a well–organized group of people bound together by the need of mutual help and cooperation. All moral rules or principles, such as non–killing, non–stealing, promise–keeping, truth–telling, helping others in need or distress, etc., have been propounded and are observed only to promote this fundamental objective of morality, the well–being of both an individual and the society he belongs to. All of us learn these moral principles in our very early life, and normally we abide by them without any external pressure or compulsion when we grow up. In the beginning we do feel some kind of social pressure or compulsion for complying with these moral principles, but gradually their observance becomes part and parcel of our life; and, eventually our habit of observing them without effort and compulsion takes the form of what is commonly known as 'conscience'. Thus, our conscience is necessarily a social product in the sense that it is the result of the early education or instruction we receive from our elders, teachers and neighbours. It is this conscience which later regulates and guides our conduct throughout our life. But unfortunately, most of us forget its social origin and begin to look upon its commands or voice as divine commands or voice of God. This, however, is proved to be wholly erroneous by the fact that diverse – and even opposite – commands are issued by the conscience of people belonging to different groups or communities. It is, indeed, impossible for theists to find any rational and satisfactory explanation for God's issuing different or opposite commands regarding the same action or object. This difficulty strongly supports our contention that man's

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conscience is only the voice of his society rather than that of God.

There is a group of thinkers who believe that the origin of morality can be traced to the will or commands of a transcendent God who is omnipotent, ominiscient, omnipresent, eternal, loving, just and perfectly good, and who alone is the creator, governor and sustainer of this universe. According to these thinkers, moral rules or principles are obligatory for us, since they are his commands. Such rules or principles can have no meaning for us if we do not regard them as divine commands. Thus, morality, for these thinkers, is nothing but a system of divine directives or commands, and we must obey them, because God is perfectly good and we are his creatures. It is this kind of morality, depending solely upon the will or commands of God, which is generally known as 'theistic morality'. Most of the theists fully subscribe to this sort of morality. They contend that morality is rooted in religion which, for them, can be defined as the belief in and worship of God. This is why theistic morality is also called 'religious morality'. These theists hold that religion, precisely speaking, theistic religion, alone provides a real and firm basis for morality which is bound to be destroyed if it is disconnected from religion. Thus, according to these theists, morality can have no meaning for us without the belief in God who constitutes a permanent basis for all moral principles, values and ideals.

Many Western thinkers have put forward their arguments in support of theistic morality. I shall present below some arguments of John E. Smith.

"The ideals (content), which are to govern human existence in society, are derived from the nature of the divine, and it is the love of God (form) that furnishes the power to live the good life in a world which often thwarts our most determined

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attempts to embody Christian perfection. In Biblical religion man is required to be just and merciful, because God is both just and merciful in all relations with his people. Man is required to manifest love in his earthly life, because, according to the essence of Christian faith, God is of the nature of love. And in all cases the love of God dwelling within the person of the individual believer is what provides the motive and inspiration for all our human efforts... The nature of God provides the norm for conduct, ... and the love of God provides the motive and passion necessary to perform. ... Prophetic Judiaism and Classical Christianity are at one in maintaining that morality without religion is ultimately impossible. ... Ultimately no view of good life, no serious doctrine of what man ought to do, is ever possible apart from some view of his final destiny; and such a view introduces the religious element. This is the most important consideration in showing that morality is necetsarily related to religion, .. A morality that has no foundation in a reality transcending itself is inevitably subject to corruption precisely because it recognises no judge beyond its own commands. A morality, however, truly based on a love of God that is religious in character and one that recognises the power of God as judge is protected, in principle, from such corruption and consequent transformation into ideology. ... It remains true that, in addition to determining the content of morality, religion is the final judge of morality. ... Religion supplies the inspiration for the moral life and provides, at the same time, something even more important – the meaning and purpose of moral striving. ... Morality is both unsure and incomplete without a living connection with religious faith. ... Morality implies religion; and when it is not founded on religion, it is continually threatened with destruction".[1]

This long quotation from Smith represents the general viewpoint of theists about the divine basis of morality. Many other

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thinkers, like Karl Barth, Emil Brunner, Reinhold Niebuhr, etc, are also strong protagonists of theistic morality.

Now, the question to be considered here is : Can this view concerning theistic morality be rationally justified ? It seems to me that it cannot. There are many serious philosophical or logical objections which can be urged against the defence of theistic morality contained in the position maintained by Smith in the above quotation and in the similar views maintained by other theistic moralists. I shall mention here briefly some of these objections which pose some formidable difficulties for theistic morality.

1. The advocates of theistic morality presuppose the existence of God who is the sole ultimate basis of all moral principles, values and ideals. But it is a well-known fact that this presupposition is highly debatable. All arguments, so far advanced for the existence of God, have been conclusively proved to be fallacious by some philosophers, Indian and non-Indian. Moreover, many have also presented several cogent arguments against the existence of God. This debate concerning the arguments for and against the existence of God is too well-known to need an elaborate discussion. However, in view of this long controversy among philosophers about the existence of God, we can reasonably maintain that there is no conclusive proof for his existence. If this is correct, the very basis of theistic morality becomes shaky or undependable. Theists cannot reasonably talk of basing morality on God's will and command, if his own existence is controversial. Moreover, from an ethical point of view also, to base morality on an unproved and unprovable belief in the existence of God also appears to be immoral, as it is to base anything on an ill-founded belief.

2. But even if we accept, just for the sake of argument, that God, as a personal being possessing good will and other

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good human qualities, exists, the problems of theistic morality are not thereby solved at all. For example, some of the questions theists would then be required to answer are as follows : How do we know God's will or commands which we are supposed to obey ? Why ought we to act according to his will or why ought we to obey his commands ? On what grounds does he issue these commands ? Does something become good because he commands it ? Or does he command it because it is good ? Does the fact that God commands X entail that X is good or right ? All these are very difficult questions; and so far as I know, theists have not been able to answer them satisfactorily.

Take, for example, the first question : How do we know what God wills or commands ? According to theists, moral rules or principles are inviolable divine commands. But our problem is that it is impossible for us to know God's will or commands, since he is considered by theists to be a wholly transcendent being beyond human experience and reason. If God is an absolately transcendent being in this sense, then we can never know what kind of being he is like and what he wills or commands. In order to overcome this difficulty, theists may say that we know his will and commands through revelation. But this reply does not at all solve our problem, because very divergent and even opposite commands are said to have been issued by God, if revelation, as presented in various religions, is to be trusted. How can God, who is said to be perfect in all respects, issue contradictory or conflicting commands ? So far as I know, theists have given no satisfactory and rationally aeceptable answer to this crucial question.

3, But suppose that we know God's will and commands. Then we can very well ask : Why ought we to obey his commands ? In answer to this question theists can say – and some of them have really said – that if we disobey them he will punish

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us in this or next life; and if we obey them, he will bestow prosperity and happiness on us here or hereafter. But this answer is highly objectionable, since it makes morality wholly dependent upon selfish or external considerations. This sort of morality cannot be called morality in the proper sense of the term. To obey a command simply for the sake of getting some reward or avoiding punishment is sheer expediency or prudence rather than morality. It is on this ground that Kant rejected the above-mentioned theological principle of morality as a "heteronomous principle". In order to overcome this serious difficulty, theists can say that we ought to obey God's commands because he is perfectly good, and whatever he commands is necessarily good. But this view makes morality completely independent of God, for we must know clearly what is good before we can meaningfully call God 'perfectly good'. Theists cannot then consistently hold the above-mentioned contention, because it contradicts their basic doctrine that morality is wholly dependent on the will or commands of God.

4. Another imortant question, that arises with regard to theistic morality, is : Why, or on what grounds, does God command us to do certain actions and to refrain from doing some others ? In other words, the question to be answered by theists, is : Do the grounds (that is, goodness or rightness, badness or wrongness) of God's commands lie in the actions themselves, or do they lie in God himself ? This, indeed, is an old philosophical problem which was discussed by Plato in his *Euthyphro* (XII, 10). He presented it in this form : "Do the gods love piety because it is pious, or is it pious because they love it ? In our contemporary terminology we can put the same question as follows : "Is X good because God wills or commands it, or does God will or command X because it is good ?" If theists hold that X is good simply because God wills or com-

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mands it, they will be confronted with the same difficulty which has been discussed above, namely, that it makes morality totally dependent upon an external source, imposing a heteronomous principle on the agent. In view of this difficulty, theists may adopt the second alternative by saying that God wills or commands X because it is good. But if they do, it would make morality completely independent of God's will or commands, since, then, the acceptability of his will or command would depend upon the goodness of X alone. It is quite obvious that this alternalive cannot be acceptable to theists, for it contradicts their basic doctrine of morality or God.

5. Another serious objection to theistic morality is concerned with the attempt of the theists to derive moral judgements from descriptive or factual statements. According to them "X is willed or commanded by God" means, or is identical with, "X is good" or "we ought to do X". This clearly amounts to deducing ethical judgements from, or identifying them with, descriptive statements. But recent studies of the logic of moral discourse have shown that this move is indefensible. This is because the nature of the two kinds of judgements is basically different. Moral judgements evaluate or guide human conduct, while descriptive statements merely describe states of affairs. Therefore, following David Hume, most of the contemporary moral philosophers maintain that 'ought' cannot be derived from 'is'. I may know the facts of any kind whatsoever, but I cannot logically deduce any moral judgement from these facts. For instance, I may know that X is willed or commanded by God. But from this factual knowledge, I cannot derive a moral judgement to the effect that X is good or we ought to do X.

G. E. Moore has conclusively shown by his "open question argument" that a moral judgement can never be the same as a factual judgement. If, for example, "X is good" is the same as

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"X is willed by God", then we cannot meaningfully say that what is willed by God is good. This is because if these two judgements are identical, we only utter, then, a meaningless tautology–what is willed by God is willed by God.

6. It has been stated above that, according to theists morality is bound to get corrupted and destroyed if it does not recognise a judge beyond its own commands—that is, if it does not depend upon God. But, in fact, there is no rational justification for this contention. The purpose of morality is to evaluate, guide or regulate human conduct with a view to securing the well-being of mankind on this earth. Now, if we accept this purpose or object of morality, there is no need of God or any other supernatural reality to serve as its foundation. On the contrary, the belief in a supernatural reality is likely to thwart it. This is because the belief may lead to escapism on the part of man by encouraging him to look for his happiness in the alleged other world or some imaginary heaven. In this way, it may make him indifferent or unconcerned towards the hard reality of evil that we find in the world in the form of suffering or wickedness. If a man sincerely believes that God alone will protect all moral values and ideals, he is likely to become complacent and lose the will to struggle against the evils he finds around him. He may then not bother about the suffering of his fellow–beings and even about his own suffering.

7. If the contention of the advocates of theistic morality is correct, then atheists or non–believers must be supposed to be immoral persons having no moral principles and ideals to guide their conduct. They must be considered to be wholly selfish and egoistic persons who simply do not bother about the well–being and suffering of others. But, as a matter of fact, the life and conduct of many great non–theistic thinkers all over the world do not at all support this accusation. Human history bears a

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testimony to the well-known fact that some of these thinkers have always championed the noble cause of selfless service and well-being of mankind as a whole, irrespective of religion, race, country and sex. By their unorthodox and revolutionary views and deeds they have always tried their best to alleviate human suffering. The lives of Gautam Buddha, Mahavīra, Karl Marx, Bertrand Russell, Jean Paul Sartre, and many other great non-theistic thinkers prove this fact. Moreover, when we evaluate any person's conduct from the moral point of view in our practical life, we do not consider it relevant to know whether or not he believes in the existence of God. On the contrary, we judge his conduct irrespective of his belief in God's existence.

8. The protagonists of theistic morality contend that morality has a divine origin in the sense that its ultimate source is the will of God which alone gives to it its real meaning and significance. But, once again, the facts concerning the origin and growth of morality do not at all support this theistic contention. Suppose we ask what is the basis of our distinction between good and evil. To my mind, the only reasonable answer, which can be given to this question, is that the distinction is rooted in human nature. Human beings are, by nature, endowed with certain basic needs, desires, wishes and feelings which constitute the ultimate sources of the distinction between good and evil. It is a well-known psychological fact that those things which satisfy human needs and desires are called good or desirable, while those that frustrate them are called bad or evil. If human beings had no desires and needs and if they had been incapable of feeling pain and pleasure, nothing would have been called by them good or bad We cannot meaningfully talk of anything being good or bad on a planet which is devoid of living beings having some desires and needs and the capacity to feel pain and pleasure.

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Against the above objection, the advocates of theistic morality may argue that it is God who has created man with his basic needs, desires, etc.; therefore, he is the ultimate basis of morality. But this argument presupposes the plausibility of the theory of creation which holds that God alone is the creator, sustainer and moral governor of this universe. But the veracity of this theory is, as already hinted at, extremely doubtful. Many Indian and Western thinkers have pointed out several serious problems and difficulties in accepting it. But it is beyond the scope of this paper to discuss them.

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NOTE

1. John E. Smith, *Reason and God – Encounters of Philosophy with Religion*, pp. 197–202.

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LANGUAGE, LOGIC AND REALITY

I

Two Views of Language

Language, a system of symbols with conventionally fixed meanings, is used principally for two purposes, viz. to describe the realities or objects encountered in experience and to communicate with our fellow humans. The second use of language, indeed, would appear to be the primary one inasmuch as our attempts to describe reality are usually intended to be shared by others with a view to securing their sympathy, appreciation or approval and cooperation in different ways and forms. The act or acts of communication may assume diverse forms in varied life situations, e.g. asking questions and giving replies, raising and solving puzzles, making requests, issuing commands, cajoling, persuading, praising, condemning, arguing, quarreling, making plans for future action, etc. To these better known uses or functions of language I would like to add a third one : its specifically creative use in the construction of such works of art and thonght as poems, songs and stories, arguments and theories or theoretical schemes of concepts or ideas. We have discussed elsewhere how language functions in promoting communication and exchange of ideas among human individuals and groups; here we shall be concerned mainly with the consideration of the sort of relationship that obtains between the symbols or symbolic structures constituting language on the

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one side and the world of objects or objective reals or realities, so called, on the other side. A proper understanding of this relationship is necessary for a critical appraisal of some of the famous paradoxical views and dialectical arguments supporting those or similar views presented by well-known historical philosophers. The problem concerning the relationship in question may be introduced by quoting two passages that seem to represent diametrically opposed views. Bertrand Russell, the realist, believes that ideal or properly reformed language can successfully mirror or represent the intricate structure or objective reality. In "The Philosophy of Logical Atomism" he observes :

> ...in a logically correct symbolism there will be a certain fundamental identity of structure between a fact and the symbol for it; and that the complexity of the symbol corresponds very closely with the complexity of the facts symbolised by it. [1]

Russell seems to think, like the optimistic Naiyāyika, that an ideal or properly constructed system of symbols, or language, can fully capture and reflect the factual structure of the word. Going farther than the Naiyāyika he suggests that such a system "will eneble us to find out what sort of facts reality consists of, how these facts are constituted, and how they are interrelated". [2] To take an illustration from the history of astronomy, Newton's theory of gravitation as applied to planetary motions relative to the sun, led to the discovery of the planet Neptune. Referring to the matter indicative of the extraordinary success of the theory, Karl Popper observes : "The success was so impressive because (as I later put it) Newton's theory repeatedly *corrected the empirical material which it set out to explain*". [3] Having said this, however, Sir Popper strikes a different note. "Yet in spite of this", he proceeds to say, "Einstein had managed to produce a real alternative and, it appeared, a better

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theory, without waiting for new experiences". Einstein himself, as Popper remarks, 'predicted new effects within (and also without) our solar system'.[4] The situation seems to support the idealistic contention that reality conforms, in its structure and/or functioning, to the *priori* forms of the human mind.

An altogether different, even a contradictory view about the relationship between language, or the categories of our thought, on the one hand and reality on the other is upheld by mystically inclined thinkers like Plotinus and Bergson in the West and by the Mādhyamikas and other Buddhist thinkers and some Vedāntists in India. Daṇḍin (Circa 600 A. D.) in his notable work in poetic theory *Kāvyādarśa* (chapter 1, verse 102), records the following challenging observation :

> Although there is a great deal of difference between the sweetness of sugarcane, the sweetness of milk, the sweetness of guda and the like, it (i. e., the difference) cannot be uttered or expressed even by the goddess of speech.

The idea, or opinion, is quoted with approval by Vāchaspati Miśra, the most versatile and highly respected commentator on philosophical texts in Sanskrit, in his famous commentary *Bhamatī* (1.1.4.), a detailed gloss in Śaṅkara's *Bhāshya* on the *Brahmasūtras*. For one thing, the difference in question cannot be indicated by pointing out, and so is incapable of ostensive definition, which device seems to work only ni cases of perceptible phenomena. He adds that thc same consideration applies in all cases where (as the *Kalpataru* explains) an object is being talked about.

Here we would like to add two comments, having a bearing on the controversy and on the problem. First, none of the thinkers or schools of thought mentioned above attemps to draw a distinction between the realities noticed and studied by the

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physical and the cultural or human sciences respectively. To thinkers like Russell, early Wittgenstein and the logical positivists all kinds of reailty can be conceptualized and understood or explained by analytical–scientific methods; to the other class of thinkers represented by the Buddhists and mystical philosophers no reality is comprehensible through concepts. Both camps seems to be wedded to the dogma of the unity of method in their approach to reality in its several forms.

Here, we would draw the reader's attention to a fact or truth, if that term may be used at all, attested by the history of even an exact science like physics. The truth or fact may be stated as follows: there is no exact fit or one–to–one correspondence between a scientific generalization, expressed no matter with what degree of precision, and the objective relationship obtaining between two or more physical entities or phenomena As Weinberg succinctly puts the point: "The inexactitude of nature seems incompatible with the exactitude of law". [5] That author also notes that "the exactitude of the measurements is restricted". [6] In plain words the implication is that mathematical symbolism with its model precision is not, in the final analysis, an altogether dependable instrument for conceptualizing the relations among physical phenomena. This ultimate lack of correspondence between mathematical equations and physical reality, in fact, is what leads to revisions, even rejections and replacements of formulated laws and theories in, say, the discipline called physics, the most exact of the natural sciences. The situation has driven some recent philosophers of science to such unpleasant, sceptical conclusions as the following: that there is no continuity and growth in the historical movement of scientific thought; that, in an ultimate sense, science may not claim to be knowledge at all; and that, for all that we know about nature, it may not, after all, be subject to any laws at

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all-laws which may be discovered and formulated by following reliable methods of experiment and reasoning. The so-called laws as enunciated by the scientists are, as Karl Popper avers, mere conjectures subject to refuation by the evidence of future experiments. For these reasons Popper is led to obesrve :

> I think we shall have to get accustomed to the idea that we must not look upon science as "a body of knowledge" but rather a system of hypotheses; that is to say, as a system of guesses or anticipations which in principle cannot be justified but with which we work as long as they stand up to tests, and of which we are never justified in saying that we know that they are "true" or "more or less certain" or even probable.[7]

The passage has been quoted from Popper's *The Logic of Scientific Discovery* (Cambridge University Press, 1970) by Gerald Holton. That author also quotes Marx Planck as having once said that: 'We have no right to assume that any physical laws exist'[8] So far as mathematical description of nature is concerned analogous sceptical or semi–secptical views have been expresssd by several other thinkers including Bertrand Russell.

II

Dialectical Arguments and Dilemmas

The Mādhyamika and the Vedāntist, then, seem to be justified in holding the view that reality cannot be conceptualized by language, and that it lies beyond both language and logic. The Mādhyamika seeks to support his view by exposing the holloness of the pretensions of philosopher and other thinkers to "explain" or make intelligible the phenomena we encounter or seem to encounter in experience. The logic used for the purpose is known as *prasaṅga* in Mādhyamika philosophical literature; it is characterized as a kind of dialectic by some modern writers

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who, following Aristotle, ascribe its invention to Zeno, the great defender of the Elcatic doctrine of Being as changeless and one.'

Instead of attempting a detailed characterization of Zeno's dialectical method we shall try to illustrate it with reference to his better known arguments against motion. It happens that Nāgārjuna, the great exponent, if not the founder, of the Mādhyamika system, has also assailed and sought to demolish the concept of motion. The circumstance provides an occasion to scrutinize the logical structure of the arguments used by these brilliant dialecticians.

1. Zeno argues that Achilles, the fast runner, can never overtake the slow–moving tortoise provided the latter is allowed to start a little earlier in the race. The reason is that Achilles must first cover the lead taken by the tortoise before he overtakes him. By that time, however, the tortoise will have got some way ahead, Achilles will now have to make up this new though reduced lead before he can reach the tortoise, and so on.

2. Nāgārjuna, like Zeno, offers serveral arguments against motion, the simplest of which runs as follows. The path along which a moving object is supposed to move may be divided exhaustively into two parts, that which has (already) been traversed by the object in question and that which has not (so far) been traversed. Now the object cannot, at any given moment, be taken as moving on the part of the path *already* traversed, nor on the part which is *untraversed* so far. Thus, there is contradiction in conceiving the object as moving at all, for there is no part of the path other than the two mentioned above where it can move.

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How do we cope with these arguments that are flatly opposed to our experience at the level of common sense? Zeno presupposes that a body moves along its course point by point, so that it cannot leap over a large number of points by a single act: Achilles must *first* place his feet at the point which the tortoise left just at the moment when Achilles started running. Likewise Nāgārjuna believes that the path along which a body moves can be neatly divided into two parts, that which has already been traversed and that which is so far untraversed. Now Nāgārjuna is out to prove that the real cannot be caught in concepts, that it is unspeakable *(anakṣara)* in essence. It is only with reference to a practical end or purpose that the real is described or can be described, but no such description can claim to be true in an absolute sense. Since the logical mind seeks to comprehend reality *per se*, without reference to any interest or purpose, it fails in its aim to describe that reality. Zeno's line of argument exposes the inadequacy of the Euclidean conception of a line, which here symbolizes the path of a moving body, as made up of a large number of separable points. The whole exercise boils down to the query: what warrant have we to suppose that reality, in its structure and behaviour, corresponds to our ways of thinking–or is under any constraint to so correspond to those ways? It is given to us, indeed, to define our concepts with utmost care and accuracy, as philosophers have been asking us to do since the time of Socrates in Greece and Pānini, Kanāda and Gautama in India; however, no philosopher, or thinker attached to one or other special discipline of knowledge, is in a position *to dictate to reality* to conform to those concepts or definitions This is true even of the concepts couched in mathematical symbols in their application to physical reality. The history of the science of physics, the most mathematical of scientific disciplines, bears testimony to the truth of above statement. The situation has led thinkers like K. Popper,

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as we have seen, to view scientific theories as conjectures that may at best claim to be probable truths.

Here same important questions arise for this essay. Are all concepts, definitions and generalisations equally conjectural in all scientific disciplines, physical and human, devised by the Bergsonian intellect condemned to view its object of study from the outside? Consider the biological theory of evolution. The theory has suffered important alterations and revisions since its original formulation by Charles Darwin. Yet it continues to be cherished as a general truth about the development of the living species. The scientific, even speculative, studies of man likewise show greater continuity than the purely physical sciences. Thus, Plato's criticism of democracy and his advocacy of communism, at least in some respects, continue to command sympathetic hearing in our own times. In a like manner, Kautilya's *Arthaśāstra* and Machiavelli's *Prince* continue to be helpful in understanding the conduct of modern rulers particularly the despotic ones. These differences in the degree of continuity in knowledge and understanding obtaining in different disciplines call for philosophical analysis and explanation. On the other hand it seems that the biological disciplines, cannot compare with physics in devising precise conceptual tools and formulating exact general principles.

It seems to us that the farther an entity or gestalt stands on the evolutionary scale from mechanically functioning wholes the less susceptible it becomes of precise conceptual description, its behaviour becoming proportionately more elusive and less predictable. On the other hand, the behaviour in question becomes more intelligible the nearer it moves or stands to the conscious purposive behaviour of the human animals. Under these circumstances, it is no' very enlightening to declare *all* sorts of reality to be equally unintelligible or unspeakable. To take an illustra-

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tion, apart from observational and experimental evidence it is altogether an opaque mystery to us *why* hydrogen and oxygen combining in a certain proportion should produce water and why certain elements should exhibit radioactivity. If it is relatively more intelligible to us why ambitious rulers should behave as they do and why power should tend to corrupt those invested with it. Dialectical thinkers like Zeno, Nāgārjuna and Bradley have simply ignored the differences in our cognition of diverse phenomena studied by the several kinds of disciplines physical, biological and socio-cultural.

"Achilles and the Tortoise" is treated by Gilbert Ryle as the example of a dilemma; we have dealt with it here as a mistaken claim of adequate conceptualization. Another dilemma mentioned by Ryle involves a claim on behalf of logic. we shall find that the plausibility of that claim, too, rests on the non–preception of the important distinctions indicated above. We have, in the first place, to distinguish between the order of physical phenomena on the one side and that of *meanings* on the other side. As we have argued elsewhere the meanings in their several varieties or forms owe their incidence to interested contemplation by us of the perceptible phenomena in the first instance and the complexes of already emergent meanings at later stages. The dilemma posed by Ryle is one arising from logical considerations; it is indicated by the title of the chapter. 'it was to be'. A general statement of the dilemma runs as follows : 'Whatever anyone ever does, whatever happens anywhere to anything could not *not* be done or happen, if it was true beforehand that it was going to be done or was goning to happen'.[12] Thus, if it was true a thousand or a million years ago that. e.g., Napoleon would be defeated at Waterloo, or Professor Ryle would deliver a lecture at such and such place and at such and time, then the event in question could not have

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failad to accur; its occurrence, so to say, was pre-determined as a fatality and so altogether unavoidable. The force of the argument can be better appreciated by believers in an omniscient God who is supposed to have known since eternity all that has been happening during millions of past years and is going to happen during millions of years to come in the future.

The argument harbours a good deal of confusion and a number of unwarranted assumptions. As already indicated, there is a clear-cut distinction between the order of physical phenomena and the various realms of meanings. Now, logic is generally conceived to be an analytical discipline; how then, can it have any jurisdiction over empirical phenomena ? The principles or laws of logic may exereise constraint upon or be binding on us, *they cannot be binding on the phenomena of nature.* Secondly, it is far from intelligible to say that there may, in any from or manner, exist a truth about some event or happening that has yet to take place. Any such truth cannot but be hypothetical, involving a long series of bonds or connections expressible in the " if p, then q " terminology. Such asserted connections, it must be reiterated, belong to one or other realm of symbols or meanings, and have the status of mere conjectures in relation to the reality symbolized.

Two other facts may be indicated here that have a bearing on the more general doctrine of determinism. Even the so-called world of Nature does not constitute a single, well-knit system. The astronomical universe, for instance, includes millions of galaxies more or less independent of each other, and billions of stars or solar systems enjoying different degrees of similar independence. Likewise there are several forms of energy acting on and through objects of diverse kinds. Nature, in other words, does not constitute a single causal order or system, but comprises a large number of sub-systems with a loose sort of

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unity. The sub-systems nevertheless exert a degree of influence on one another. The extent and direction of this influence presumably varies with the sub-systems undergoing subtle changes through alterations in energy levels, spatial distances and the like, relative to one another. These factors interfere with the total predictability of events in the diverse sub-systems. As regards events and affairs arising and taking shape in diverse meaning-spaces occupied by conscious human beings their absolute predictability is precluded by innumerable patterns of effort and exertions, cooperation and conflict emerging in day-to-day histories of individuals and groups seeking a diversity of competitive and common goods.

In view of these considerations it seems naively simplistic to take certain events or actions to be the necessary outcome of the totality of interacting forces of factors making up the universe at a particular antecedent moment.

We may now try to sum up the results of above reflections. Our concepts do not mirror the reality. Seeking to represent it *from a particular point of view reflecting one or other of our interests,* what they actually succeed in achieving, particularly in respect of physical reality, is an approximate or probable description or descriptive characterization of it. This means that the description or characterization is more or less satisfactory *for the purpose* in hand. Here two facts about the activity or process of conceptualization deserve our attention. First, what we seek to conceptualize is not always a sensory, tangible phenomenon having existence or being as an individual entity. All conceptualization involves definition, i.e., attribution of a quality or relation to the given or contemplated entity, the quality or relation being indicative of a *meaning* relevant for a particular interest or purpose motivating or informing the conceptual act or series of acts. In more advanced stages of the

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act or acts in question, they are likely to go beyond what is immediately or directly given, seeking to visualize or hypothesize about possible relationships subsisting between the immediately given and other entities, forces or factors. This extension of conceptual or conceptualizing act or process may extend to entities or processes (and their interrelations) lying wholly beyond the range of the senses.

Secondly, while trying to conceptualize and articulate possible conjunctions, concatenations or disjunctions of such intangible entities as wishes and dreams, ideals and ambitions, or changing novel patterns of behaviour involving the interplay of love and hate, jealousy and rivalry, the impulses of domination, protection, and the like, we are not concerned merely, or even primarily, to report the actual or the existing; what we are actually indulging in is the construction of couplets of meanings bearing the semblance of reality. While this activity of construction is prominently displayed in creative literature such as fiction and drama as also in poetry, it is not altogether absent in the writing of history and even in the production of coherent scientific accounts of phenomena–physical and social–cultural.

Here it may be pointed out that the real or the objectively given counts for us mainly as the bearer or the vehicle of some meaning to us. When the meanings involved belong to the grossly pragmatic order, i.e., the orcer of utilities catering to our biophysiological and economic needs, then the given objective tends to coincide with one or more natural or sensible objects; however, in the cases where other meanings, e.g., moral and aesthetic, and even such utility–bound commodities as name and fame, are tied to linguistic or other symbols the symbols and their complexes tend to behave as direct objects of our varied feelings, and the suggested referents of words and more complicated compositions. Among other things, the thesis accounts for

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ultimate failure of even carefully and thoroughly worked out theories in the natural sciences to achieve empirical reference.

I should like here to indicate an important mark of what may be taken to be objective, and real. That which engages one or other of our interests and tends to evoke a response tinged with feeling however faint is objective, and real, *for us*. The feeling or feelings of a sort are likely to accompany our responses to arguments and theoretical or conceptual constructions in general—witness the heat generated by arguments between disputants or debaters—hence the constructions and arguments, e. g. abusive or slanderous remarks of statements and declarations damaging to a cherished cause, evoke strong, even violent reactions in us. As a matter of fact the entities arousing such reactions or responses are invariably seen either as bearers of or as constituted by meanings. Here, the term meaning designates a chacteristic or complex having significance or value relative to one or other of our interests, or in terms of a purpose or set of connected purposes immediate or distant. In this connection an important complexity, with highly significant implications for the matter under discussion, may be carefully noted.

A purpose or set of purposes sought to be realized in near and/or remote future presents itself to us as a pattern or complex of meanings to be realized through well–directed effort or a network of acts adapted to ever–varying circumstances that can be visualised, imagined or anticipated but dimly or imperfectly at a given moment. The uncertainty regarding the circumstances in question is due, on the one hand, to the inherent incompleteness and fallibility of our understanding of the dispositions and characters of the persons likely to get involved in the manifold transactions affecting the pursuit of an objective or end by us; and, on the other, to interference by other, unforeseen factors not directly related to the wills or dispositions of the persons

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and agencies already reckoned in our calculations. Thus, an unforeseen riot or accident, or a slump in the share market, or the sudden demise of a personage like Zia–ul–Haq, may upset our calculations and thus make a difference to the prospects of the project in hand. Indeed, any chance occurrence, e. g. the arrival of an important guest or an unforeseen holiday following the death of an important personage may affect the execution of a well–planned set of acts or operations.

The noteworthy point is that while the visualizing of a purpose or a plan involves a more or less clear vision of the meanings constituting a goal or objective and of the steps leading to it, *it is not tied to a fixed order of physical movements or operations.* In other words, a plan as expressed in word–symbols does not incorporate fixed, determinate empirical references. The movements and operations, and even the instruments, appliances and other devices, are usually replaceable not only by their likes but also by the substitutes with comparable uses. It is the uses and not the physical dimensions of objects and operations that count in our day–to–day transactions even of sophisticated variation.

III

On the Understanding of Biography, Histroy and Fiction

We have been discussing the role of language in its relationship to what is vaguely called the real or the objective. Now physical reality, while affected by the flow of time in its movements, does not seem to undergo substantial changes in respect of its dispositional and/or functional properties that count for us and for the scientist's equations. Hence the presumed predictability of its future course or career. Even so, generalisations in a science like physics or chemistry tend to assume the form of conditional statements. As Carl G. Hempel and P. Oppenheim

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observe: "...a lawlike sentence usually is not only of universal but also of conditional form; it makes an assertion to the effect that universally, if a certain set of conditions C, is realized, then another specified set of conditions, E, is realized as well" It may be noted that the sets of conditions referred to in the above statement can be produced, or found, only in a laboratory; the law-like statements, therefore, may be taken to assert, or suceeed in asserting, bonds or connections among variables as they exist *under artificial conditions arranged in the laboratory.* It follows that these statements need not succeed in *fully* explaining and predicting the course of nature. This would be true even of astronomy where predictions are good enough for certain rather crude or unrefined purposes only. Incidentally, it may be noted that the internal physico–chemical make–up of the various planets, as also of the sun, hardly affects, or so it seems, their relative movements or motions. This goes counter to the dilemma, 'this was to be,' posed by the strict determinist. That the success of scientific equations is spectacularly striking only in relation to the occurrences in the laboratory is borne out by the mixed record of our weather forecasting devices and the total incapacity or highly limited capacity of the disciplines dealing with such wild natural phenomena as floods and earthquakes and changes of temperature in various regions of the earth.

The physical scientist, ideally, gest his data consisting of quantitative relationships through a series of experimental observations; he then proceeds to establish regularities among the changing patterns of those relationships. The historian and also the biographer, however, have to deal with particular events uniquely related to a given context in the life history of a community or nation, an epoch or an individual. The events, recorded or made available by contemporary witnesses, authors

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of memoirs, and the like, count for the historian or the biographer only as bearers or vehicles of meanings relevant in terms of the interests of the actors, viewed as individuals or as representatives of groups, involved in the events in question. Obviously, the historians and the biographers are motivated in their labours by different types of curiosity, and the texts they produce have appeal for readers who share those curiosities.

Two points may be noted in this connection. While both historians and biographers aim at producing truthful accounts of the events and the lives dealt with by them, what they actually succeed in achieving is the production of more or less self–consistent narratives of the happenings and the exploits relevant from their special viewpoints or perspectives. These viewpoints and perspectives define the limits as well as the limitations of the validity or the truth of the narratives in question. Seeing that different historians and biographers, particularly the more notable among them, have each his own temperament and bias which determine his way of looking at history, it seems wellnigh impossible to define the concept of truth in its application to historical narratives. As for the readers of history they are satisfied if a particular narrative makes logical sense while seeking to do justice to available factual evidence. Inasmuch as these facts or phenomena consist of utterances, actions and other transactions meaningful with respect to wider contexts, they already involve interpretation by the historian or the biographer interested in the suggestion and/or construction of those contexts. These interpretations or interpretive records hang together in the product called the narrative, which means that their validity can seldom, if at all, be tested or assessed apart from the total narrative. This, however, need not rule out inconsistencies, duplicity, errors of judgement, and

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even contradictions in the doings and characters of the actors figuring in the narrated contexts.

The general reader, as distinguished from the practising historian, it may be noted, is seldom interested in checking the factual data incorporated in the final narrative; in fact, his main interest is directed towards comprehending the logical sequences of events, comprising free or forced decisions, actions and interactions involving the various historical agents, and aspects of their temperaments and characters revealed in the varied transactions between those agents on the one hand and those between them and the environmental factors on the other. These acts of comprehension, singly and cumulatively, affect the readers in two principal ways. First, they bring enlightenment to their minds concerning the *forces* and *factors,* subjective and objective, that tend to influence and shape the course of history or the lives of important individuals; and secondly, even apart from the enlightening effect, they bring about a general expansion of their consciousness by acquainting them with manifold possibilities of active and exceptionally significant living.

Whether or not fictional works succeed in bringing to their readers true enlightenment regarding the forces and factors that influence and shape human life, they certainly effect the expansions of the reader's consciousness as specified above. It seems though that the types of lived experience or enjoyed consciousness produced by fiction and other works of art have a quality and flavour of their own. But in that respect the works of different historians differ from one another; equally, the works of such masters of fiction or drama as Tolstoy and Proust and Dostoevski on the one side and Kālidāsa and Bhavabhūti, Racine and Shakespeare on the other side exhibit marked differences. Viewed from a different perspective, autobiographical

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and fictional writings seem to offer more intimate glimpses of the human psyche than the works of history and even dramatic compositions. The reason is that the actions and conflicts portrayed by history and drama have to do relatively with grosser issues affecting man's socio-political or economic existence and fortunes while those that interest the novelist may touch finer and deeper psychological, moral and metaphysical dimensions. Another factor that seems to separate the fiction writer from the historian and even the biographer is greater degree of freedom that the former enjoys, at least in the initial stages, in choosing his characters and the types of interaction and conflict among them that he seeks to delineate and represent. All these differences, however, do not go to prove that, as compared to the historian or the biographer, the writer of fiction necessarily achieves lesser success in capturing the sinuosities of the actual course of life or lived experience. Indeed judging with respect to their capacities to express or represent the realities of life, poetry, or literature, as observed by Aristotle, 'is a more philosophical and a higher thing than history' for 'poetry tends to express the universal, history the particular'. Elucidating his remarks Aristotle proceeds to say : "By the universal I mean how a person of a certain type will on occasion speak or act, according to the law of probability or necessity; and it is this universality at which poetry aims in the names she attaches to the personages." [13]

What, then, about the empirical reference of the so-called poetic or literary discourse ? As a matter of fact all types of discourse operate with meanings, combining them into wholes or patterns of varying lengths and dimensions; these wholes claim to represent reality, as in history and the physical sciences, in the sense that the meaning units incorporated in them are supposed either to inhere in or expressed by observable particu-

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lar entities, objects, events or processes. However, in so far as a meaning (e.g. a numerically expressed, quantified property) figures in or represents a term in an integrated whole like H_2O or a relational complex such as the one represented, say, by Boyle's law, does not stand for a definite particular and so may not claim empirical reference. In this sense *no general concept or conceptual bond may be regarded as having a definite empirical reference.* Such reference, it seems, may be properly attributed only to noun-terms or Russell's proper names occurring in extensive definitions or in statements embodying knowledge by acquaintance. Even in these sorts of descriptive expressions the qualifying predicates as also several types of connective words cannot claim to have (purely) empirical reference. In general, the predicative and relational terms belong to different categories of meanings relevant in relation to man's interested responses — pragmatic or utilitarian and non-utilitarian or spiritual.

Writers of fiction operate with such meanings, weaving them into patterns of significant living; their readers enjoy contemplating these patterns as contributing to the expansion and enrichment of their nonpragmatically involved aesthetic consciousness. The novelist's activity of weaving or fusing together of the meaning-units takes place in the semiconscious region of his imagination and roughly corresponds to the chemist's or the experimental scientist's operations in producing novel combinations of elements, which operations lead to the emergence of relatively unfamiliar or uncommon entities with characteristics of their own. The difference between the two consists in the fact that the novelist or the poet works purely with words and the products of his activity affect the mind on a non-physical plane of being and response. It happens though that even the physical scientists indulge, on occasions, in thought experiments which can be carried on with the aid of symbols only; as for the

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mathematicians and mathematical physicists their dependence on symbols is still greater.

A very important difference between the mathematical physicist on one side and the literateur or the artist on the other side may now be noted. Even in his thought experiments the former seeks to imagine and represent a reality external to his mind; to the contrary, artists of all brands aim at projecting or creating new patterns of lived experience or consciousness rather than represent patterns of forms already known as existing. These projections or creations validate themselves, not by their conformity to some pre-existing modes or forms of being and response, but by their logico–effective acceptability and/or shareability by the connoisseurs. It follows that the problem of adequate conceptualization of a given reality does not exist for the works of art, not at any rate in the manner in which it exists for the physical and even the social sciences. However, in as much as the latter sciences too are concerned with manifold possibilities, rather than with the limited, given expressions, of human behaviour under ever-varying circumstances created by unforeseeable interactions between a plurality of subjects as also between them and their environmental determinants, what those sciences can aspire to attain are only probable truths about that behaviour. In practice that sort of truth amounts to little more than insight into the interconnections among varied motivational factors on the one hand and between the operant motives and the decisions and steps taken by typical concerned agents under circumstantial constraints on the other.

To sum up: what language or the linguistic and other varieties of symbols directly refer to are meanings or concatenations or complexes of meanings seen or supposed as inhering in, or expressed by, either visible entities or by other complexes of meanings. The fact that language refers mainly to meanings is

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correlated with the circumstance that the conscious human agents, that alone make use of language and other symbols, are primarily interested in the pursuit and production of meanings or values; their interest in the production of certain arrangements of physical phenomena is derivative of that primary interest. This explains why the physical arrangements sought to be produced are interesting not in their particularity but as instances of universals. Thus, for the realization of a particular purpose, it may be equally convenient to me to travel by one night train, or one morning plane, or another, and accept a particular payment in cash or by a cheque or draft, and so on. Again, the cheque or draft may bear one number or another, without making any material difference to my financial fortunes; equally, the number of the seat allotted to me on a plane does not materially affect the timing of my journey. Viewed in this light the entire panorama of the physical world would appear to be a system of the media serving as the bearers or vehicles of the meanings or values relevant to varied human interests.

This our account of the relationship between language and reality directly derives from our conception of man as a consciously creative being continually engaged in the contemplation, production and enjoyment of values. It happens that the account has a good deal of agreement with one of the recent trends in linguistics that originated in the work of the Swiss linguist Ferdinand de Saussure (1857–1973). The trend has found support in quite a few structuralist and poststructuralist thinkers including, among others, Claude Levi Strauss, Roland Barthes, Michel Foucault, Jacques Lacan and Jacques Derrida. According to John Sturrock what these thinker-writers have in common is their preoccupation with or recourse to "the lexicon of signification."[14] They further agree in 'advancing the claims of the signifier above those of the signified'[15] and of writing

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over speech. This latter emphasis sets them in opposition to Plato and others who thought that true knowledge could be transmitted only by the word of the mouth. While the signifier, to be sure, has a tangible material being or existence, the status of the signified is at best uncertain. On our view the signified is a meaning which is not tied to a specific particular. In fact, even the signifier, a collection of sounds or marks, is not to be identified with a specific particular assuming as it does different individuals. Another linguistic philosopher, Noam Chomsky, has laid stress on the infinite productivity of language; this, again, has found favour with the structuralist or neo-structuralist thinkers referred to above. From our viewpoint the productivity of language is another factor that makes linguistic products transcend the bounds of the empirically given. The true and usual referents of symbolic structures, including questions and commands, prayers, recommendations and the like, are, according to us, concatenations or configurations of meanings relevant to the interests inspiring the production of those structures.

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NOTES

1. Ed. Robert Charles Marsh, *Logic and Knowledge* (London : George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1956), p. 197.
2. *Loc. cit.*
3. *Unending Quest* (Fontana, inpression of 1977), p. 37. (Italics in the original)
4. *Loc. cit.*

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5. Julius Rudolph Weinberg; *An Examination of Logical Positivism* (London : Kegan Paul, 1936), p. 151.

6. *Ibid.*, p. 150.

7. Quoted from *The Logic of Scientific Discovery* by Gerald Bolton in *Thematic Origins of Scientific Thought : From Keplar to Einstein* (Cambridge : Massachusette, Harvard University Press, 1988), p, 31.

8. *Ibid.*, p. 32. For the views of other thinkers see the present author's *Freedom, Creativity and value* (New Delhi : Indus Publishers, 1988), p. 71.

9. See John Burnet : *Early Greek Philosophy* (London : Adam & Charles Black, 1948), pp. 313–14.

10. Nāgārjuna, *Madhyamaka Śāstram*, II. 1.

11. John Passmore, in his *Philosophical Reasoning* (London, 1961), rightly refers to cases of 'something being such and such' that *cannot* be explained. See his discussion of the Infinite Regress argument. p. 19 ff especially p. 23.

12. Gilbert Ryle; *Dilemmas* (Cambridge University Press, 1962), p. 15.

13. See S. H. Butcher; *Aristotle's Theory of Poetry and Fine Art* (New York : Dover Publications, 1951), p. 35.

14. John Sturrock (ed,), *Structuralism and Science* (Oxford, OUP, 1979), p. 5.

15. *Ibid.*, p. 15.

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UNDERSTANDING THE SYSTEM CONSTRUCTION IN LOGIC

The aim of this paper* is to understand the mechanism that lies behind the system construction in logic. In other words, it explains this mechanism by explaining the aim and method of logic. Further it reflects on the nature of system construction as a whole and suggests that the system construction in logic is no way different from that of theory construction in any branch of knowledge. This, in turn, shows that the nature of "Logical truths" and "truth" in different fields of sciences are not different in kind but on the contrary they are on the same par in this sense that the method of verification as well as their nature are same.

In constructing a system of logic, logicians are interested in characterizing a family of meta–logical notions such as logical truth (L-truth), logical falsity (L–falsity), Logical satisfiability (L-satisfiability), Logical unsatisfiability (L–unsatisfiability), Logical consistency (L–consistency), Logical inconsistency (L–inconsistency), Logical consequence (L–consequence) etc. and thereby are in a position to formulate a theory of demonstration. The problem of characterization of all the notions reduces to the characterization of any one of them. Because, all these notions are interlinked with each other in an interesting way. For example, we define all the above notions by L–truth as follows. A formula K is called L–inconsistent if and only if–K is L–true. A set S of formulas implies K (or K logically

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follows form S) if and only if S U { –K } is L–inconsistent. Similarly, K is called L–unsatisfiable if and only if – K is L–true and K is satisfiable if and only if K is not L–unsatisfiable. In brief, the same can be done by use of any other above notions chosen as our starting point. Thus, the characterization problem for a system of logic may be stated as a method by which the class of logical truths and valid inferences may be isolated or delineated. Historically we have different methods[1] of characterization which may be summarised in the following table –



Table–1

The characterization of any system of logic cannot be achieved without a precise theory of forms which can be thought as a bed–rock on which a system can be developed. It states how the artifical (or formal language) for a system of logic can be constructed. In otherwords, the aim of artifical language (say L) is to exhibit the class of all possible Logical form. The formulas in it are simply the logical x–rays of sentences of the corresponding ordinary language related to L. The process of formalization can be viewed as explicating the hidden forms or structures of sentences while suppressing its content. Of course,

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there is nothing as *the* Logical form because logical forms are relative to a given family of concepts. For example, the logical forms of propositional modal logic is different from that of classical propositional logic as the family of base concepts differ, namely the former has "negation", "conjunction", "disjunction", "implication" and "biconditional" as its base concepts while the latter has, in addition to all these, the notion of "necessity" and "possibilility". Thus, the theory of forms (or logical forms) presupposes a suitable family of concepts as its base. But the problem is how to choose such a family of concepts ? A reasonable solution would be that our choice of base concepts should be determined by our intention for the construction of the system in question. For example, Aristotle has suggested that such a family of concepts should be global in nature. Because, for him, logic plays an instrumental role in his theory of Science. A body of true sentences, in order to be called Science, should be deductively systematized i.e., starting with the first principles (i.e., Axioms), by use of rules, all and only true statements can be generated. Thus, it is highly important to know when and only when a given statement follows from the axioms or not. According to Aristotle logic aims at solving this problem. Since this is indispensable for any discipline, logic serves a global role. In other words, though logic is instrumental,[2] in its function yet in itself is global. Thus, Aristotle's suggestion is that a scientist should train himself in logic before he studies system of sciences "and not be enquiring into them while they are listening to lectures on it".[3] The theory of demonstration that it (i.e., logic) gives not only works in a particular field but also the same principles of demonstration will work in every field. Thus, Aristotle thinks as evident from his works that the family of base concepts for the subject matter of logic should be global (or logical) as distinguished

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from local (or non-logical) concepts. The following classification of concepts in this connection may be instructive.



Table 2

A concept is called *Logical (or global)* (Aristotle calls them "Koina archai") if it plays a role in every scientific discipline, otherwise it may be called *Non–logical* (or Local). For Aristotle, the notion of "Subject," "predicate" and "the relation between them" as expressed in form of copula are logical. In our modern logic the concepts like "negation", "conjunction", "disjunction", "implication", "biconditional", "some", "all" etc. are global, while the concepts of "number", "point", "line", matter etc. are not global. There may be disputes among logicians with respect to the globality of a concept. For example, a number of logicians including C. I. Lewis [4] are of the opinion that the modal concepts like "possibility", "necessity", "impossibility" etc. are logical in the sense that the notion "logically follows" (or logical implication) cannot be characterized faithfully without the modal notions. In brief, for defining "logical implication" we have to consider the modal notions in addition to our truth functional connectives; otherwise we will have the paradox of material implication. On the other hand, according to W. V. Quine they (modal concepts) are not global in the sense that for all scientific purposes alethic modalities (i. e. "possibility," "necessity" etc.) are dispensable. Hence,

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they are not logical concepts. Whatever may be the case, atleast indispensable role of base concepts is evidently clear.

Once we identify the suitable family of concepts as our base, we may then go on to define the artifical language in an usual way. Thus, the difference in base concepts results a difference in the class of logical forms (i. e. the class of formulas). After developing the theory of logical forms, logician proceeds to characterize the notion of L–truths i. e. he isolates the truths of logic. This can be either semantically or derivationally as shown in our table 1 given above. If one tries to characterize them semantically he should preferably characterize L–satisfiability which intuitively means true in some logically conceivable (or L–conceivable) situation. Then L–truth (or laws of logic) would be characterized as true in all logically conceivable situations. Similarly, in an usual way the notion of L–valid inferences can be defined. Thus, the entire burden of characterzation of the meta–theory for a system of logic falls on the characterization of L–conceivable situations. Hence, for different logics we will have different characterization of L–conceivable situations. For example, the well–known notion of Boolean valuation of propositional logic serves as the formal counter–part of the informal notion of L–conceivable situation and for predicate logic, the notion of first order valuation serves the purpose. On the other hand, if one is interested in developing the system of logic in derivational manner, his course would be to define the notion of proof in the artificial language. This may be done in the way described in table 1. Once the notion of proof is formalized we say that a formula is a truth of Logic if and only if it is provable i. e. all provable formulas are truths of logic.

In general, a system of logic should be described as an ordered triple $S_{f,} = (TLF_f, TLT_f, TL\ Inf_f)$ Where "S", "TLF",

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" TLT " and " TL Inf " means respectively as the logical system, theory of logical forms, theory of logical truths and the theory of logically valid inferences. Finally, the subscript " f " indicates the chosen family of global concepts. If we would be little economical, we may reduce these above three co-ordinates to two by considering the laws of logic as a special kind of inference in which it follows from the empty set of premises. It may be noted that two systems may have the same theory of logical forms but they may have different sets of logical truths For example, the classical logic and intuitionistic logic have the same theory of logical forms but their body of logical truths differ. This is because though logicians agree on the theory of logical forms yet they disagree about the meaning of the base concepts such as " negation " and " disjunction ".

So far we have explained what is a system of logic ? What does it aim at ? and how can it be constructed ? Now in the following paragraphs let us reflect philosophically about the system itself.

System construction in iogic, like the theory construction in any branch of knowledge, should be backed by necessary pre-theoretic analysis of the chosen family of concepts. Pre-theoretic analysis (or conceptual analysis) though indespensable would not by itself permit us to uncover various properties of the concepts which may lie at varying depths from the surface level of the discourse. Theoretically significant properties of concepts are not given to us like items in the sunlight. On the other hand, the field of our intuition is more often than not like a twilight zone. Our intuitions may be sharp concerning some surface level features of the concepts but they may very well fail us when we work at a relatively deeper level. For example, the relation between logical necessity and truth. What must our intuition dictate, will at least be represented by a law such as whatever

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is logically necessary is true i.e, "CLpp". But we are not so sure whether whatever is necessary is also necessarily necessary i.e. "CLpLLp". Thus, in constructing system of logic we are clearly modelling upon the pre–theoretic insights of a given family of concepts, their relations among themselves and so on.

This does not mean logicians are completely free in the sense that their modelling is whimsical. On the other hand, at each stage of system construction, the system builder's responsibility is to account for the data in question. In the present case, our data are the pre–theoretic insights. If the system does not explain the data or runs contrary to data, we should try to repair the system or if the system would be unrepairable, we should reject the system and try to construct a new one. For example, if one constructs a system of propositional modal logic by adding the formula CMpp (i.e. if p is possible then it is true (or actual) to the well known system T^4 then the new resulting system would not be inconsistent but would be counter–intuitive. In other words, in it, the intuitive distinction between actuality (i.e. truth) and "possibility" vanishes. Thus, we should at first try to repair the system if this is not possible; but if that is not possible, then the obvious course would be to reject it. Exactly this sort of situation has happened to Mally's system of deontic logic. This shows that the system of logic is not sacrosanct like the scientific theories.

In this connection there is a close affinity between a system logic and theories of science. Thus, the nature of logical system and scientific theories is not diametrically opposite to each other as many philosophers of the past have thought. As for example, Carnap's work,[5] this fact is reflected in the form of a distinction between explication and explanation. He says that explication is closely related to the study of formal sciences, while "explana-

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tion", " prediction " etc. are related to empirical sciences. This dichotomy is pre-supposed by related dichotomy between analytic and synthetic statements. According to logical positivists in general and Carnap and Ayer in particular the statements of formal sciences viz. logic and mathematics are analytic, whereas the statements of empirical sciences are synthetic. Historically this dichotomy has come down to the logical positivists through the Hume's distinction between ideas of reason and ideas concerning matters of fact. Acceptance of this dichotomy poses a serious threat to the nature of formal sciences as it makes all formal sciences a closed and uninformative (in the sense of logical positivists) discipline. Thus, this distinction has recently come under attack by various philosophers.[6] Moreover, the method of verification of truths of natural sciences is no way different from the verification of truths of logic. Of course, this is more conspicuous when the system is developed semanticlly.[7] In this connection Hintikka writes, " For instance, natural laws are never established by first verifying all their instances. The logic of their verification involves an opposite process viz. the process of deducing simple observable consequences from the complex expression of the law in question. Somewhat in the same way, some of our most intuitive methods of dealing with logical formulas involve the transition from complex formulas to the simpler ones rather than a transition in opposite direction."[8] From this it is clear that the method of verification of natural laws and truths of logic is analoguous. In other words, the nature of truths of logic is not different from that of other sciences. Dagfinn Follesdal says in the context of epistemic logic that "...the truth of logic of knowledge need not be considered as differing radically in epistemic respects from, say, truth of physics "[9]

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From the above considerations we may conclude that a system of logic should be viewed as a proposal (or a hypothesis) to explain and discover the hidden theoretically interesting properties concerning the chosen family of concepts. The adequacy of the system should be judged from its explanatory power in explaining the data in question. If the given system does not explain the data or is inadequate to do so, we should construct another system. If, on the other hand, the new one fails, we should construct still another and so on. For example, philosophically we should think that the classical propositional logic is a proposal to analyze our intuitive notion of "Logical consequence" or "Logical implication". According to C. I. Lewis, it fails to achieve its goal because it contains the formulas "CpCqp" and "CNpCpq" as theorems which seem to be anti-intutive and hence paradoxical. Hence, Lewis rejects it and constructs the system of logic called "the system of strict implication"[10] that avoids the above paradox. But his system contains another kind of paradox called "the paradox of strict implication." Again Anderson and Belnap[12] reject Lewis' proposal in defining the notion of logical consequence by modal notion viz. "necessity" or "possibility" (of course in addition to the truth functional notions) and try to characterize it by use of the notion of relevance. Thus, they construct the system of Relevant logic. More examples of this type can also be available in the field of deontic[13] and epistemic logic.[14] Hence the moral we learn is that the theory construction (or system construction) in logic, like that of theory construction in Science, is an on-going process. Therefore, when we construct system of logic and prepare to modify it as demanded by the complexities of theoretical situations it is likely to prove more rewarding like

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theory construction in different branches of natural and social sciences.

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NOTES

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A CRITIQUE OF MARX'S EXTENSION OF THE PRINCIPLES OF DIALECTICAL MATERIALISM INTO THE PHENOMENA OF SOCIAL LIFE, SOCIETY AND HISTORY

It is my aim in this paper to focus mainly on the possible criticisms that could be levelled against Marx's extension of the principles of dialectical materialism into the phenomena of social life, society and history

1. The first objection stems from Marx's claim that the socialism he is offering to us is advanced on a scientific viewpoint. Marx believes that socialism is proved scientifically, made evident by a careful observation of nature. He buttresses his assertion by saying that socialism is the result of the laws of reality, especially the laws of human history and progress. The theory holds basically, that everything in reality undergoes change in a revolutionary fashion, in accordance with the dialectics of nature. From the start, whatever exists generates its opposite (or negation). When this clashes with its opposite, a brand new item emerges, which then produces its own opposite. The process continues throughout nature until a point of total harmony is reached. Marx believes that the point of harmony in the operation of the dialectics in society is socialism which will finally culminate in communism. Thus, Marx's dialectical process proceeds along an upward–moving continuum.

Now the objection to this postulation is as follows : It can be argued that Marx's socialism is not scientific enough and

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hence his view that socialism is scientific is untenable. There is no rational justification for any attempt to establish broad general laws of history. This may serve as a useful way of knowing the past but it can't provide any valid basis for predicting the future, as Marx tried to do. Marx sees historical process as an inevitable process which will ultimately lend to the establishment of a classless society. There must be serious doubt about the validity of this kind of interpretation of history and the claim that the process will stop somewhere along the line. Tibor R. Machan has rightly pointed out in his book *Introduction to Phiolsophical Inquiries,* that "the dialectical principle, whereby everything develops its opposite and then, through their clash, resolves into a new kind of thing, is difficult to confirm. The process simply does not appear to occur with sufficient regularity to qualify as a scientifially supportable law of nature and human social development". [1]

This quotation aptly shows that it is very difficult to find any strict regularity in social phenomena. No one doubts the fact that physics and chemistry are reputable kinds of understanding, but intelligent thinkers have argued that the employment of the method of the natural sciences in the social life or society is misguided and that any theories that may be formulated do not correspond to social and political reality. For one thing, the social phenomenon is too complex for analysis, and quantification. If this be the case, which actually cannot be denied, then the whole strand of scientificism which Marx claimed to be inbuilt in the dialectic process is a false proclamation.

Yet it can again be argued that the dialectical principle is not well established. Although Marx's partner, Friedrich Engels tried to show, in his book *The Dialectics of Nature,* that all aspects of nature exhibit the operation of the dialectical principle, he did not succeed in his task. This is understandable since

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the principle was borrowed from Hegel who did not view it as a scientific law of nature. It should be recalled that Hegel viewed this principle as a fundamental feature of reality, established by metaphysical inquiry. But Marx rejected Hegel's metaphysics for a scientific analysis. And without the metaphysics of Hegel, it is difficult to see how the dialectical idea can be defended. Without the dialectical principle – the idea that things develop their opposites and after a clash, between positive and negative, a new thing emerges, the basis of the communist theory is substantially lost. According to Bertrand Russell, in his book *History of Western Philosophy*, "Broadly speaking, all the elements in Marx's philosophy which are derived from Hegel are unscientific, in the sense that there is no reason whatever to suppose them true." Thus, we can even argue from this that Marx's dialectical materialism is a metaphysical notion, that's the philosophical component of Marxism.

If this criticism sounds well, then communism amounts to nothing more than a mere day-dream, or a promise. It is no longer possible to view it as an ideal society. Instead, it becomes an image to which reality cannot conform, and any attempt to make it to conform is bound to lead to disaster. Communist society becomes an utopia which people try desperately to impose upon the people of the world. It is this criticism that underlies that 'Stalinism', a recent era in Soviet Union, filled with massive brutality and complete tyranny, was the inevitable outcome of trying to make communism realistic.

2. Critics have objected to Marx's emphasis on the priority of the base (i.e., the material order) over the super–structure (i.e., the realm of thought or ideas). For Marx, the political institution of a society followed from its economic situation, not *vice versa*. Thus, we could regard Marx as an economic theorist. But political theorists might disagree with Marx because they

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are interested in the character of a political system and generally believe that economic situation of a society is determined by its political structure. They might say that the spiritual concerns of human beings are paramount to human life as such. But Marx had said that the mind of man could not operate free from the influences of his economic conditions. For him, it is these conditions that determine man's spiritual life.

More often than not people who see human beings as primarily spiritual beings build their political theories to suit the intellectual and moral life of the people. For example, conservatives in the United States tend to advocate laws that prohibit immorality e.g., gambling. But this does not mean that immorality has been completely wiped out in United State of America. As a matter of fact it is in United States of America moral decadence has reached its peak.

3. Another criticism of Marx stems from his attitude towards ethical evalution of the dialectical development. Marx disclaimed always all ethical or humanitarian reasons for preferring socialism or taking side with the workers. Marx even said that his own idea of capitalism did not constitute a moral condemnation; he did not say that capitalism was either wicked or due to man's folly. For him, not that this or that is bad but that the side taken is determined by the law of motion of the society, the law of dialectic in its wholly deterministic movement.

Marx might say that he did not advocate socialism, but only predicted it. This, however, wouldn't have been wholly true. He undoubtedly believed that every dialectical movement is a progress and he certainly held that socialism once established would usher in happiness more than either feudalism or capitalism. However, Marx occasionally abandoned calm prophecy for rigorous exhortation to rebellion.

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My first objection is against Marx's evaluation of each stage of the dialectical progress. Each one, Marx tells us, is superior to the one that preceded it and the final stage, the classless society, is more perfect than the earlier stages. Here, it can be argued that there must be some standard by which we evaluate this progress so that to speak in this way is to appeal to an absolute moral criterion which Marx himself will not accept the validity of. Marx might reply that it is only because of his belief in the inevitability of the dialectical progress that he thought it necessary to dispense with ethical considerations. But one might wish to know whether Marx's views that the classless society is a perfection, and that it will minister happiness to man more than feudalism or capitalism are not moral evaluations of the dialectical progress or not. Of course, they are. Thus, one can justifiably argue that Marx's notion of dialectical progress has some tinge of moral evaluation around it.

Marx's occasional appeal to rebellion or force instead of insisting on calm prophecy showed that he had not understood clearly how society could move through self–criticism and change, and even revolution, without physical violence. But one might defend Marx by saying that the idea in his mind was to let people know that they were exploited in order that they might be able to smash the system of exploitation.

4. A basic weakness in the inner logic of Marx's dialectic is the question of why the dialectic has to stop with the overthrow of capitalism. Here one would itch to know why his communism should not be a new thesis. Why does dialectic have to stop there at all? Why not a new ruling class exploiting the masses on a completely new basis? Some Marxist writers have argued that the bureaucracy of the communist party has become a new ruling class, which exploits the masses not through private property but through its control of the state. Good examples

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of Marxist writers who have argued this way are Leon Trotsky - who wrote *The Revolution Betrayed* and Milovan Djilas, who wrote *The New Class*.

Marx's assertion that economic alone is the basis of social class and also the basis of opposition or clash between two opposing tendencies is another subject for criticism. In contrast to Marx's view that social change is always explicable by a clash between only two incompatible or contradictory phenomena and that this opposition is purely an economic one, Althusser maintains both that such pure oppositions are never to be discovered in reality, and that the practical contradictions that do exist in the society are never, at any time, purely economic. For Louis Althusser, the social world and history are too complex and as such "Whatever economic opposition the scientific theory of Marxism may discern, at any given point in time, as being fundamental is always going to be 'over-determined', that is, inextricably influenced by many other factors such as political and cultural ones, in such a way that the 'basic' contradiction may frequently not ever appear salient to the social factors."[3]

Apart from this criticism by Althusser one can also criticise Marx's analysis of classes and the prediction of their future devolopment. It could be argued that there could be numerous instances of political changes that do not reflect on social and economic changes. Certain powerful historical forces or movements, for example, nationality, cannot be explained by class struggle; neither can Marx's explanation of ideological commitment adequately explain them.

Marx Weber would argue that it is not economic alone that determines social class; he would say that 'status' is another determining factor.

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Another criticism of Marx's dialectical principle is that it solved some problems of sociology of knowledge but created new ones, particalarly the problem of accounting for the diversity of ideas and of erroneous ones. If ideas reflect reality, there has to be a correspondence between thought and reality. But how does one account for the emergence of Utopian thought? Granted that ideas are mere reflection of the material order. But what does Marx's Utopian society correspond to? We can argue that this is beyond empirical verification. However, Marx could be defended on the grounds that he was influenced by the social ideas of his time.

Lastly, defenders of capitalism have criticised Marx's economic theory by appealing to facts which seem to disprove it. Marx seemed to be unaware that at the time he was writing his *Capital* the nature of English capitalism was undergoing modifications. He came up with his analysis without supporting it with empirical observation.

Now, the defenders of capitalism attack Marx's economic theory on two counts. First, they point out that the prediction of increasing misery in capitalist societies has not been confirmed. They claim that the lot of the worker is better than ever before. For instance, he works fewer hours, has more money and in general enjoys a higher standard of living. Secondly, defenders of capitalism assert that the capitalist system has shown itself amazingly inventive in solving problems inherant in the system. They say that "such developments as the growth of Trade Unions, anti–trust laws, social security measures, have all proved beneficial in contributing to the economic stability of capitalist societies. For example, Trade Unions have thwarted the tendency to sell labour power more and more cheaply by fixing the rates for the use of labour time"[4] In the light of this, critics of Marx conclude that such measure mentioned

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above will constantly be discovered by capitalist countries and hence the prediction of increasing misery will not be realised.

However, defenders of socialism might contend that the spread of socialism throughout the world is now greater than it was before. This, they may argue, is an evidence that socialism is being embraced by the masses all over the world, whereas capitalism is gradually losing its hold. Indeed, the cry everywhere in the world is 'we want socialism, away with capitalism.' This is a pointer to the fact that people have become fed up with capitalism because of its exploitative and dehumanizing tendencies.

Conclusion :

Despite all attempts to demolish his importance, Marx has been universally accepted as the founder of Marxist ideas. In the third world he remains widely accepted and widely read. He condemed exploitation and alienation, despised capitalism in all its remifications and saw it as the last conflict in the dialectic movement that man has to overcome. He denounced the barbaric horrors of slavery and serfdom with the horror of excessive labour.

Marx analysed the consequences of colonialism for the enslaved peoples of the world and noted the inevitable collapse of the system of colonial enslavement. He stressed that there is hope for the revival of the enslaved countries in the more or less distant future. He linked the prospect of such a revival with the development of the world-wide struggle of working people.

In his teaching on socialist revolution and ways and forms of mankind's transfer from capitalism to socialism, Marx's successor, Lenin, worked out non-capitalist ways by which the development of the peoples liberated from imperialism could be enhanced. This paved the way for the prosperity and well-being

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for the countries whose historical development was hampered by colonialism. Scientific socialism's theory of national liberation movement enriched by Lenin became an efficient tool for people struggling for independence and against colonial oppression.

About seventy years ago, Lenin claimed that the Marxist doctrine is omnipotent because it is true. Today we can confidently say the same about Lenin's teaching which creatively developed under a new historical era. Today most African leaders with socialist bias believe that the scientific conception of our epoch is a fundamental factor for socialism as a theory which may not be accepted by broad masses but can provide them with a realistic programme for building a new, advanced society. They were initially attracted by the political aspect of Maxism, but at the present stage of national liberation movement an equally significant part embrace the economic doctrine of scientific socialism.

The distinct structure of the Third World has given birth to a kind of communal ethic, the concept of a proper balance between man and nature, and the integration of the social and natural worlds. The synthesis of the important values of the communal ethic through socialist relations will finally permit the suppression of bourgeoise individualism and repressive collectivism alike by a society where, in the word of Karl Marx, the free development of each is the promise of the free development of all.

The Marxist–Leninist theory is being put into practice by the social–oriented nations who struggle not only against imperialist oppression but against all forms of exploitation of man by man. It is not uncommon nowadays to hear people quoting from Marx to warn against certain threats being perpetuated by the status quo. For instance, quoting extensively from Hegel and

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Marx, Chief Obafemi Awolowo, a veteran Nigerian politician, was so confident to remark in *the Guardian* of 17th December, 1983, that although the (then) ruling party (N.P.N.) seemed impregnable, yet with the inexorable law of dialectics at work, it would eventually wither away through self–destruction. I think the chief's words have been confirmed today.

That Marx's contribution to the present world is tremendous is not an overstatement. What did come as a genuine contribution from Marx was his insight that the economic order is capable of creating an ideology whereby some people are led to believe that the status quo rests upon eternal and immutable principles. All this goes to show that even though Marx is now dead, his spirit still parades itself around the whole world and many people are learning from it. In fact, in this century, for at least one–third of the world's population, Marxism provides the official philosophical point of view or the systematic articulation of beliefs about the world and the destiny of man in it. In the Soviet Union, for instance, Marx's Dialectical Materialism is the official philosophical doctrine. Still, it is fascinating that Marxism as a philosophy should have spread like wild fire chiefly among the underdeveloped peoples of the world rather than among the advanced capitalist countries where, presumably, it was supposed to have its greatest impact.

Today, of course, as in Marx's time the underdeveloped and developing countries have to break the chain of oppression and exploitation as its strongest link, the advanced industrial countries, if they wish to build socialism. But, for that very reason, the task and the challenge it offers call for an immediate action among the so–called Third World countries. There is no other suitable conclusion to this work, dedicated to Marx's dialectical materialism and the extension of its principles into the pheno-

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mena of social life, society and history, than his remark that, "philosophers have hitherto only interpreted the world in different ways; the point is to change it." [5]

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3. William L. McBride; *The Philosophy of Marx*, (London, Hutchinson and Company Limited, 1977), p. 159.

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DISCUSSION

RELATIVISM REVISITED

In a recent issue of this journal, Joseph Wayne Smith offers a rejoinder to my defence of anti-realist relativism.[1] According to anti–realist relativism a sentence is true if and only if it is warranted by a correct theory. Contrary to what the realist believes, sentences are not determined as true (or false) by reality. In my original essay I did not argue for anti–realist relativism. I simply maintained that Hilary Putnam and William Newton–Smith (amongst others) fail to show that this position is self–refuting or otherwise incoherent. Smith apparently accepts that I was successful in this endeavour but presents three new arguments against anti–realist relativism. Smith's arguments, I argue, are no more successful than those of other realists. Anti–realist relativism is a possibility that will continue to haunt the realist.

Before presenting his objections Smith raises an important question about the nature of anti–realist relativism. In "Relatively Speaking" I characterised this theory as the view that a sentence is true if and only if warranted by a correct theory. (Originally I used a conditional, not the biconditional (correctly) used here.) I made, however, no effort to say what counts as a correct theory. Smith is quite right to seek clarification of this point. Relativists can characterise a correct theory in a number of ways but some of them play into the realist's hand. Rela-

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tivists might suggest that a correct theory is any consistent set of sentences. No one, however, wants to say that a sentence is true merely because it is supported by a consistent but fictitious story. For example, it is not literally true that

(1) Louisa Musgrove visited Lyme Regis

even though Jane Austen wrote a consistent story. On the other hand, relativists must avoid an account of a correct theory that presupposes realism. It is tempting to say that the reason that (1) is not true is that the theory that warrants it does not stand in some appropriate relationship to reality. The same temptation suggests that the sentence

(2) Jane Austen visited Lyme Regis

is true because it is warranted by a correct theory, that is, a theory composed of sentences determined true by reality. Obviously anti-realist relativists must resist this temptation.

Relativists must somehow identify the correct theories which warrant true sentences and do so without presupposing realism. This is easily done when we remember that true sentences are warranted by *theories* and not by arbitrary but consistent collections of sentences. A theory is not merely a collection of sentences. It is a collection of sentences held to be true by some community. A theory is correct if it is currently adopted by some community. On this account of a correct theory, not just any sentence is true. A sentence such as (1) is not true because it is not warranted by a theory held by any community. On the other hand (2) is true because warranted by a theory adopted by our community.

Having dealt with this preliminary question, I turn to Smith's first objection. He holds that

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(3) There are objects in the universe

is true. Next he claims that (3) is warranted by any number of theories. But, says Smith, relativism is the view that a sentence is true if (and only if) warranted by *a* theory. He takes 'a theory' to mean 'a unique theory' and concludes that relativism is mistaken. Smith unfortunately provides no reason for interpreting 'a theory' as he does rather than as 'some theory (or other)'. Any sensible relativist would opt for the latter interpretation and avoid Smith's objection. Some community may believe that the universe contains only material objects. Another could maintain that only mental entities exist. Since both communities hold that if objects of a certain type exist, then objects exist, but communities can agree that (3) is warranted and true. It is not clear why Smith thinks that the relativist must think that this is in the least problematic.

In his second objection, Smith holds that there are what he calls "brute facts". These are facts that cannot be explained. The fact that, say, electrons have negative charge is an example of such a fact. Electrons have negative charge but science cannot say why they do. (There must always be some brute facts, that is, facts in terms of which others are explained. As Hume remarks, the most perfect natural philosophy merely staves off ignorance a little longer). Now, Smith reasons, if there are brute facts, there are truths warranted by no theory. He concludes that there are truths warranted by no theory and relativism (as he interprets it) is wrong. Unfortunately for Smith the existence of brute facts provides no grounds for thinking that there are unwarrantable truths. Suppose it is a brute fact that electrons have negative charge. The sentence

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(4) Electrons have negative charge

is still warranted by contemporary physics and, according to relativism, true. Perhaps this is not the sort of case Smith has in mind. If not, I encourage him to give an example of a brute fact that requires an unwarrantable truth.

In his third objection, Smith tries to drive a wedge between what is true and what is justified or warranted by a theory. Smith invokes the brain in a vat hypothesis in an effort to find his wedge. The sentence

(5) We are embodied creatures in a material world

is warranted. Nevertheless, Smith holds, it is *possible* that we are actually brains in a vat and misled by evil scientists. If this is possible, Smith reasons, (5) may be false even though it is warranted. He concludes that a sentence may be warranted but not true and that relativism is false. The trouble with this argument is that it presupposes that relativism is correct. Smith admits that (5) is warranted by present theories. Relativists will say that this is all they need to know : it must then be true. They may admit that the brain in a vat hypothesis is possibly true, by which they mean that it could possibly be warranted. This bare possibility does not change the fact that (5) is warranted and true. Remember, according to the relativist, truth depends only on what is warranted. It does not depend on what is or may be. Only because realists presuppose that truth depends on what is real does the possibility that we are brains in a vat seem to reinforce their position.

Realist intuitions die hard and, like so many other writers, Smith cannot avoid employing them in his arguments against relativism. Those with realist intuitions find relativism a threatening and obscure spectre. This being the case, it is hardly

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surprising that they should represent relativism in unflattering terms. The result is that realists frequently beg the question or attack straw men. It is, perhaps, a little ironic that relativism, a position that might be expected to foster tolerance, should be an object of such horror.

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NOTE

1. "Young on the Coherence of Anti-realist Relativism," *Indian Philosophical Quarterly*, 16 (1989), 61-65. He is replying to my "Relatively Speaking: The Coherence of Anti-Relist Realativism", *Canadian Journal of Philosophy*, 16 (1986), 503-509.

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ASPECTS OF THE PROBLEM OF REFERENCE : PHENOMENOLOGY, HERMENEUTICS AND DECONSTRUCTION (1)

Introduction

The present studies seek to explore some aspects of the problems of intentionality and reference. After an initial formulation of the emergence of the thesis of intentionality in Franz Brentano, I seek to mark out the specific ways in which Husserl develops the theme of intentionality in the form of his celebrated theory of noesis and noema Distinguishing Husserl's phenomenological approach from that of Brentano, I next raise the question of the status of the noema in Husserl's theory. I now follow the recent suggestion of Follesdal and others and sketch out the interpretation of noema modelled on the Fregean distinction of sense and reference. I then explore the relationship between a phenomenological theory of act meanings and a semantic theory of linguistic meaning.

But the Fregean semantics of sense and reference does not significantly depend on the distinction between speech and textual discourse. At the next level, I introduce this distinction by way of Ricoeur's hermeneutical theory and then consider the problem of intention and reference at the level of speech and at the level of writing.

While Ricoeur's hermeneutics does clearly distinguish the phenomena of speech and those of writing and also recognises

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the specific functionalities and privileges of writing or textual discourse, yet it does not undermine this distinction itself.[1] Hence, in the last movement of these studies, I take up the deconstructionist argument concerning the opposition of speech and writing and following Derrida, I try to show what happens to the ideas of sense and reference and to the idea of intending subject within the deconstructionist critique of phenomenology and transcendental hermeneutics.[2]

PART I

The Preparation in Brentano

It is almost universally claimed that Brentano's formulation of the intentionality of mental phenomena in *Psychology from an Empirical Point of View* inaugurates a new turn to realism in contemporary philosophical thought. But the text brief as it is, is, as it were, fractured from within at the same time, including two entirely different perspectives on the relationship of the mind to the object. I shall try to indicate the different strata of thought implicitly held in solution, as it were, in the passage and then try to show, how, out of this density and polysemy of the text from Brentano, different configurations of intentionality may be said to emerge.

To quote the celeberated text : "Every psychical phenomenon" Brentano writes, "is characterized by what the scholastics called intentional and (also mental) inexistence of the object and what we would call, a relation to a content, direction toward an object (which is not to be understood here as something real) or immanent objectivity. Each psychological phenomenon includes something as object within itself, although not always in the same way. In a presentation, something is presented,

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in a judgement something is affirmed or denied; in love, something in loved; in hatred, something is hated, in desire, something is desired etc."[3]

In order to study the concealed problematics of this passage, I would like to offer a few preliminary orienting remarks. First of all, it may be noticed that Brentano gives cognitive as well as affective and volitional examples in the same format; judgement, perception, feeling, willing — all mental phenomena are presented as conforming to the same pattern of intentional structure. This may be important, for, when we explore the scholastic background of the doctrine of intentionality, we shall see that the scholastics distinguish two paradigms of intentional reference– in the order of knowing and in the order of willing.

In Brentano's text, two different conceptions of intentionality are juxtaposed, as if they are homogeneous. The first may be called immanent existence; this idea is expressed by such terms as 'mental in-existence', 'intentional inexistence', 'immanent objectivity' etc. The second may be called relational, insofar as it suggests relation to a content, direction towards an object etc. These two give rise to very different conceptions of intentionality and hence they may be called different paradigms or models of intentionality. But the point I want to make immediately is that both the models of intentionality have a scholastic background, only in two different philosophical contexts.

As Brentano himself points out, the language of intentional or mental inexistence is a scholastic usage. The scholastics used intentional and objective interchangeably. Objective, for them, meant the mode of being in consciousness which the cognitive image or species has. The idea that the intentional object is immanent as the object present in the knower is found in

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Aristotle. Later Aristotelian tradition distinguished intentional or objective being from real being. This theory of Aristotelian intentionality arose in the epistemological context – in order to explain how the knower can, in a certain sense, be the object he knows, without becoming like that object 'physically'. The intentional object is the representative in the knower; this representative image the Aristotelians called the cognitive species; they also called it the 'intentio'.[4] The species makes possible the *intentional identity* of the knower and the known. Thus, for the Aristotelian tradition, intentionality is a mode of being. Furthermore, for Brentano, intentionality distinguishes the non–physical from the physical, whereas for the Aristotelian tradition, it is a bond of union between reality and the knowing mind. The intentional object is that through which the real object is known, rather than that which is known in itself. We know the real object via the medium of the intentional object. This is closer to Husserl's idea of the noema as that which directs the act to its object.

But what about the second sense of intentionality in the form of directedness to an object? Does this also have an Aristotelian source? If we look at Aristotle's *Nichomachean Ethics*, where he discusses will, desire, apetite etc., there is something very similar to the second sense distinguished by Brentano Here 'intentio' is the form of striving after, grasping, or an impulse towards something.[5]

To sum up: The first sense of intentionality as presence in consciousness is an Aristotelian idea but it occurs in the order of knowing, wheras the second idea as a direction toward something is also Aristotelian but it is functional in the order of willing. Hence in Aristotle, the intentionality of knowing is

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different from the intentionality of willing, but Brentano brings them together.

A second issue which is implicit in the passage is the access to the characteristic in question, whether it is taken as an immanent presence or a relation to something outside. The essence of the mental, Brentano suggests, is this characteristic of intentionality. But how do we prove this? Since intentionality appears to be a simple unanalysable characteristic, in a sense, there can be no proof possible here. Only an attentive inspection of mental states can show us this. But an attentive inspection of mental states is a psychological description. But the claim about intentionality is a claim about proper or valid psychological statements, and must be meta-psychological, rather than itself a psychological statement. In response to this, we can say that Brentano's appeal is not merely psychological, i.e., what he calls an attentive description of mental states is not really introspection; on the contrary, it may be claimed that what he is doing is phenomenological and not psychological description. Or, we can take Brentano's claim to be, not about mental phenomena, but about the logical features of sentences about such phenomena. Using Quine's notion of 'semantic ascent' and Carnap's distinction between formal and material mode, we can reformulate Brentano's thesis as a thesis about *language* rather than about facts [6] The problem here would be to have a proper account of the relationship between the phenomenological and semantic levels of description.

But even prior to this issue of the modes of presentation of the theory, either as phenomenological or linguistic, one may ask what is it that a theory of intentionality is supposed to explicate, what are the problems or issues for which we require a theory of intentionality. Since MacIntyre and David Woodruff -Smith discuss this question of the explicandum of a theory of

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intentionality most eleborately and insightfully, I propose to briefly summarise their discussion at this point.[7] They show that intentional relations are peculiar and are radically different from ordinary relations in two ways, which they call *existence independence* and *conception dependence*. Compare an intentional relation like 'X believes P' with a non–intentional relation like 'X hits P'. Like an intentional relation, a non–intentional relation also relates a person to an object. But a non–intentional relation like 'X hits P' can obtain only when both X and P exist. In this sense, a non–intentional relation is existence dependent. But X can believe P even though P does not exist. We may therefore say intentional relations are *existence independent*. (But it may be noted that it is independent, only of the object, P, and not of the subject X).

Suppoee X is taller than Napoleon. 'Taller than' is a non–intentional relation and it relates X to Napoleon irrespective of any conception or idea X may or may not have about Napoleon. Now, Napoleon was, in fact, the lover of Josephine but X may not know this But irrespective of this, if "X is taller than Napoleon" is true, then "X is taller than the lover of Josephine" also is true. In fact, the non–intentional relation would obtain even if X does not even know that there was a person named 'Napoleon'. We may say that a non–intentional relation relates the terms between which it holds under all descriptions of the terms i.e., it does not depend upon any particular conception or description of the objects related; in this sense, non–intentional relations are *conception independent*. But the case is different with intentional relations. X may fear the man who makes threatening phone calls and it may be the case that it is X's neighbour who makes the threatening calls, but X may not know this. If so, "X fears the man who makes threatening phone calls" may be true, but "X fears his neighbour"

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may not be. The intentional relation relates X to the object only under a certain concept or description "the man who makes threatening phone calls". It is the way that X thinks of the object or has a conception of it that is important. Hence, intentional relations are conception dependent.

Incidentally, it may be noted that literature sometimes exploits this feature for effect. Consider the play *Oedipus Rex*. Oedipus hates the man he met at the cross roads (= his own father). Oedipus loved the woman he married (= his own mother). Oedipus loathed the man who brought the curse upon Thebes (= himself).

MacIntyre and Woodruff-Smith argue that the basic task of a theory of intentionality is to satisfactorily account for these two features of existence independence and conception dependence of intentional relations and also to show up connections between these two features as well as other implications of these [8]

We may now proceed to distinguish different configurations or shapes such theories of intentionality may take. For this purpose, Brentano's characterization provides a convenient point of departure. It may be remembered that Brentano's description emphasises two aspects of the intentional relation; on the one hand, there is the aspect of relation or directedness and on the other, there is the idea of the object on which the relation is focussed. Accordingly, we may make a distinction between object theories of intentionality which emphasise the object aspect and relational theories which emphasise the relational aspect. Both types of theories, in one sense, accept that intentionality involves a relation between an act and its object. But the difference between the two types of theories—object theories and relational theories – arises in their respective accounts of

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the two features of existence independence and conception dependence.

From this point of view, one could say that the object intended is just the ordinary sort of entity; for instance, when I perceive a tree, it is the physical object out there in the real world independent of me that I am intending. However, the intentional situation is peculiar because the intentional relation is peculiar and unlike any real relation. According to this way of looking at the situation, intentionality involves a unique or non-natural relation.[9] As we shall see, Husserl's theory of intentionality may be described as a version of such a relational theory, but apart from Husserl, Twardowski and Frege, among the moderns, and Aristotle and Thomas Acquinas among the classics, are examples of such a relational conception of intentionality. The fundamental features of such a theory would be :

1. Intention involves a referent (i.e., the object intended) and a sense (the way of intention).

2. The sense or the intentional object only mediates the reference to the object; it is not itself the object referred to. In Aristotelian term, it is *' id qua cognoscitur '* and not *' id quod cognoscitur '*.

3. The referents are independent of the mind.

4. The intentional object functions like sense or meaning which prescribes the aspects or characteristics under which the object is referred to. It is because of this directive function of the intentional object that intention has the feature of concept dependence.[10]

5 It is also because of this that intentionality is existence independence, since the sense or intentional object may point to something that does not exist.

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As against such a relational theory, which is perhaps better called a mediated theory, since for such a theory intentional reference is mediated by way of the intentional object, an object theory of intentionality would seek to explain both existence independence and conception dependence by way of the peculiarities of the object. Consider, for example, Brentano's claim that the intentional object is an immanent object, having mental inexistence. Here the intentional object is mental and because it is immanent or mind dependent, it is constituted by the attitude of the subject. Hence, the object is conception dependent. But because it is immanent, its existence depends only upon the act and not on whether outside the mind, there is anything at all. Hence, it is also existence independent.

But there could be another version of the object theory, where the intentional object need not be seen as mental, in Brentano's sense. For example, in Meinong, there are three types of object – concrete objects (physical or mental), which may be said to exist, abstract objects like propositions or states of affairs which subsist and objects which neither exist nor subsist, but are beyond being and non-being. Meinong makes a crucial distinction between "what is in the mind" in intention and what is intended. The former he calls the content and the latter the object of intention. The object is not immanent in Brentano's sense, but these objects are of a peculiar sort. They are independent of existence in the ordinary sense; in other words, an object need not exist in order to be an object of consciousness. Another peculiarity of these objects is that they are incomplete. For example, when X thinks of a winged horse, the object, 'the winged horse' is neither black nor brown nor white, because such characteristics have not been thought in the act and it has only those properties which are thought in the act. For every other property, it neither has it nor lacks it. In

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this sense, it is incompletely determined.[11] The idea of incompleteness is Meinong's way of recognising conception dependence.

Now, whatever may be the difference between these three theories, they all seem to hold that intentional phenomena should be analysed in terms of a relation to something. But we can have a fourth type of theory which rejects the schema of 'relation to something' altogether. For this view, 'thinking of Pegasus', for example, is not a relation of thought to an object at all, but a characteristic of the thinker i.e., the expression 'thinks of Pegasus' is gramatically a relational expression, but its logical form is that of a predicate i.e., 'Altekar thinks of Pegasus' really means 'Altekar is a Pegasus–thinker', where the hyphenated expression 'Pegasus–thinker' is a predicate which applies to Altekar. This seems to have been Brentano's later position, according to which intentionality is a characteristic and not a relation.[12]

This fourth type of theory seems to suggest that the clue to the solution of the enigmas of intentionality lies in the logical analysis of act–sentences. In other words, we can explain the features of intentional phenomena only by shifting to the linguistic level where we deal with intentional sentences. The logical behaviour of these sentences is the key to the solution of the problems of intentionality. In other words, intentionality is not really an epistemological but a semantic issue.

But the linguistic or semantic turn has a more disturbing implication. For, what the later position of Brentano suggests is that the act – object schema is mistaken in principle. This would suggest a dissolution *a la* Ryle and A. J. Ayer, rather than a solution of the problem of intentionality.[13] In fact, once the shift to language is made, the dissolution can be taken one

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step further. If the notion of 'mental acts' is given up, there does not seem to be any longer any real need for the subject either. One may hope to explain epistemic situations without postulating a subject of knowledge, as suggested by Popper's programme of 'Epistemology without a subject'.[14]

But one could go even beyond Popper and hold that the notion of the subject could be dismantled, along with the notion of the sense and reference as well as the signifier – signified coupling. With the shift to discourse or language, it, therefore, appears that we release a veritable flood tide of ever more disturbing dislocation In the subsequent sections of the present study, I shall attempt to follow through one particular path of this deconstruction of the problematics of intentionality. As this programme takes its point of departure from Husserl's phenomenology, upon which it turns back in its undermining project, in the next section, I shall present the basic features of Husserl's theory of intentionality and intentional reference.

Husserl's Theory of Intentionality

In this section, after a brief stage–setting presentation of Husserl's theory of intentionality in terms of the distinction between noesis and noema in the *Ideas,*[15] I shall follow the suggestion of Follesdal that the noema functions as sense in directing the act to its object.[16] This suggestion opens up the exciting comparison of Husserl's theory with that of Frege's distinction between sense and reference. Following recent discussions of this issue, I shall formulate the basic claims of Husserl's theory of intentional reference.[17] The comparison with Frege's theory of linguistic sense and reference allows us to distinguish two levels of Husserl's theory of intentionality, as a phenomenological theory of act–meanings and as a semantic theory of linguistic meanings. I shall explore the relationships

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between these two levels of Husserl's approach and in the final part, I shall try to show how in phenomenology, even when developed at the language level, there is a primacy of speech over writing and I shall also suggest how the same priority of speech is to be seen in the case of Frege as well as de Saussure.

For Husserl, the intentionality of an act is mediated by way of an intentional content, which in the *Ideas*, he calls the noema The noema is to be distinguished from the object intended; at the same time, it is also not a general essence. David Woodruff–Smith takes it as an abstract or ideal entity.[18] Husserl further says that it is by way of the noema that an act refers to the object; noema mediates intentional reference. The approach of Husserl, therefore, requires a three–fold distinction between act, noema and object. The content or the noema gives the act its peculiar and characteristic intentional directedness to the object. It is this which is specifically intentional but it itself is not the object intended.

MacIntyre and Woodruff–Smith summarise the essential features of Husserl's theory in the form of six major theses :

1. The content of an act is to be sharply distinguished from the object; whatever is true of the object is bracketted out in the transcendental reduction and hence is not available for a phenomenological explication. The content which makes the act intentional is not itself seen or noticed in the ordinary attitude. It is revealed only in transcendental reflection after the epoche.

2. The content alone confers intentionality on the act; it is this which gives the act its relation like character of being 'of' or 'about' some object.

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3. If the intention is successful, the act reaches an existing object and not any other because it is this object to which the content directs it.

4. But even if the intention is unsuccessful, even if there is no such object prescribed by the content, the prescribing or 'pointing' character of the content is unaffected. The act's intentional character is independent of the existence or non–existence of the object.

5. On the other hand, the content of the act is closely connected with the conception or ways of conceiving the object.

6 The object of the act is transcendent in the sense that it has further properties than what are included in the content.[19]

From the above summary presentation of the theory, it must be already clear that the centre piece of the entire theory is the notion of the content or the noema. What exactly is the noema and what status can we abscribe to it? Unfortunately Husserl's explicit and direct exposition of the noema in the *Ideas* is brief and far from clear. The notion is given further refinements in his later work, particularly the *Cartesian Meditations* but the nucleus is to be found in the *Ideas*.[20]

From these discussions, we may distill the following characterizations :

1. Every act includes, as a constituent part, a noesis which is meaning–giving.

2. The noesis of an act entertains exactly one noema which is a sinn or meaning.

3. Although for every noesis, there is one noema, the same noema may be entertained by different noeses. The relation between noeses and noema is a many – one relation.

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4. Different noeses and hence different acts may entertain the same noema.

5 The noema is an ideal entity; it is not a real event either in consciousness or in the external world. Noema are meanings or ' sinne '.

6. Since noema are not real components, they can be grasped only after all ' real ' elements are suspended by the epoche.

7. The noema is distinct from the object.

8. But although distinct, yet there is an intimate relation between the two, for intentional reference to the object takes place by way of the noema.

9. The noema prescribes the object by way of the determinations contained in it e.g. ' the author of Waverley prescribes Scott as determined in a certain way, or as having a certain property.

10. But the same transcendent object could be referred to by different noema in the sense that it could be identified as having other properties. Hence, different noema may converge upon the same object.

For Husserl, the noema determines the reference of the intentional act. The basic question to be answered is how exactly the noema fulfils this directive function. We are offered a highly significant clue when we are told that the noema is a sinn or meaning. We remember that Frege also uses ' sinn ' for the sense or meaning of a linguistic expression; but for Husserl, sinn is the meaning component of an act and hence *non linguistic*. Husserl's term for linguistic meaning is ' bedeutung ' which is Frege's term for referent of an expression. Hence, there are terminological disparities between Husserl and Frege, which we must first sort out.[21]

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Frege

Sinn = linguistic meaning or sense

bedeutung = referent of an expression.

Husserl

Sinn = meaning of an intentional act i,e. noema

bedeutung = linguistic meaning; this is the noema expressed in language; therefore, in a sense, for Husserl, sinn = bedeutung

object = referent of an act / referent of an expression

But the fundamental similarity between Husserl and Frege rests upon two features :

1. For both of them 'sinne' or meanings are abstract or ideal entities which are neither physical nor mental.

2. Reference, i.e. the relation of an expression to the object for which it stands is a function of sense. In Husserl this takes the form (i) noema determines the intended object, (ii) Bedeutung (linguistic meaning) is the expression, at the level of language, of act meanings. Hence, (ii) at the linguistic level also, the meaning of an expression (Frege's sense), determines the reference of the expression.

The basic presupposition of the above is the identification of linguistic meaning with noematic sinn.

act – meaning	Linguistic meaning
(Phenomenological)	(Semantic)

For Husserl as well as for Frege, linguistic meanings are different from the objects to which the expressions refer. Husserl develops this idea in two ways :

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1. an expression could be meaningful although there is no object for which it stands ;

2. even where an expression does have a reference, the meaning of the expression is not the referent.

However, the fact that meaning cannot be identified with the object, it does not follow that reference is unrelated to meaning or sense. On the contrary, Husserl believes that sense determines reference or more property reference is a function of sense.

For Husserl, as for Frege, meanings are also different from mental states or events. This was the effect of Frege's critique of Husserl's earlier attempt in the *Philosophy of Arithmetic* to explicate the meaning of logical and mathematical concepts by means of a psychological analysis of their origins. Frege had pointed out that such a procedure violates the distinction between image and concept, imagination and thought. Subjective ideas are peculiar to individual thinkers or speakers but the meanings are shared and common. Husserl accepted Frege's major criticism that psychologism cannot account for the inter-subjectivity of knowledge. The proper way of formulating the problem of knowledge, for Husserl, after Frege, would be : what is the proper way of understanding the relationship between the subjectivity of knowing and the objectivity of what is known ?

Under the influence of Frege in the *Logical Investigations*, Husserl took meanings to be essences exemplified in act. This, roughly Aristotelian position, may be explained somewhat as follows :

When I think of a red ball, there is a mental state which may be called thinking of the red ball, on the one hand, and the red ball in the outer world, on the other. Both are particulars, one a mental and the other a physical particular. In the

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red ball, the property redness is instantiated; this property is the essence of the object. But in the mental particular, the meaning of red is instantiated. This is the essence of the act; hence meanings are *act essences*. But in the *Ideas* meanings or noema are taken to be abstract *sui generis* entities, and not essences – meanings are abstract particulars

As we saw, at the semantic level, both Husserl and Frege share the view that meanings determine reference. But in Husserl, this theory of linguistic reference is grounded on a phenomenological theory of intentional acts. But in Frege, there is only a concealed or implicit phenomenology, insofar as he also holds that language is an expression of thought. Similar remarks may also apply to Wittgenstein, for it is only this implicit or rudimentary phenomenology that prevents his position from lapsing into behaviourism.

Since, following Follesdal and others, I am presupposing that Husserl's theory of intentionality is, in a sense, equivalent to Frege's theory of reference, it may be useful, at this stage, to briefly sketch the fundamentals of Frege's theory of sense and reference.

Frege's fundamental distinction is between intentions or meanings and extension or referents of expressions. In his essay "On Sense and Nomination" Frege holds that meaningfulness of referring expressions is to be distinguished from their having a reference.[22] An expression is meaningful if and only if it expresses something as its sense. To put this in Dummett's formulation, we can say "for any term t and any person p, there is a sense s, such that p understands t, if and only if p attaches s to t".[23] On the other hand, a term has reference

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only if it stands for something as its bedeutung. The sense of an expression is always distinct from its referent.

The distinction between sense and reference can be applied to other types of expression also. Thus, Frege holds that the 'bedeutung' of an one-place predicate is a concept and of a many place predicate, a relation.

The distinction between sense and reference is used by Frege to clarify three features of the use of referring expressions–

1. Meaningfulness of expression, such as 'Pegasus', which have no referents. The meaningfulness of the sentence 'Pegasus is a winged horse' cannot be a function of the reference of its parts, but a function of their senses.

2. *Significant identity* : The statement 'The morning star is the evening star' is an identity statement since both expressions have the same reference. But this identity is different from that of 'the morning star is the morning star'. We can explain this difference by saying that although the referents of 'morning star' and 'evening star' are the same, their senses are different.

3. *The failure of the principle of substitution in intensional contexts* : The principle of substitution holds that if two expressions e_1 and e_2 have the same reference, i e , if they are extensionally equivalent, then we can substitute either in the place of the other, without changing the truth value of the sentence.

Thus, 'the victor at Jena' and 'the vanquished at Waterloo' have the same reference i.e., Nepoleon. Thus, we can substitute the second in the place of the first, in the context 'the victor at Jena was a morose and haughty French man' and get 'the vanquished at Waterloo was a morose and haughty French

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man'. S_1 and S_2 have the same truth valve. But in intentional contexts such substitutions may fail.

S_1 : 'P believes that the victor of Jena was a morose and haughty French man'.

But P may not know that the victor at Jena was the same as the vanquished at Waterloo. Hence if we now substitute into this context, S_2, 'P believes that the vanquished at Waterloo was morose and haughty French man' it may be false. Among other things, Frege's distinction between sense and reference was used to preserve the principle of substitution in intentional contexts. What Frege proposed was that in S_1 and S_2, the referents are not the same; for, in intentional contexts such a 'P believes that', 'P knows that' etc., the expressions do not have their ordinary referents. In such contexts, the expressions refer to their customary senses and these senses are different. Hence, the principle of substitution is not really violated.

4. *Existential generalization* : From 'the neighbour's dog bit him' we can infer 'there is something which is a dog and which bit him'. But from 'Jones is looking for the golden mountain in Mexico' we cannot infer 'there is something which is a golden mountain and Jones is looking for it in Mexico'.

Here, again, Frege's distinction between sense and reference comes to the rescue; for, Frege holds that in intensional contexts, expressions do not have their customary reference but that in such contexts, they refer to their customary senses.

Although sense and reference are distinct, they are intimately related. Frege holds that sense determines reference, for the sense of an expression illuminates an aspect of the referent. Hence, it follows that expressions with different senses may

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yet refer to the same object. From this point of view, a sense may be described as a mode of presentation of the object. Indeed, Gareth Evans interprets the sense as a way of thinking about the object.[24]

Husserl and Frege seem to share the following two major claims :

1. meanings are abstract, ideal, non-physical and non-mental entities;
2. meanings or senses mediate reference.

But beyond these points of similarity, for Husserl, linguistic meanings are expressions of the noema of acts. Hence, for Husserl, to say that a person expresses some meaning implies that certain acts of his consciousness confer or lend his words their meanings. These acts are meaning-giving acts and because of them, the expression is more than merely a sound – it means something and is constituted as significant.

We may represent the situation as follows :

Linguistic level : Utterance → Meaning → Reference

↑

Intentional level : Act → Noema → Object

The noema of the intentional act is lent to the speech-act and thereby the utterance becomes capable of expressing a linguistic meaning.[25]

Husserl is suggesting that the concept of meaning which is first given in the linguistic context may be extended to the level of acts. In one sense, act meanings are derivatives of expression meanings, but in another sense, phenomenologically, it is the act meaning which is primary.

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Husserl says that the phenomenon of a meaningful expression is a function (i) of certain vehicle i.e., a sound pattern is perceived as an object This formation of the linguistic object is the result of a perceptual act for it is perception which constitutes a perceptible datum as an object. In this sense, all linguistic acts are founded upon a perceptual act But (ii) the pattern of sound becomes a word with meaning because the noema of a simultaneous act of thinking is lent to the act of speech. In this sense, in all linguistic meaning, there is a double intentionality, perceptual and semantic.

But with regard to the paralellism between act meanings and linguistic meanings, two kinds of interpretation may he possible ;

1. Intentional meanings explain the possibility of linguistic meaning. It is because of this that we can subsume lingustic meaning under the broader concept of act meaning

2. Act meanings are really analogical extensions of linguistic meaning. This is how a Fregean like Dummett would look at Husserl. From a Fregean point of view, the extension of meaning to acts is philosophically mistaken. The reason for this is easy to see : a noema is dependent on an act; but for Frege, meanings or 'sinne' are self-sufficient; it would appear to a Fregean that Husserl's theory of noema calls into question the objectivity of meanings Dummett puts this in a different way; he holds that by extending the concept of meaning to mental acts, Husserl relapses into psychologism [26] But as we have seen, the noema is not a mental state or process. In fact, Husserl claims that the noema is grasped only after the reduction. It is obvious that Dummett does not really accept the claim that phenomenology is not a kind of descriptive psychology. But apart from this, we can note a certain problem which arises for a position like that of Frege. Frege says that senses are independent of even whether

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they are expressed or not; but at the same time, he also holds that it is only through words that we grasp the sense. How should we understand this indispensability of language for meaning ? Frege seems to be suggesting two ways of understanding this principle :

1. Sometimes he seems to be suggesting that there is a kind of necessity. But if this is a necessary principle, then it also looks as if Frege is really close to Husserl i.e., the act of expression constitutes meaning.

2. But at other times, Frege seems to be suggesting that as a matter of fact, human beings require language as the medium of access to meanings, although other kinds of rational beings may grasp the same senses without language. But then we require some further explanation of this i.e, what is it about human beings that makes language constitutive of human nature ?

In Husserl also there is a principle of expressibility; since, for him, linguistic meanings are the expressions of noematic act–meanings, it would follow that every noematic meaning is, in principle, expressible in language. This may be called Husserl's expressibility thesis. "Every meaning in the noematic sinn of any act whatsoever is expressible through linguistic meanings."[11]

But we must take the principle of expressibility with some qualifications :

1. Husserl is not claiming that every noematic meaning has actually been expressed in language; it is a thesis of expressibility in principle.

2. Expressibilty is restricted to the noematic sinn rather than to the whole noema. The noema includes other components, which Husserl calls 'ways of givenness' e.g. clarity, distinctness,

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attentiveness etc., are also components of noema. But when the act is expressed, these components are not included in the linguistic meanings.

Noema and Intentional Reference

The basic idea in the above discussion is that in Husserl's theory, the noema of the act directs it to the object intended and hence intentional reference takes place by way of the noematic meaning The reference here is to a singular or unique object We may call such reference singular intentional reference The point which now has to be clarified is how noematic meaning guides such singular reference.[28]

For this purpose, we must first clarify the inner structure of the noema of an act. Husserl first distinguishes two moments within the noema – a noematic nucleus, which he calls the sinn or meaning and the thetic phase. The thetic component is the way of presentation of the noema as presentational, memorial, assertional, presumptive etc But the distinction within the noematic nucleus or meaning is, for our present purposes, more important.[29]

The sinn or meaning component of a noema is a sense which prescribes an object as such and such. This is comparable to the manner in which a definite description such as 'the so and so' determines the referent as the object having such and such characteristics. This analogy with definite descriptions provides a first model for intentional reference. But the noema, apart from its characterising component, also has a demonstrative component which Husserl calls the X component The X component of a noema is not a predicative sense; it does not characterize the object but rather refers to it, somewhat as a proper name or a pure demonstrative expression does. This X component, it may be said, is what carries singular reference; if we

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take this view, we would be having a second model of demonstrative reference.[30]

The noema, therefore, has two components (i) an aggregate of predicate senses, which prescribe, the object may be thought of as having, and (ii) another component, which Husserl calls the X component wich is purely indicative. The predicate senses ascribe properties to the object indicated by the X component. It is this coupling of the X component and the predieate senses that enables the act to refer to a specific object as having various properties. The predicate senses prescribe the properties or the *what* of the object. These properties are thought of as unified in a certain specific individual bearer of these properties. This sense of properties belonging to an object is given the X component. The X component has two main functions :

1. to indicate the unifying centre of all predicative determination, and
2. to serve as the basis for co–directed acts i.e., other intentional acts which refer to the same object but under different senses. All such acts which characterise the object as having different properties bear upon the same object; this is expressed by their having the same X component.[31]

Within this structure, we could say that the function of intentional reference is performed by the X component alone, independently of the predicative component. this may be called the model of Direct Reference. At the semantic level, this would correspond to Kripke's theory of *Rigid Designation.*[32] The relation of noema to the object, for this theory, would be like the relation of proper name to its referent. The chief problem for such a theory would be what kind of sense may be attributed to the X–component. For the second type of theory, the real work of reference is performed by the predicative component.

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It is the descriptive content which determines which object is being referred to. This may be called the Definite Description model of Intentional Reference.

It seems to me that as far as Husserl's theory is concerned, the first model seems to be more appropriate i e I suggest that in Husserl, the uniqueness of reference is a function of the X component rather than of the predicative sense.[33] If this is so, Husserl's theory is immune to the criticism of the Frege–Russell model of reference by way of definite descriptions. But the problem for this would be what kind of non-descriptive sense could be attributed to the X component. It is a non-descriptive sense in the sense that it presents the object directly rather than by way of properties. As to the kind of sense which may be attributed to the X component, we have a clue in Husserl's theory of perception; Husserl says that the sense of a perception can be expressed by means of a demonstrative pronoun such as 'this'. This seems to suggest that the X component functions like a demonstrative expression. But what kind of a sense do demonstrative expressions have ?

The sentences in which demonstrative expressions such as 'this' occur may be called occasional sentences in the sense that to determine their meaning and truth value, we must consider the occassions in which they are used. Now, Husserl distinguishes two aspects of the meaning of occassional sentences. The *indicating sense* of 'this' is roughly what we may call its semantic function – "the object is the speaker is pointing to". This is common to the speaker and hearer. But the *indicated sense* depends on the specific context, hence the indicated meaning varies from context to context.[34]

The commonly held view is that the reference of demonstrative expressions is determined by the context of their utterance by

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the speaker's *de facto* physical relation to the referent. At first it appears that Husserl's account also is such a contextualist theory of demonstrative reference But, on a closer look, there appears to be an important difference, for Husserl distinguishes the situation of the speaker and that of the hearer. The hearer must consider the factual circumstances of utterance but the speaker is already given the referent in his perception. The indicated meaning is directly available to him in intuition.[35]

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WITTGENSTEIN ON EMOTION

Wittgenstein achieved celebrated insights in tackling many philosophical problems, from metaphysics to epistemology and to philosophical psychology. Some critics, however, hold that when it comes to an account of emotion, Wittgenstein merely propounded what James propounded and what James denied. This is so, such critics would say, despite the fact that he often argued against James. For example, they would say, consider his following comments,

> "Remember at this point that the personal experiences of an emotion must in part be strictly localized experiences; for if I frown in anger I feel the muscular tension of the frown in my forehead, and if I weep, the tensions around my eyes are obviously part, and an important part, of what I feel This is, I think, what William James meant when he said that a man does not cry because he is sad but he is sad because he cries." *BB* 103.[1]

The purpose of this paper is (1) to decide whether the critics who maintain that Wittgenstein only stated what James propounded and what he denied are correct in believing so and, (2) to critically evaluate Wittgenstein's analysis as an independent analysis of emotion. To this end, let us begin with James' theory of emotion.

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I

1.0 James' theory of emotions is essentially *a physiological* theory. For our purpose, James' theory can be summarised as follows :

The perceived object (either mental or physical) is followed by the bodily changes–the visceral, the muscular and those above and beneath the skin. The feeling of these changes as they occur IS the emotion.

For example, the perception of an 'exciting' object (e.g. a tiger) is followed by the bodily changes (e.g. perspiration, increase in the heart-beats, etc.) and the feeling of these bodily changes as they occur is the fear. This is the central claim of James' theory; he explains and develops this thesis in his essay "The Emotions" and his later works.

According to him, the bodily changes that follow the perception of an exciting object have a great variation — there are changes in the facial expression, in the muscular part and in the visceral part. For example, in grief, there is a pang in the breastbone, suffocation of the heart, tears and sobs. In case of fear, there are bodily changes of quickened heart-beats, shallow breathing, trembling lips and the visceral stirrings. But though there is a great variation in the bodily changes, James' final choice is the visceral part. To conceive an emotion as *felt*, James thought, the changes in the visceral part are a *sine qua non*... *'On the visceral and organic part of the expression,'* James Claimed, *'it is probable that the chief part of the felt emotion depends.'* If the sensations from the visceral are removed *imaginatively* from a given emotional experience nothing is left behind ... no mind-stuff out of which an emotion can can be constituted (*Principles*, 451-2)

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Further, though the bodily changes, including the changes in facial expression, are present in any given emotion, they are not always the same, they are not characteristic of a given emotion. The facial expressions, in particular, vary from individual to individual and from occasion to occasion. There is no facial expression characteristic of an emotion of a certain sort. James writes.

..... every one of us, almost, has some personal idiosyncrasy of expression, laughing or sobbing differently from his neighbour, or reddening or growing pale where others do not (Principles, 448). This fact, that there is a great variation in the facial expression is acknowledged by James, but in itself, this issue is not of primary importance for him The questions of description : *" By what expression is each emotion characterized ? "* are of subsidiary importance (*Principles,* 453). Elsewhere, he writes.

" a question such as what is the ' read' or ' typical' expression of anger, or fear ? " have no objective meaning at all (*Principles* 453)- The questions, of primary importance for James are the *causal* questions, not that of classification and description.

As we have seen, his theory is this that, the perceived *object* is followed by the bodily changes the feeling of which is the emotion, and since he claims that his analysis is essentially *a causal analysis.* it follows, that for him the perceived object is also the cause of an emotional experience, say that of fear, the perceived object — the fire, is also the cause of the fear. The cause of a child's fear is the fire present before him, which is also the present object of his fear. Also, since James realizes this fact by getting on to a higher logical level (Principles, 448), the claim that the object of an emotion is also the cause of an emotion, is and ought to be a logical claim.

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In short, we can say that the major claims of James' theory are,

a) The visceral part of the body is a *sine qua non* for us to conceive an emotion as felt. If the sensations from the viscera are absent, an emotion is absent.

b) Considering the fact, that the analysis of an emotional experience (in which a perceived object is followed by the bodily changes as they occur), is essentially a causal analysis, it follows that the perceived object is also the cause of the emotion.

c) Though the question, " By what expression is each emotion characterized ?", is not of considerable philosophical importance, it is clear that there is no 'typical' or 'characteristic' expression of each emotion.

Now, if we want to prove that the critics who believe that Wittgenstein only states what James propounded or denied are mistaken in so believing, we must show that Wittgenstein critically takes up and refutes these major claims of James. Since the claims (a) and (b) are satisfactorily accounted for in the philosophical literature[2], I shall concentrate on the third claim, namely the claim that there is no typical or characteristic expression behaviour of an emotion .

1.1 Wittgenstein's views on this topic are found in various works, *Philosophical Investigations, Zettel, Remarks on Philosophy of Psychology* and *The Blue and the Brown Books*. A considerable part of *Zettel* and *Philosophical Investigations* is reserved for the arguments against the following claim of James — there is no 'characteristic' expression-behaviour (facial expression). Of course, expression-behaviour includes much more than mere facial expression, but Wittgenstein limits it only to facial expression (Z 225, RPP 836). Against the above claim of James, Wittgenstein argues,

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Emotions have a characteristic expression – behaviour (facial expression) (*Z* 488 & *RPP* 836). This claim in itself logically implies another claim — each emotion has a facial expression characteristic or typical of it. For, if each emotion does not have a characteristic facial expression, then how can it be true that all emotions have a characteristic facial expression ? The claim that emotions have a characteristic expression-behaviour seems to be a true claim. For example, we can say that a smile is typical of joy and a cry characteristic of sorrow. Now given that all emotions have a characteristic expression-behaviour (facial expression), does it follow that a characteristic or typical facial expression is conceptually related to an emotion ? In other words, is the claim that all emotions have a typical facial expression a conceptual claim ? But before taking up this issue, I want to say something about another related but less important issue in this connection — verbal expression of emotion. According to Wittgenstein, occasionally, a facial expression of an emotion may include a speech act. A speech act may be declarative in form (in other words, an assertion or a statement) for example, "I am very angry at you" or "I am very frightened". It may be an exclamation or an interjection like "Oh, no", or "ugh". But for Wittgenstein, as opposed to some moderns, like Green, a declarative sentence like "I am angry at you" in the first person present is expression of an emotion *simpliciter* rather than a statement about emotion, provided that it occurs in certain context and is spoken in an appropriate tone of voice. He writes,

> "No, no! I am afraid"
>
> "I am still a bit afraid, but no longer as much as before."
>
> To each of these sentences a special tone of voice is appropriate and a different context (*PI* IIix)

...3

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But this claim is compatible with another claim, namely, a declarative sentence of the above form may not always be an expression *simpliciter;* sometimes it may be a statement about emotion. Wittgenstein writes,

> Is it, then, so surprising that I use the same expression in different games? And sometimes as it were between the game?... When it is said in a funeral oration "We mourn our..." this is surely supposed to be an expression of mourning; not to tell anything to those who are present. But in a prayer at the grave these words in a way may be used to tell someone something (*PI* IIix)

Thus, sometimes a declarative sentence may be an expression of emotion and sometimes a statement about it. No doubt, there are serious debates going on in philosophical circles over this issue, but as Lyons' analysis shows the issue — whether emotions have characteristic expression–behaviour—can be satisfactorily discussed without going into controversies that surround the issue of the verbal expression of an emotion.[3]

Having clarified this point, let us proceed to the issue under consideration — emotions have characteristic expression–behaviour (facial expression). Wittgenstein writes,

> Grief, one would like to say, is personified in the face. This belongs to the concept of emotion (*Z* 225). At another place he writes,
>
> An emotion.. ...has characteristic expression which one would use in miming it (*RPP* 836).

From these comments, it is clear that for Wittgenstein, the link between the characteristic expression and the emotion itself is a conceptual link. Now it is plausible to ask *in what sense* behaviour typical or characteristic of an emotion implies (and provi-

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des us with sufficient grounds to say) that the connection between emotion and facial expression of it, is conceptual connection? It may be said that in the following sense a typical facial expression may be conceptually related to an emotion.

It can be said that heat is typical of fire, in the sense that heat is a *natural concomitant* of fire. In the same sense, facial expression of certain sort is typical of an emotion — it is the natural accompaniment of an emotion. For example, a smile is typical of joy and looking daggers typical of anger. This is one sense in which a facial expression may be said to be typical or characteristic of an emotion.

In another sense, typical or characteristic means *commonly or frequently found as concomitant of*. This Lyons explains with an example,

> an acrid smell might be said to be typical of fire insofar as it is a concomitant of most types of fire.[4]

So to speak, commonly, whenever fire is there, an acrid smell is present. By analogy, a smiling face is commonly found as a manifestation or expression of joy. This is what Green seems to have in mind when he says,

> Behaviour which is described in defining emotion–terms must be typical. Reference to unusual or esoteric emotional behaviour would not be helpful.[5]

Now, in which of these two senses of 'typical' or 'characteristic', is a facial expression related to an emotion, so as to provide a conceptual link between emotion and the expression typical of it?

Wittgenstein's remarks in *Philosophical Investigation, Zettel* and *Remarks on Philosophy of Psychology* suggest that in the

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first sense of 'typical' or 'characteristic', facial expression is related to emotion so as to provide us with a conceptual connection (that is, with a connection sufficient to hold that whenever a facial expression of a certain sort is present, an emotion of a certain sort is present and *vice versa*) But the point is, is it not the case the there is no static facial expression of emotion? That there is no 'always the same' expression of an emotion? If this is so, then how is facial expression of an emotion to be interpreted? Yes, say, a smile is typical of joy but at one time it is monstrous laughter, at another just movements of the lips. This objection can be answered by pointing out that just as the degree of heat varies according to the intensity of fire, so does facial expression of emotion vary with variation in the degree of intensity of emotion (anger flares up, abates, vanishes). Indeed, it may be claimed that from the changes in facial expression, it follows that the degree of intensity of emotion has changed. Wittgenstein writes,

> Fear, is there alive in the features. If the features change slightly, we can speak of corresponding change in the fear (*PI* 537).

This may be granted (of course hesitantly); it may be true that the changes in facial expression correspond to changes in emotion But this in itself, is not a major objection. The fundamental objection is of a quite different sort. If there is a conceptual connection between emotion and the behaviour typical of it, then the typical behaviour ought to be fairly (clearly) distinctive of the emotion in question. Now apparently, all emotions do not have a fairly distinctive facial expression. In fact, it seems to be the case that the same facial expression is typical of more than one emotion. For example, a cry is typical of both grief and fear Not only this, a facial expression may be typical of phenomenon other than emotion. A cry is not

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only typical of fear and grief but also of pain. If the typical facial expression of an emotion is not fairly distinctive, then how can it provide us with sufficient ground for the ascription of an emotion ? By observing someone cry, one cannot judge with certainty whether the person crying is frightened or is sad or is in pain. Also, seeing someone smile, we often fail to judge whether he is joyful or is contemptuous. Wittgenstein himself entertains and recognises such possibility. But still he holds that what this objection proves is that typical expression-behaviour, since it is not fairly distinctive, cannot in itself be a sufficient condition for the ascription of an emotion. It is often true that a psychological state can not be individuated and described as an emotional state simply by reference to typical or characteristic facial expression. But, if the circumstances in which the characteristic expression occurs are also accounted for in defining an emotion term, then a facial expression typical of emotion will also be distinctive of that emotion by virtue of the circumstances in which it occurs, and hence a sufficient condition for the ascription of an emotion Typical expression in itself cannot be fairly (clearly) distinctive of an emotion and hence cannot provide sufficient ground for the ascription of an emotion but it can be fairly distinctive on account of the circumstances and hence indicative of a certain emotion. Wittgenstein writes,

> It might now be asked whether this word (fear) would really relate simply to behaviour....and this may be denied. There is no future in simplifying the use of this word in this way It relates to the behaviour under certain external circumstances. If we observe these circumstances and that behaviour we say that a man is... or has...
>
> Pain-behaviour or the behaviour of sorrow.—These can only be described along with their external occasions,

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(If a child's mother leaves it alone it may cry because it is sad; if it falls down, from pain). Behaviour and kind of occasion belong together (Z 523 & 492).

Thus, for example, a cry (a typical expression of emotion) is fairly distinctive of an emotion (say sorrow) only if the circumstances under which it takes place (a child's mother leaving it alone) are also taken into account. A facial expression taken out of its sorrounding or its context may not be fairly distinctive of an emotion. Indeed, if certain circumstances do not occur, a facial expression may be quite differently interpreted. For example, a smile of a soldier in war is not a manifestation of joy but rather an expression of his malicious attitude at the suffering of his enemy Thus, in different surroundings or the circumstances, a facial expression (a smile) typical of an emotion, may be interpreted quite differently. An expression becomes the expression of emotion due to its context. Wittgenstein says,

> Now suppose I sit in my room and hope that N. N. will come and bring me some money, and suppose one minute out of this state could be isolated, *cut out of its context;* would what happened in it not be hope? –Think, for example, of the words which you perhaps utter in this space of time. They are no longer part af this language. And in different surroundings the institution of money does not exist either.
>
> A coronation is the picture of pomp and dignity. Cut one minute of this proceeding out of its surroundings : the crown is being placed on the head of the king in his coronation robes. –But in different surroundings gold is the cheapest of the metals, its gleam is thought as vulger (*PI* 584). (emphasis mine).

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What Wittgenstein wants us to note is this — any emotion, e.g. hope or grief, has a temporal duration, a past and a future are necessary for the ascription of an emotion. However short may be, an emotion has a temporal duration. Another point he wants us to note is that, if the event — crown is being placed on the head of the kind in his coronation robes — is cut out of its context and put in other surroundings, where the values we hold dear have no objective significance it would lose its meaning and importance By analogy, in the emotional context, if facial expression is cut out of of its surroundings, it would not be indicative of the emotion. But given that facial expression is observed along with the circumstances, does it follow logically that it will be indicative of an emotion of certain sort? May it not be the case that surroundings or the circumstances in which the expression–behaviour occurs may at times fail to make the expresson–behaviour fairly distinctive of an emotion? If this is the case, then, facial expression along with the surroundings cannot be indicative of the emotion since it is not fairly distinctive of the emotion A child's cry, when its mother leaves it alone, may be an expression of sorrw or may be an expression of his fear. On knowing that a child's mother has left it alone, one can say that it is sad but another can say with equal plausibility that it is frightened. This is equally true of other emotions Take for example, contempt. Someone's switching off the Radio when Salil Chipa's music is announced on the Radio–4 or his never buying Salil Chipa's records cannot be said to be contemptuous. It can be the case that the person who behaves in this way is simply not interested in this composer's music. Simply by observing his behaviour in a given circumstances he cannot be ascribed such 'evil' psychological state as contempt.

Thus, facial expression along with its surroundings may sometimes not be indicative of the emotion.

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As one can expect, to repel the force of the above objection, the next Wittgensteinian move is to extend the argument further, this time by characterising the circumstances and the surroundings themselves as fearful, hopeful, etc. So to speak, according to Wittgenstein, a cry in fearful circumstances is fear and someone saying something in a hopeful situation is hope. He writes,

> An expectation is embedded in a situation, from which it arises. The expectation of an explosion may, for example, arise from a situation in which an explosion is to be expected (*PI* 581).

Like expectation, for Wittgenstein, emotions such as hope, fear anger or grief are embedded in a situation or in the surroundings. The situation or the surroundings themselves are fearful, joyful, etc. Thus, the characteristic expression–behaviour along with the characteristic circumstances is indicative of an emotion. An emotion term is to be defined by reference to characteristic facial expression and characteristic surroundings or the circumstances But, this sounds pretty circular. On this analysis, an emotion should be defined and explained with reference to and in terms of characteristic facial expression The facial expression is construed or is said to be characteristic of an emotion as it occurs in certain circumstances and the circumstances are in turn defined and explained in terms of the emotion itself Before discussing the problem of circularity, let us briefly recapitulate. We started with James' claim that there is no characteristic expresson of an emotion and Wittgenstein's contention that emotions have characteristic expression–behaviour (facial expression). Then we went on to analyze Wittgenstein's contention. We noted that

(a) since typical or characteristic expression–behaviour is not also fairly or clearly distinctive behaviour of an emotion,

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in itself, it can not be a sufficient condition for the ascription of an emotion. Facial expression may be typical of more than one emotion, and for this reason, if it is indicative of an emotion, it must also be a fairly distinctive expression of an emotion.

(b) to counter the above objection, Wittgenstein argues that typical expression in itself is not a sufficient condition for the ascription of an emotion, it must be observed along with the circumstances in which it occurs. But this will not do, since the circumstances along with the behaviour sometimes may not be indicative of an emotion. The emotion present may often be other than argued for (by reference to facial expression occurring in certain circumstances).

(c) to defend the validity of the second move, it is further argued that not only facial expression is characteristic of an emotion, the surroundings or the circumstances themselves are also characteristic of an emotion. The characteristic facial expression along with the characteristic surroundings or the circumstances is indicative of the emotion. It is argued that the surroundings or the circumstances themselves are fearful, hopeful, etc. Just as an expectation is embedded in a situation, the emotions are also embedded in the surroundings or the circumstances. This last move, I said, makes the argument viciously circular. In part two, I shall discuss the problem of circularity and other fundamental objections against the Wittgensteinian argument.

II

2.0 Wittgenstein (also, Kenny) argued that typical expression and the characteristic circumstances provide us with the conditions sufficient for the ascription of an emotion. Cry (facial expression) and the fearful circumstances are, thus, sufficient for the ascription of fear. The problem with this sort of explanation

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of an emotion–term is that it is viciously circular. For, this kind of explanation of emotion tries to give an explanation of an emotion *in terms* of the emotion. Fear is explained by reference to fearful circumstances and fearful behaviour. Expressions such as "hopeful circumstances" and "symptoms of hope" are freely (but necessarily) used in explaining the emotion-term 'hope'. This objection can be answered by saying that it is not necessary to use such expressions (e.g. fearful occasions and fearful behaviour) since this can be explained otherwise. But if the phenomenon in question can be explained otherwise, that is, if it is susceptible of different explanations, then why is this sort of explanation imposed on the phenomenon that can be adequately explained otherwise? Thus, the problem of circularity cannot be resolved just by saying that the expressions used in explaining emotion need not be used in that way. Wittgenstein and his followers thus fail to answer adequately this major objection against their claim the emotions have characteristic expression–behaviour.

Before discussing the most powerful objection against this claim of Wittgenstein, I intend to discuss another equally powerful objection The claim that each emotion has a characteristic expression–behaviour is just a wrong claim. It is true that emotions such as anger, fear, joy, etc., usually have a typical facial expressions. But, it is equally true that there are other emotions like love, contempt and pity which do not have any characteristic expression–behaviour. Take for example, love. If the beloved is happy and is flourishing, love is expressed in a smile, if the beloved is insulted, love is often expressed in a facial expression akin to that of anger—looking daggers; or again if the beloved is seriously ill, love is expressed in a cry. Thus, there is no expression typical or characteristic of love. This is also true of other emotions like contempt and pity.

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Wittgenstein's claim of typical expression—behaviour is, thus, a false claim. Kenny aptly remarks,

> there is, again, no particular form of behaviour which is characteristic of an emotion in the way in which eating is characteristic of hunger.[6]

2.1 As we have seen, Wittgenstein's last move in defence of his claim was to characterize the surroundings of the circumstances as fearful, hopeful, etc. He claimed that emotions are embedded in the surroundings and the circumstances. This observation is apparently very unfortunate for Wittgenstein's theory. The sorroundings, the circumstances themselves are not fearful, hopeful or joyful, but rather the agent's believing them as such makes them fearful, joyful, etc. The world is not directly related to the agent, it is related to the agent through his intentionality—in other words through his beliefs and thoughts. If the agent believes the circumstances to be dangerous, he is frightened An emotion generally depends on the agent's believing certain state of affairs to obtain or not to obtain. Also, the third person's ascription of an emotion to the subject depends upon his believing the subject's construal as a plausible construal of the object. Believing that the advancing bull is a serious danger to one's well–being, if the agent tries to avoid it the emotion fear should be ascribed to the agent only if the third person who ascribes fear to the subject of the emotion, also believes that the object construed as dangerous is really dangerous. If the third person does not believe the object as dangerous, the subject's behaviour may strike him as a deception rather than the expression of fear. Claire Armon–Jones says,

> *A fortiori,* the third–person's evaluation of an agent's emotion as warranted depends upon agreement over the agent's

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> construal as being a plausible construal of the object (e.g, that x can be construed as menacing or dangerous).[7]

Also for this reason, the behavioural evidence is not sufficient for the ascription of an emotion For, the interpretation of the behavioural evidence may vary from person to person.

Thus, the surroundings, or the circumstances are not themselves fearful, it is the agent's believing them to be so that makes them fearful or hopeful. Just as James spoke of the object as "exciting", Wittgenstein spoke of the circumstances as fearful and joyful. Also, for the above reason, it is clear that if the emotion is *embedded* anywhere, it is embedded in the agent's psychological state and not in the situation or in the surroundings. For, if it is embedded in a situation or in the surroundings, then in a given situation, as such, all subjects must experience the same emotion. But, obviously, this is not the case. James very correctly remarks,

> Jokes at which one explodes with laughter nauseate another, and seem blashphemous to a third. And occasions, which overwhelm me with fear or bashfulness are just what give you the full sense of ease and power (*Principles*, 449).

Further, there are dreams and other delusional states in which the surroundings are very different than what really are. My hoping in dream, that N N will come and give me some water before I die may have as its surroundings, the desert of Kalahari, whereas the *actual or the real* surroundings may be my boat-house in the middle of the Dal lake. Wittgenstein's claim that the emotion is embedded in a situation is, thus, obviously a wrong claim.

Another source of discontent is his unwillingness to define and to explicate the terms, the context, the surroundings and

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the circumstances. Undoubtedly, by bringing in the notions of the context, the surroundings and the circumstances, he correctly pointed out that an emotion has a temporal duration, that it is extended over a period of time however short the duration might be. Now, he did not further explicate clearly whether these surroundings, these circumstances are psychological, physical or both. From his scattered comments in the Investigations, it can be said that for him the context, the surroundings and the circumstances seem to be the situation in which the subject of the emotional experience is. He gives an example,

> Remember this case : if one urgently wants to make some remark, some objection in a discussion, it often happens that one opens one's mouth, draws a breath and holds it; if one then decides to let the objection go. one lets the breath out. The experience of this process is evidently the experience of veering towards saying something. Anyone who observes me will know that I wanted to say something and then thought better of it. In this situation, that is. – In a different one he would not interpret my behaviour, however characteristic of the intention to speak it may be in the present situation (*PI* 591).

Thus, it appears that for Wittgenstein, the present situation in which the person is, are the surroundings and the circumstances. However, his unwillingness to acknowledge and explain this interpretation of the terms in question, sometimes leads to confusion.

2.2 A Wittgensteinian counter-attack :

So far so good, a Wittgensteinian follower would retort in haste. It may be true that there is no characteristic facial expression of an emotion and that the surroundings or the circumstances are

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not themselves fearful or joyful. But this does not show that the surroundings or the circumstances are not significant in the explanation of an emotion. There is something uniquely true in Wittgenstein's analysis. Despite the above claims being true, the surroundings or the circumstances are still important and necessary for the explanation of an emotion. This is so, they would insist, because the subject's believing that his present psychological state is an emotional state is dependent on his being in a certain situation. They would say, one labels one's psychological state as an emotional state only after consulting the situation. The subject's beliefs, thus, depends on his circumstances and the surrondings. The surroundings and the circumstances are, thus, determinative and constitutive of an emotional state. Here, a Wittgensteinian follower sounds reasonable. But still, I think, there is something problematic about the claim that the subject's beliefs ultimately depend on the situation. If we analyse the nature of beliefs, we can distinguish between two kinds of beliefs –

(a) –beliefs regarding the situation (the Situation-beliefs) and,

(b) –beliefs regarding psychological state (the phenomenological beliefs). In a given situation, the agent believes the situation as dangerous. It is the agent's believing the situation or the circumstances as dangerous that makes the situation or the circumstances dangerous. For the sake of brevity, this first kind of belifs may be called *S-beliefs*. The second sort of beliefs are the phenomenological beliefs. These beliefs are about the psychological state of the subject. By holding these beliefs, the subject is able to identify his psychological state as an emotional state. These second sort of beliefs may be called *P-beliefs*. Now what a Wittgensteinian follower says is true of *P-beliefs* but not of *S-beliefs*. The *P-beliefs* are dependent on the circumstances or

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the surroundings; these beliefs about one's psychological state are dependent on the situation and his *S-beliefs*, but the *S-beliefs* are not dependent on the circumstances or the surroundings. The *S-beliefs*, as we have seen earlier, makes the circumstances or the surroundings as they are. It is the agent's believing the situation as dangerous that causes him to be frightended. The characterization of the circumstances or the surroundings as such is, thus, dependent on the *S-beliefs*, whereas, the agent's identifying a psychological state as an emotional state, his holding the *P-beliefs* is dependent on the circumstances or the surroundings. A Wittgensteinian proponent is, thus, not entirely justified in holding that the beliefs are dependent on the circumstances or surroundings. The *S-beliefs* are both independent of and constitutive of the circumstances and the surroundings.

Now the interesting question is, how and why Wittgenstein did not take into account this important fact that the characterization of the circumstances and the surroundings is dependent on the subject's *S-beliefs ?* Perhaps, Wittgenstein was led astray by his following remarks :

> Let us forget entirely that we are interested in the state of mind of a frightened man (*Z* 523).

This was fatal to Wittgenstein's analysis of emotion. The above remarks perhaps prevented him from taking into account the *S-beliefs* and the *P-beliefs*. For this reason, just as James went deeper and deeper beneath the skin to find out what an emotion is, Wittgenstein went out far beyond the countryside to find out what an emotion is. These above remarks forced him to hold that the circumstances and the surroundings in themselves are fearful, joyful, etc. This observation leads us to the final part of this essay.

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2.3 If the above argument is true (and indeed it is true), together with the fact (as we examined earlier) that Wittgenstein is wrong in arguing against James that emotions have a characteristic expression–behaviour, then how one can correctly claim that Wittgenstein has provided us with a new insight into the analysis of emotion? His critics, as we noted earlier, would still insist that Wittgenstein says nothing new. Here, I think, a Wittgensteinian follower can point out that such critics lack adequate knowledge of the theories of emotion, traditional or modern. It is true that the distinction between the object and the cause of an emotion is not a unique Wittgensteinian contribution, since Hume had already hinted at and made this crucial distinction (though perhaps in a naive and wrong way). But, none of Wittgenstein's predecessors, a Wittgensteinian follower can correctly claim, had pointed out the importance of the surroundings or the circumstances. The unique contribution of Wittgenstein was to point out this important fact that the surroundings or the circumstances should be accounted for in any analysis of emotion. As we saw earlier, a Wittgensteinian follower can correctly point out that the subject's *P–beliefs*, by holding which, the subject identifies his psychological state as an emotional state, are dependent in an important way on the situation. Also, he can say that though the *S–beliefs* are independent of the circumstances or the surroundings, those beliefs are about the circumstances or the surroundings. It is true that Wittgenstein ignored beliefs and was wrong in arguing that (a) there is a characteristic expression–behaviour (facial expression) and (b) the circumstances and the surroundings are in themselves fearful or joyful, but this should not undermine the validity of the claim that by emphasising the importance of the circum-

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stances or the surroundings, Wittgenstein has provided us with a new insight in this area.[8]

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NOTES

1. References to Wittgenstein's works are given in parentheses as follows : to *The Blue and Brown Books* by BB and the page number, to *Philosophical Investigations* by PI and the paragraph number in Part I or the page number in Part II; and to *Zettel* by Z and the paragraph number: to *Remarks on Philosophy of Psychology* as RPP and the page number, and to William James' *Principles of Psychology–II* as *Principles* and the page number.

2. Please refer to, Miyashitha, A., 1978, "Wittgenstein on Emotion" in *Wittgenstein and his impact on Contemporary Thought*, Holder & Co., Vienna, pp. 449-454, Kenny A., 1963, *Action, Emotion and Will*, Routledge and Kegan Paul Ltd.. p. 74 and Cannon W. B. in M Arnold (ed.) *The Nature of Emotion*, 1963, Penguin Books Ltd., pp. 43–52.

3. W. Lyons, 1980, "Emotions and Behaviour" in *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*, pp. 410-18, for the discussion of the issue of the verbal expression of an emotion, please refer to, W. Alston, 9967, "Expressing" in *Philosophy in America* ed. by Max Black, George Allen and Unwin, J. Benson, "Emotion and Expression" in *Philosophical Review* 76 (1967) pp. 335–357, and O. H. Green, "The Expression of Emotion", *MIND*, July, 1970.

4. Lyons, W., *Ibid.*, p. 412.

5. Green O. H., *Ibid.*, p. 552.

6. Kenny, A., *op cit*, p. 48.

7. C. Armon-Jones, 'The Thesis of Constructionism' in *The Social Construction of Emotions* ed., by R. Harre. Basil Blackwell Ltd., (Oxford, 1986), p. 43.

8. The author is thankful to Dr. T. C. Potts, Mr. Chris Coope and John Rae for their helpful comments on the earlier version of this essay.

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PROLOGUE

Sorry Plato : but you should have seen it coming. What with every hollywood superhit being followed by at least one (if not two or three) sequels, you couldn't have expected your classic work to go unsequelled. And if you saw how sharply the quality dropped from the original movie to the sequel, you wouldn't froth quite so much in the mouth just because I've borrowed a title you've used first. It wasn't my doing that the country of which I'm a citizen took the title of 'Republic'. Since I'm writing about my country, what better heading could I choose ?

Ths 'dialogue' has obvious advantages in dealing with matters which have no simple solutions and where differing points of view can be argued with almost equal force. Though the approach favoured by the writer does get preferential treatment, the dialectical process gives the reader freedom to pursue independently, terms of the argument that may have received inadequate attention in the exposition.

This dialogue deals with some of the psycho–social impediments to India's economic growth. It broadly remains within the boundaries of the concepts and categories that emerged in the NIAS lecture programme held in January–February 1989, but lest the propositions and ideas appear too fanciful or wayward, several of them have been linked to the bibliography appended at the end of the dialogue (from where they have, in

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fact, been shamelessly plagiarised almost verbatim). The list of references is short, considering the breadth of topics covered. This is because the references have been mainly confined to books accessed in the first three weeks of the lecture series; the challenge being to extract the most out of the reading time available to a NIAS participant and to write it up before the course ended.

The problems facing India require multilateral thinking. It is, therefore, inevitable that a discussion on any of these problems should range across several disciplines. Not only is this in keeping with the spirit of NIAS, there is a presumptuous hope that some of the interdisciplinary issues left unresolved in this paper will provide subject-matter for a few of the future projects of the Institute.

Appropriately enough, the participants in the dialogue are supposed to be from the group attending the NIAS lecture course. Equally appropriately, they are not meant to characterise a particular participant but the Platonic 'universal ideas' of different points of view. Naturally, then, the errors or excesses of the participants in the dialogue should not be attributed to any lecturer or participant of NIAS programme.

The mames of those participating in the dialogue are (in order of speaking) :

DEV, KIRAN, RAHIM, CHUBBLES, ADLER & WENDY

Abbr : (D) (K) (R) (C) (A) W)

The argument is divided into Books, each of which is intended to have an internal unity. Those, who find the length of the full dialogue forbidding, could choose to read one or more Books without too much loss of continuity.

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"Come, then, let us create a city, from the begining, in our theory. Its real creator, as it appears, will be our need." [1]

BOOK I

DEV : So, Kiran, have the Economics lectures put you in the proper frame of mind to understand the Annual Central Government Budget ?

KIRAN : Who's bothered ? These budgets are full of populist twaddle at the best of times and in an election year, everyone will fall over themselves in giving handouts. You can't blame them either. The economy has far more going wrong with it than a budget can cure. It's like giving Crocin for cancer. Let me tell you something : unless we achieve a solid economic growth over a sustained period, we're in deep trouble. And we have a 2000 year history of political decline caused by overstressing the collection of revenue without extending the activities leading to revenue.[2]

D : That's exactly the trap our planners walk into. Right from the time of Mahalanobis, the planners have been busy drawing up pretty mathematical models which just don't fit the untidy reality of this country.

RAHIM : Come, come, aren't you being a little unfair ? Granted a few of the assumptions made by the planners were unrealistic, they have given the country an infrastructural base which is the envy of our neighbours.

D : Instead of sounding like an Onida TV advertisement, suppose you list out the 'few' assumptions that went wrong. I'm sure it will take you an hour if you are honest about it.

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R : Not really. In fact, the only real thing that didn't come up to expectations was the output from investments we had made.

D : And he calls it 'only'. My friend, that's an omnibus phrase which wraps up all the failings of our economy.

CHUBBLES : Hold on a minute. There were a couple of other things that didn't pan out the way they were expected to in the early years of planning. Firstly, we added to our population faster than was anticipated; secondly, no one had quite thought 'leakages' would claim such a hefty share of the nation's earnings.

ADLER : So we have three great impediments to economic growth already listed. Why don's we analyse them and see if they're as remedyless as they seem ? For instance, why has corruption become so endemic in our system ?

D : There's nothing new about it. Do you know what Cornwallis, who was Governor General 200 years back, wrote : 'Every native of India, I verily believe, is corrupt.' [3]

C : Less corrupt than his countrymen who were busy bleeding the country white at that time – and afterwards too.

K : Be that as it may. Today the level of corruption in our country is so high that someone has estimated it would be enough to wipe out the massive deficit in the central and state budgets.

A : What worries me is that it's not just corruption in the mometary sense. We seem to have more than our share of 'Kamchors' too.

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C : But that really takes us back to Rahim's initial point about our dismal capital : output ratio. The poor productivity Adler mentioned is the root cause of this ratio continuing to drag our economic performance down. Linked to it, of course, is the enormous waste of resources and pervasive lack of accountability. Topping everything is a lack of concern for time : as if we had all eternity to do things. It's difficult to visualise how these attitudes will change.

WENDY : It's very simple, pal. Send them for a course on motivation : there are any number of consultants who can arrange it.

C : Aren't you being a little simplistic Wendy ? If the answer were so easy, wouldn't we all be sitting in the clover already ?

D : In fact, it's not just that there's no easy answer. There's no answer at all. Not unless our climate changes, that is. All our problems, including the stifling caste system, the reluctance to change and, above all, our bone laziness, are because of the climate in our country.[4] And short of airconditioning it from end to end, there's nothing we can do.

R : I hope you were not serious about that argument, Dev It's the nature of the race and not the climate that makes all the difference. As Herder pointed out : if different kinds of men are placed in the same environment, they will exploit the resources of that environment in different ways and thus create different kinds of civilisation.[5]

A : You know of course, Rahim, that this patently absurd primacy given to race has caused wars and untold

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misery to humankind. I won't have you raise it even for putting down Dev's claptrap about climate

W : You're all getting needlessly excited. If you want to hear something funny, I'll tell you what some jaurnalist once wrote : It's because so many Indians are vegetarians that they don't really exert themselves.

D : I don't know about the vegetarian part but I do think this 'ahiṁsā' business has sapped our fibre. Even the great Emperor Ashoka's empire crumbled because 'ahiṁsā' had emasculated his army.

C : Sorry to have to correct you, Dev, but that's a bit of historical distortion, isn't it ? Ashoka's non-violence was not of such an unrealistic nature and he didn't weaken his army.[6] If we are going to come up with any worthwhile answers, we will have to dig a little deeper into the Indian mind.

D : Oh, come now. Surely you're not going to blitz us with some Hegelian concept of historical events emerging from thought.[7]

C : No, but I do believe that ideas and sentiments that are elaborated by a collectivity, have an ascendancy and an authority that cause the particular individuals who think them and believe in them to represent them in the form of moral forces that dominate them and sustain them. Such collective representations becomes autonomous and have the power to attract and repel each other and to form various syntheses among themselves.[8]

W : Look guya, it's getting late. Chubbles, I suggest you put forward your depictation of the Indian mind tomorrow.

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BOOK II

K : Well, Chubbles, we know what you're going to say : that the concept of '*māyā*' is what makes us all feel it's no use pursuing any worldly affairs since all is in any case illusory.

R : If indeed he was planning to say that, he should give it another thought. In his recent paper, Dr. Raja Ramanna has suggested that since *māyā* comes from the root 'mā', meaning measurement, instead of translating it as 'illusion' it could alternatively be translated as 'immeasurable'.[9]

D : Which meaning, of course, could be a pointer to the shoddiness of India goods, since quality is so greatly dependent on measurement.

A : I think you're jumping to an unwarranted conclusion. In its origin 'Māyā' had an almost exact parallel with the English word 'craft'. That's not going to lead to poor quality.

D : Yes, but we all know that by the time of the Upaniṣads the ancient wisdom – action complex depicted by 'māyā' had been degraded and the word stood close to 'avidyā' in contract to 'jñāna' or genuine knowledge.[11]

C : Let us not spend too much time on a metaphysical concept like *māyā*. I think '*Karma*' has more relevance in establishing a source for our day-to-day behaviour. When people say things like : 'Indians are more intelligent but less result-oriented than people from Hong Kong', it's not because Indians don't have goals. Rather, to reach their avowed goals, they

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must enlarge the inner world rather than act on the outer one The injuction inherent in the *Karma* doctrine is to accept and use outer reality for inner development rather than to strive to alter worldly realities. Hence, the indifferent respect given to scientists and professionals compared to the unequivocal reverence for spiritual 'gurus'.[12] Hence also, the fact that time for us, does not have the impersonal and objective (to the point of being coercive and driving) quality it has for the average Wesrerner.[13] And, of course *Karma* is also a convenient alibi for actions which would otherwise come in for social censure. Thus, instead of acknowledging and working through conflicting emotions and thoughts and actions which contravene moral norms, the tendency is to attribute them to the 'saṁskars', the innate constitutional dispositions.[14]

R : I think the *Gītā* effectively rebuts the charge of 'inaction' which you are attempting to build up against Indians. The *Gītā* postulates that it is impossible to stop action which must in fact be performed with *śradhā* and skill. You are only asked to act without anticipating pleasure or pain.

C : I have a sneaking suspicion the *Gītā* attempted to insist on action because the tradition of thought till then seemed to lead to absolute inactivity – and looking around us one can't be too certain the *Gītā* succeeded in reversing the trend. In a sense one can understand why it would be difficult for the layman to practice the *Gītā* philosophy. By eliminating considerations of pleasure and pain, it removes what are the mainsprings of action for the bulk of humankind.

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Similarly, in the *Yoga* scheme of things, the tantalising possibility of *Siddhis* is perhaps intended to attract ordinary men. The Catch-22 comes in the formal injunction prohibiting the practitioner from desiring such powers or ever using them. Thus, there is created a dichotomy between what is actually necessary to get a man to act and what is considered an acceptable goal of action : One connot openly admit or benefit from the fruits of power.

A : Given the *Sāṁkhya* underpinning to *Yoga*, it is not surprising action is at a discount. After all, highest ideal is *Puruṣa* : an inactive obsever who gives meaning to things (is that why we like to go on talking without doing anything ?) There is a subtle downgradation of the active/female principle of *Prakṛti* and *Rajas*,, which is its moving component, must be stilled. The eternal reality is timeless (why worry about a deadline here or there in the world of sensation ?) and one is accountable only to oneself for the process for self–realisation which is the ultimate goal. Perhaps a demanding external God has given a sense of accountability to a larger proportion of the population in the West than we have here.

K : You have built a huge castle without taking into account the injunction to action implicit in the *āśramadharma* cycle of *brahmacarya, gārhasthya, vānaprastha* and *saṁnyāsa.*[14] *Gārhasthya* is an integral part of the scheme.

A : But don't you see, the end goal is still withdrawal from the social process and everything else has to be a preparation for withdrawal ? The very fact that there

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was a short circuit to renunciation possible without going through the householder stage implied that withdrawal was the supervening goal. And over the years, withdrawal has become our 'society-defence-mechanism' number one. Withdrawal from the unpleasant hurly-burly of life goes a long way to explaining current-day phenomena like the brain-drain.

D : You may have a point there. The emphasis is on *svadharama* (autonomy) and it's only a pious hope that since you are in tune with the whole universe (*anukaṁpā*), the action will be in keeping with the cosmic will. The individual has no responsibility for social cohesion. Socially speaking, the thrust for realisation is passive. In fact, it was the Christian missionaries who reactivated us into active philanthropy.[16] The basic selfishness of the desire for self-realisation perhaps underlies the success of the green revolution and the failure of the industrial revolution in India.

K : What is the point of talking to you ? All of you have missed the essential dynamism of Indian philosophy. You need a much deeper understanding before you can analyse its impact.

A : Perhaps that's true, Kiran, but we're not really speaking of the effect of Hindu thought on the minority of intellectuals who have understood its essence. Our interest lies in tracing its impact on the population of the country at large : population in which intellectuals who truly understand Hindu Philosophy forms very, very small part.

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K : You keep talking about Hindu philosophy. India is not only full of Hindus. What about Muslims, what about Budhists ?

R : I don't know about Budhists but I'm afraid Muslim thought as it evolved was no more conducive to modern economic enterprise than Hindu thinking. It directed the conduct of life into paths whose effect was plainly opposite to the methodical control of life found among Puritans, who were among the most successful in managing business affairs[17] What is more, Muslims too fell prey to the constricting effects of caste, which further depressed the economic capability of the society.

K : That's the second time someone has denigrated the caste system. Aren't we accepting without question someone else's conclusion about the pernicious effects of caste ? Let's go into it ourselves.

W : By all means, but not right now. We need some rest before we enter that labyrinth.

BOOK III

K : Sometimes I find it difficult to understand all the uproar over caste. People should be grateful for the division of labour that has been worked out, with each man expected to specialise in his own occupation. How is it any different from the Protestant concept of 'calling' which man has to accept as a divine ordinance, and to which he must adapt himself ?[8] If it could lead Protestants to economic prosperity, why won't it do the same for us ?

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C : 'A little knowledge is a dangerous thing...' In the first place, it was not the Lutheran concept of 'calling' alone that was responsible for the Puritan attitude to work. It was the Calvinistic view that one had an absolate duty to consider oneself chosen and to combat all doubts as temptations of the devil, since lack of self-confidence was thought to be the result of imperfect faith and hence of imperfect grace.[19] In to order attain that self–confidence, intense worldly activity was recommended as the most suitable means. It and it alone was thought capable of dispersing religious doubts and giving the certainty of grace.[20] In this sense, good works became the technical means, not of purchasing salvation, but of getting rid of the fear of damnation.[21] Nor is this the only way in which the Puritan ethic differs from our caste system. Form the viewpoit of economic organisation, a very important difference is the attitude to changes in occupations. Puritanism replies affirmatively to the question of one person combining several callings, if it is for the common good or one's own, and not injurious to anyone. Even a change of calling is by no means regarded as objectionable, if it is not thoughtless and is made for the purpose of pursuing a calling more pleasing to God, which means, according to them, more useful.[22] The contrasts with our caste system and the implications for industrial organisation (where flexibility and deployability are crucial) and restructuring (say in the context of 'sunset' industries) are obvious. In fact, the rigidity of our 'jātis' impede not just economic growth but the solidarity of society as a whole. After all, the

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division of labour only produces solidarity when and insofar as it is spontaneous. It supposes not only that individuals are not relegated by force to determinate functions, but also that no obstacle, of whatever nature, prevents them from occupying the place in the social framework that is compatible with their faculties.[23] It is no wonder then that *Karma*, fatalism and caste rigidities build on each other. After all, fatalism (which is really the converse of anomie) comes from an excess of regulation or the unavoidable and inflexible character of a rule over which one is powerless.[24] The degree of permanency enjoyed by this manner of structuring society was because these inequalities not only existed in fact but were also accepted as legitimate.[25] In fact, the definitive *Artha-śāstra* treatise specifies maintenance of social order, which included making the castes stick to their occupations, as the chief function of the king.[26]

A : That's quite a forceful statement you've made, Chubbles, but you've not included a very important point. The reason the caste system throttles economic progress is because of the very low esteem in which it holds all economic activity. Even before Ashoka's time, the vaiśyas, though theoretically included among the dvija or twice born, were in practice generally treated contemptuously.[27] And it is not as if they were politically downgraded alone. They were made to feel low. Remember, the hierarchical caste system is built around the opposition of purity and pollution.[28] And one must not forget that the skilled craftsmen's śreṇī was put into the śūdra varṇa :[29] still closer to the polluted end of the continuum.

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It is no surprise then that even today 'profit' is treated as a dirty word and industry is considered a relatively tainted calling. Contrast this with the Puritan view that the acquisition of wealth is not only morally permissible but actually enjoined.[30] The Puritan attitude created an atmosphere where a businessman felt absolutely clear in his conscience about making money, so long as it took place legally.[31] Apart from the obvious conclusions, God knows how much the overt denigration of money has led to covert money–making and contributed to corruption in our country. Not only was the brāhmaṇa who dealt openly in money–matters looked down upon, there was a time when investment and saving were discouraged, since they implied a reduetion in the outlays on rituals which the brahmins benefited from.[32] A society which looks down on saving and investment can place severe limitations on the creation and maintenance of an economically healthy state.[33]

K : Your theories are really meant for the dustbin. If all was as dreary as you have mentioned, how did India have its 'Golden ages', for instance under Ashoka and Akbar ?

A : Whatever Golden ages we had, if indeed one can use that term, were not known for any great economic advancemcnt of the general masses. And the two specific emperors you have mentioned were known for the inroads they had made in derating the caste system. In fact, Ashoka gave considerable support to the Budhists, who along with the Jainas made it possible and socially acceptable for businessmen to use their wealth for non–ritual purposes.[34] The Budhists

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endorsed the status of the financier and did not disapprove usury.[35] They provided an ethic in support of simple living and the investment of wealth.[36] To push the argument further, one may even venture to state that relatively low caste-feeling, characterises states which are economically prosperous today. While states with a history of wet rice cultivation, e.g. in the South and East, have been typified by a relatively tall caste hierarchy, Punjab and Haryana have had relatively simple caste hierarchies.[37] One could also imagine that it was the influence of the Jainas that created an atmosphere conducive to trading and business in Gujarat.[39]

R : To take your hypotheses about the unorthodox sects like Buddhism and Jainism further, do you think we would have been more dynamic in economic terms if Ashoka had been successful in establishing Buddhism permanently as the majority religion in India ?

A : I'm afraid my prognosis wouldn't be as optimistic as that. While Buddhism provided a more palatable alternative for the businessman compared to the demeanment that was in store for him in the Brahmanical caste system, Buddhism itself was not totally attuned to the values of worldly business. For instance, Buddhism continued to encourage, perhaps with a view to containing dissent, the tradition of renunciation.[39] All rational, purposive activity was regarded as leading away from salvation, except of course the subjective activity of concentrated contemplation, which empties the soul of the passion for

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life and every connection with worldly interests There is no path leading from this consistent position of world–flight to any economic ethic or any rational social ethic.[40] Thus, once again we see a beautiful superstructure erected in Indian philosophy on a base that cannot and is not meant to take the load of intense social intercourse needed for organised economic activity Eliminating desires is like removing the mainspring from a watch : the parts may still fit perfectly and the whole appear attractive – but there will be nothing to make it run. As Rousseau wrote : "What then constitutes human wisdom or the path true happiness ? It is precisely not to diminish our desires, for if they were less than our powers, a part of our faculties would remain idle and we would not be in enjoyment of all our being ... Only ... with all his forces in play, will man's mind still be at peace and will he be well regulated." [41]

C : In any case, Brahmanism exercised Buddhism by a twin attack It wielded very astutely its capability for legitimising rulers.[42] More importantly, it enveloped Buddhism itself in its fold.

D ; Sounds like cellular evolution with cells proceeding to absorb mitochondria along the way.

C : Well, I don't know if I can accept the parallel with serial endosymbiosis Buddhism, of course, continued as an independent sect, though with a truly Indian capacity for intellectual compromise it too tried to gain support where it could. By associating itself with magical cults, much of its original ethical thinking was further submerged in ritual.[43]

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D : Boy ! The guys at Coca-Cola should have learned from this the danger of positioning your product too close to the competitor's. They wouldn't then have goofed into changing and making the coke formula so close to Pepsi. Come on, all this talk must have made you thirsty, let's order something cool to drink.

BOOK IV

R ; I've been thinking a lot over what we've spoken and it's really helped me get a better perspective on our situation. But one thing worries me. I can't flaw the logic of our analysis but it does strike me that our progress through history can't have been all that different compared to societies that are today economically advanced.

K : You have a good point there, Rahim. It appears to me that till approximately the end of the Moghul period, the economic condition of Indian society was no better or worse than anywhere else in the world. If we were to focus on what went wrong after that, we would be in a better position to understand our problems.

D : I agree fully. Enough of these 2000–year–old philosophies and castes.

C : Well, I'm not sure the last 300 years can be understood without reference to the past. But, Kiran, I think the answer to your query is fairly straightforward. The gap between us and the advanced European nations started widening with the increasing momentum of their industrial revolution which just seemed to pass us by.

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K : You mean it was made to pass us by because it suited the British to have a raw-material source and a market-sink for their produce without the possibility of competition which industrialisation would have brought. And they planted enough disunity to make sure nothing of the kind of effervescence which, for instance, galvanised the whole French nation under Nepoleon, ever took place here. Perhaps the most lasting damage they did to our prospective industrialisation was the legacy of labour legislation they left behind. It's small consolation that the same type of legislation put them for many years at the end of the field among the industrially advanced nations.

C : There's mueh in what you say. Kiran, but would you not agree that we share at least part of the blame for our slow industrial progress ?

D : I've been reading a book on the heroes of the industrial revolution in various countries It appears to me that every one of them is characterised by a strong combination of entrepreneurial drive and down-to-earth technical innovativeness invariably accompanied by the ability to tinker and build with their own hands. The development of the steam engine, the revolutionary improvements in textile machinery or farm equipment, all came from men like these Even in this century, we've had giants like Henry Ford and Soichiro Honda, who didn't hesitate to dirty their hands in building and improving products which they divined were needed. Now I wonder how this, compared with our attitudes which, right since the emergence of the leisured class in the post-vedic society, looks upon manual labour as slavish-the mark of the

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Śūdra.[44] Even the rural rich have always tended to avoid manual work;[45] the actual work of cultivation was done by the peasant who was generally of the śūdra caste.[46] This was so in feudal Europe too, but our system was more entrenched in the values of the people themselves and hence more lasting.[47] According to some commentaries on Manu, mechanical work was a minor sin.[48] The typical brahmanical education denigrated technical knowledge.[49] Partly this was done to keep those with technical knowledge and skills relatively powerless.[50] Whatever be the reason, when castes were arranged from the purest to the most poliuting, those not actually involved in production would always claim higher status.[51] It would appear, then that our society was not too favourably inclined to the inventor – entrepreneur who was lionised in Western society and who contributed (along with others similarly inclined to manual work and innovation, though perhaps not equal in genius) to the industrial revolution.

W : Looking at it another way, could one say that by the 17th century the pattern of both Brahmin and Muslim education had become inward–looking and the sweep of Renaissance thinking passed them by.

D : The trouble was we thought ourselves so perfect that no one could teach us anything. What Alberuni observed so long ago is still an impediment to the process of education in our country ; "... The Indians believe that there is no country but theirs, no nation like theirs, no king like theirs, no religion like theirs, no science like theirs. They are by nature niggardly in communicating what they know, and they take the

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greatest possible care to withhold it from men of another caste among their own people."[52]

W : May be I'm getting a little fanciful but could it be that withdrawal of the senses involved in most Indian paths to realisation led to an essentially anti-empirical set which retarded the type of thinking needed for technology to grow. The Baconian revolution passed us by. May be that is why some of our engineers even today are more comfortable dealing with analytical concepts and find it a strain relating them to empirical reality.

C : That's what we ourselves seem to be doing, isn't it? But while we are being fanciful, let me come out with another line of reasoning. We have always prided ourselves on the marriage between thought and practice in Indian philosophising. Could this have proved to be our Achilles' heel? When the educational system bogged down thought, as Wendy has been pointing out, even the practicalities of technology could not progress. By contrast, the empiricist tradition in the west was not restrained by the yoking of thought and practice and could let one or the other go ahead as occasion demanded. For instance, take Hume, who, despite his brilliantly reasoned skepticism, could advise (and live himself) a successful practical life.[53] And then, of course, there's Ryle's more recent assertion that knowing how to do things is independent of and more fundamental than knowing certain things are the case.[54]

W : What's with you, Adler? You've been keeping unusually quiet for some time.

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A : I've just been mulling over the problem Rahim and Kiran have defined : of understanding how and why we started diverging from industrialised societies. But my thoughts are not yet clear : may be we could meet again tomorrow.

BOOK V

A : Since our talk yesterday, I've been trying to analyse why the knowledge explosion since the Renaissance did not rejuvenate thinking in India. And I've come to the conclusion such knowledge didn't really pass us by.

D : Are you suggesting our technology kept pace with that in Europe ?

A : No, I've not become bold enough to take such liberties with historical facts.

In the first place, of course, it's true that we were not as favourably placed as any European country to experience the cross-currents of fresh thought sweeping across their continent. But what is perhaps more important is the fact that we simply absorbed whatever little currents came our way.

K : But isn't that what assimilation of knowledge and technology are all about ?

A : I'm afraid I didn't mean 'absorb' in quite that sense. Let me give a parallel. When two people have differing points of view, they can either reason them out so that there is one conclusion which has the best of both arguments or they can pretend that there is really no fundamental difference. In the latter case, some fancy footwork may be required for rewording

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the terms or making minor adjustments; but then that is always possible in subjects which are complex enough to deal with real-world issues. If I may be excused for using dialectical terms, I would say that our infinite spirit of compromise just didn't allow an anti-thesis to develop – we merged it into the thesis immediately. There was, therefore, never a question of genuine synthesis emerging between our thought and the new traditions from the West. Because we feel uncomfortable with confrontation, we just chopped and changed enough to get a merger or absorption. Unfortunately, even between people, brushing conflicts under the table doesn't always give the best results (though compromise is genuinely valuable there) – in the world of ideas it can be fatal.

D : That's true you know. Like Chubbles gave the example a while back, of the Brahmanical religion converting the Buddha, who headed an antithetical sect, into a manifestation of Viṣnu himself In the process, it even converted itself to vegetarianism." And why go so far back : even today, if you enter a Philosophy class in India, you will find the students hard at work in fitting every single concept of modern philosophy into the 2000-year-old but continually cobbled and still absorbent structure of Indian Philosophy.

C : What happens in our Philosophy classes doesn't worry me. But what Adler has said can have enormous implications for the development of Indian thinking. If I reinterpret it in Kuhnian terms, it implies that we are just unable to discard a paradigm that has outlived its usefulness and go through the

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intellectual turmoil of a scientific revolution.[56] It speaks volumes, of course, for the subtlety of the Indian intellect, both in explaining away the anomalies and in keeping track of the intensely complicated system that resulted. To put it differently, if we were put in charge of astronomical developments, we would still be running the Ptolemaic system. We would have chipped it and touched it up and added riders and qualifications till hardly a handful of living men could have waded through its intricacies; the Copernican system would have had its own small place as a rider or as a manifestation of something else – the teeth of its incommensurability with the vast body of the main theory would have been painlessly extracted; there would have been peace all round and Galileo would have retired as a prosperous purohita. Forgive me for getting carried away; but this really is a very important point.

K : And how, pray, does it relate to the economic problems we are discussing ?

C ; Don't you see – it's all very well to conceptualise away contradictions when nothing more important than the prize in a disputation depends on the outcome. There is no test one way or another. But the real world of science, technology and industry doesn't respond to wishes and empty constructs – especially not those which have their contradictions woven into them. Our supple minds can help us explain away the contradictions, but the productivity of our science and of our industries will not improve until we overcome our single-paradigm-fixation.

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A : Peculiarly enough, this same tolerance of contradiction which is so fatal to intellectual activity also has a correspondence in social life : it permits castes of differing habits to survive in the same society. Where the West would approve or exclude, we assign a rank in the hierarchy.[57]

K : So you admit that beacause of the caste system, rivals are not forced to eliminate one another, but can co-exist. Thus, it permits the survival of a greater number of individuals who, in more homogeneous societies, would be condemned to disappear.[58]

A : What I meant was ...

K : Don't interrupt me please. I'm tired of hearing constant criticism of our past. Are you all too blind to see the fantastic opportunity that awaits India with the coming of the New Post-Industrial age ?[59] And in the explosion of the knowledge-industries lies our chance to exploit the very white-collar, non-manual-work attitudes you have been criticising. If we play our cards well, there's no reason we can't start catching up with countries like Japan and US. See what Japan has done in the last 40 years All it needs is a little more national pride and a little less 'small-nation-syndrome'.

C : Easy, Kiran. We're all equally proud of our country but if we're to examine the psychosocial impediments to our economic growth, we can't remain self-adulatory throughout.[60] None of us has any argument with your proposal that we should exploit the increasing importance of the knowledge industries. Speaking for myself, however, I would like to ques-

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tion whether this alone can cure our ills. Quite apart from the economic feasibility of a country like ours opting out of the manufacturing sector, we should see whether any of the problems that have afflicted manufacturing industries would dog us when we turn to the service sector. Maybe we should all give a thought to what really sets us apart from the Americans and Japanese whom Kiran rightly held up as benchmarks. Let's sleep over it and meet tomorrow.

BOOK VI

W : It's nice seeing everyone look so rested. Let's hope you remain calm throughout the discussion. So who's got bright new insights ?

R : Before we get on with our comments on Japanese, American and Indian societies, I'd like to suggest a scheme of categorisation which is slightly different from the usual bipolar classification. I think we should look at the attitudes each of these societies have to the individual (I), the small collective (S) which would range from the family and clan upto the immediately perceived caste or tribe, and finally the large collective (L) best typified perhaps by the nation–state and extending down to the large corporations where a substantial number of members are not known to any one person.

D : Seems an interesting approach. Maybe comparisons would be eased if we gave each society 10 points to distribute among the 3 categories suggestsd by Rahim. We could then judge the relative importance they attach to (I), (S) and (L), depending on the

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points each receives. Maybe someone could draw bars representing our judgement in each case.

W : I'll do that on the board. Let me start with the Japanese. Half their life at least is devoted to country and corporation, so 5 out of their 10 points should be allotted to (L). They're fairly committed to their immediate social groups, so we could give them 3 points for (S). Their own individuality they seem to emphasize least, so only the last 2 out of the 10 points should go to (I).

A : There's no quarrel with your prioritisation. Lest we get carried away by the pseudo-commensurality numbers can inspire, we should take note of some interesting attitudes the Japanese have to each of these categories. The relatively low score we've put against (I) shouldn't hide the fact that in fact the Japanese are highly competitive from a very young age.[61] However, they are also capable of transferring this feeling of competitiveness from an individual basis to the level of the large institutions of which they are members. Compared to us, of course, it's a little easier for them to think of the whole nation rether than one particular race or tribe. This is because racially and culturally they are the most homogeneous of the world's major nations.[62]

C : Don't get carried away by the racial homogenity, Adler. What is more to our purpose is that Japanese society is not horizontally stratified by class or caste as much as it is stratified vertically by institution or group of institutions.[63] Each of these institutions is a relatively independent economic entity – unlike a jāti, which is an occupational group dependent on

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other occupational groups for completing an economically meaningful task.[64] Thus, when a Japanese transfers his competitive impulse to the institution it is translated into a powerful thrust for economic progress.[65] Very obviously, these characteristics assist the development of the feeling for the state as a whole and were an essential basis for Japan's industrialisation.[66] That's as far as the large collectivity is concerned. Interestingly enough, while the Japanese have strong cohesive ties with the small groups to which they belong, these do not extend to a clan, caste or community outside their immediate sphere of interaction.[67] As a result of what one may call the principles of 'localism' and 'tangibility', which govern Japanese behaviour, clan/caste, ties which could have diverted loyalty from the large economic or state institutions are weakened.

D : Enough about the Japanese. Wendy, will you note my point allocation for the Americans. They're strongly conscious of their individuality, so I'll give 5 points to (I). They also seem to have a fair degree of loyalty to country, but not so much to the corporations to which they belong – so a score of 3 in category (L) may be a fair compromise. They couldn't care less for almost anything else, so we'll leave 2 for (S).

K : All these point games are fine, but they gloss over the fact that the Americans today are almost as far as can be from the Protestant Ethic virtues of thrift, hard work and non-indebtedness. What then has happened to all the precepts enunciated by Benjamin Franklin,

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which were considered so quintessential of the Spirit of Capitalism.[68]

D : Obviously enough, that's the reason why countries like Japan and Korea are giving the Americans a good run for their money. Unfortunately, there's not much for us to gloat about. If the average American worker has come far from the Puritan ethic, I'm afraid the average Indian worker has never even come so close. Not his fault of course. The traditionalist attitude of which the caste system is a continuing reminder is inimical to the possibility of rationalising the method of production, which is basic to all modern national technology, or the possibility of systematically organising a commercial enterprise along the lines of a rational business economy.[69] More importantly for the future, perhaps as a result of emphasizing individualism, the US seems to enjoy a creativity edge in technology over most other nations. This will stand it in very good stand as the knowledge industries come into their own. Since you were suggesting a major share for India in these industries, Kiran, perhaps you will now understand the concern we were expressing about our being caught in a stultifying paradigm. Hey, Wendy, what have you done ?

(She has finished making the entries for India, and the blackboard now has a chart on the lines shown below).

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

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

K : Would you mind explaining why 3 of the 4 points allocated in the individual category for India are shown below the line ?

W : Well, I thought it would be a rather neat way of depicting the fact that while we are as individually oriented (I won't go so far as to say selfish) as anyone else, we seem to be rather ashamed in admitting it. Metaphysically, we try and merge our identity with the infinite; sociologically, we subordinate the self to the group; [70] and economically, we feel so guilty about providing for the self, that many in our society who really make large sums of money, feel unashamed to accept it only 'under the table'. So I thought it rather appropriate to show the larger part of our concern for ourselves 'under the line',

A : I certainly agree with the preponderance you have shown for the small collectivity. The psychological reality of the Indian family extends well beyond an

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individual lifetime and jāti is second only to the extended family as a pervasive social dimension of ideatity in India.[71]

In fact, one can picture the evolution of societies in terms of the diffusion of the energies which are initially totally self–centered. Evolution, of course, ensures that only those societies survive where the energies of self–preservation extend to cover the small group or clan. At the next stage of diffusion of energy, say from the clan to the state, evolution is not so ruthless. Of course, it exacts an economic penalty from societies which cannot redirect energies from the immediate group to the impersonal institution. Right from the time political ideas developed in India, the loyalty, which in most other cultures is given to the state, was given to the social order.[72] Inevitably, we have paid a price for this fixation (to an earlier stage of societal evolution) both in political and in economic terms.

K : That's all very well. But I'd like to go back to the fact that we were no worse off than any other country till around the 17th century. If our 'small–collective–fixation' is really as great an impediment as you make it out to be, why did it wait till 300 years ago to make itself felt ?

A : A very pertinent observation indeed. The answer, I think, lies in the fact that it's only the modern nation–state and the technology of the industrial age that demand the type of organisation which our small–collective orientation does not encourage. Till the 17th

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century, it didn't matter whether social structure could support modern industrial organisation or not. Afterwards, of course, it determined which societies would industrialise and how fast.

C : At the same time, let's not forget, Adler, that this same profile gave our civilisation its stability over millenia. Whether through the conscious design of those who were supposedly responsible for the social order or through a process of natural selectivity for the most stable order, we acquired a structure which ideally suited the objective of longevity for the civilisation with which it was linked. After all, our type of a world–view and caste hierarchy provides an unobtrusive mechanism for defusing energy which could have otherwise led to revolution and turbulence Even if it meant underutilising the potential of the vast majority of the population it didn't matter – as long as all other societies also didn't have the means to or the technology requiring better organisation. It was only when they could start tapping a larger proportion of the energies available in the population that our approach of spiritual withdrawal and water-tight social fragmentation started being a handicap. Prior to this, the only other times when inability to draw on the energy of the masses would have hurt us, would have been at the time of foreign invasions. Our relative inability to resist these is perhaps an indication this hypothesis is not totally baseless.

K : You're right. Even with hindsight, it's difficult to devise a psycho–social system better adapted to ensure stability with prosperity for the elite and quiescence from the rest. It was aesthetically pleasing, logically

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consistent and gave psychologically satisfying answers to some of the eternally recurring questions of mankind. It reduced stress in the social structure by bleeding it of energy rather than through coercive controls.

D : It was also unfalsifiable in its essence and therefore, scientifically meaningless.[73] Relying on this sterling quality the elite ensured its own perpetuation with ruthless disregard for the bulk of the populace as if the whole of society was meant only for propelling and advancing the cause of these select few.[74] If we want mass progress, all this old luggage must go. How long can we remain chained to the Hindu growth rate ?

K : Dev, I sometimes wonder which side of sanity you stand on. Do you not understand that the constancy of the Hindu growth rate is only one of the external indicators of a critical homeostatic mechanism in our society. You are closer to the truth than you realise, when you say our psychosocial set conditions this mechanism and thus predetermines economic growth. It is also true that, our social beliefs contain contradiction (and don't contradictions arise in much simpler social systems too ?)[75]. But if you sincerely believe that destroying this mental set will push up the growth rate, you must have lost several children with the bathwater by now. If the homeostatic mechanism breaks down (which, thank God, can't happen just by your wishing it), there will be disorder of such magnitude that what is left at the end of it will not be worth saving.

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W : Whew ! Where there is heat I hope, sometime, will emerge Light. I think we've all reached the end of our patience. Let's have cool–off period. When we meet again, we must take up something practical instead of this empty word–play which has been getting everyone hot and bothered.

BOOK VII

W : Let's go easy on the pyrotechnics this time, shall we? The reason we're all getting carried away by emotions is because we haven't got down to dealing with practical realities. Why don't we get down to some pragmatic solutions straight–away.

R : Wendy seems to be harbouring an impression that this is the National Institute for Accelerated Solutions. Don't you realise Advanced Studies automatically rules out quick fixes.

W : Granted. But we have not even started focusing on the agenda we set for ourselves when we commenced these deliberations. If all the concepts we have thrown around are indeed of some use, surely we should have been able to bring them to bear by now on the three practical issues we had identified.

K : Okay. Why not finish off 'corruption' first ?

D : I wish we could. But seriously speaking, corruption in our society remains a bit of an enigma to me. I know, Wendy, you made a passing reference to our being ashamed to make money above–board causing us to resort to underhand deals (sorry for the mixed metaphor). But it just doesn't make sense to me.

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The other day, some of us were discussing why Indians lack the 'killer instinct' – which apparently is the most important ingredient in sports victories nowadays. A psychology student listening to the discussion proposed an interesting explanation. He said some psychologist had theorised that the motivation to do something depended on how much your exerting to do that thing really made it happen and, once the thing happened, how likely it was to bring you a reward; obviously it also mattered how much you wanted that reward. Moreover, since the relationship between the three is multiplicative, if any of these factors is missing, the action would not take place.[76] Now if our ethical tradition tells us to eliminate desires, there's no question of wanting any rewards. Since *Karma* tells us that whatever rewards come our way are the result of previous deeds, there can be no link between present action and reward. Taking advantage of the fact that Kiran has not exploded yet, I am tempted to add that in the all-embracing mist of Māyā one can't even assign a probability to something really happening, regardless of how much you exert to make it happen. So, with all three factors approximating zero, how can the action of corruption take place ?

C : Well I must say you've made an amusing, if somewhat hamhanded, effort to explain the general lethargy and inaction, of which we Indians are accused. But I don't see corruption getting explained away so easily. Let's try another tack : you are all familiar with Freud's constructs of id, ego and supergo ?

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R : I see what you're driving at. Since Indians believe desires have been eliminated, they posit id as non-existent. Hence, they see no need for superego or the control of conscience. So the ego has a field day guiding the id (which obviously is very much there) in the absence of any moral checks.

C : A valiant attempt, Rahim, but psychoanalytic interpretation is a little more complex than that. It is the conflicts generated by the second birth and the model Hindu resolution of the Oedipus complex that lead to a relatively weaker differentiation and idealisation of the Indian superego. Much of the individual behaviour and adaptation to the environment that in Westerners is regulated or coerced by the demands of the superego, is taken care of in Indians by a communal conscience (including family and jāti norms). The greater authority of the codes of the communal conscience, as opposed to the internalised rules of the individual superego, creates a situation in which infringements of moral standards become likely in situations 'when no one is looking'[77] Because there is relatively little tension between the ego and superego, the inner life of most Indians is not crippled by the constant judgement of all thoughts and actions into 'good' or 'bad'. There is thus much less pressure and guilt on the ego to appease the superego by means of productive activity and achievement in the outside world. An Indian can sit for hours doing nothing, without an inner voice condemning him a 'do–nothing.'[78] So you see, Adler, a 'kam–chor' doesn't see himself as such. The values stressed by the communal conscience are thus in conformity with the

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social order rather than honesty, productivity and the rightness of political action.[79] In this situation, 'right' and 'wrong' are relative : and individual's occupational activity and social acts are 'right' or 'good' if they conform to the traditional pattern prevalent in his kinship or caste groups.[80] Thus, among the vast majority of tradition–minded Indians, dishonesty, nepotism and corruption are merely abstract concepts. These negative constructions are irrelevant to Indian psychosocial experience, which, from childhood on, nurtures one standard of responsible adult action, and one only, namely, an individual's lifelong obligation to his kith and kin. Allegiance to impersonal institutions and abstract moral concepts is without precedent in individual developmental experience. Guilt and its attendant inner anxiety are aroused only when individual actions go against the primacy of relationships, not when foreign ethical standards of justice and efficiency are breached.[81] In such a system, socially disapproved actions generally require expiation rather than punishment.[82]

D : A very scholarly exposition, Chubbles, and it's very obvious that some parts of this framework must change if we are to progress towards reducing the corruption which we all agreed was eating into the vitals of the nation.

K : That change is necessary no one doubts, but it must be handled very carefully. If the change incorporates mandates of rational individual deliberation and decision–making, regard for objetivity and empirical fact, and loss of the warmth and connectedness pro-

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vided by the primary groups of family and jāti, it may be experienced as injurious to self–esteem and may indeed evoke a 'regressive' employment of the full repertoire of psychological defences acquired in a Hindu childhood. There could be outbreaks of violence or withdrawal into alchoholism, drug addiction and pursuit of mystical cults. Then there could be a frantic search for and an uncritical submission to charismatic leaders without regard for the political contents of their cause or ideology. Polarisation could take place between 'traditionalists' and 'modernists' – both resorting to irrational arguments and violence. In some ways, I think these tendencies are already visible. [83]

D : Help us, Chubbles, otherwise Kiran is going to frighten us to death with his forebodings of doom. Or have you yet to recover your breath after your long peroration ?

C : Sorry, Dev, but I do think there is a lot of sense in the warning Kiran has given. Not that I feel nothing can be done. But perhaps a psychological revolutionary situation can come in India only if large sections of our society question the usefulness of 'ultimate reality', bring up to awareness its origins in infancy and firmly reject many of its social and cultural manifestations as vestiges of an archaic personal and historical past [84] This process must be led with great sincerity and sensitivity, so that we save as much as possible of the warmth and tolerance that has made our heritage unique. No one person can take up this task. Perhaps an institute like NIAS

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could one day activate enough like–thinking intellectuals throughout the country to begin making a contribution for India's tryst with reality.

BOOK VIII

W : It's been pretty heavy going trying to keep pace with Chubbles. Can't we deal with the population problem now ? Surely, that can't have a psycho-analytical angle.

C : Want to bet ?

W : No, really. Can't we think of some radical, new approaches to the country's family–planning programme ? It would be such a break–through for NIAS if it came up with something like that.

A : Don't get too carried away in your enthusiasm, Wendy. A lot of very clever people have been breaking their heads on just this for many, many years. Don't forget we're up against mankind's strongest urge : the strength of which has, at some stage of his evolution, made the difference between survival and extinction of man as a species. It's moored so strongly in the mind, with thongs of culture and tradition, that it appears well–nigh impossible to shake it.

W : I didn't expect you to sing such a defeatist tune, Adler. Surely, no mental construct is so permanently embedded that it will never budge. Take caste, for instance. Everyone said this is one thing which will never change in India. Now I'm not saying we've eliminated caste but its foundations are certainly not

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so strong as they were a hundred years ago. And who made the first major breakthrough ? Gandhiji.

K : Surely, you're not under the impression that we have today a leader who enjoys almost the blind kind of mass support Gandhiji did.

W : I guess not. What I wanted to suggest was that instead of just hammering home a blunt family-planning message, a subtle campaign should be worked out. Family planning should become part of a greater goal which retains, on other counts, appeals to those emotions and drives which have traditionally been closest to the heart of the common man. I know it sounds a bit confused, but I feel it was just such a combination of radically new social practice covered in the comforting envelope of age–old concepts that Gandhiji struck upon in his fight against untouchability.[85]

D : Just suppose you get a little more specific and let us have details of this master–psychological campaign you have in mind.

W : I have no details to offer but a group of psychologists, sociologists, theologians and advertising professionals (with TV experience) working together could come up with some innovative options, though perhaps not with the brilliant intuitive understanding of the psyche of the common man which Gandhiji possessed.[86] Don't you think this is just the kind of intellectually sophisticated multidisciplinary problem for which NIAS could get the right group together.

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A : You have a point, but perhaps some of us have suggestions within the overall direction you have depicted.

R : Yes. I'd like to say something about our policy on Family Planning incentives. To me, it appears all the money we are spending on incentives is going down the drain. We're tackling the wrong end of the problem. As long as there a niche for a certain population at a particular socio-economic level, a set of families practising birth control will not make much of a difference.[87] Families not practising birth control at that economic level or the levels adjacent to it will fill up the niche. The problem facing us must, therefore, be redefined in terms of identifying factors which reduce the size of the niche itself. Let me give an example which is intuitively self-evident. Economic advancement is a factor that influences niche space by making smaller families more appropriate as a strategy for specie survival and propagation. As someone put it a little facetiously : "The rich get richer, while the poor get children."

D : Isn't that a bit of petitio principii, Rahim ? After all, we're discussing the problem of economic prosperity – we can't make it a precondition to finding a solution.

R : I was only giving an example. Let me give another : Studies have shown that the curve relating economic prosperity with optimal family size for a particular niche shifts downwards with progressive increases in female literacy. Studies like these could give us clues to leverage points where incentives could really deliver results without generating the type of resistance

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our present approach is bound to evoke. To continue my example, incentives for female education would never bring out the kind of emotion–changed hostility a sterilisation campaign engenders.

D : Don't be too sure of that. Improving the status of women, which would result from greater literacy, may bring out unexpectedly high levels of resistance. After all, don't forget, Aryan Brahmanism, in its struggle to acquire cultural supremacy over the matriarchially organised indigenous civilisation, purposefully depressed the status of women in our society. Which is why the honoured position accorded to women in the early Vedas is replaced by hostility and degradation in subsequent centuries.[88]

K : I think you're exaggerating the resistance Hindu society will have to progressive measures. The facts speak differently. My concern would be directed to ever–increasing numbers of those who are already economically and socially disadvantaged. How do we make it in their interest to push a thing like female literacy ?

W : I have an idea. These are the very groups who have considerable job reservation and 'seat' reservation going for them. Suppose most if not all of the reservation was kept only for women of that community, there would be an automatic incentive to educate women. And obviously it would also serve the purpose of uplifting the more depressed half of the depressed class. Isn't that what social justice is all about ?

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A : A most innovative, if somewhat eccentric solution. Let's hope no one misinterprets it to mean an increase in the overall percentage of reservation.

C : And Wendy, the whole process of equalisation can be retarded if the men feel insecure and threatened by the upliftment of women. The Indian male finds mature women sexually threatening.[89] The process of creating acceptance for mature womanhood must be handled cautiously and gradually. It is complex enough for NIAS to set up a special research project around it.

K : Once again Chubbles has fallen prey to Freudian abstraction. Why don't we treat the upliftment of women as a straight supply – demand problem? Reduce the supply and the 'price' will go up.

W : And how, pray, do you intend to carry out this massacre of womankind?

K : Not really a massacre, though I don't suppose you'll find my solution much better. To my way of thinking, the least painful way of making women more wanted in our society would be to legalise and encourage foeticide. We should encourage research which helps detect the sex of the unborn child at an early stage in a manner not injurious to the health of the mother or the child. Such testing should be offered free and the parents should be at liberty to terminate the pregnancy thereafter. In a short time, the number of boys will so outnumber the girls that the market will ensure an increase in the worth of women. Dowries will disappear as will every other practice that demeans Indian womanhood.

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W : Why, you unthinking, murdering monster. I could...

R : Khamosh. We have all got too carried away with just one possibility for making a smaller family the optimal survival strategy in the various niches our society provides. Let's leave it to the NIAS brains-trust to identify other even more promising avenues.

BOOK IX

R : Well, we have examined individual and social issues from a fairly large number of angles and several of these have obvious implications for economic productivity. In this context, shouldn't we look, in passing at least, at the broader policy issues that can outweigh all the social engineering we have been debating ?

K : I guess we can talk about it for a bit, but so much has already been said or written on the subject that I don't know if we really have something to add.

A : Only a few stray points I'm sure. But here's one that could be of some relevance. During the last few days, I've been making a rough and ready survey of Indian history to see if the periods of relative economic stability – 'prosperity' would be too strong a word – share any features. At first glance, a curious kind of correlation appears : the better off periods have all enjoyed comparatively strong central rule. I wonder if it's worth pursuing this chain of thought in case the economic genius of the Indian people only realises its full potential when assured of the stability and unidirectional purpose a single strong central ruler provides.

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W : Couldn't we get a little specific ?

K : Sure I could. Some of the instances Adler would have come across are Ashoka, the Gupta kings, or Akbar. Why, even the British empire in India remained relatively shaky till, after Hastings, it came under a central command. [90]

R : Are you suggesting there were no provinces in thes, kingdoms ? I don't think that's correct.

K : No, no. The provinces existed. But the autonomy they got, especially in political matters, was carefully moderated, if not extremely restrieted. For instance, in the Mauryan empire, not only did the emperor appoint a member of the royal family as provincial administrator, but placed under the administrator, ministers who were in direct contact with the king. [91] In addition, of course, were the well-known systems of inspectors and spies appointed by Ashoka. [92]

I think Adler has a valuable insight to offer. We created our constitution with memories of British rule fresh in our minds and enshrined in it centre–state relations more appropriate for wresting power from an alien central authority than for a newly formed nation where all the parts must pull together if progress is to be achieved. This, of course, is not surprising since the 1935 Government of India Act was used as a working model and, in fact, long passages from its text are inserted in our constution. [93] It appears to me we overdid the Federalism a bit and it is hampering the country from taking bold and rapid united action until it faces external threat. At this rate, we will never be able to galvanise our energies

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for economic action which can help bridge the gap between us and more prosperous countries.

D : To read the papers and the plaints of the State Chief Ministers, one would believe the actual state of affairs is quite the converse of what you're stating.

K : That's because they're comparinq the situation with what is in the constitution – and it's true there is less federalism in practice than specified in the constitution. But the more fundamental question is whether the level of federalism the constitution specified was appropriate. And even if it was appropriate when the constitution was framed, is it still appropriate today? After all, structure must follow strategy;[94] and our strategic need seems to be to pull in unison towards the superordinate goal of nation-building. Perhaps there is too much federalism in the constitutional structure for a period when we need to squeeze the maximum efficiency out of the system in the quickest time.

W : Look, if Nehru could manage to run the country for so many years with the constitution respected, why only after him should erosion start?

K : My dear Wendy, Panditji did not have to contend with states of different political hues pulling in different directions. And his stature discouraged dissidence. Surely it can't be a coincidence that even when the Janata came to power in the Centre, the process of eroding federalism did not cease. It happened because every pragmatic PM realises that if the country is managed strictly by the book, there is a good chance it will all go to pieces. And since you

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are quoting the example of Nehru, please remember that at the time the Constitution was framed, he had to operate within the envelope of a certain choice-set. Within that envelope he did opt for the extreme closer to centralisation rather than federalisation. Historical evidence seems to show that he was willing to pay the price of partition rather than have a loose federation, which would lead to the type of Balkanisation the British wanted in the sub-continent. He obtained as centralised a structure as he could. At that stage, a constitution with more central emphasis could have been self-defeating. Even so, I'm sure, after actually running the country for a few years, he wished the constitution had not made the task so difficult.

D : I can see our young fascist friend is yearning for a re-imposition of the emergency.

K : Don't be silly, Dev. The emergency took place because there's no constitutionally approved mechanism for steering the ship of state as one vessel rather than as bunch of life-boats strung together. The economic state of the country requires concerted action but short of misusing emergency power, the PM can't do a thing about getting cohesive action. And because emergency is meant to be a specific short-term instrument, it fails miserably when used for the wrong purpose. Look, there's no need to suspend individual rights or freedom of the press or anything like that in the slightest. But you can't go on having a state within a state without impairing the function of the totality.

...7

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R : At the same time, Kiran, the closer the political structure is to where the action takes place, the more meaningful and effective it is likely to be. You can't run a country of our size just from the centre.

K : I'm not suggesting we do. Have panchayats or district–level units where the men in charge are really close to the action. At the state level understanding of local problems is scarcely better than at the centre, while the loss of efficiency in having an additional intermediate level is horrendous. The quality of our bureaucracy and the communication technology now available remove the last justification for perpetuating this age–old concept of 'satrapies'.

R : Kiran, you don't seem to understand. In the interest of efficiency, you will sacrifice the unity of the whole country. Don't you realise this is precisely what happened in East Pakistan and Northern Sri Lanka?

K : That was because one group was favoured over another. Here, it will be only one tier, which in any case causes only confusion, being uniformly excised. All other judicial and constitutional checks on the executive remain. Rather than inciting secession in reality, there will be much reduced focus for regionalism and other such fissipareous tendencies.

A : Admittedly, Kiran, you've put up a powerful case and I'm sure the government would be happy to hear it. But no one really expects the NIAS to come with suggestions for changing the constitution. So why don't we turn and give a thought to economic policy.

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K : Well, the writing has been on the wall for years and admittedly the government has started moving in the right direction by enhancing competition, reducing controls and easing taxation. All of these have already started paying results and, if more such measures are taken, they could really root out corruption and hike the productivity of all resources.

D : Provided the intertia of the administrative machinery lets things happen.

W : And provided the second nation is willing to wait.

K : Which second nation ?

W : The nation of India's poor, which stands a dumb spectator while, among the elite (who often masquerade as champions of the poor), ideologies and parties battle it out for occupying seats of power and payment.[95] Yes, I know you'll tell me the poor are where they are because of their own sloth and traditionalism and that they must pull themselves out of it. But what are we offering them in return ? The consciousness of how poor they are ? Or theories with tall names like federalism and liberalism ? We've taken turns in criticising ever so many things. What do we plan to leave in the place of all these beliefs which have solaced Indians through generations and which we now plan to exercise ? The last time the world saw the destruction of an Aryan myth it was followed by the Marshall Plan, lest Europe fell prey to an ideology the Americans detested.[96] Let us pause before we crumple up centuries of comfort till we have something warm and yet real to offer in its place.

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BOOK X

W : Sorry, folks. I didn't mean to get so emotional last time. We have done a fair amount of hard thinking and it was mean of me to denigrate it so utterly. I apologise.

A : There's no need to. What you said may have been overstated, but it did get us to think some more. I, for one, have been reviewing how some of the previous reformers of Indian society have dealt with the problem of the psychosocial vacuum which you pointed out. You'll be happy to hear, Wendy, that they never allowed the vacuum to take place : They built before they destroyed. They sought to establish a belief–set which they hoped would better suit their society's need. It was the new set of beliefs which was intended to ease out the old.

D ; All going above my head, I'm afraid. Why don't you just quote the specific instances of the reformers you have in mind and leave the generalisations to us ?

A : All right, let's start with my favourite example, Ashoka. The central control of the ruler, which Kiran had rightly emphasized a while back, could have been maintained through force. Instead of this 'sledge-hammer' route, Ashoka adopted the more subtle approach of disseminating an eclectic collection of views, stressing the virtues of tolerance, ahimsā and mutual adjustment, which he considered essential for welding divergent groups in a cohesive whole. He hoped consequently that the dominance of divergent groups, including those subscribing to the orthodoxy, could be undermined and ths central authority could

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increase its power. The interesting thing is that essentially the same policy, though different in form, was adopted by Akbar, eighteen centuries after Ashoka.[97] Akbar too founded an eclectic cult much influenced by Zoroastrianism and centred on himself.[98] Here again, the aim was to weld unity between normally opposed communities and Akbar tried creating it by establishing a cult of the monarch, whom it was a religious duty to obey and a sacrilege to oppose.[99]

D : Sound the trumpets, beat the drums ; Here the founder of 'Din Adleri' comes.

C : Don't be perfectly idiotic, Dev. There's no question of our attempting an alternative religion the way Ashoka and Akbar did. But isn't the process Adler has been describing, in substance the same as the one the Mahātmā used to galvanise the nation not so long back.[100] Wasn't Nehru attempting a similar feat when he tried building up science and industry as an answer to the laws of Manu ? Surely, you don't imagine they were trying to create new religions. We have already a diversity of profound religions which leave on space for another.

R : That's right. All that Wendy and Adler have been saying is that it is not enough to cut out; we must replace. And we must only discover the rational substrates for those religious nations that for a long time have served as the vehicle for the most essential moral ideas. It is necessary to discern the moral rules and ideals latent in and appropriate to the contemporary social situation.[101]

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D : Hang on, hang on, before your fervour pushes you over the precipice of the naturalistic fallacy.[102] Surely, you don't expect a study of society as it is, to yield you answers about the moral ideals we ought to follow.

C : Forgive him his enthusiasm, Dev – God knows it's a rare enough virtue of which we could do with a lot more. Yes, we cannot expect science to relieve us of our task of positing our basic values. I would like to suggest integrity, both intellectual and interpersonal, as the cornerstone of our value-structure, while rationality delineates the boundaries within which we must stay. For, to be free is not to do as one pleases; it is to be master of oneself, it is the ability to act rationally and do one's duty.[103] And, therefore, discipline performs an important function in forming character and personality in general.[104]

W : I think you have perpetuated our old tradition of thinking of virtues on an individual basis. The welfare of society at large, the commitment to industriousness and respect for the rights and aspirations of others, which is the true basis of team work, must also find a place in the fabric we are creating.

A : At the same time, Wendy, I believe our social concerns should not outweigh our respect for the individual and his development. As all the other beliefs and all the other practices take on an increasingly less religious character, the individual must become the object of a sort of religion. There would be a cult of personal dignity which derives its force from society but attaches itself to the individual.[105] In

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fact, individualism provides the only system of beliefs which can ensure the sustained moral unity of a modern country. A citizenry as heterogeneous as ours has only its humanity in common. The idea of the human person is therefore the only idea that can survive, immutable and impersonal, above the changing tides of particular opinions.[106]

C : I don't think there can be much dispute about the basic values we are proposing. Some clarity also seems to have emerged during these dialogues we have had about the beliefs which need to be de-emphasized. But the new value-framework can never ease out the old unless it is blended into a mutually supportive whole, and is fleshed out with the mythology, literature nnd art, which are necessary to make it acceptable and accessible to various segments of the population.

D : Goodness, Chubbles, do you realise the magnitude of the task you are proposing. It will be decades before we even see the first signs of change.

A : I wouldn't be quite as pessimistic as that, but I accept the whole thing will be very gradual. I will also require the goodwill and commitment of numerous intellectuals at the forefront of a variety of fields, working together to achieve a synchronicity of the social sciences, the natural sciences and the arts.

C : What better goal could there be to provide NIAS with an unending source of socially meaningful, interdisciplinary projects ?

W : That's great, let's go and tell the Director of NIAS all about it.

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R : Wait a moment. Telling him the bald conclusion will leave him thinking we're a bunch of megalomaniacs masquerading as participants. We have to give him the full background and the train of our reasoning.

D : That's no problem, since the ubiquitous tape–recorder was switched on through all our discussions.

A : And in the highly–productive pattern of society we are planning, I am sure everyone will work as one team to transcribe the tapes. Where's everyone gone?

EPILOGUE

And that's how this dialogue came to be written. I hope it has not caused too much anguish to you, Plato. Though I have kept to the number of books you put in your dialogue, you won't find a Glaucon or an Adimantus in 'Republic : 2'. It will also take you quite some guessing to find out whether the role of Socrates has been inherited by one or more of my participants. I suggest you don't even try. The world has changed since you knew it. You will not find it worth your while to snatch yourself away from the realm of permanent 'Forms' where you are now ensconced to tangle with the sensation–confined world in which we operate. Thank you all the same for the use of the Idea of 'Republic'. "A man of the right sort, I think, when he comes in the course of his narrative to some word or act of a good man will be willing to impersonate the other in reporting it, and will feel no shame at that kind of mimicry, by preference imitating the good man when he acts steadfastly and sensibly...."[107] "You have received a better and more complete education than the others,

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and you are more capable of sharing both ways of life. Down you must go then, each in his turn, to the habitation of the others and accustom yourselves to the observation of the obscure things there. For once habituated you will discern them infinitely better than the dwellers there, and you will know what each of the 'idols' is and whereof it is a semblance, because you have seen the reality of the beautiful, the just and the good. So our city will be governed by us and you with waking minds, and not, as most cities now, which are inhabited and ruled darkly as in a dream by men who fight one another for shadows and wrangle for office as if that were a great good, when the truth is that the city in which those who are to rule are least eager to hold office must needs be best administered and most free from dissension, and the state that gets the contrary type of ruler will be the opposite of this."[10]

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A CRITIQUE OF JAYARASI'S CRITIQUE OF PERCEPTION

The view developed in the *Tattvopaplavsiṁha* of Jayarāśi (8th century A. D.) aroused considerable interest in the last few decades of twentieth century Indian philosophy. According to Jayarāśi, in order to assert something one must have sufficiently warranted supportive grounds or *pramāṇas* as they are called in Indian philosophy and that these *pramāṇas*, in order to produce valid cognition (*pramā*), must be free from different kinds of blemishes–such as over–coverage (*ativyāpti*), under – coverage (*avyāpti*), absurdity (*asaṁbhava*) and interdependence (*itaretarāśraya*) etc Unfortunately there is no such nondefective *pramāṇa*, according to Jayarāsi. Since this is the case, we have no legitimate and rational basis of knowing anything with certitude, be it material like four elements (*bhūtas*) or non-material like soul (*ātman*), liberation (*apavarga*) etc. The inevitable outcome of such a philosophical position is a kind of pure, unmixed and thoroughgoing scepticism, the upsetting of all assertions or principles and suspension of any judgement regarding knowledge altogether. In his philosophical treatise *Tattvopaplavasiṁha*, Jayarāśi examines different *pramāṇas* one by one and refutes them all as absurd and ambiguous. He opens his criticism with the *Nyāya* definition of perception and subjects it to a searching critical analysis, demonstrates its many logical blemishes (doṣas) and finally rejects the justifiability of perception as an instrument of valid knowledge (*pramāṇa*). And with the rejection of the validity of perception, the existence of four

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material elements (earth, water, fire and air) also stands rejected because it is only through the evidence of perception, holds a Carvak, that the existence of the material elements can be ascertained.

In this paper we propose to discuss Jayarāśi's critique of the Nyāya view of perception only. And in fact, while criticising the *Nyāya* definition of perception, Jayarāśi criticises the possibility of valid knowledge in general. The paper is divided into two parts. The first part contains a straightforward exposition of Jayarāśi's arguments against the possibility of perception and the second contains an assessment of the strength and weakness of Jayarāśi's arguments.

I

Jayarāśi's Arguments

Gautama, the author of *Nyāya–Sūtra*, defines perception[1] as "the knowledge resulting from sense–object contact independently of words (*avyapadeśya*), invariably related [to the object] i. e., non–erroneous and is of a definite or determinate character (*vyavasāyātmaka*). This definition contains four necessary conditions – (1) the contact between the sense–organ and the object, (2) the contact is not due to words (*avyapadeśya*), (3) it is non–erroneousness (*avyabhicāritva*), and (4) *vyavasāyakatva* or definiteness or determinateness. It is to be noted that the last two characteristics, i e. the third and the fourth, are both the necessary and sufficient conditions for any piece of valid knowledge in general (*pramā*) and not for perceptual cognition alone. Jayarāśi in his *Tattvopalavasiṁha* refers to another book called *Lakṣaṇasāra*[2] which contains refutation of the term '*avyapadeśya*' in connection with the definition of perception. Unfortunately the work *Lakṣaṇasāra* is not extant; but Pandit Sukhlalji Sanghavi and Prof. R. C.

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Parikh, the joint editors of *Tattvopaplavasiṁha*, attribute the authorship of this work to Jayarāśi himself. So he (Jayarāsi) does not feel inclined to criticise the appropriateness of this term '*avyapadeśya*' in the *Tattvopaplavasiṁha*. Instead, he concentrates attention and applies his negative dialectic to the other three conditions of perceptual cognition. Again, among these conditions, he takes up the third (i.e. *avyabhicāritva*) and the fourth (i.e., *vyavasāyātmakatva*) conditions for discussion first and then he goes on to discuss the justifiability of the 'sense–object–contact' (*indriyārthasannikarṣa*). The reason for this priority is perhaps this : The third and the fourth conditions are necessary conditions for any piece of valid knowledge, be it perceptual or non–perceptual. So, a refutation of the justifiability of these two conditions in the context of the difinition of perception would *ipso–facto* apply to other cases of cognition gained through other means of valid knowledge, viz. inference (*anumāna*), comparison (*uphmāna*) etc.

Now, valid knowledge (*pramā*) is defined by the *pramāṇavādins* as that which is 'non–erroneous' (*avyabhicāri*). But what makes a piece of cognition 'non–erroneous'? An answer to this question requires understanding of the meaning of the term 'non–erroneous'. This gives rise to the following consideration ;

> Does non–erroneousness (*avyabhicāritva*) mean the cognition produced by non–defective causal factors ?

If it is argued that the non–erroneousness or truth of a cognition is known or established by non–defective causal factors or conditions (*aduṣta kāraṇa sandehotpadyatva*), then the question will crop up : how the non–defectiveness of causal factors is known or established ? It cannot be established by perception[8], since the senses which are indispensable conditions

...8

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of perception are beyond the scope of perception : they are too subtle to be perceived (*atīndriya*)[4]. It cannot again be established by inference[5], since *liṅga*, which is said to be the heart of inference, is beyond apprehension, and a thing which itself is not established cannot be used for establishing other things. Precisely the argument stands as follows :

A particular cognition is non–erroneous if it is produced by non-defective causal factors, and a causal factor is said to be non-defective if it produces a non–erroneous cognition. This is a clear case of interdependence (*anyonyāśraya*). Again, senses are admitted as substances which are the loci of qualities like proper–functioning as well as disturbances.[6] Obviously the cognition produced by them cannot always claim to be non-disturbed. So, '*avyabhicāritva*' or 'non–erroneousness' of cognition means a kind of cognition which is caused by non-defective causal factors remains un-established. And what itself is not established cannot be regarded as a sufficient warrant for establishing something else. Hence, *avyabhicāritva* in the sense of *non–defective causal factor* cannot serve as a defining characteristic of valid cognition.

Does '*avyabhicāritva*' mean a kind of cognition devoid of sublation or contradiction (*bādharahitatva*) ?

According to Jayarāśi valid cognition cannot be defined in terms of the absence of sublation or contradiction because the precise meaning of this term in the context of knowledge remains undefined. What is meant by a cognition 'being devoid of sublation or contradiction' ? Is it on account of the fact that cognition is right (*yathārtha*) or does it mean the absence of deficiency or inadequacy of causal conditions operating in the production of 'sublating cognition' (*bādhaka jñāna*) ? There are some cases in which, despite the presence of inadequacy in

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causal conditions which could have produced the sublating cognition, the cognition takes place. On the other hand, sometimes it is also seen that inspite of the presence of the deficiency of the said causal conditions, the sublating cognition is not produced. Jayarāśi cites the example that there is no contradiction when we cognize distant mass of sunrays (*marīcinicaya*) as water. Moreover, there is no logical necessity that the contradicting cognition would arise immediately even when the said causal conditions for the production of it are present. It may be the case that the place is a familiar one or the cogniser stands nearby The sublating cognition (*bādhajñāna*) may also be produced with a difference of time, such as, after a year or so, or, sometimes on account of the deficiency of the necessary causal conditions, it may not arise at all. So, it cannot be maintained on *sufficiently warranted ground* that the cognition is non-erroneous, since no sublation or contradiction has arisen [7] Our inability to apprehend the contradiction does not necessarily imply or establish the real non-existence of 'sublation' or contradiction as such. To be precise, what the sceptic Jayarāśi intends to mean is perhaps this : our non-apprehension of contradicting (sublating) cognition is not a sufficient condition to imply the non-existence of *contradiction* and that the *contradicting cognition* is erroneous It does not guarantee that the said cognition is non-erroneous, since it cannot avert the possibility of non-production on account of the vitiating causal conditions.

The sceptic Jayarāśi further clarifies the point. He asks : Does the absence of sublation or contradiction which makes of particular cognition non-erroneous hold good for the reason that all people do not apprehend the contradiction or that with reference to the different conditions of one and the same cogniser ? [8] If the first possibility is accepted, then everybody would become

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omniscient. But this is contrary to secular '*lokavyavahāra*' i.e. all people are not omniscient. Now, if we accept the second alternative, that is, the non-production of contradiction depends on the cogniser's non-apprehension of contradiction among his different cognitions - then it is unjustified for the simple reason that an erroneous cognition of diamond rays and of mirage and the like is cognised even when there is non-production of a contradictory cognition for the perceiver on account of his going to a different place or his death or on the similar grounds. [9]

It may also be the case that due to the nature of necessary and sufficient causal conditions, erroneous cognition arises in such a way that it prohibits the production of contradictory cognition, and it is on account of this complex situation that a particular cognition is said to be uncontradicted just as a cognition is recognised as *valid* in the *pramāṇa*-theorists' philosophy. Thus, according to sceptic Jayarāśi, "a cognition whose cause is defective and about which one has the cognition 'it is false' that cognition alone is untrue". [10] So, absence of sublation or contradiction cannot serve as *sallakṣaṇa* of valid cognition and thus to define valid cognition in terms of this is not acceptable.

Does '*avyabhicāritva*' mean a kind of cognition which has the efficiency of successful activity ?

Next, Jayarāśi considers whether '*avyabhicāritva*' or 'non-erroneousness' could mean efficiency which leads to successful activity (*pravṛtti sāmarthya*). It is a fact of common experience that after cognising an object, we are either tempted to get it or avoid that object. If we are successful in attaining the thing, then we consider our cognition to be 'nonerroneous' (*avyabhicāri*). But if we fail, then we consider our cognition as 'erroneous'. Is *successful practice* the intended meaning of the term

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'non-erroneousness' (*avyabhicāritva*) ? This is, the sceptic argues, not an appropriate interpretation. Jayarāśi argues that if 'non-erroneousness' means practical efficiency, that is, a connection of the said cognition with a fruit (metaphorically which means garland, sandlewood etc), then we must consider whether the practical efficiency (*pravrttisamarthatva*) is known or unknown If it is said to be not known, then the question [11] arises : how can we ascertain the 'nonerroneousness' of such a cognition ? If it becomes impossible for the cogniser to apprehend the practical efficiency in case of a particular cognition, then also it becomes obviously impossible on his part to assert the truth of the said cognition. If, on the other hand, it is said that practical efficiency is something that is known, then also difficulties arise. Generally it is held that the criterion of truth is successful practice. A cognition is known to be non-erroneous if practice based on the assumption of its truth results in the attainment of the desired end. If I judge that the substance before me is water and snbsequently wish to confirm this judgment I may drink it to quench my thirst. If I then judge that my thirst has been quenched, I am in a position to confirm the initial cognition by noting its agreement with the subsequent cognition by way of the fact that one property of water is that it quenches thirst.

But Jayarāśi here asks : Whether the later apprehended water is identical with the previously cognised water or with the class or set of it ? The sceptic submits that it cannot be the same [12] water as previously cognised, since the continuity may cease to exist on account of the impacts and impulses of the fishes and buffaloes. In other words, there is no guarantee for the absence of causal factors which would disturb the continuity of water. There is no surity that it is the water of the same set [13] either because sometimes it so happens that having false cognition of

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water, people may accidentally reach the real water and thus if this view is right then the clear and distinct *false cognition* must be accepted as *non–erroneous*. But this is something which is patently absurd.

It may, however, be urged by the *pramāṇa* theorists that erroneous cognition never allows a person to obtain water at the same time and place whereas the non–erroneous cognition does so and on account of this reason it may be claimed that the said cognition is not erroneous (*avyabhicāri*).[14]

But Jayarāśi points out that if this contention is accepted, then the cognition caused by an object that is about to vanish and the cognition of the sun, the planet (which are beyond our reach) would be false. Even in case of cognition of water, there is no warranted ground that we surely obtain water connected with that place and time since due to earthquake, volcanic eruption etc., the water of the place under consideration may cease to exist or disappear.[15]

What Jayarāśi intends to mean is that the *exact nature of the object of a practically efficient cognition cannot be described.* It cannot also be argued that the said water has the class character (*jāti*) of water, since there is nothing as class-character.[16]

Now in connection with this comes another question :

> Can we know the successful practice which makes a cognition valid ?

Jayarāśi answers this question in the negative. He argues that the truth of practical efficiency cannot be perceptually apprehended on its own right, since there would not be any contact with anything which occurred before and then vanished.

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It is an admitted view of the Naiyāyikas that a unit of cognition lasts for two moments and perishes there after. When we perceive an object, we generally exercise our will to get it and only then successful achievement would appear. Evidently it becomes difficult to observe how the successful practice can be perceptually apprehended to exist in a unit of cognition which cannot exist at the time of perception. The cognition of the practical efficiency cannot be established by perception, because it does not have any object like the cognition of 'the whole mass seen by pressing the eye with a finger' (*keśonduka*). This kind of cognition does not have any object corresponding to it; neither the negation of it, nor its presence can be established. A non-existent thing is not entitled to be an object of cognition in the proper sense of the term. If it were so, it would not be different from the case of illusion and in that case refutation of all accepted principles becomes obvious.[17]

Now comes another important question : Is *avyabhicāritva* the *lakṣaṇa* of cognition ? If for the sake of argument, we assume that a cognition is valid by virtue of its own presence or existence, then the *pramāṇa* theorists must accept that all cognitions are valid. This is something absurd, even from the Naiyāyikas' own standpoint. A cognition cannot be right by its mere presence. For, if we cognise a snake in place of a rope, then nobody would deny that there is the presence of snake-cognition, although this cognition is false.

Now, if, as an alternative solution, we admit that the truth of a cognition depends not on its own existence or presence, but on another thing, then we must consider first whether that another thing is known or unknown. The first alternative cannot be accepted, since on this hypothesis, past, future, inferential and intuitive (*pratibhā*) cognitions, which are accepted by the Naiyāyikas themselves as valid, would be erroneous for the

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reason that there is no known favourable causal conditions for their ascertainment. To put the matter more technically, the sceptic Jayarāśi argues : 'either you (*pramāṇa* theorist) know a thing you are judging about or you do not know'. If you know a thing, then you cannot judge it falsely since you know it, so that there is no false knowledge. This is something absurd. Again, if you do not know it, you cannot make any judgement at all, since your mind is blank of that of which you know nothing. Jayarāśi's argument may be put in a slightly modified way. If you know both A and B, then you obviously cannot confuse A with B. If you know A and not B, then obviously you cannot compare A with B. And if so, then you must suspend judgement.

There may be some thinkers who may counter the above argument by saying that false judgement is the belief in 'what is not'.

But the sceptic argues that to think or to know means to think of '*somthing*'; to think of nothing is equal to '*not-thinking*' or '*not-knowing*' at all. In other words, non-existence cannot be an object of our knowledge. [18]

But a little reflection would at once reveal that the very first argument put forward by the aceptic is based on a watertight distinction between knowledge and ignorance. It rests on the forgetfulness of the fact that in between knowledge and ignorance there is a process called 'getting to know' or learning a thing which we did not know before. This also makes us aware of the fact that valid knowledge is something where there is an element of novelty, (*anadhigata artha-adhigantṛ-pramā*).

Is the term *vyavasāyātmaka* (definiteness) necessary?

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It had been stated earlier that in addition to 'non-erroneousness' (*avyabhicāritva*), the term 'definiteness (*vyavasāyātmakatva*) is also used as a necessary condition in the definition (*lakṣaṇa*) of valid perceptual cognition. Jayarāśi, in order to show the absurdity (*asaṁbhava*) of this definition, subjects this term (*vyavasāyātmaka*) to a searching criticism. Cognition (*jñāna*) has many species. A widely prevalent classification brings forth the distinction between *pramā* and *apramā* (valid and invalid cognitions). Among erroneous cognitions (*apramā*) doubt is included. Doubt (*saṁśaya*) occurs when we have a cognition of a subject having no specific *prakāra* or predicate characterising it, say for example, the cognition of an object whether it is a man or a pillar. There is no feature of certitude in this cognition. The object may be characterised either by manness or by pillarness. But in doubtful cognition, firstly, the predicates must be mutually incompatible and secondly they must be referred to the same subject.[19]

Now Jayarāśi raises questions : Is anything revealed in such doubtful cognition or not ? If we say that something is revealed then, according to Jayrāśi, the question arises : Is it a substance, or an attribute ? If it is a substance which is said to be revealed in the cognition, then we must consider whether it is real or unreal. If it is real, then the saying that 'the cognition is doubtful' becomes non-sensical. If, on the other hand, it is accepted as unreal, then the cognition non-erroneousness (*avyabhicāritva*) is sufficient to exclude the possibliity of such cognition and the additional qualification, viz., *vyavasāyātmaka* (definite) turns out to be an unnecessary condition.[20]

If the revealed thing is taken to be an attribute, then the question arises again : Is it real or unreal ? If it be real, then it is futile to say that the cognition is of the nature of doubt, its being the cognition of real water. On the other hand, if it is

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assumed to be unreal, then as discussed above, it is enough to say that valid cognition is *avyabhicārt*–non–erroneous. In other words, the term *vyavasāyātmaka* or definite becomes superfluous over and above the term *avyabhicārt* to get a non–defective definition of valid cognition. Again, if both the attributes in the case of doubtful cognition – a man or pillar – are assumed to be revealed, then the question persists : Are both these attributes real or both unreal, or is one of them real and the other unreal? If the first, then their cognition should be 'non–erroneous only' and not of the nature of doubt; and if both be unreal, then the cognition should be 'erroneous' and not of the nature of doubt. If one of then be real and the other unreal, then one and the same cognition should be both 'non–erroneous' (*avyabhicāri*) and 'erroneous' (*vyabhicāri*), which is a manifest contradiction (*asaṁbhava*).

If to avert these difficulties doubtful cognition is considered to be something which reveals the form of doubtful objects then does such an object exist or not ? The so-called doubtful cognition can no longer remain doubtful if the object of doubtful cognition is said to exist, since it would be just like the form of real water revealed in the uncontradicted apprehension of water. If it is argued that the doubtful object in doubtful cognition, in fact, does not exist, then the condition of 'non-erroneousness' is *adequate* to eradicate such cognition and the condition '*vyavasāyātmakatva* (definiteness)' in the definition of perception becomes superfluous. If, for the sake of argument, we say that nothing in fact is revealed in the doubtful cognition, then such a view of cognition cannot be distinguished from illusory cognition.[21]

It is evident from the above discussion that the use of the term 'definiteness' (*vyavasāyātmakatva*) as a *lakṣaṇa* of *pratyakṣa pramāṇa* as advocated by the *pramāṇa* theorists

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cannot be justified. Thus, Jayarāśi proves that neither 'non-erroneousness' nor 'definiteness' can serve as a necessary condition of the definition of valid cognition, and as neither of them is a necessary condition, their conjunction cannot serve as a sufficient condition for the definition of valid perceptual (*pratyakṣa*) cognition in particular and valid cognition (*pramā*) in general. In this way Jayarāṣi prove that the *Nyāya* difinition of perception as a species of valid knowledge does not have any logical leg to stand upon.

II

Some Difficulties in Jayarāśi's Arguments

Some reflection, however, shows that Jayarāśi's criticism of the *pramā* or valid knowledge is not so well-grounded as it appears to be. There is twofold incoherence between theory and practice. Jayarāśi refutes the knowledge claim of his philosophical opponent and prescribes 'suspension of judgement' on account of the absence of any viable ground or evidence for knowledge. Now, the same charge could be brought against Jayarāśi himself. It may be asked : Does he know that the evidence is inadequate ? If the answer is the negative, i.e. if it is said that Jayarāśi does not know that the evidence for knowledge-claims is inadequate, then he has no ground to refute the contention of his contestant (*pratipakṣa*). On the other hand, if he says that he does know, then as a matter of fact, he must accept that there is a satisfactory criterion or adequate evidence and he will no longer be a sceptic and would turn out to be a *pramāṇa theorist*.

Now, a follower of Jayarāśi may argue that the above quibble does not make any sound criticism of Jayarāśi and is based on a misunderstanding of Jayarāśi's point of view. The

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sceptic Jayarāśi is never inclined to assert that 'knowledge cannot be reached.[22] In an assertive statement there is an expression of the *belief* of the speaker. Speaking implies believing; if there is no believed content, there cannot be any speaking and whenever we speak, we assert.[23] The sceptic Jayarāśi makes no philosophical assertion; his negation of the thesis of the *pramāṇa*–theorists is not a logical negation, 'but a *refutation*, a *prasajya-pratiṣedha* which is compatible with not asserting a thesis of one's own'. Having reached the general suspension of judgement, Jayarāśi is inclined to try to look for 'counter arguments and counter–counter arguments'. And when all *pramāṇas* or supportive grounds for the claim of valid knowledge are refuted, his own arguments are no longer necessary; these are only *ad hoc*. In fact, what is said by Jayarāśi either in an affirmative or in a negative form, should be understood as negations of their opposite, which is not equivalent to asserting anything at all.

But there is another general charge that can be levelled against Jayarāśi's philosophical position. His scepticism finds a limit when it leads to practical difficulties in actual life, or to quote from Hegel "Its deeds and its words belie each other continually". The absolute sceptic's attitude "announces the nullity of seeing, hearing and so on, yet it itself sees and hears. It proclaims the nothingness of essential ethical principles and makes those very truths the sinews of its own conduct".[24] If we ask Jayarāśi: 'Do you have father or grandfather? He would not be able to argue since he does not believe in any *pramāṇas*. On the other hand, he cannot deny his existence as a son or grandson of somebody. Here lies the limit of sceptical thinking i.e., when it is applied to action or practice.

Moreover, there are a few other specific arguments which expose the difficulties in Jayarāśi's sceptical position.

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To start with, we have seen already that while criticising the appropriateness and necessity of using the term 'definiteness' (*vyavasāyātmakatva*) as a definiens of valid perceptual cognition, Jayarāśi refutes its necessity assuming the term non-erroneousness (*avyabhicāritva*) as a sufficient condition for the purpose. But prior to this, he has shown absurdity (*asaṁbhavatva*) of the term non-erroneousness and refuted its necessity in connection with the definition of valid cognition. Now, what had previously been refuted by Jayarāśi himself as unnecessary and absurd was used later on by himself as a sufficient ground for refuting another definiens' justifiability. This makes his standpoint logically self-contradictory.

Again, Jayarāśi argues that even if, for the sake of argument, we admit the practical efficiency as a criterion of truth, the so-called truth-claim of the *pramāṇa*-theorists cannot be proved. It can neither by proved be perception nor by inference since truth is not perceived in any instance of cognition. The universal concomitance (*vyāpti*) between truth and volitional success, which is an indispensable condition for valid inference of truth from successful practice, cannot be ascertained.

But from day to day experience we may say that it is not always quite impossible to apprehend truth of a cognition directly. We can very easily, without the interference of any third entity or operating relation, distinguish our cognition of 'a cat' from that of 'a dog'. From *Nyāya* standpoint, it may, however, be argued that in such cases of cognition the truth or non-erroneousness is directly apprehended. And if it is apprehended in one example, or instance, we appredend the universal and particular's concomitance in that instance. In view of this, there would be no logical difficulty in establishing the invariable concomitant relation (*vyāpti*) between 'non-erroneousness' and 'practical efficiency' or volitional success and consequently the

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sceptical charge of Jayarāśi that the invariable relation can neither be known by perception nor by iuference seems to be unwarranted.

We have seen that while refuting the term '*vyavasāyātmaka*' as a definiens in the definition of valid perceptual cognition in particular and valid cognition in general, Jayarāśi takes the case of doubtful cognition (*saṁśayajñāna*) as an instance and asks: Does such cognition reveal something or not?

In reply to this we may say that for *Nyāya*, each and every case of cognition – be it erroneous (*apramā*) or non-erroneous (*pramā*) – reveals its object – *wrongly* in the first case and *rightly* in the second case. Even in case of illusory cognition of 'snake in a rope', the perceiver is definite or sure, at least so long as the illusion lasts, that the object before him (rope) is characterised by *snakeness* and not indefinite as either snakeness or ropeness. But in case of doubt we are not sure about the exact *prakāra* (qualifier) of the object cognised (*viseṣya*). To cite an example: We are not sure or definite about manness or pillarness in the case of a doubtful cognition whether the yonder object is a man or a pillar. In this case of doubt the man and the pillar stand as the *prakāra* (qualifier) in relation to its *viseṣya* (*qualificandum*). Jayarāśi, while refuting the *Nyāya* view, fails to distinguish a case of illusion from a case of doubt. The *Nyāya* theory of illusion is known as '*anyathākhyāti*' – i e., illusion consists in cognising something as something else'. Vātsyāyana, thus, says that a *avyabhicārī* or right perception is the perception of an object as it actually is. According to this interpretation doubtful perceptions also are *avyabhicārī*. On perceiving the common characteristic of dust and smoke in a distant object, one has a doubt: Is it dust or is it smoke? If it is actually dust, the perception is non-erroneous

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in its first part and if it is actually smoke, the perception is non-erroneous in its secoud part. Since the object actually is either dust or smoke, the perception is in fact invariably related to the object. In short, according to Vātsyāyana, only the illusory perceptions of something as definitely something else are to be considered as erroneous, Perception in the form of doubt being short of definite knowledge is not, therefore, excluded by the word *avyabhicārī*. Nevertheless, the instrument of such perception cannot be regarded as *pramāṇa* because definite knowledge alone is the result of *pramāṇa*. That is way Gautama excludes perception in the form of doubt by using the expression "of a definite character".[26]

In the light of this, Jayarāśi's refutation of the term "*vyavasāyātmaka*' seems to be unwarrated. As a matter of fact, Jayarāśi is not only a *vaitandika* but a *kutārkika* (bad debater) who uses *chala*. "*Chala* is the rebuttal of words (or arguments) of an opponent by way of inventing a meaning contradictory to the meaning intended" (*vacana vighāto'rtha vikalpopattyā chalam* : *Nyāyasūtra*, 1.2.10). In our expository survey of Jayarāśi's arguments against the possibility of valid cognition (*pramā*) and means of valid cognition (*pramāṇa*), we come across the trickery of arguments where he, without trying to understand the intended meaning of the terms used in the *Nyāya* definitions, assumes the twisted meaning and shows the absurdities and ambiguities of the definiens. Vātsyāyana[27] condemns such bad argumentations on the ground that a user of *chala* has no valid supportive reasons for giving preference or in selecting one among different alternative meanings of the words used in any argument and thus it is only a false accusation And, as a matter of fact, unless the actual contexts of use of intended sense of the word or words used by the speaker are grasped, its proper meaning would not be clear. "The utterer

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produces something by his utterance – with a complex audience directed intention, involving, say, getting the audience to think that he has a certain belief".[28]

Jayarāśi twists the proper meaning of *pramā-lakṣaṇa* as well as *pramaṇalakṣaṇa* as upheld by *Nyāya* philosophy and "deliberately distorting the position of the opponent disregards regulation and selects a meaning at random. Therefore, objections raised on the basis of such deliberate distortions are futile".[29] A good debater in philosophy would understand that the incapability of defining or describing something in particular (distorted sense) does not necessarily mean that the object is *false* or excludes all the possibility of the cognition of such an object to be valid. "To read an another simply in order to refute him is not the proper way to understand him".[30] And, in fact, the spirit of philosophy lies neither in mere rebuttal of the opponent's views nor in ignoring opponents' merits and spirits but in understanding others' view with due sympathy and intellectual honesty.[31]

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NOTES

1. *Indriyārtha sannikarṣotpannaṁ jñānaṁ avyapadeśyam avyabhicāri vyavasāyatmakaṁ prtayaksṁ–Nyāyasūtra.* 1.1.4.

2. *Avyapadeśyapadasyasādhutve lakṣaṇasāragrantha syollekhaḥ – Tattvopaplavasiṁha,* p. 20.

3. *Na pratyakṣena; Nayanakuśalāderatīndriyatvāt| – Tattvapaplavasiṁha,* p. 2.

4. See : S. C. Chatterjee : *The Nyāya Theory of Knowledge* (University of Calcutta, 1960) p. 132.
   Cf. *Śarīrasmyuktam Jñānckaraṇamatīndriyamindriyamanderatīndriyatvāt – Tarkabhāṣā,* p. 19.

5. *Nāpyanumānena; lingāntarāSnavagateḥ | Nanu idameva jñānam lingaṁ tadutthaṁ tasya viśiṣtatāṁ gamayati; Yadyevam itaretarāśrayatvaṁ duruttaramāpanipadyate | – Tattvapaplavasimha,* p. 2.

6. *Indriyāṇāṁ guṇadoṣāśrayatve tadutthe vijñāne doṣāśaṁkā nāti varttate puṁvyāpārotpaditaśabdavijñāna iva. – Ibid.*

7. *Dṛśyate hi bādhaka jñānotpādakakārakavaikalyād bodhanutpādḥ, yathā dūre marīcinicaye jalajñāne jāte ˙bādhā na saṁpdyate a–bhyāsdeśāvasthitasya kārakopanipāte satyutpadyate | sā copajŏyamānā saṁvatsarādi kālavikalpena sañjāyate, kadācicca kārakavaikalyannaiva saṁpadyate | Na caitāvatā tasya yathārthatā upapadyate. – Tattvopaplamsiṁha,* p. 2.

8. *Bādhāvirahaḥ kiṁ survapuruṣāpekṣayā, āhosvit pratipattrapekṣayā ?* Tadyadi sarvapuruṣāpekṣayā ... *tadvirahopya ... sarvajñāḥ syuḥ | Bhavantu nāma sarve sarvajñāḥ ko doṣaḥ ? Asarvajña vyavahārābhāvaprasangaḥ. – Ibid,* p. 2.

9. *Pratipatturbādhaka jñānāSnutpādeSpi deśāntaragamana–maraṇādinā manimaricyādiviparyaya jñānadarśanāt, Ibid.* p. 3.

10. Jayarāśi in *Tattvopaplavasiṁha* (p. 3) quotes from *Śābarabhāṣya : Mīmāṁsā Sūtra* 1. 1. 5, " *Yatra ca duṣtaṁ kāraṇaṁ yatra ca mithyeti pratyayaḥ sa eva asamīcinaḥ pratyayaḥ" ityetadevāSsamīcinaṁ,"*

11. *Pravṛttiḥ kāyasthā kriyā tatsāmarthyaṁ avyabhicāritām gamayati, Tatkiṁ avagataṁ, anavagataṁ vā ? Yadi nāvagataṁ, tad 'asti' iti*

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kathaṁ vetsi? Athāsvagataṁ, tadavagatervyabhicāritā kathamavagamyat iti pūrvoktamanusartavyam – Ibid p. 3.

12. *Tadyadi pratibhātodakaprāptyāḥ, tadayuktam; pratibhātodakasya avasthānaṁ nopapadyate, Jhaṣamahi ṣaparivartanā Sbhighātopajāta-Svāyavakriyānyāyena pratyastamaya saṁbhāvāt. – Ibid.*

13. *Atha tajjātīyodakaprāptyā, evaṁ tarhi asatyodaka jñāne 'pi jāte kvacittoyamāsādayanti pumāṁsaḥ tadapyavitathaṁ syāt. – Ibid.*

14. *Atha taddeśakāla saṁlagnamndakaṁ na prāpayati mithyājñānaṁ, samyagjñānaṁ tu taddeśakālasaṁ lagnamudakaṁ prāpayati tena tadavyabhicārīti cet. – Ibid.*

15. *Yanna prāpayati tad vyabhicāri tarhi mumūrṣu – pad ārthotpāditaṁ jñānaṁ candrārkagrahanakṣatratārakādi sa ṁvedanaṁ ca vyabhicāri prāpnoii. Na ca taddesakāla saṁlagnodakaprāpakatvamasti, deśasyāpi udakavad vināśasambhavāt. – Ibid,* p. 4.

16. Jayarāśi in his *Tattvopaplavasiṁha* refutes the independent existence of class character (jāti).

17. *Avidyamānasya viṣayārtho vaktavyaḥ—kim ākārārpakatvena vā, mahattvādidharmopetatvena vā, sattā mātreṇa vā sahotpādena vā? Sarvasya pratyastamitatvāt kathaṁ asau viṣayaḥ? Tad-viṣayatve keśoṇdukādi – vijñānasyeva mithyātve bījamauvesaṇīyaṁ / ātmasattāmātreṇa mithyātve sarvasya mithyātvaṁ āpadyate tataḥ tattvopaplavaḥ syāt. – Tattvopaplavasiṁha,* p. 9.

18. *Atha nirviṣayena bādhyate, na kiñcid vidadhāti pratiṣedhati vā nirviṣeyatvād eva – Tattvopaplauasiṁha,* p. 16.

19. J. N. Mohanty : "*Nyāya* Theory of Doubt" in the *Visva – Bharati Journal af Philosophy* (Vol. III, No. 1, 1966), p. 19.

20. *Tasmin sandehajñāne jāte kiñcit pratibhati āho na pratibhāti? Tadyadi pratibhāti, sa kiṁ dharmi, dharmo vā? Tadyadi dharmi pratibhāti sa tāttvikaḥ vā? Yadi tāttvikaḥ, nāpaneyatā tadviṣayavijñāaasya. Atha tāttvikaḥ; tadā avyabhicāripadena apanītatvāt na vyavasāyātmakapadamupādeyam. – Tattvopaplavasiṁha,* p. 19.

21. *Atha na kiñcidapi pratibhāti: na tarhi tasya indriyārtha sannikarṣajatvam, bhrāntodaka vijñānavat / Tasmād vyavasāyātmakapadamapi anupādeyam. – Ibid.,* p. 20.

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22. Arne Naess : *Scepticism* (Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, 1968), p. 6.

23. See : K. C. Bhattacharyya : *Studies in Philosophy*, Vol. II, (Progressive Pub., Calcutta 1958), p. 30.

24. As quoted by Professor J. N. Mohanty in his 'Foreward' to B. Bhattacharya's book *Absolute Skepticism : Eastern and Western*, (Prajñā, Calcutta, 1967).

25. Debiprasad Chattopadhyaya and Mrinal Kanti Gangopadhyaya; *Nyāya Philosophy* (Literal Translation of Gautama's *Nyāya Sūtra* and *Vātsyāyana's Bhāṣya*) Part I, Indian Studies : Past and Present, 1967), pp. 54–5.

26. *Ibid*, p. 151.

27. *Ibid*, p. 152.

28. Strawson, P. F. (ed.); *Logico-Linguistic Papers*, (London, Methuen, 1971), p. 185.

29. M. K. Gangopadhyaya, *op. cit.*, p, 153.

30. B. Russell : *Our Knowledge of the External World*, (Allen and Unwin, London, 1961), p. 56.

31. I am deeply indebted to Paṇdita Paresh Chandra Pañca Tīrtha of Dārikanāth Catuspāthi, Alipurduar, Jalpaiguri, who taught me the *Tattvopaplavasiṁha* of Jayarāśi.

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A THINKER'S AGENCY IN THINKING

Let us say I announce my intention to think and someone says, " To think for oneself is to think of oneself." What then would we make of this ststement ?

Our first reaction might be to respond by feeling that although we all do think for ourselves we are definitely not thinking of ourselves whenever we think. For instance, when I set an intellectual problem for myself that does not mean that I have decided to think about myself The problem which I have set for myself could be. say, about global disorder; and unless I constitute the world I cannot be said to be thinking of myself when I am trying to solve some problem of the world. Surely the world and I are not identical : I am the subject and the world is the object; and it is quite silly to imagine that there is any confusion on a matter as direct as this.

If our first reaction is dismissed we can then interpret the statement " To think for oneself is to think of oneself " as being a warning that the very act of setting intellectual problems for oneself is a selfish act. When half the world is either at war or hungry it will seem perverse to a sensitive person that some people should be content with sitting at their tables and making claims that they are trying to solve the misfortunes of the world. By this interpretation it seems that to speak of thinking for oneself is valid in a psychological sense, indicating something like a personal obsession, an intense committment towards solving a

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particular problem for one's own satisfaction. The selfishness that is referred to here is the selfishness of catering to one's own priorities – in this case the priority of seeking intellectual over practical solution – thus ignoring or abstracting away from the felt needs and pains of others. Perhaps, this statement comes from someone who would prefer us to become social workers or social activists.

There is, however, the possibility that this statement points to deeper issues that concern thinking. Conceivably, the problem relates to the issue of the thinker – his Ego as opposed to his metaphysical self – and the connection that this bears to the status of thinking. Hence, an elucidation of the cryptical statement that confronts us will depend on what is meant by 'I' when we say "I think such–and–such;" it will depend on whether we can in any sense speak of "my thought." It will also depend on the extent to which we can exert our will when we are involved in thinking. These issues are of importance even for social workers and activists. Social workers and activists are not exempt from the need to think. Selfless as they may be they could unwarily be trapped into thinking of themselves; and although by its nature thinking is necessarily a personal activity, still it can sustain statements and actions of the most socially revolutionary nature.

Indeed, thinking is a personal activity in the sense that we are conscious of what we think and we alone know what is going on within our heads. We are able to form connections between various objects or events, we are able to form relationships, we are able to explain and theorise. Above all, the fact that we are personally involved in all these mental processes is clear to us. And this comes across most explicitly when we say, "I think this–and–this." Even when we say "X and Y happen", we might mean, perhaps, that "Kepler thinks X and Y happen",

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and, of course, Kepler could then say, "I think X and Y happen because of this and this." In other words, to declare that I think certain things is to admit *my* agency behind those thoughts which *I* have organised in my mind in a particular fashion.

But to hold this view of thinking immediately leads us into a big problem. This is because when we claim to have certain thoughts we are in effect saying that we are aware that there exists what may be called a field of thought. However, to say that we are aware that a certain field exists is to say that there is a seer who sees the field. This seer cannot be within the field of thought for if this were so then there would not be anyone who could describe the field which we must be doing when we say "I think this-and-this." If the seer were to be within the field of thought, occupying very much the same status as all other elements within the field, nothing could be said of the elements.

On the other hand, we may be tempted to propose that there is a self which observes objects and events, and which draws relationships between these units. And that there is another self which observes and describes the activities of the first self. Unfortunately, we would then be forced to acknowledge that there is a series of observing selves, each beyond the previous one. If this were to be the case there would be an infinitude of observing selves and we should be able to enumerate a number of them. This is out of the question because one is always him-self. One does not have a higher self and a lower self. More simply, even if there were an infinitude of selves that would not mean that the question of seership is solved. The question remains regardless of the number of selves we posit.

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The relation of the self (or the seer) to the field of thought becomes less troublesome if we accept the fact that the self (or the subject) is not itself within the field of thought. This comes across lucidly if we employ the analogy of the eye and the field of vision. It is true that the human eye can see whatever lies before it. Yet, the eye that sees what lies before it cannot see itself. The eye that sees is not itself included amongst the various objects that are seen by it. The eye that sees is beyond what it sees, otherwise the eye would not be able to see and describe what it sees. Ironicallly, the eye cannot describe itself because although it sees, it cannot see itself. This attests to the objective nature of the eye. The eye as seer is beyond what it sees By virtue of being ' beyond ' it cannot be seen by itself.

Just as the eye stands beyond the field of vision so the metaphysical subject or the transcendental 'I' stands outside the field of thought. But it is necessary to be wary about carelessly extending the eye–analogy. We think of the eye and the field or vision as two discrete entities. This image comes from the kind of picture generated by such examples as that of a man perched at the peak of a hill and watching the goings–on in the valley far below his feet. This sort of example, wrongly used, provides the foundation for failing to recognise the danger of applying rules that are acceptable in another domain. That of space, in this case. We can draw a circle and then say that all this is included within the circle, and all this,i. e., whatever is outside the circumferenee, is not within the circle. We would be making gross mistake if we extended these rules to logic. It can be said that all this is logical and so is sensible, and all this is illogical and so is nonsensical. But we cannot speak of a boundary of logic in the same way as we speak of the circumference of a circle. Because what is logical and sensible can be thought of, whereas what is illogical and nonsensical cannot be thought of. Taking

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a step further, it is easy to appreciate that I think of such things as P and Q and R. It is I who think of P, and it is I who think of Q, and it is I who think of R. It is the same 'I,' too, who states that I think of P, Q and R. It is, once again, the same 'I' who records that I have stated that I think of various things. Although I think, the transcendental 'I' is not a thought. The transcendental 'I,' being characteristic of any subject, is not an object. But we tend to believe that the 'I' which thinks thinks *about* this and *about* that. I think, supposedly, about the different objects that lie before me. The subject that thinks–the transcendental 'I' – is really more elusive. Taking yet another step we see that if we were to try to isolate this 'I' we would find ourselves in an embarrassing position. Because we would first start off by identifying and describing our bodies, then we would go on to identify and describe our mental activities, and then we would find ourselves to be in something of a fix if we were asked to describe the 'I' to which all this occurs. It then becomes clear that the 'I' which thinks is not a thought, and the 'I' that experiences is not itself an experience.

If the transcendental 'I' is beyond thought and experience it is qutie difficult to see the validity of any attempt to seek ownership of thought. It is true that there are thoughts. There is no cause for uneasiness on that point. What does cause uneasiness it that 'entity' which we call 'I.' Because if this 'I' is beyond thought and experience, then this metaphysical subject is beyond description and comprehension. It then makes no sense to endow the unknowable with attributes, not even with the attribute of authorship. To put this differently: the metaphysical subject by virtue of its transcendental nature lies beyond space and time. To speak of that which lies beyond space and time is impossible since what lies beyond space and time cannot be thought of. Consequently, it is unimaginable to speak of 'my

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thought' – simply because this 'I' makes no claims, not even the claim of something or other being 'mine'.

Equally, it is meaningless to say that a thought is mine in the sense that I have willed this particular thought. Even at a very concrete level we are struck by our powerlessness. If I went to dry my clothes in the sun I would bring my clothes out. It might rain just when I bring my clothes out. Supposing the weather is more reliable, then I shall be left at the mercy of the sun. After all, I depend on the sun's rays, and there is nothing here about which I can exert my will. The sun and its rays are beyond my will. Should the sun not rise that day—and that is logically possible—then I would be left with my wet clothes.

At the level of psychology our powerlessness is even more astounding Take the case of a rat scurrying past our feet. One of us might react by shrieking in fear, someone might angrily rush in search of a club, another person might shake his head as if to express distress over the possible threat to our health, and the rare person would maintain his equanimity. Each of us would react in a manner consistent with our training, temperament and past experiences. What thoughts arise in our minds given a certain situation thus depends on so many factors beyond our control. Should I persistently have thoughts that I find disagreable–for example, if I am plagued by frightful thoughts whenever I see a rat and sometimes break into a sweat–then I might resort to some process of cognitive psychotheraphy. Undertaking certain mental exercises does not necessitate that I shall have the thoughts that I want. There is no necessary connection between wanting to have a thought and having that thought. It is easy to illustrate the absence of any such connection. For instance, we could prepare ourselves to think about some subject, say, physics. As part of the preparation we could

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read many books and journals on physics. But all this preparation is no guarantee that the theory of relativity should occur to any one of us (assuming this theory is yet to be formulated). Although I might want to have a certain thought there is nothing I can do to ensure that it will occur to me. And should it occur to me there is still nothing to negate the fact that wanting and having are logical non–sequitars.

It seems unwarranted to speak of 'my thought' for two basic reasons. First, it does not make sense to speak of thinking or having a thought as if one had ownership over the process of thinking, or as if one could possess a thought. We could definitely prepare ourselves in a certain manner, as if to entertain a thought or to make ourselves conducive to receiving the thought; but that would be all. Second, given the transcendental nature of 'I' it does not, once again, make sense to ascribe ownership to it. The metaphysical self being beyond time and space, and beyond subject and object, it cannot be said to possess this idea or that opinion. Being transcendental, the 'I' that thinks cannot be meaningfully said to claim ownership over a thought. Since no Ego is involved in thinking it would be wrong to say that the metaphysical self owns or possesses thoughts.

It makes sense, instead, to speak of thinking as a prossess that involves submission. Not will. That is because the process of thinking requires the thinker to wait upon thoughts. All that is within the reach of the thinker is to prepare himself to think. This preparation will take the form of reading, gathering facts, acquainting oneself with all that has already been said. Beyond that there is nothing we can do. It would be incorrect to imagine that we could wait *for* thoughts. That would imply waiting for something specific. We could wait for the bus, or for our friends. To say that we are waiting for the bus or for our friends

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is meaningful because we know what we are waiting for and there is a certain time range over which we can reasonably expect these events to occur. We cannot estimate when a thought will occur to us. We have no control over its passage. It is as if the thought will dacide when it will appear to the thinker. A thought can very well appear instantaneously; and the instant is not within time, it transcends time. In addition, we cannot anticipate the nature or character of a thought. Since only archangels and yogis have foreknowledge, mortals such as us will know the content of a thought once it occurs, and not before. To think is therefore to wait *upon* thought, this waiting being undertaken by the transcendental self.

To wait *for* thoughts is, strictly speaking, meaningless. Thinking will be a perversion if the thinker is waiting for a thought. This perverted activity will lie and remain at the level of propositions. Thinking will then come to be mistaken for the formulation and evaluation of proposition. All that will matter will be the correctness of a proposition. Taken from a slightly different angle, thinking in this perverted form will solely imply the verification, calculation and manipulation of facts. The focus of all attention will be centred on collecting facts, verifying or negating them and expressing them in different ways. But it must be remembered that facts only contribute to the setting of a problem, they are parts of the problem to be solved and should never be mistaken to be a part of the solution of a problem. As has been stated in a different context earlier on, the solution to any problem in space and time can only lie beyond space and time; but facts and propositions cannot constitute a part of any solution because facts and propositions lie within the world. What lies within the world is the case, it is as it is, and everything happens as it does happen. If our interest is in the truth rather than in what is correct, then we cannot be

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content with documenting and commenting on facts and propositions, we must take it upon ourselves to seek the sense beyond the obvious, we must be willing to submit ourselves to what is higher than the obvious.

When thinking is perverted, the transcendental self does not participate in thinking. Consequently, thinking which properly belongs to the metaphysical realm becomes distorted into a psychological activity. It is at this level that one can refer to thinking for oneself as thinking of oneself. It is valid to speak of thinking for oneself – although that is not characteristic of thinking, meaningfully considered – in the sense that the Ego is the centre of fact gathering, verification and processing. By extension, if one's Ego is at the centre, then one is simply reflecting upon what one can do to the facts at one's disposal. To reflect upon what use one can put one's facts to is to be concerned about one's capabilities, i.e., to think about oneself. Thus, thinking which is not a waiting upon is a perversion because what properly should be at the centre (thought) has its place taken by the Ego. And the transcendental self is completely forgotten

When the transcendental self is at the centre of thinking then we could go so far as to say, "Thoughts think," instead of "I think." To allow the transcendental self to participate in thinking is to preserve the pristine nature of thinking. Otherwise, thinking becomes an egocentric activity; thinking is reduced to shrewdness and calculation. We must, therefore, understand the statement "To think for oneself is to think of oneself" as a warning against the temptation to be clever and egocentric.

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